ZEL M. FISCHER, Judge.
The City of Kansas City ("the City") appeals a judgment based on a jury verdict awarding compensatory and punitive damages to Melissa Howard for discrimination by the city council ("the council") when it rejected a panel of three Caucasian women nominated for the municipal division of the circuit court because of their race.
The judgment is affirmed.
On August 31, 2006, Judge Marcia Walsh retired as a judge of the Kansas City municipal division.
Upon Walsh's retirement, the plaintiff, Melissa Howard, applied for the position along with 12 other applicants. From that pool of applicants, the commission nominated three Caucasian women to fill the vacancy. One of those three nominees was Howard. This panel was submitted to the council October 30, 2006. At its meeting November 9, 2006, the council rejected the panel by a 7-6 vote, despite acknowledging that all three panelists were well-qualified
Several council members expressed dissatisfaction with the panel because it did not include any minorities. Multiple statements made during the city council meetings, which were open to the public, addressed concerns that the all-Caucasian female panel lacked diversity. Specifically, the following statements were made at the council meetings:
Several council members also testified at trial as to the influence that the panelists' race had on the council's decision to reject the panel. One councilman agreed that race "was involved" in the council's refusal to consider the applicants selected by the commission, and another councilman testified that, had the commission placed a minority on the panel of final applicants, he would have voted to consider the panel. Mayor Kay Barnes similarly testified that "race was a factor in [her] decision to reject the panel" and she likely would have voted to select a judge had an African-American candidate been on the panel, despite acknowledging her lack of knowledge as to the commission's interview and selection process.
Howard subsequently brought suit against the City under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("the MHRA").
At trial, Howard testified that she suffered emotional distress due to the actions and statements of the council, many of which were distributed throughout the media, discounting her nomination as a result of her race. She explained that her distress manifested itself in physical ways, as she suffered sudden weight loss, inability to sleep, and would "still get sick to [her] stomach." Howard also testified about her ongoing concern and distress about her career in the future. Her husband further testified that because of the public nature of the council members' statements and because of Howard's position as a county prosecutor, the stress she felt was ongoing and occurred on a nearly daily basis. He also expressed that he had observed the impact this ordeal had on her firsthand, explaining that she had lost weight, could not sleep normally and was uncharacteristically emotional.
The jury in the Platte County circuit court found in favor of Howard and awarded her a total of $633,333 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. The circuit court entered a judgment awarding Howard's damages as well as attorneys fees and prejudgment interest. The City brings seven points on appeal.
The City argues that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict for the City because the MHRA does not apply to the
The case was submitted to the jury on an instruction
The jury is presumed to have found that plaintiff was deprived of "employment opportunities" pursuant to the instruction given. The City does not contest submissibility, but only the proper scope and application of the MHRA. Therefore, the principal issue for this Court is whether a municipal judge, as defined by the city charter, is an "employee" and, if so, whether Howard was an employment applicant under the protection of the MHRA.
"The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning." Farmers' & Laborers' Co-op Ins. Ass'n v. Director of Revenue, 742 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Mo. banc 1987).
The MHRA protects important societal interests by prohibiting unlawful employment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, national original, sex, ancestry, age, or disability. State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Mo. banc 2006). Specifically, § 213.055 is a remedial prohibition against discrimination in the employment context. The section provides:
§ 213.055.1 (emphasis added).
The MHRA defines "employer" to include "the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof...." Section 213.010(7). The City has conceded that it is an employer covered under the MHRA.
Under traditional rules of statutory construction, undefined words are given their plain and ordinary meaning as found in the dictionary to ascertain the intent of lawmakers. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Mo. banc 1993). The word "employee" is commonly defined as "one employed by another, usually in a position below the executive level and usually for wages," as well as "any worker who is under wages or salary to an employer and who is not excluded by agreement from consideration as such a worker." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 743 (1993). To "employ" means "to provide with a job that pays wages or a salary or with a means of earning a living." Id. There is no dictionary definition for "employment applicant."
These definitions support a finding that a municipal judge is an employee of the City. Under the charter, the City pays its municipal judges a fixed salary and requires that the judges perform their services exclusively for the City. CHARTER OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI §§ 305, 307. Therefore, a municipal judge is "employed ... for wages" by the City. A municipal judge is likewise "a worker ... under wages or salary ... not excluded by agreement from consideration as such a worker." Under the definition of the verb to "employ," a municipal judge is provided "a job that pays wages or salary."
