JAMES M. SMART, JR., Judge.
Jeffery Spain appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") denying him unemployment benefits based upon a finding that he was discharged for misconduct connected with work. We affirm.
Jeffery Spain was employed as a dock worker and forklift operator by R & L Carriers Shared Services ("R & L") from September 2, 2008 until May 6, 2010. His job duties included operating a forklift for the purpose of loading and unloading customers' shipments. Prior to his employment, Spain completed forklift training and received his certification on August 28, 2008. On that same date, Spain signed an "Employee Acknowledgment Form" confirming that his "relationship with [R & L] is voluntarily entered into and is subject to termination by [Spain] or [R & L] at will, with or without cause, at any time." He acknowledged in writing that he had "received, read, and understand, and will comply with the policies, programs and benefits contained in [the employee] handbook and any revisions or supplements hereto."
The employee handbook included a section on "Disciplinary Procedures," which stated the following, in pertinent part:
After completing forklift training, Spain began working for R & L on September 2, 2008. On February 17, 2010, Spain was discharged from R & L after he deliberately tampered with a forklift's computer system in order to increase the forklift's speed. After a peer review proceeding, he got his job back but was placed on notice that if charged with another preventable offense, he could be terminated.
On May 13, 2010, Spain filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Division of Employment Security ("Division"). R & L contested the claim on the basis that Spain was discharged for violating the company's reasonable safety rules and regulations which are in place for the safety and well-being of its employees. Specifically, R & L noted that Spain was terminated for gross negligence, violent forklift driving, placing fellow employees in danger, and abuse of company property. A deputy with the Division concluded that Spain was ineligible for benefits because he had been discharged for misconduct connected with work for operating his forklift in an unsafe manner and striking McFadden's forklift, causing injury.
Spain filed an appeal with the Appeals Tribunal. The Appeals Tribunal held a hearing on August 4, 2010, and received testimony from McFadden, Spain, the service center manager from R & L, and a co-worker. After the hearing, the Appeals Tribunal issued its decision, affirming the deputy's determination that Spain had been discharged for misconduct connected with work. The Tribunal entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Spain filed an appeal with the Commission, which adopted and affirmed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal. Spain appeals.
Appellate review of a decision made by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is governed by section 288.210, RSMo.
In his sole point on appeal, Spain contends that the Commission erred in denying his claim for unemployment benefits because there was no substantial and competent evidence to support its decision, and the Commission misapplied the law. Spain argues that he did not operate his forklift with such a degree of negligence as to show an intentional and substantial disregard of his employer's interest in safety and his duty to use care that would rise to the level of misconduct.
The purpose of the Missouri Employment Security Law is to benefit individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Section 288.020.1. A claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he or she has been discharged for misconduct connected with work. Section 288.050.2. "Misconduct" is defined as:
Section 288.030.1(23) (emphasis added).
Under this definition, misconduct may be established by an employee's deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. Scrivener Oil Co., Inc. v. Crider, 304 S.W.3d 261, 268 (Mo.App. 2010); Ottomeyer v. Whelan Sec. Co., 202 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Mo.App.2006). An employee's noncompliance with an employer's reasonable safety standards may constitute misconduct for purposes of disqualifying the claimant from receiving unemployment benefits. Finner, 298 S.W.3d at 584. While a claimant generally bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she is entitled to benefits, the burden shifts to the employer to prove misconduct connected with work when the employer claims
At the hearing before the Appeals Tribunal, McFadden testified that on April 30, 2010, he was sitting on his forklift at a complete stop, when he observed Spain heading towards him "going pretty fast" on the dock. He recalled that, "with the amount of people who [were] in the area and me sitting there," Spain was driving "definitely faster than what [he] needed to be going." McFadden stated that he and Spain made eye contact as Spain drove towards him, so he knew that Spain could see that he was sitting on his forklift and not moving. He indicated that Spain had plenty of room to go around his forklift instead of hitting him. McFadden testified that Spain "rammed into my forklift."
McFadden explained that after he and Spain were able to "unhook" their forklifts, he turned the corner and stepped off his forklift to check the skid and the drum he was hauling to make sure it was not leaking. He indicated that after checking the drum, he got back onto his forklift and was preparing to drive, when Spain drove back towards him and "plowed into me again." McFadden stated that Spain struck his forklift a second time within two minutes of the first incident, this time hitting the left rear of McFadden's forklift. McFadden testified that he believed the second incident was "completely intentional" and not by accident. McFadden recalled that Spain had no loads on his forklift either of the times that he was struck and that there was no reason for Spain to have driven his forklift so close to McFadden's forklift at the time of the incidents.
McFadden explained that when Spain struck his forklift the second time, the force of the impact caused him to fall forward onto the shifters of his forklift. He suffered injuries as a result, including bruised arms and ribs. McFadden reported both incidents to his supervisor. He also stated that Spain contacted him by phone the day after the incidents to ask if he would testify on his behalf if he paid him "a couple hundred dollars" allegedly to report that the "incident never took place." Spain admitted that he had contacted McFadden after the incident, but denied offering to pay him to testify.
