LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.
Nathaniel Manner appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to American Family Mutual Insurance Company and American Standard Insurance Company (the insurers) on Nathaniel's
Because the insurers fail to show that the owned-vehicle exclusion applies, the question becomes whether Nathaniel may stack the underinsured motorist coverages provided in each of the four policies in determining whether the tortfeasor was underinsured and in determining the amount of underinsured motorist coverage to which he is entitled. This Court finds that the "other insurance" provisions of the four policies permit him to do so. Finally, because his unrecovered damages exceed the total liability limits of the stacked policies, the insurers are not entitled to offset the amount recovered from other tortfeasors against those liability limits. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
On September 25, 2004, Nathaniel, then 23 years old, suffered extensive bodily injury while riding a Yamaha motorcycle when it was hit by a vehicle driven by Nicholas Schiermeier (the "tortfeasor"). Nathaniel sued the tortfeasor, asserting the latter negligently caused the collision. The tortfeasor's insurance company paid its $100,000 limit of liability to Nathaniel.
The insurer and Nathaniel have agreed for purposes of this suit that the value of his claim for damages is $1.5 million. Nathaniel's $100,000 recovery from the tortfeasor, therefore, left him with $1.4 million in unpaid damages. He sought additional recovery for his injuries under the $100,000 underinsured motorist coverage
Both insurers denied coverage under all of these four policies. Nathaniel then joined both insurers as additional defendants, alleging that he was entitled to recover under the underinsured motorist endorsements of all four policies and that their limits could be stacked to provide him with $400,000 in coverage.
The insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policies for the three vehicles other than the Yamaha that Nathaniel was operating at the time of the accident could not apply because the policies covering Nathaniel's two Ford trucks and his father's Suzuki each contained an "owned-vehicle" exclusion that precluded coverage under the underinsured motorist endorsement. These owned-vehicle exclusions state: "This coverage does not apply for bodily injury to a person: ... While occupying, or when struck by, a motor vehicle that is not insured under this policy if it is owned by you or any resident of your household." (emphasis added). The insurers claimed that Nathaniel owned the Yamaha and that, because it was insured under a different policy than the ones insuring the other three vehicles, this owned-vehicle exclusion precluded coverage under those policies.
Additionally, the insurers claimed that none of the policies' underinsured motorist endorsements applied as to any of the four policies because the tortfeasor's vehicle did not come within the definition of an "underinsured" vehicle as that term in used in those policies. In support, the insurers argued that a vehicle is considered "underinsured" only if the coverage for it is less than the coverage in the insured's policy. Here, because the four policies under which Nathaniel claimed coverage and the tortfeasor's policy each had identical $100,000 limits, the insurers allege the tortfeasor's vehicle cannot be considered "underinsured" and, therefore, Nathaniel is not entitled to recover under any of the underinsured motorist endorsements of any of the four policies.
Nathaniel countered that the insurers did not meet their burden of showing that he owned the Yamaha, nor that he resided in his father's household; therefore, the owned-vehicle exclusion did not apply. Instead, he argued, the policies' "other insurance" clauses permitted him to stack their coverages, and, under Missouri law, it is the total of stacked coverage that must be compared with the tortfeasor's coverage to determine whether the latter is underinsured. Nathaniel cross-moved for summary judgment.
The trial court denied Nathaniel's motion but granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. Nathaniel appealed. After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer pursuant to art. V, sec. 10 of the Missouri Constitution.
Whether summary judgment is proper is an issue of law that this Court
The four policies all contain $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. The insurers claim that the owned-vehicle exclusion to this coverage applies, however, because Nathaniel owned the Yamaha motorcycle he was riding at the time of the accident. The burden of showing that an exclusion to coverage applies is on the insurer. Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Mo. banc 2010) ("Missouri also strictly construes exclusionary clauses against the drafter, who also bears the burden of showing the exclusion applies") (emphasis in original).
