Cynthia L. Martin, Judge.
Gary Browning ("Browning") appeals his conviction of driving while intoxicated as an aggravated offender following a jury trial. He complains that there was insufficient foundation to permit the admission of Sergeant Joe Kantola's ("Sgt. Kantola") testimony about the results of administration of the horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN") test. Browning also questions the adequacy of the approved verdict director for driving while intoxicated, MAI-CR 3d 331.02, though he concedes that the trial court committed no error in tendering the instruction. Because any error in the admission of the results of the HGN test is not prejudicial in light of other evidence supporting the verdict as to which Browning has no complaint, and because Browning asserts no error in the trial court's use of MAI-CR 3d 331.02, we affirm.
Browning does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. Viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction,
On Sunday, April 22, 2007 at around 10:15 p.m., Sgt. Kantola of the Kearney Police Department was stopped in an unmarked patrol vehicle at a red light at the intersection of 92 Highway and Interstate 35. Sgt. Kantola was in the right lane, and a minivan was stopped next to him in the left lane. Sgt. Kantola observed a black Jeep approaching the minivan quickly from behind, without appearing to slow down. The Jeep then came to a sudden stop. When the light turned green, all three vehicles proceeded through the intersection.
Because Sgt. Kantola had witnessed multiple traffic offenses, he followed the Jeep, and activated his emergency lights. The Jeep slowed down, but did not stop immediately.
Sgt. Kantola approached the Jeep. Browning was driving, and was the sole occupant. Before Browning spoke, Sgt. Kantola could smell an "overpowering" odor of alcohol from Browning's breath. When Browning did speak, his speech was slurred. Browning's eyes were glassy and bloodshot. His pupils were dilated. Sgt. Kantola asked Browning if he had been drinking. Browning responded that he "drank some earlier." Browning was asked to get out of the car. As Browning did so, he stumbled and used the door to support himself.
Sgt. Kantola administered several field sobriety tests. He administered the HGN test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-legged stand test. According to Kantola, Browning showed all six signs of intoxication during the HGN test, and also swayed while balancing during the test. Browning showed four of the eight signs of intoxication during the walk-and-turn test, with two being required to demonstrate intoxication. Browning showed all four signs of intoxication during the one-legged-stand test. Browning also submitted to a portable breath test, which was positive for the presence of alcohol. At that point, Browning was placed under arrest. He began pleading with Sgt. Kantola, "Please don't do this to me."
After being transported to the police station and advised of the implied consent law, Browning agreed to submit to a breath test. Browning's blood alcohol content was.103.
Browning was convicted of driving while intoxicated following a jury trial. The court imposed a four-year sentence, but suspended the sentence and placed Browning on probation. Browning filed this timely appeal.
Browning's first point on appeal argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Sgt. Kantola's testimony regarding the results of the HGN test over Browning's objection. Browning claims that an adequate foundation was not established to permit admission of the testimony. Browning raised this same issue in a pre-trial motion to suppress which was denied by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing.
We review a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Prince, 311 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo.App.W.D.2010). We will not find an abuse of discretion unless a trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration. State v. Brown, 939 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Mo. banc 1997). We will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence unless prejudice is demonstrated, established by proof that the admission of the evidence was "outcome-determinative." State v. Adams, 350 S.W.3d 864, 866 (Mo. App.E.D.2011) (citing State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Mo. banc 2006)). "`A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice
Here, Browning only challenges about the trial court's admission of Sgt. Kantola's testimony regarding the results of the HGN field sobriety test. Browning does not challenge the admission of Sgt. Kantola's testimony regarding Browning's erratic driving and about the physical signs of intoxication he observed immediately upon approaching Browning including the smell of alcohol, bloodshot and glassy eyes, dilated pupils, slurred speech, and problems with balance. Browning does not challenge the admission of Sgt. Kantola's testimony that Browning acknowledged he had been drinking. Browning does not challenge the admission of Sgt. Kantola's testimony regarding the results of the walk-and-turn and the one-legged stand tests, the results of the portable breath test, or the results of the breath test which demonstrated that Browning had a blood alcohol content of .103, well in excess of the presumptive level of intoxication set forth in section 577.037.1.