The only ambiguity in the definitions is the language that provides "usually in a position below the executive level." The term "executive" is defined as "one who holds a position of administrative or managerial responsibility in a business or other organization." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 794. A secondary definition includes those "belonging to a branch of government that is charged with such powers as ... superintendence of the execution of the laws," which is distinct from the judiciary. Id. Although judges have independent decision-making authority regarding the cases they hear, they are not normally considered in the context of above or below the "executive level." This part of the definition simply does not apply. This minor ambiguity in the definition does not disqualify a judge from being an employee when all other portions of the definition of "employee" apply to Kansas City municipal judges.
The City urges that common law principles of agency should be applied to determine whether a municipal judge is an "employee" within the scope of the MHRA. Specifically, the City cites to Sloan v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 1 S.W.3d 555, 563 (Mo.App.1999). In Sloan, an insurance salesperson sued the company he
Notably, the contract between Sloan and the insurance company expressly stated that he was an independent contractor, he was paid on commissions only, the company did not withhold taxes from his paycheck, nor did the company provide him with an office or supplies. Id. at 563. Sloan determined his own schedule, set his own hours, and provided for his own transportation and administrative support at his own expense. Id. The court in that case held that, for the reasons stated above, Sloan was an independent contractor; therefore, he lacked standing to bring his discrimination claim because independent contractors are not employees within the meaning of the MHRA. Id. at 563-64. Accordingly, Sloan does not apply to the facts in this case.
The City also points to Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Mo.1973), and suggests that the Winebrenner eight-factor test designed to gauge the employer's right to control the means and manner of a person's service is appropriate in this case to determine whether Howard is an "employee" covered by the MHRA.
With the exception of Sloan, almost all cases in Missouri that apply this common law analysis to distinguish employees from independent contractors are concerned with workers' compensation coverage or respondeat superior liability. See, e.g., Ascoli v. Hinck, 256 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Mo. App.2008) (vicarious liability); Leach v. Board of Police Comm'rs of Kansas City, 118 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Mo.App.2003) (workers' compensation). Whether an individual is an employee for purposes of receiving workers' compensation benefits or for purposes of holding the employer liable for its tortious acts involves different considerations than whether an individual is entitled to protection as an employee under the MHRA.
Independent contractors are typically hired to complete a specific task, use their own tools in completing their work, are paid a fixed sum on a by-the-job basis, and are not provided with benefits. Missouri has no statutory definition of the term
Kansas City municipal judges are employed on a full-time basis, provided the necessary supplies and work space they need, and paid a regular salary that includes benefits. While judges must be free from the control of their employer "as to the result" of their work, judges are required to follow the law, show up when scheduled, and are subject to removal under certain circumstances. Kansas City municipal judges are not independent contractors as that term is generally understood.
While the City argues that municipal judges are not "employees," evidence in this case suggests that these judges are treated as City employees. Here, as opposed to the insurance salesman in Sloan, municipal judges are at no point expressly designated to be "independent contractors." To the contrary, they are repeatedly referred to as an "employee" on various forms they are required to fill out and sign upon being hired. These employment forms require both the judges' signatures as "employees" and their "employee" identification number, and several of these forms must then be sent to the City's human resources department to be placed in the judges' "personnel" files. The following examples highlight the various ways in which the City assigns an employee status to its municipal judges:
All of these factors run counter to any assertion that the judges are independent contractors and further emphasize why the common law analysis applied in independent contractor cases simply does not fit. Despite the City's lack of control of judicial decision-making, these facts, taken as a whole, support a legal determination that municipal judges are employees of the City.
Courts in three other states have previously been called on to construe their respective state's human rights laws to determine whether a public official is an "employee." They have split on the issue. A Texas Court of Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court have held that a judge, as a public official, is not an employee, while the Kentucky Court of Appeals has found that public officials are "employees."
In Thompson v. City of Austin, two municipal court judges who were not reappointed by the Austin city council upon expiration of their initial two-year terms brought suit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) claiming they were discriminated against because of their respective disabilities. 979 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex.App.1998). The Texas appellate court held that judges were public officials and therefore were not protected as employees under the TCHRA.
