PER CURIAM.

The Empire District Electric Company ("Empire") and the City of Branson, Missouri ("Branson"), separately appeal from the trial court's "Judgment" entered on January 14, 2010 ("the 2010 Judgment"), arising out of a quiet title action. The 2010 judgment found that Douglas L. Coverdell ("Mr. Coverdell") and Coverdell Enterprises, Inc. ("Coverdell Enterprises") (collectively "Respondents") were the fee simple owners of certain properties located on a peninsula bounded by Roark Creek and Lake Taneycomo in Branson, Missouri, and certain other property apparently located on an adjacent tract to the south of the peninsula. The 2010 Judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded as to both Branson and Empire.1

The genesis of this litigation arose on July 18, 2003, when Empire, successor in interest to Ozark Power and Water Company ("Ozark Power"), filed a "Petition to Quiet Title" against Branson; The Branson Paper, Inc.; Mr. Coverdell and his wife, Julia A. Coverdell ("Mrs. Coverdell"); Coverdell Enterprises; B'Cuz, Inc.; Keycom International, Inc.; Henry Griffin ("Attorney Griffin"); Peter Rea ("Mr. Rea"); and Darlene Rea ("Mrs. Rea"). In this petition, Empire alleged, inter alia, that it was the fee owner of a piece of property containing 3.36 acres it described as that land conveyed by Annie I. Compton along with other heirs of the estate of Henry H. Compton to its predecessor in interest, Ozark Power, in 1913 ("the Compton Deed"). As best we discern from the record, this piece of property largely consisted of the eastern portion of the peninsula at issue as well as a section of the western portion of the peninsula, designated as "Property 1" in Empire's petition.2 Empire also alleged it was the fee owner of a second piece of property referred to in the petition as "Property 2," which was conveyed to Ozark Power on May 14, 1913, by The Branson Town Company.3 Further, Empire alleged that on April 14, 1927, Ozark Power, "as owner of Property 1 and Property 2, conveyed such properties and others ..." to Empire such that Empire "is the owner in fee simple of Property 1 ... and Property 2."

Empire's petition then set out that the defendants named in its petition "may claim some interest in and to Property 1 and/or Property 2, which claim is adverse, prejudicial and junior to that of [Empire], but which represents an improper and invalid cloud on [Empire's] title." Empire then recited the respective legal descriptions and chains of title to properties it described as "Property 3," "Property 4," "Property 5" and "Property 6." Empire contended that the legal descriptions and title holders of the aforementioned properties infringed on Empire's unfettered fee simple title to its legally owned Property 1 and Property 2. Empire then prayed, inter alia, that the trial court "quiet fee simple title of Property 1 and Property 2 in and to [Empire] ... and forever bar [the named defendants], their successors or assigns, or anyone on their behalf, from any right, title or interest in Property 1 and Property 2...."

On June 10, 2004, Respondents filed an "Answer and Counterclaim" in which they asserted they had fee simple ownership "to all the ... property described in [Empire's] Petition" as well as all the property set out in their attached "Exhibit A," which as best we discern set out the legal description for the eastern portion of the peninsula.4 They also asserted title to the aforementioned property by way of adverse possession.

In July of 2004, Branson filed both an Answer and a Third Party Petition naming as defendants all the original parties named in Empire's Petition, including Empire and Respondents together with Joseph Chenworth, Lillian E. Compton, Karen Rea and "anyone else having or claiming any interest in the real estate." It asserted ownership of "all properties described in [Empire's] Petition" based on legal title as well as adverse possession.

The properties at issue were the subject of various deeds and appear to have once been part of the same tract of land. As best we discern, the chain of title relied on by Empire consisted of the 1913 Compton to Ozark Power deed which, according to Empire, conveyed the entire peninsula to Ozark Power;5 the May 14, 1913, deed from The Branson Town Company to Ozark Power; and an April 14, 1927, warranty deed from Ozark Power to Empire.6 Also, as best we discern, the chain of title relied upon by Respondents started with a July 14, 1917, conveyance of the peninsula by the Comptons to W.H. Malone. The property was then conveyed by mesne conveyances to Ralph McBride, who on February 15, 1957, made a conveyance to W.F. Hoke and Vera Hoke ("the Hokes").7 The Hokes then divided the peninsula into uneven western and eastern sections.

