GARY D. WITT, Presiding Judge.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") appeals from the trial court's judgment granting Courtney Taylor's ("Taylor") motion for summary judgment, and denying State Farm's motion for summary judgment. We reverse.

Factual Background

The parties stipulated to the facts below and do not dispute the relevant facts on appeal. Pursuant to the stipulated facts the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

On October 31, 2007, Taylor, who was fifteen years old at the time, sustained serious injuries when she was struck, while walking, by a vehicle operated by Donna Scott ("Scott"). The parties stipulated that Taylor's damages equaled or exceeded $135,000. Scott's automobile insurance policy, issued by Chicago First Insurance, provided liability coverage limits of $25,000, and this amount was subsequently paid to Taylor.

At the time of the accident, Taylor was insured under two automobile policies purchased by her parents from State Farm. Both policies provided underinsured motorist coverage ("UIM") in the amount of $50,000. State Farm paid Taylor $50,000 for UIM coverage under one of the policies, but refused to pay UIM coverage under the second policy based on its contention that the policies precluded "stacking" of benefits pursuant to clear and unambiguous language in the policies.

On October 12, 2010, Taylor filed suit against State Farm in the Circuit Court of Clay County to recover an additional $50,000 based on the UIM coverage provided in the second policy. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

On May 10, 2011, the trial court entered its Judgment granting Taylor's summary judgment motion, and denying State Farm's summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Taylor in the amount of $50,000. State Farm now appeals.

Further facts are outlined below as relevant in the analysis section.

Standard of Review

This is an appeal from summary judgment, and as such our review is de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The Court "will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." Id. Granting summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 380. "The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially." State ex rel. Outcom, Inc. v. City of Peculiar, 350 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Mo.App. W.D.2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Analysis

In its sole Point on appeal, State Farm argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Taylor because the Court "permit[ed] Plaintiff to stack underinsured coverage as a pedestrian because the $50,000 of underinsured benefits paid by State Farm fulfilled the obligation of State Farm in that each State Farm policy had underinsured policy limit of $50,000 and [because] each State Farm policy unambiguously stated that the maximum underinsured coverage available was the policy limit of the policy with the highest limit which State Farm paid by its payment of $50,000."

Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted.) "However, where insurance policies are unambiguous, they will be enforced as written." Todd v. Missouri United School Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. banc 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "Courts should not interpret policy provisions in isolation but rather evaluate policies as a whole." Ritchie v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009) (citation omitted).

Taylor received the maximum limits of liability coverage ($25,000) from Scott's Chicago First Insurance based on Scott's undisputed liability in causing the accident and injuring Taylor. Taylor has also recovered the maximum limits of UIM coverage of $50,000 pursuant to the first of the two State Farm policies which covered Taylor. The question before us is whether the trial court erred in concluding that Taylor is entitled to recover an additional $50,000 of UIM coverage from State Farm under the second Policy.1

The difference between Uninsured Motorist ("UM") coverage and UIM coverage in set forth in Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Missouri:

992 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo.App. E.D.1999) (citations omitted and emphasis original).

The Policy provided for UIM coverage as follows:

(Emphasis original.)

It is undisputed that this Policy had a "stated limit[] of underinsured motor vehicle coverage in the amount of $50,000." Furthermore, this Policy contained the following relevant "Limits of Liability" language for "Coverage W":

(Emphasis original.)

Therefore, because the parties stipulated before the trial court that Taylor "sustained at least $135,000 in total damages," there is no dispute that, if the above clauses were the only relevant language in the Policy, Taylor would be entitled to recover an additional $50,000 pursuant to the second Policy. The disputed issue is whether the additional language below, which was also contained in the Policy, precluded Taylor from recovering under the second Policy as a matter of law:

(Emphasis original.)

State Farm contends that the above language precluded Taylor from recovering under the second Policy because 1(a) of the Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage language "tells the reader that where multiple underinsured coverages apply, the total limit of all such coverages `shall not exceed' the limit of the policy with the highest limit." Accordingly, the dispositive issue is whether the language of 1(a) makes it unambiguous that "stacking" of UIM policies is disallowed under the Policy.

The Missouri Supreme Court has outlined the following applicable principles in Ritchie v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009):

Taylor sets forth numerous arguments as to why the relevant language of 1(a) is ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Ultimately, under the facts of this case, we do not find the following language ambiguous: "If the insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian and other underinsured motor vehicle coverage applies: the total limits of liability under all such coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage with the highest limit of liability." A person reading the Policy would know that Section 1(a) applies if more than one policy covered a UIM claim because this section is entitled "If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage."

The substance of Section 1(a) is also unambiguous. Taylor argues that the language is ambiguous because of the use of the word coverage instead of policy. We disagree.

Because both of the State Farm policies undisputedly covered this UIM claim, Section 1(a) acts to limit the liability of "all such coverages" to the "highest limit of liability" in either policy; in this case, $50,000. On appeal, Taylor simply fails to articulate a plausible alternative reading of this provision, which would cause a reasonable lay person to believe that the limits of both policies would apply to the facts of this case.

Instead, Taylor argues that language in the Policy that pertains to liability coverage, as opposed to UIM coverage, sets forth proper language to constitute an "anti-stacking" clause, while the language of Section 1(a) is not a proper "anti-stacking" clause. Taylor's argument concerns the following language found in the Liability Coverage section of the Policies:

(Emphasis original.)

