Zel M. Fischer, Judge.
New Garden Restaurant, Inc. petitions for review of the Administrative Hearing Commission's summary decision dismissing New Garden's appeal of the Director of Revenue's tax assessments against New Garden. The Commission held it had no authority to hear New Garden's appeal because the appeal was not filed within the time limitation for doing so. New Garden argues the Commission's interpretation of §§ 621.050.1 and 144.261
In July 2014, New Garden received "estimated audit assessments" from the Department of Revenue, notifying New Garden it owed $43,737.82 in unpaid sales tax and that final assessment notices would be delivered via certified mail after the audit was reviewed and processed. The record reflects that, on September 5, 2014, the Department sent 34 final assessment notices by certified mail to New Garden's address, each of which stated:
The notices also explained that another option was to "request the director of revenue to conduct an informal review of the assessment" but that such request did not extend or affect the 60-day limitation for filing an appeal with the Commission. As such, the deadline to file an appeal with the Commission was November 4, 2014.
New Garden claims it then requested such informal review on October 24 and that, after not hearing back, its counsel called the Department on November 12 and was told New Garden's filing was missing and to "quickly file with [the Commission]." New Garden further claims its counsel was then given the wrong fax number for the Commission, which caused additional delay. New Garden's appeal was finally filed with the Commission on November 19, over two weeks past the deadline. The Director of Revenue then filed a motion to dismiss New Garden's appeal as untimely. Because this motion contained matters outside the pleadings, the Commission treated it as a motion for summary decision, pursuant to 1 CSR 15-3.436(4)(A). The Commission granted the motion, and New Garden subsequently petitioned this Court for review.
Summary decision "is proper if a party establishes facts that entitle any party to a favorable decision and no party genuinely disputes such facts." Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 358 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotations omitted). "A claimant wishing to succeed on a summary decision motion, therefore, must establish that there is no genuine dispute as to those material facts upon which the claimant would have had the burden of persuasion at a hearing." Id. (Internal quotations omitted).
This Court will uphold the Commission's decision when it is "authorized by law and supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the record as a whole unless clearly contrary to the reasonable expectations of the General Assembly." 801 Skinker Blvd. Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 395 S.W.3d 1, 3-4 (Mo. banc 2013) (internal quotations omitted); see also § 621.193. "This Court reviews the commission's interpretation of the applicable statutes de novo." BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 392 S.W.3d 438, 443-44 (Mo. banc 2012). "The Commission's findings of fact will be upheld if the findings are supported by substantial evidence on the whole record." 801 Skinker, 395 S.W.3d at 4.
Section 621.050.1 provides the right to appeal "any finding, order, decision, assessment or additional assessment made by the director of revenue," and requires the director to give notice of this right of appeal. Section 621.050.1 also provides a time limitation for appealing: "within thirty days after the decision of the director is placed in the United States mail or within thirty days after the decision is delivered, whichever is earlier." However, § 144.261 modifies this time limitation, providing
New Garden's position is that it missed the deadline to file an appeal with the Commission because it never received the final assessment notices and, therefore, had no notice of the right of appeal and the corresponding deadline. New Garden argues the Commission's interpretation of §§ 621.050.1 and 144.261 is unfair to taxpayers and violates the due process clauses of the Missouri and United States Constitutions. It contends that, because § 621.050.1 requires the director to provide notice of the right of appeal, the legislature intended to make the taxpayer's actual knowledge of the right of appeal a "pre-condition to the imposition of the 60-day filing deadline," i.e., the time limitation should not begin to run until the taxpayer receives actual notice of the final assessments with the accompanied information on right of appeal. This argument is without merit.
First, the Commission's application of the law involved no statutory interpretation. Sections 621.050.1 and 144.261 unambiguously provide that the respective time limitations begin to run either after mailing or delivery of the director's decision, whichever is earlier. Neither section contains any provision that the taxpayer must actually receive the decision — or have actual knowledge of the right of appeal — for the time limitation to run. There is no issue of interpretation; the Commission simply applied the statutes' plain, unambiguous terms in calculating the deadline. See Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. Dir. of Revenue and Dir. of Ins., 269 S.W.3d 32, 34 n. 5 (Mo. banc 2008) ("There is no need to resort to statutory interpretation to determine a statute's applicability when the statute is unambiguous.").
Second, the fact that the sections provide for the time limitations to start without the taxpayer actually receiving notice of the director's decision does not raise a due process concern. Due process does not require actual notice before the government takes action. State v. Elliott, 225 S.W.3d 423, 424 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002)).
Because due process does not require actual notice, there is no constitutional prohibition with §§ 621.050.1 and 144.261 starting the time limitations without requiring the taxpayer to receive actual notice. The issue is whether notice sent pursuant to these sections was reasonably calculated to give notice and an opportunity to respond in this particular case. In Elliott, the director sent notices of tax assessments by certified mail to the taxpayer's last known address, pursuant to § 143.611's requirements.
New Garden argues the deadline should have been extended due to the Department's actions in that: (1) a Department agent told New Garden's counsel, incorrectly, that the 60-day period to appeal did not begin to run until New Garden received the final assessment notices; (2) the Department lost New Garden's October 24 filing; and (3) a Department agent gave New Garden's counsel the wrong fax number for the Commission. That is, New Garden argues the doctrine of equitable estoppel excuses its late filing.
Generally, equitable estoppel, "should not be deployed in a manner that countermands the clear intent and language of the legislature...." Boland v. Saint Luke's Health Sys., Inc., SC93906, slip op. at 16, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 4926961 (Mo. banc Aug. 18, 2015). "The doctrine of equitable estoppel is rarely applied in cases involving a governmental entity, and then only to avoid manifest injustice." Lynn v. Dir. of Revenue, 689 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Mo. banc 1985). "Fundamental to an estoppel claim against the government is that in addition to satisfying elements of ordinary estoppel, governmental conduct complained of must amount to affirmative misconduct." Farmers' and Laborers' Co-op Ins. Ass'n v. Dir. of Revenue, 742 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. banc 1987). A government agent's mere mistaken advice, based on an incorrect understanding of the law, does not amount to affirmative misconduct justifying equitable estoppel. See Lynn, 689 S.W.2d at 49 (holding estoppel was inappropriate where Department of Revenue employee mistakenly told taxpayer his operations were exempt from sales tax because "[t]he incidence of taxation is determined by law, and the Director of Revenue and subordinates have no power to vary the force of the statutes"); Lalani v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Mo. banc 2014) (rejecting estoppel argument when Department of Revenue employee gave advice to taxpayer because, even if advice was "ambiguous or misleading, that communication cannot alter [the taxpayer's] statutorily mandated tax obligations").
New Garden argues the Commission "based its entire decision" on the assumption that New Garden received the final assessment notices, and that this finding was not supported by the evidence. However, nowhere in its findings of fact does the Commission find that New Garden received the notices. Nor was any such finding necessary to its decision. Rather, the Commission found the notices were mailed to New Garden's address of record on September 5, which was sufficient to support its decision under § 144.261.
New Garden also argues the Commission erred in finding New Garden filed its appeal on November 19 because it filed an "appeal"
"Failure to comply with statutory time for appeal in an administrative proceeding results in a lapse of jurisdiction and loss of right of appeal." Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dir. of Revenue, 752 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Mo. banc 1988). The Commission's application of §§ 621.050.1 and 144.261 did not violate New Garden's right to due process. Further, the Commission did not err in holding equitable estoppel did not apply, nor did it err in its challenged findings. The Commission's decision to dismiss New Garden's appeal is affirmed.
All concur.