On April 20, 1972, the Hokes conveyed the following property, referred to in Empire's petition as "Property 4," to Henry J. and Marjorie A. Cordes by "GENERAL WARRANTY DEED:"

In turn, this property was ultimately conveyed to Branson.

The remainder of the Hokes property was conveyed by the Hokes via "QUIT CLAIM DEED" to Tori, Inc., an entity in which Mr. and Mrs. Rea held an interest. The description of this property conveyed by the Hokes to Tori, Inc. is referred to in Empire's petition as "Property 5" and set out as follows:

Tori, Inc., then executed a "GENERAL WARRANTY DEED" in favor of Mr. Coverdell on September 2, 1999, which recited the legal description in the Hokes quitclaim deed and stated the warranty deed was "subject, to the rise and fall of Lake Taneycomo and the rights of [Empire] in and to the said lands."9 Mr. and Mrs. Coverdell then conveyed a portion of this property to Coverdell Enterprises on June 12, 2001, with a "QUIT CLAIM DEED."10

On November 22, 2004, Branson filed a "Motion for Severance" in which it sought to sever all the issues relating to the western half of the peninsula, which it contended it owned through the conveyance made by the Hokes to the Cordeses. The trial court granted the motion and a bench trial was held "as to the western portion" of the peninsula in November of 2004. Following a bench trial, on December 20, 2004, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Branson ("the 2004 Judgment").11 The 2004 Judgment determined Branson "is the owner, in fee simple absolute ... free and clear of any claims or encumbrances" of the following described property:

The trial court also determined "no other party has any claim of right, title or interest in or to said property...." As part of the 2004 Judgment, the trial court specifically set out that "upon oral motion of the parties, [the trial court] continues the trial of the remaining issues in the case, dealing with the eastern portion of the property alleged in [Empire's] Petition, for setting at a future date ...." (Emphasis added.) The trial court also noted "there is no just cause for delay in entry of this Judgment and Decree, and it is therefore decreed... final for purposes of appeal." No appeal was taken from the 2004 Judgment. Branson did not remain an active participant in the proceedings leading up to the 2010 Judgment, although it appeared to technically remain a party in the proceedings. Further, Branson did not receive notices and motions made by the parties remaining in the litigation.

Thereafter, on December 31, 2009, Empire "voluntarily dismissed] its Petition ... without prejudice...." However, as previously mentioned, there yet remained Respondents' previously filed Answer and Counterclaim that was followed by their Second Amended Answer wherein they tersely maintained they had "title in fee simple absolute to the `disputed' property...."12 The trial court then determined Respondents' claims survived the voluntary dismissal by Empire and a jury trial was held regarding the quiet title action on January 11, 12, and 13, 2010. Only Empire and Respondents were active participants in this trial.

After hearing evidence and argument, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondents. The ensuing 2010 Judgment then ordered, adjudged and decreed that the following property was owned "in fee simple absolute" by Mr. Coverdell:

(Emphasis added.) As best we discern and without so holding, this legal description includes the entirety of the peninsula at issue with a specific exception for that portion awarded to Branson in the 2004 Judgment, and it also appears to include a much larger tract of real property adjacent to the south boundary of the peninsula.13

The 2010 Judgment also ordered, adjudged and decreed that the following property was owned "in fee simple absolute" by Coverdell Enterprises:

This latter property awarded to Coverdell Enterprises matches the legal description for the property referred to as the eastern portion of the peninsula.14 Further, the 2010 Judgment decreed that "no other party has any claim of right, title, or interest whatsoever in or to the above-described propert[ies]...." (Emphasis added.) Since Branson remained a named party in the litigation the judgment facially appears to also apply to Branson.

The 2010 Judgment led to Branson filing a "MOTION TO APPEAR AMICUS CURIAE." This motion argued that Branson was aggrieved by the 2010 Judgment because although Respondents argued throughout the 2010 trial that Branson "was no longer a party to the suit," the 2010 Judgment, nonetheless, wrongly affected Branson's "rights and interest ..." in the southern tract of land awarded to Mr. Coverdell. Branson further asserted that the legal description in the 2010 Judgment appears

Accordingly, it requested to appear amicus curiae "to provide the [trial c]ourt suggestions regarding the validity and scope of [the 2010 Judgment]." This motion was denied by the trial court. Branson then filed a Writ of Prohibition and a "REQUEST TO APPEAR AMICUS CURIAE ON APPEAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NOTICE OF APPEAL" with this Court. This Court determined Branson was a party to the lawsuit at issue such that it had an independent right to appeal the 2010 Judgment. These appeals by Branson and Empire followed.