The record shows Nathaniel's uncle had agreed to sell him the motorcycle and allowed him to take possession of it. Nathaniel responsibly obtained insurance coverage for the motorcycle before driving it. But, at the time of the accident, Nathaniel still was in the process of paying his uncle for the Yamaha, his uncle still retained title, and he did not yet consider it his own: when police arrived at the accident scene, Nathaniel explained that the motorcycle belonged to his uncle.
The insurers argue that even though Nathaniel did not have title to the vehicle or other indicia of ownership of it, they met their burden by showing that he had possession of and an interest in the Yamaha sufficient to allow him to obtain an insurance policy on it. Insurers cite no authority for their proposition that an insurable interest is equivalent to ownership, and this Court has found none. Such a definition could lead to conflicting claims and confusion because persons other than an owner can have sufficient interest in property to insure it. For example, the uncle who was selling the vehicle also had an insurable interest in it. Indeed, both a rental or leasing company and the person renting or leasing a vehicle or other item have an insurable interest in the car or other item rented and have some possessory interest in it. This does not make the renter the owner of the car, however, at least not in the absence of a contract provision so defining "ownership" for purposes of the contract.
While the insurance policies at issue could have defined "owned," for purposes of the underinsured motorist endorsement,
"Owner" is defined generally as "one that has the legal or rightful title whether the possessor or not." WEBSTER'S THIRD
The insurers had the burden of showing that the term "owned" in the endorsement unambiguously included Nathaniel's situation. At best, the term is ambiguous as used in the policy, and any ambiguity will be interpreted in favor of the insured. See Burns, 303 S.W.3d at 509 (multiple meanings for a term suggest that the word itself is ambiguous if not defined). The insurer failed to meet its burden of showing that the owned-vehicle exclusion applied.
All four policies under which Nathaniel claims coverage define an "underinsured motor vehicle" as "a motor vehicle which is insured by a liability bond or policy at the time of the accident which provides bodily injury liability limits less than the limits of liability of this Underinsured Motorists coverage." (Emphasis added). The burden is on the insured to show coverage is provided under this provision. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ballew, 203 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.App.2006); Martin v. Prier Brass Mfg. Co., 710 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Mo.App.1986).
The insurers argue that the four $100,000 policies covering Nathaniel should be compared individually with the coverage provided by the tortfeasor's policy to determine whether the latter's vehicle was underinsured. If this is done, the insurers argue, then as each policy provides the same $100,000 limit as did the tortfeasor's policy, the tortfeasor was not underinsured under any of the policies, none of the underinsured motorist endorsements apply and there are no policy coverages to stack.
The insurers' argument explicitly was rejected by this Court in Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129 (Mo. banc 2007). There, as here, the insurer argued that this Court should find that "the tortfeasor's vehicle does not come within the definition of `underinsured motor vehicle' in the [insurer's] policy" because the limits of liability of both policies were the same if stacking was not permitted. Id. at 132-33. This Court held that to so hold was inconsistent with the long-standing policy of this Court to consider policy provisions as a whole rather than to look at them seriatim, as the insurer effectively requested. Id. at 133.
This Court further explicated this long-standing policy in Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132 (Mo. banc 2009), in rejecting a similar argument:
Ritchie, id. at 138 n. 5.
Numerous court of appeals cases have followed similar reasoning,
This approach is consistent with the fact that one of the purposes of underinsured motorist coverage is to provide the insured with the coverage the insured purchased when the excess amount is necessary to cover damages. When insurance policies permit stacking, such as Nathaniel argues is the case here, the coverage contracted for is the total of the policy limits when stacked.
Here, it is conceded that if the policies are stacked, the tortfeasor is underinsured. Accordingly, this Court turns to whether the policies permit stacking. Stacking of insurance policies refers to:
Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 135.
As applied here, this definition means that, if the underinsured motorist endorsements of Nathaniel's policies permit stacking, then he can recover the sum total of the policy limits of the stacked policies, here $400,000, up to the amount of damages remaining after recovery from the tortfeasor. If stacking is not permitted, he will be limited to the $100,000 amount of recovery of each policy considered singly because each policy contains an identical $100,000 limit of liability.
