PER CURIAM.
Jordan Danielle King-Willmann filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Webster Groves school district to enroll her in the district pursuant to section 167.131.2.
King-Willmann alleged that she lived within the St. Louis school district, that the school district was unaccredited, and that, pursuant to section 167.131, she was entitled to attend the public school of her choice in another district of the same or an adjoining county. She asked that a writ of mandamus issue directing the Webster Groves school district to enroll her.
The school district answered the petition and denied that King-Willmann lived within the St. Louis school district, denied that she had completed all necessary school work to enroll in the ninth grade, and denied that it was required to enroll King-Willmann. It also asserted several defenses and requested an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court did not grant the requested evidentiary hearing. Relying on the pleadings and the parties' oral argument of various motions, the trial court issued the requested writ of mandamus. The school district appeals.
Proceedings in mandamus are governed by and conform to the rules of civil procedure and the existing rules of general law on the subject. Rule 94.01. In a court-tried case, the judgment of the trial court will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).
A trial court judgment based solely on the pleadings is not supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record if material issues of fact are raised by the pleadings. Eaton v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 2007). As noted, the parties contest material facts concerning King-Willmann's claim for relief. The judgment, therefore, must be reversed, and the case is remanded.
As the case is to be remanded, the Court will address the school board's defense that section 167.131 violates Mo. Const. art. X, secs. 16 to 24 by requiring a new activity or service without full state financing. The question is whether the school district, which is not a taxpayer, has standing to use the Hancock amendment as a defense. The answer is, "No."
Under the provisions of the Hancock amendment, "any taxpayer" of the state, county or other political subdivision shall have standing to bring suit to enforce the Hancock amendment. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 23. In Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. State, this Court said:
896 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Mo. banc 1995).
The school board argues Fort Zumwalt is not applicable because it is not bringing suit, but using the Hancock amendment as a defense. But this Court has rejected that distinction. State ex rel. Bd. of Health Center Trustees of Clay County v. County Com'n of Clay County, 896 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Mo. banc 1995)(noting it was not the trustees' role to act as a judge of the constitutionality of a tax).
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
All concur.