We turn first to Branson's assertions of trial court error. In general terms, Branson's four points relied on urge that the trial court plainly erred in entering the 2010 Judgment, because Branson's due process rights were violated by its lack of notice and involvement in the lawsuit following the 2004 Judgment; that the 2010 Judgment exceeded the relief sought by the Respondents in that they asserted no claim against Branson, although the 2010 Judgment divested Branson of its rights in certain property awarded to Mr. Coverdell in the 2010 Judgment; that the 2010 Judgment was not supported by the evidence in that Mr. Coverdell did not have record title to the property awarded to him; and that the finality of the 2010 Judgment was in question due to the fact that it affected the rights of Branson, although Branson's interest in the property was never presented to the jury. In essence, Branson posits error in the fact that, following the 2004 Judgment, it was no longer present in the case as its claim to the western portion of the peninsula had been settled in the 2004 Judgment, and it had no claim in relation to the eastern portion of the peninsula which was supposedly to be the sole issue presented in the second trial. Yet, Branson maintains the 2010 Judgment not only determined the ownership of the eastern portion of the peninsula, it also determined Mr. Coverdell was the title owner to an approximately 27 acre tract of land, the bulk of which was adjacent to the southern boundary of the peninsula. According to Branson, it, as well as numerous other third parties, have interests in that southern tract of land such that Branson was aggrieved by the 2010 Judgment.

We review Branson's allegations of error for plain error relating to its assertions that the 2010 Judgment was not supported by the evidence. In doing so, we are cognizant that Branson was not an active participant at the 2010 trial, made no objections to the presentation of evidence, and did not participate in the jury instruction conference held during the trial. "Rule 84.13(c) states that `[p]lain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal, in the discretion of the court, though not raised or preserved, when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.'"15 Wagner v. Mortgage Info. Srvs., Inc., 261 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Mo.App. 2008). "In reviewing a claim under the plain-error standard, this Court first asks `whether there facially appears substantial grounds for believing that the trial court committed error that is evident, obvious and clear, which resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.'" Id. (quoting Cohen v. Express Fin. Srvs., Inc., 145 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Mo.App.2004)).

Id. at 632-33 (quoting Cohen, 145 S.W.3d at 864-65). We recognize that "`[p]lain error review is rarely applied in civil cases, and may not be invoked to cure the mere failure to make proper and timely objections.'" Roy v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 43 S.W.3d 351, 363-64 (Mo.App.2001) (quoting Guess v. Escobar, 26 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Mo. App.2000)). Nevertheless, we reverse for plain error in civil cases "in those situations when the injustice . . . of the error is so egregious as to `weaken the very foundation of the process' and `seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.'" Flood ex rel. Oakley v. Holzwarth, 182 S.W.3d 673, 680 (Mo.App.2005) (quoting Davolt v. Highland, 119 S.W.3d 118, 136 (Mo.App.2003)).

Branson contends the issues to be presented to the trial court at the 2010 trial were clearly supposed to have been limited to ownership of the eastern portion of the peninsula and no longer involved Branson's interests. It maintains the trial court in the litigation leading up to the 2004 Judgment set that limitation out by its statement that

Further, Branson points out that Respondents' counsel explicitly informed the jury and the trial court during opening statement that "the area we're going to talk about in this case and which my client, [Mr.] Coverdell, and his company, Coverdell Enterprises, owns . . . is this portion of what we call the east side of the peninsula, up here, way north here, okay. We're looking at this way north, not down to the North Beach Park area." He also related that

Likewise, Respondents' counsel referred "to the land . . . as the eastern half, and it's a little bit more than half, but the eastern portion of the northern part of the peninsula here." Respondents' counsel then set out that with "the other side, the western side, that went from Cordes to a couple of other people, and then eventually. . . Branson bought that. So . . . Branson is the owner and was the owner when it got its deed to the western side of the peninsula." Respondents' counsel then related that Empire "sued Mr. Coverdell and Empire . . . sued . . . Branson claiming Empire owned the entire peninsula." He also related that in separate proceedings, "Empire and . . . Branson fought over that side over there. And in 2004, a judgment was entered and that judgment was and is in favor of . . . Branson [as to the western side of the peninsula]." Saliently, he stated that "[t]here was a final judgment with regard to . . . Branson. [Branson] has nothing to do with this dispute between Empire and [Respondents]." (Emphasis added.) He opined that he did not know "why somebody's sitting here [in the courtroom on behalf of Branson], but, anyway, they have nothing to do with that. This dispute is as to the eastern side of the peninsula." (Emphasis added.)