However, the Texas legislature expressly intended for the TCHRA to "provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001(1). As such, the Texas court in Thompson felt inclined to examine federal case law for guidance and apply federal common law agency doctrine. 979 S.W.2d at 681 n. 5. The federal common law test applied by the court in Thompson originated from cases construing Title VII, which explicitly defines "employee" and includes within that definition an exception for various public officials. Under the federal Civil Rights Act (Title VII), public officials clearly are not employees because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) states:
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm'n adopted the reasoning of Thompson and applied a similar common law factor test
In a related case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reached a contrary holding. It held that an elected mayor and elected commissioners were "employees" for purposes of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA) despite being public officials. Kearney v. City of Simpsonville, 209 S.W.3d 483 (Ky.App.2006). In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the KCRA did not exclude public officials from the definition of "employee"
The Missouri General Assembly chose not to include a definition for "employee," as provided by Title VII, and expressed no purpose of the MHRA to embody Title VII as did the legislatures in Texas and Tennessee. The Missouri language is more like that of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, making Kearney v. City of Simpsonville the more persuasive precedent. In fact, this Court previously has acknowledged that "Missouri's discrimination safeguards under the MHRA, ... are not identical to the federal standards and can offer greater discrimination protection." Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818-19 (Mo. banc 2007). By not defining "employee," our legislature chose to omit the "public official" exception. For that reason, the rationale underlying the decisions in Thompson and Bredesen is not persuasive in this case.
A Kansas City municipal judge is an employee or an employment applicant under the MHRA. Because the City did not challenge submissibility, the question of whether Howard was actually deprived of an employment opportunity because of her race is not before us.
This Court would note that diversity is an honorable goal. In fact, Rule 10.32(f), governing Missouri's judicial commissions provides:
This rule requires that the commissions actively "seek out and encourage ... women and minorities to apply for judicial office." The commissions are further charged to "take into consideration the desirability of the bench reflecting the racial and gender composition of the community." This is to be distinguished from the provisions of § 213.055.1(1)(b) of the MHRA, which prohibit deprivation of any employment opportunity because of an "individual's race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability[.]"
The City argues "[t]he trial court erred in admitting testimony of a third party regarding the lawfulness of the City Council's decision because the testimony of the third party was improper opinion testimony in that it was evidence regarding an ultimate issue of law." Patrick McLarney, an attorney in private practice in Kansas City, testified that he had made the council aware that "to reject [the panel] simply because of lack of a minority was discrimination and illegal in [his] opinion."
Generally, "the opinion of an expert on issues of law is not admissible." Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133, 153 (Mo.App.1992) (citing Young v. Wheelock, 333 Mo. 992, 64 S.W.2d 950, 957 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Executive Bd. of Missouri Baptist Convention v. Carnahan, 170 S.W.3d 437 (Mo.App.2005)). This is because such testimony "encroaches upon the duty of the court to instruct on the law." Wulfing, 842 S.W.2d at 153.
The trial court, however, did not rule the testimony admissible as an expert opinion but, rather, specifically ruled that this testimony was admissible for purposes of rebutting the testimony given by an earlier witness. The mayor had previously testified that she did not know whether it was illegal for an employer to make employment decisions on the basis of race. McLarney was then allowed to testify that he had notified Mayor Barnes and certain members of the city council that, in his opinion, their rejection of the panel based on racial considerations was illegal in order to refute the mayor's testimony that she was unaware it was unlawful to consider race when making an employment decision.
It is established law that "[a]ny competent testimony that tends to explain, counteract, repel or disprove evidence offered by [one party] may be offered in rebuttal."
A trial court's decision regarding admissibility of evidence is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, such as when the ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable and
The City claims it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit evidence from certain council members that would have been probative as to a non-race-based motive behind their decision to reject the panel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the City could not offer testimony about an unsubstantiated story in a blog about Howard's past that allegedly raised concerns for at least two of the council members who voted to reject the panel.
A court may exclude evidence that may have a prejudicial effect, even though the evidence is logically relevant, when the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value. State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Mo. banc 2000), overruled on other grounds by Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667 (Mo. banc 2010). It has been well established that "[t]he admissibility of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion." Mitchell, 313 S.W.3d at 674-75. "This standard gives the trial court broad leeway in choosing to admit evidence, and... [i]n part, such broad leeway is granted to ensure that the probative value of admitted evidence outweighs any unfair prejudice." Id.
The evidence at issue was unconfirmed hearsay. During the City's offer of proof, its witnesses admitted that they did not have any personal knowledge as to whether the information about Howard was true. Moreover, the evidence at issue relates only to Howard and had nothing to do with the other two panelists. Therefore, regardless of whether certain council members had concerns about Howard, these concerns did not extend to the other panelists. The council's rejection of the entire panel does not support a claim that the council's decision was motivated by a concern that Howard was not a suitable candidate.
The City argues that the trial court erred by instructing on punitive damages because punitive damages are not specifically available against municipalities under the MHRA and because the evidence did not show the City acted willfully, wantonly, outrageously or with reckless disregard for the rights of others. The jury was instructed:
The City argues the language of the MHRA does not override the general rule that "in the absence of a statute specifically
There is a conflict in the reported cases that have dealt with this issue. This Court has not ruled on this issue previously. However, our Missouri court of appeals has held uniformly that municipalities and other political or civil subdivisions are liable for actual and punitive damages under the MHRA just like any other employer defined in the statute. Section 213.111.2 and 213.010(7). Brady v. Curators of University of Missouri, 213 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Mo.App.2006); H.S. v. Board of Regents, Southeast Missouri State University, 967 S.W.2d 665, 672-73 (Mo.App.1998).