The insurers argue that stacking is prohibited by a "Two or More Cars Insured" clause in each policy, which provides:
Here, each vehicle was insured under its own policy, and therefore the second clause of this "Two or More Cars Insured" provision does not apply.
The insurers' argument ignores the fact that the underinsured motorist endorsements to each policy also each contain an "other insurance" clause providing:
This Court's analysis of a similar "other insurance" clause in Ritchie is dispositive here. In Ritchie, the insurer claimed that stacking was precluded by a clause stating that the limit of liability shown on the declarations page was the maximum the insurer would pay regardless of the number of claims or premiums. But, this Court noted, this was inconsistent with the policy's "other insurance" clause, which stated:
Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d. at 136-37.
As just noted, it is well-settled in Missouri that "courts should not interpret policy provision in isolation but rather evaluate policies as a whole." Ritchie, id. at 137. Conflicts and inconsistencies between different policy provisions, with one seeming to deny coverage but the other seeming to grant it, will render a policy ambiguous, and such an ambiguity will be interpreted in favor of the insured. Id.
Applying those principles to the case before it, Ritchie held that even if when read in isolation the "limits of liability" clause precluded stacking in certain other situations, when read together with the other insurance clause, an "ordinary person of average understanding" reasonably could conclude that the "other insurance" clause set out an exception to this anti-stacking provision "in the special situation where the insured is injured while occupying a non-owned vehicle." Ritchie, id. at 137, quoting Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 S.W.2d 308, 315 (Mo.App.1999). Accord, McCormack Baron Mang. Servs. Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Mo. banc 1999).
More specifically, Ritchie said, an insured reasonably could interpret the words of the "other insurance" clause stating "Any coverage we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible underinsured motorist coverage" to mean that "when an injured insured is occupying a non-owned vehicle and there are multiple underinsured motorist coverages, as it is conceded there are here, then each of the underinsured motorist coverages are excess to the other, and, therefore, may be stacked." Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d. at 137-38.
Ritchie found that this made the insurance policy ambiguous as to whether stacking was permitted in the case of underinsured motorist coverage and, therefore, permitted the insured to stack these coverages.
Insurers assert that, because the limits of liability provision in the policies' underinsured motorist endorsement states that underinsured motorist coverage will be reduced by a "payment made or amount payable by or on behalf of any person or organization which may be legally liable, or under any collectible auto liability insurance, for loss caused by an accident with an underinsured motor vehicle," the $100,000 that the tortfeasor's insurer paid should offset the amount Nathaniel can recover under the underinsured motorist endorsement.
The Court rejects this argument. The policy promises to pay the listed limits of liability, not simply the listed limits of liability reduced by the amount paid by the tortfeasor. Insurers' construction of the policy would permit the policy to promise to pay the full limits of liability and yet these limits never would be paid as the amount of liability promised always would be reduced by the recovery from the other driver.
Here, Nathaniel's damages were $1.5 million. Reducing those damages by the $100,000 paid by the tortfeasor leaves a remaining $1.4 million in damages, which far exceeds the $400,000 he can recover under the policies. The full limits of the limits of liability, therefore, are recoverable.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurers. This Court finds that the tortfeasor's vehicle was an underinsured motor vehicle, the insurers failed to show that the owned-vehicle exclusion applies, the "other insurance" clause permits stacking of underinsured motorist coverage and offset is not permitted. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
TEITELMAN, C.J., RUSSELL, BRECKENRIDGE and FISCHER, JJ., concur. DRAPER and WILSON, JJ., not participating.
Murray v. American Family Mutual Insurance, 429 F.3d 757 (8th Cir.2005), relied on by the insurers to support precluding stacking, did not consider the second sentence of the "other insurance" clause, which this Court finds dispositive. In any event, Murray was decided before Ritchie, which is the governing Missouri law.