Specifically, Taylor argues that because State Farm did not use the same "anti-stacking" language in the Liability Coverage section of the Policy and the UIM coverage section of the Policy that Section 1(a) is thereby rendered "ambiguous." "It is settled law that when analyzing an insurance contract, the entire policy and not just isolated provisions or clauses must be considered." Rice, 301 S.W.3d at 47 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

While we agree that the anti-stacking clause in the liability section of the Policy is stronger language than Section 1(a), Taylor cites no authority to support her argument that this fact alone somehow renders Section 1(a) ambiguous. "A court is not permitted to create an ambiguity in order to distort the language of an unambiguous policy, or, in order to enforce a particular construction which it might feel is more appropriate." Rodriguez v. General Acc. Ins. Co. of America, 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. banc 1991). "Thus, where insurance policies are unambiguous, they will be enforced as written absent a statute or public policy requiring coverage." Id. Here, Section 1(a) was broadly worded to include situations where duplicative coverage existed, precluding stacking of any of the policies issued by State Farm with each other or with the policies of another insurance company. Ultimately, Taylor fails to offer any support for her suggestion that Section 1(a) "is not an anti-stacking clause."

This Court recently highlighted how a typical "anti-stacking provision" reads:

Long v. Shelter Ins. Companies, 351 S.W.3d 692, 699 (Mo.App. W.D.2011) (quoting Chamness v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 226 S.W.3d 199 (Mo.App. E.D.2007)). Section 1(a) reads nearly identically to the above "anti-stacking" language in Long and Chamness; the only difference is that Section 1(a) does not limit stacking in the context of only State Farm policies, but rather also precludes stacking "coverage" issued by another insurance company.2 Taylor has cited no authority that holds that this is a distinction with a difference, and when giving Section 1(a) its plain and ordinary meaning it is clearly anti-stacking language.

To support its argument that Section 1(a) is ambiguous, Taylor relies heavily on Clark v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 92 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Mo.App. E.D.2002). On the surface Clark is factually similar to the instant case because it also dealt with a scenario where the insurance company "issue[d] two separate policies for under-insured motorist coverage," and, therefore, "[i]f each endorsement is considered, however, the `total limit of all similar insurance' is $100,000.00 and American Family's proportionate share is $50,000.00 under one policy and $50,000.00 under the other." Id. But in Clark, the Eastern District concluded that an ambiguity existed because that policy contained an anti-stacking clause and a separate "other insurance" clause, with the "other insurance" clause stating, in relevant part, "[i]f there is other similar insurance on a loss covered by this endorsement, we will pay our share according to this policy's proportion of the total limits of all similar insurance." Id. at 201. Based on this "other insurance" clause, the Eastern District concluded that "[t]here are two possible ways to read the policy as to how to calculate coverage in this situation: (1) the insured may recover the proportionate share regardless of the stated maximum; or (2) the insured may only recover the stated maximum regardless of the proportionate share." Id. at 203.

But here Taylor has not demonstrated how the anti-stacking provision of the Policy conflicts with any other portion or clause of the Policy. Taylor clings to the fact that the above "other insurance" policy language in Clark is similar to the language found in the instant Policy in 1(b), which states that "we are liable only for our share. Our share is that percent of the damages that the limit of liability of this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to the accident." (Emphasis added.) The flaw with Taylor's analysis is that it ignores the critical language of 1(a), which immediately precedes 1(b) and states that "the total limits of liability under all such coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage with the highest limit of liability." (Emphasis added.) We fail to find any ambiguity between Section 1(a) and Section 1(b), as applied to the facts of this case, because they are not at odds when read together, as written.3 Indeed, both 1(a) and 1(b) reference the fact that there is a "limit of liability" that pertains to when "there is other underinsured motor vehicle coverage." Simply put, had Clark's "other insurance" clause contained the language of Section 1(a), there would have been no inconsistency in that policy because the "other insurance" clause would have mirrored the anti-stacking clause in that policy. Id.

Furthermore, Taylor argues that "[t]here is no anti-stacking clause in the `Limits of Liability' Section of the UIM coverage," but fails to cite any authority that the anti-stacking language must be contained in the Limits of Liability Section. Here, State Farm had a distinct section clearly entitled "If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage," which was on the page immediately following the Limits of Liability Section. "If ambiguity exists, the policy will be interpreted in the manner that would ordinarily be understood by the lay person who bought and paid for the policy." Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Mo.2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). While Section 1(b) is not a model of clarity, we fail to see how an average insurance consumer would read this language to provide for coverage up to the policy limits from both policies for the damages in this case.

Because we conclude that the relevant language of 1(a) is unambiguous in disallowing stacking, this Court must reverse the judgment of the trial court that awarded Taylor $50,000 pursuant to the second Policy.

Furthermore, because State Farm filed an opposing motion for summary judgment before the trial court on the identical issue (that it need not pay an additional $50,000 to Taylor because the anti-stacking language is unambiguous), we conclude that this Court must grant State Farm's motion for summary judgment. Rule 84.14 provides that "the appellate court shall award a new trial or partial new trial, reverse, or affirm the judgment or order of the trial court, in whole or in part, or give such judgment as the court ought to give. Unless justice otherwise requires, the court shall dispose finally of the case." Rule 84.14 (emphasis added).4 "An appellate court may give judgment as the circuit court ought to have given, but only in circumstances that indicate there is no further need for proceedings in the circuit court." DeBaliviere Place Ass'n v. Veal, 337 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Mo. banc 2011).

The facts in this case are stipulated to by the parties. On appeal, no party disputes that the resolution of this issue is dispositive of the instant litigation. Because we conclude that State Farm has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we grant State Farm's motion for summary judgment. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 376.

Conclusion

The judgment of the circuit court, granting Taylor's motion for summary judgment, is hereby reversed. Finally, pursuant to Rule 84.14, we enter an order granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment.

All concur.