It is our view that the foregoing statements by counsel constituted judicial admissions. "A judicial admission is an act done in the course of judicial proceedings that concedes for the purpose of litigation that a certain proposition is true. Judicial admissions are generally conclusive against the party making them." Moore Automotive Group, Inc. v. Goffstein, 301 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal citation omitted). "`[A] judicial admission is, in truth, a substitute for evidence, in that it does away with the need for evidence.'" Allen v. Watson, 935 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Mo.App.1996) (quoting Wild v. Cons.Aluminum Corp., 752 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Mo.App.1988)). "Determinative, then, of whether [Respondents'] counsel's opening statement constituted a judicial admission is whether he was stating facts or merely outlining what he anticipated the. . . evidence would be." Rawlings v. Young, 591 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo.App.1979). We find that the statements at issue were clearly judicial admissions as the declarations involved statements of fact upon which the jury, the trial court, and the other parties involved in the lawsuit were entitled to rely. These unequivocal admissions of fact in counsel's statements are judicial admissions and "[a]s such, [the statements are] conclusive on the matter[s] being admitted." Smith v. Whalen, 613 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Mo.App.1981), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Mo. banc 1994). Accordingly, Branson facially established that the 2010 Judgment quieting title in Mr. Coverdell in what appears to be a 27 acre tract of land was in error. "A judgment must be based on the evidence presented." State ex rel. Langiano v. Langiano, 3 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Mo.App.1999). The error here is clearly "so egregious" that it "`weaken[s] the very foundation of the process' and `seriously undermine[s] confidence in the outcome of th[is] case.'" Flood, 182 S.W.3d at 680 (quoting Davolt, 119 S.W.3d at 136). In this respect, the trial court committed evident, obvious and clear error by entry of its judgment that affected substantial rights of Branson as party to the litigation which resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. See Dana Comm'l Credit Corp. v. Cukjati, 880 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Mo.App. 1994) (holding that plain error review is appropriate to correct trial court errors in entering judgment against a defendant where the plaintiff's petition does not pray for relief against a particular defendant); see also Meredith Dev. Co. v. Bennett, 444 S.W.2d 519, 524 (Mo.App.1969).

Additionally, while Branson presented evidence in certain post-judgment proceedings showing that the 2010 Judgment had an adverse impact on its real property holdings and possibly those of third parties, the matter has not been conclusively proven in a court of law. Furthermore, we are cognizant that in quiet title actions "where each party is claiming title against the other party, the burden of proof is upon each party to prove better title than that of his adversary. The claimant must rely upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weaknesses in the title of his opponent." Shuffit v. Wade, 13 S.W.3d 329, 332-33 (Mo.App. 2000). It is impossible to determine the effect Branson's lack of active involvement in the litigation may have had on Empire and the way it tried its case. Furthermore, as to Respondents, "`[i]f a plaintiff, by mistake or inadvertence, fails to produce sufficient evidence at trial to prove his claim, in a situation where the proof seems to be available, the case should be remanded to permit the introduction of additional evidence.'" Brattin Ins. v. Triple S. Props., 77 S.W.3d 687, 689 (Mo.App. 2002) (quoting In re Estate of Mapes, 738 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Mo. banc 1987)). Given the particular and unusual circumstances of this case, justice and the requirement of a fair trial for all parties require the reversal of the entirety of the judgment and remand of the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.16 See Pitts v. Pitts, 388 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Mo.1965) (holding that where a cause must be remanded "the interests of justice will best be served by permitting [the] plaintiff and [the] defendants to present to the court the matters upon which their respective claims are based in order that the court may be fully informed before determining their respective rights"); see also Stottle v. Brittian, 459 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Mo.1970). In this respect, the trial court shall permit Branson to amend its pleadings and to freely permit the amendment of pleadings of both Empire and Respondents should they choose to do so without prejudice to the rights of third parties to intervene in the litigation as the rules of civil procedure may provide.17 Costs on appeal are assessed one-third each against Branson, Empire and Respondents.