The City relies on Kline v. City of Kansas City, 175 F.3d 660 (8th Cir.1999), which acknowledged that statutory language specifically provided for punitive damages against municipalities when the above statutes were read in conjunction with one another. However, the court in Kline held "the MHRA is a voluminous statute with many provisions and definitions. We believe that a result cobbled together from different sections of the statute is insufficiently explicit under the Missouri Cases to overcome the presumption against punitive damages when a municipality is a defendant that has been found liable." Id. at 670 (internal statutory citations omitted).
That same year, a contrary holding was made by a federal court in Fortner v. City of Archie, 70 F.Supp.2d 1028 (W.D.Mo. 1999). In response to the Kline decision stating that the MHRA was "voluminous" and that a result should not be "cobbled together," the court in Fortner stated:
Id. at 1031.
This Court's determination of whether punitive damages are allowable under the MHRA is not a policy decision, but rather one of statutory interpretation.
Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of America, Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009). "If the intent of the legislature is clear and unambiguous, by giving the language used in the statute its plain and ordinary meaning, then we are bound by that intent and cannot resort to any statutory construction in interpreting the statute." Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 215 S.W.3d 145, 161 (Mo.App.2006).
The court of appeals in Brady correctly pointed out that in Chappell this Court states, "[i]t is the general rule that in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing such recovery, punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable against a municipal corporation." 213 S.W.3d at 108
Because the Missouri General Assembly has not amended or clarified the MHRA in the face of our court of appeals decisions authorizing punitive damages against political subdivisions and because the Missouri General Assembly included the phrase "the state, or any political or civil subdivision" in the definition of "employer" in § 213.010, it is clear the legislature intended to treat the state and its subdivisions in the same manner as it treats other employers.
A submissible case for punitive damages requires clear and convincing proof that the defendant intentionally acted "either by a wanton, willful or outrageous act, or reckless disregard for an act's consequences (from which evil motive is inferred)." Werremeyer v. K.C. Auto Salvage Co., 134 S.W.3d 633, 635 (Mo. banc 2004). The defendant must have intentionally committed a "wrongful act without just cause or excuse." Downey v. McKee, 218 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Mo.App.2007); Hoyt v. GE Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc., 193 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Mo.App.2006).
Brady, 213 S.W.3d at 109 (citing Hoyt, 193 S.W.3d at 322).
There were many statements made that the council rejected the panel because it lacked racial diversity. Among them:
And the councilmen's testimony that:
Furthermore, testimony was adduced at trial that the council members were advised that failing to choose from among the panel because of race was illegal. Attorney McLarney testified that he notified Kansas City's attorney that what the City was doing with regard to the vacancy was "discriminating against white females" and was illegal. McLarney also testified that he said the same thing to numerous council members, including Councilman Skaggs, Councilman Brooks, Councilman Eddy, Councilman Glover and Councilman Riley. McLarney stated that he was
Based on this evidence, it is clear that there was sufficient evidence to support the submission of punitive damages to the jury in this case.
The City argues "[t]he trial court erred in instructing the jury on future damages because future damages were not supported by the evidence in that there was no evidence that [Howard] was reasonably certain to sustain damage in the future." Specifically, Instruction No. 6 read:
This instruction was modeled after MAI 4.01 [2002 Revision]. The trial court did not submit an alternative instruction offered by the City that read as follows:
Instructional error is reviewed de novo. Harvey v. Washington, 95 S.W.3d 93,
To the extent that this point attempts to challenge the instruction given, the claim of error has not been preserved. Rule 70.03 instructs that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or failure to give instructions unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." "Timely objections [to an instruction] are required as a condition precedent to appellate review in order to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any mistakes immediately and inexpensively without risking the delay and expense of an appeal and a retrial." Gomez v. Construction Design, Inc., 126 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Mo. banc 2004). There is no record of the City making an objection to Instruction No. 6 at trial. Notably, there is a record of the City objecting to three other instructions (Instruction Nos. 4, 5 and 7), and providing grounds for those objections.
To the extent that the City did submit an alternative version of the instruction, which the trial court refused, the City could have raised an issue regarding the trial court's failure to give the alternative instruction, but it did not do this either. There is nothing in the record indicating the City objected at trial to the court's failure to give its alternative instruction. Moreover, the City failed to preserve in its motion for new trial any issue regarding the court's refusal to give the City's version of the instruction.