Spain testified that due to the heavy work load expected by the company, he would sometimes drive as "fast as the forklift can go" and that he had seen other forklift drivers bump into each other. He admitted that in February 2010, he had tampered with the computer system on his forklift to increase its ability to go faster. He acknowledged that after a disciplinary proceeding, he was discharged for the incident. After a peer review meeting, he was re-hired, with the understanding that he would not drive his forklift in an unsafe manner or beyond a certain speed. With regard to the April 30, 2010 incidents, Spain denied that he intentionally struck McFadden's forklift. When asked by counsel if he had hit McFadden's forklift, Spain responded, "I—the—the second time. The first time I bumped—I backed into his skid."
Daniel Graham, the service center manager at R & L, testified that prior to Spain's employment with R & L, he had completed training and had been instructed in the safe operation of a forklift and that he had received his forklift certification in August 2008. He indicated that the freight dock where Spain worked is a busy area with fourteen forklifts operating in a confined space and that the forklifts have speed limits for the safety of the employees. When asked whether the forklifts sometimes bump into each other, Graham indicated that it did not happen very often, but if it did occur, it would be because "somebody [was not] paying attention to
Graham testified that after Spain was discharged in February 2010 for tampering with a forklift to alter the speed, and then re-hired, he was on notice that the next time he was charged with any preventable offense "or anything in the workplace," that he could be terminated. Graham indicated that McFadden had reported that after Spain struck his forklift the first time, Spain "turned around and rammed him a second time." He stated that McFadden sustained injuries, including bruises to his arms and ribs, as a result of the incident, and that Spain's actions were sufficient grounds to warrant his termination. He indicated that Spain was discharged due to his gross negligence, violent forklift driving, placing fellow employees in danger, and abuse of company property.
On appeal, Spain does not dispute that the record supports his termination based on the operation of his forklift in such a manner that resulted in causing McFadden's injuries. Nevertheless, he maintains that his actions were "unintentional." Spain contends that while he may have "acted negligently or with poor judgment warranting his termination," his negligence does not rise to the level of misconduct so as to disqualify him from receiving unemployment benefits. He argues that both forklift incidents were merely "accidents" and that he was simply "engaged in the activities which were contemplated and encouraged by R & L" by working at a fast pace on the freight dock in order to complete his work assignments and make his hourly "quotas."
Spain also maintains that the Appeals Tribunal failed to address how his culpability rose to the level of misconduct, rather than mere negligence. He asserts that the Tribunal found that he did not act with "malicious intent" with regard to either of the incidents. While there is no actual mention of "malicious intent" in the Tribunal's findings, we assume Spain is referencing the Tribunal's finding that Spain did not deliberately operate his forklift with the intent to "ram" into McFadden's forklift. We interpret this to mean that the Tribunal did not believe that Spain acted with any evil intent or bad motive designed to deliberately crash into McFadden's forklift in order to cause harm to him. This is not to say, however, that the Tribunal found Spain to be merely negligent or without culpability with regard to the second incident.
Contrary to Spain's assertion, the Tribunal, in its decision, as adopted and affirmed by the Commission, did address how Spain's actions rose beyond the level of mere negligence. The Tribunal specifically concluded that while the first incident of bumping into McFadden's forklift could be considered an accident, or simple
We do not disagree that there are certain instances where an isolated act of ordinary negligence does not constitute misconduct. See, e.g., Buckley v. Safelite Fulfillment, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Mo. App.2009); Yellow Freight Sys. v. Thomas, 987 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo.App.1998). That is not the case here. Under the statute, misconduct may be established where there is "negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, . . . or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer." Section 288.030.1(23); Scrivener Oil Co., 304 S.W.3d at 268; Ottomeyer, 202 S.W.3d at 91.
R & L had the right to expect its employees to not engage in conduct that would endanger the safety of others. Spain was fully aware of the safety standards expected by R & L and that his position as a forklift driver required him to utilize a high degree of care and safety while operating his forklift on the freight dock. Spain disregarded R & L's safety standards when he drove his forklift in such a careless manner that resulted in two workplace incidents within minutes of each other, the second of which caused injuries to McFadden. We find this evidence sufficient to demonstrate a conscious and substantial disregard for the safety of others, as well as a disregard of R & L's reasonable expectations and interests in maintaining a safe work environment.
Despite Spain's characterization of his actions as "mere negligence" and "poor judgment," the Commission obviously did not believe that the second incident was the result of an isolated act of ordinary negligence on the part of Spain. The Commission's interpretation of whether a claimant's behavior and actions amount to misconduct is entitled to great weight. Bartsch v. Moore, 931 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Mo.App.1996).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Commission's determination that Spain acted with such a degree of negligence as to show an intentional and substantial disregard of R & L's interests in safety and his own duty to use care is supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Commission did not err or misapply the law in concluding that Spain's actions constituted misconduct connected with work, thus disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits.
Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's decision.
All concur.
