MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J.
This is a driver's license revocation case. The Director of Revenue ("Director") revoked the driving privileges of Matthew Lawrence-Fehl Davis ("Davis") because Davis refused to submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol content after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. See
On September 2, 2012, at about five o'clock in the evening, Deputy Zach Moorhead ("Deputy Moorhead") of the Camden County Sheriff's Office was dispatched to the intersection of Old Kinderhook Drive and Lark Spur Drive in Camdenton, Missouri, to investigate a report of an intoxicated man who had injured himself in a golf cart accident. When Deputy Moorhead arrived on the scene, he encountered David Waugh ("Waugh"). Waugh told Deputy Moorhead he had been informed a golf cart had wrecked near the home of Waugh's relatives. Thinking the wreck might have involved his relatives, Waugh went to the location of the wreck. Waugh said he found Davis lying on the ground next to the golf cart. Davis could not stand without assistance, and Waugh convinced Davis to allow Waugh to drive him home in the golf cart. Waugh reported Davis became angry because Waugh was driving too slowly. According to Waugh, Davis reached over from his position in the passenger's seat of the golf cart and pushed the accelerator of the golf cart with his foot just as the golf cart was going around a corner. Davis was thrown from the golf cart and sustained injuries.
Deputy Moorhead next spoke with Davis. Davis's eyes were watery and bloodshot, and Davis smelled strongly of intoxicants. Davis admitted he had consumed "[a] lot" of alcohol and that he was "too drunk to be driving[.]" Deputy Moorhead then conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus test which confirmed his suspicions that Davis was intoxicated. Deputy Moorhead arrested Davis for driving while intoxicated, and Davis was taken to the hospital for treatment of the injuries he had received when he fell out of the golf cart.
Deputy Moorhead followed the ambulance to the hospital. At the hospital, Deputy Moorhead informed Davis of the implied consent law and requested that Davis submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol content. Davis refused to submit to the test. Davis's license was suspended for one year pursuant to Section 577.041.1.
Davis filed a petition for review in the circuit court. A trial was held on November 16, 2012. The only evidence presented was Director's Exhibit A. Exhibit A was a packet of Department of Revenue records which included, among other things, a copy of Deputy Moorhead's report. The narrative portion of Deputy Moorhead's report outlined the facts stated above.
After Exhibit A was admitted, Davis's attorney made two arguments in support of the request to reverse the revocation. First, he argued the evidence did not support the revocation because "Deputy Moorhead's report [was] based on hearsay." The attorney representing Director replied that Deputy Moorhead was allowed to consider hearsay in determining probable cause to arrest. Davis's attorney responded
The trial court subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law reinstating Davis's driving privileges. With respect to the issue of whether Deputy Moorhead had reasonable grounds to arrest Davis for driving while intoxicated, the trial court stated:
(Emphasis added). Director appeals.
Director argues the trial court misapplied the law in two respects. First, he claims the trial court improperly considered whether Davis was driving the vehicle. Second, he asserts the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of reasonable grounds because an officer is entitled to rely on hearsay in establishing probable cause. We agree the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard when it decided whether Davis was driving or operating the vehicle.
In driver's license revocation cases, as in any other court-tried civil case, "the trial court's judgment will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." White v. Director of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307-08 (Mo. banc 2010). The application of this standard of review first depends on whether the contested issue is a question of law or a question of fact. Id. at 308. "Claimed error in applying the law is reviewed de novo." Hanna v. Director of Revenue, 347 S.W.3d 95, 97 (Mo.App. S.D.2011); see also White, 321 S.W.3d at 308 ("questions of law are reviewed de novo").
"The object and purpose of Missouri's implied consent law `is to rid the highways of drunk drivers.'" Hinnah v. Director of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo. banc 2002) (quoting Shine v. Director of Revenue, 807 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo.App. E.D.
Under the statute, a person is also entitled to judicial review of the revocation. Id. "On review of a driver's license revocation based on a refusal to submit to a [chemical test], there are only three issues to be determined: `(1) whether or not the person was arrested or stopped; (2) whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition; and (3) whether or not the person refused to submit to the test.'" Risner v. Director of Revenue, 404 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Mo.App. S.D.2013) (quoting Hager, 284 S.W.3d at 194). In the present case, there was no dispute regarding the issues of (1) whether Davis was arrested, and (2) whether Davis refused to submit to the test. Consequently, the only issue presented to the trial court was whether Officer Moorhead had reasonable grounds to believe Davis was driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. That is, the legal issue involved was a narrow one: "Under the plain words of the statute, the question is not whether the person arrested actually was driving but whether the officer who requested the test had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was driving while intoxicated." Hager, 284 S.W.3d at 196 (quoting Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 622).
Here, the trial court found in its judgment that it was not convinced Davis was driving because that fact was only supported by a hearsay statement. However, under Section 577.041, the issue of whether Davis was actually driving was not before the trial court for its determination and should not have been relied upon by the trial court in deciding whether Deputy Moorhead had reasonable grounds to believe that Davis was driving while intoxicated.
The principles used to determine whether an officer has reasonable grounds to believe a person has been driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated have been summarized as follows:
Hager, 284 S.W.3d at 196 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Proof of probable cause need only meet the preponderance of the evidence standard." Id. at 197. Additionally, probable cause does not need to be established by the officer's personal observations. Id. It is well-settled that "[a]n officer has a right to rely upon information communicated via police dispatch and information reported
Director's sole point is granted.
The trial court's judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for determination of whether the facts found by the trial court provided Deputy Moorhead with reasonable grounds to believe Davis was driving while intoxicated.
GARY W. LYNCH and DON E. BURRELL, JJ., concur.