To the extent that this point challenges submissibility, this claim of error also was not preserved. Rule 72.01(a) mandates "[a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor."
Pope v. Pope, 179 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Mo. App.2005). See, e.g., Johnson v. Allstate Indem. Co., 278 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Mo.App. 2009) (holding defendant's claim of insufficient evidence to find him negligent for defamatory statements against plaintiff was not preserved for appeal where it was not raised as a specific ground in its motion for directed verdict); Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 163-64 (Mo.App.1997) (holding that because defendant's motions for directed verdict did not raise the issue of submissibility of aggravating circumstances they failed to preserve that issue for appellate review). Where an insufficient motion for directed verdict has been made, a subsequent post-verdict motion is without basis and preserves nothing for review. Pope, 179 S.W.3d at 451.
The City's motion for a directed verdict against Howard set forth the following grounds:
As shown, the City's motion for directed verdict contains no language relating to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding future damages. Accordingly, the motion does not state the specific grounds that are now asserted by the City on appeal that "future damages were not supported by the evidence in that there was no evidence that [Howard] was reasonably certain to sustain damage in the future." In fact, the word "future" does not appear once in the motion. Because the City did not argue against the submissibility of future damages in its motion for directed verdict, it has failed to preserve the issue for appeal.
The City states, "The trial court erred in upholding the jury verdict on damages because the evidence did not support the compensatory damages awarded in that [Howard] was not entitled to front pay or back pay." This point falls short of the requirements of Rule 84.04(d)(1). Review is gratis only to the extent the Court can understand the City's argument.
The City appears to argue this point in two ways. First, it asserts that the verdict is not supported by the evidence because Howard linked emotional distress to lost wages in her closing argument, and, second, it asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant remittitur.
To the extent the City complains of the manner in which Howard's counsel argued the evidence, no objection was made at that time.
State v. Hall, 319 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Mo. App.2010); see also Pollard v. Whitener, 965 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Mo.App.1998) ("It is a settled principle of Missouri trial practice that to preserve trial court error it is necessary to give the trial court the first opportunity to correct the error, without the delay, expense, and hardship of appeal and retrial.").
To the extent the City complains that the trial court did not order remittitur, or that this Court should do so in its place, that argument simply is not preserved in the point relied on or adequately developed and supported in the City's brief. An appellate court should exercise its power to interfere with the judgment of the jury and trial court with hesitation and
The City argues the trial court erred in awarding the amount of attorneys' fees Howard requested. Specifically, the City contends that the attorneys fees awarded included fees incurred by Howard's prior counsel in a different case filed against the City.
"The trial court is considered an expert at awarding attorney's fees, and may do so at its discretion." Weissenbach v. Deeken, 291 S.W.3d 361, 362 (Mo.App. 2009). "To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the complaining party must show the trial court's decision was against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice." Russell v. Russell, 210 S.W.3d 191, 199 (Mo. banc 2007). The City has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorneys fees based on the amended fee application.
The judgment is affirmed.
TEITELMAN, RUSSELL, and WOLFF, JJ., and BAKER and CRANE, Sp.JJ., concur.
PRICE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed.
Breckenridge and STITH, JJ., not participating.
WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Chief Justice, opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the principal opinion, except the punitive damages award. In Chappell v. City of Springfield, this Court set forth the general rule that "in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing such recovery, punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable against a municipal corporation." 423 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Mo.1968) (emphasis added). The Court explained that "[p]unitive damages, in this state as in others, are awarded for the purpose of inflicting punishment for wrongdoing, and as an example and deterrent to similar conduct," but "the underlying justification and purpose of punitive damages ... is not applicable when applied to a municipal corporation." Id. at 814.
The majority has ruled that section 213.111.2 of the MHRA, which provides "actual and punitive damages" are available against an employer, should be read along with section 213.010(7) that defines an "employer" to include a municipality. By combining the language of these two sections, the majority finds that the MHRA authorizes punitive damages against municipalities.
I disagree. The presumption is that punitive damages are not available against municipalities unless the statute
This is precisely the rationale set out by the Eighth Circuit in Kline v. City of Kansas City, holding that the MHRA did not overcome the presumption against awarding punitive damages against municipal defendants. 175 F.3d 660, 670 (8th Cir.1999).
Id. For a statute to specifically provide for the imposition of punitive damages against a municipality or other governmental entity it must do so clearly and expressly in a single section, uninterrupted by other statutory provisions.
I would reverse the judgment with respect to punitive damages.
499 S.W.2d at 395.