Given all of this unchallenged evidence, the sufficiency of which to support his conviction Browning admits, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Browning but for the trial court's admission of Sgt. Kantola's testimony about the results of the HGN test. Thus, even assuming the trial court committed error in the admission of this evidence, that error is not prejudicial as it is not outcome-determinative, and the error will not support the reversal of Browning's conviction.
Browning's second point on appeal does not claim trial court error, but instead questions whether the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the adequacy of MAI-CR 3d 331.02, the approved verdict director for driving while intoxicated. At trial, Browning tendered a modified verdict director that added an essential element,
Browning queries, however, whether it would be "prudent" to define the term "intoxicated condition" in the approved verdict director,
Because Browning claims no error in the trial court's use of the approved verdict director for driving while intoxicated, there is nothing for this court to review. Rule 84.04(d)(1).
Browning's second point on appeal is denied.
Mitchell, Presiding Judge, joins in the majority opinion.
Witt, Judge, joins in the majority's result and concurs in separate opinion.
Gary D. Witt, Judge, Concurring.
I concur with the Majority opinion in its holding that there was no prejudice in this case so as to warrant reversal. I further fully concur in the Majority opinion's assertion that the admission of the HGN test results in this case was error. I write separately, however, because the error in admitting the HGN test results in Browning's case sharply illustrates rampant misunderstanding and weaknesses in the administration of the HGN test, calling into serious question the reliability of the results when not properly administered.
Browning raised the issue of the improper admission of the field sobriety tests, including the HGN, in a motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Kantola, the arresting officer, indicated that he had been an officer for eighteen years and had worked for the Kearney Police Department for ten years. In 1993, he completed the course through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). Sgt. Kantola also completed the following training: advanced DWI detection in 1996; drug recognition expert "preschool" and drug recognition expert school, both in 2004; drug recognition expert recertification in 2005; drug expert recertification in March 2007. Then, after Browning's April 2007 arrest and shortly before the hearing on the motion to suppress, in 2008, Sgt. Kantola completed another recertification. In spite of attending all of this training, it became clear throughout his testimony that Sgt. Kantola had very little grasp of the proper way to administer and score the field sobriety tests.
Sgt. Kantola testified that he understood that if any element of the standardized field sobriety test is changed, the validity of results is compromised. As mentioned in the Majority Opinion and as explained more below, one of the standardized field sobriety tests is the HGN. Sgt. Kantola understood that if a test is not administered in compliance with NHTSA guidelines, the results may be inaccurate. However, he acknowledged at the suppression hearing that he had never bothered to even read the NHTSA manual, which was admitted into evidence and which was the source of his training.
As the Majority Opinion points out, in order for the HGN test to be admissible in court, (1) the officer must be properly trained and (2) the test must be properly administered. State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo.App.W.D.1993) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. banc 1997)). The full title of the NHTSA manual that Sgt. Kantola admitted never reading is the "DWI (Driving While Intoxicated) Detection & Standardized Field Sobriety Testing" Manual ("NHTSA manual" or the "manual"). It is a product of the International Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP") and the NHTSA and is published by the U.S. Department of Transportation. Since the mid-1970s, the NHTSA, with the help of the law enforcement community (including the IACP), has conducted extensive research, resulting in the development of a battery of three standardized field sobriety tests to assist officers in detecting impaired drivers. DWI (DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED) DETECTION & STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTING app. § B (2006 ed.). Those tests are the HGN, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand. Together, the three tests are known as the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests ("SFSTs"). In 1992, the NHTSA and IACP, in conjunction with police officers, instructors, curriculum specialists, and training administrators from several states reached a
The manual emphasizes the necessity of teaching officers everything in the manual:
Id. at 7 (Introductory material).
The manual also notes that the "course is `flexible' in that it can easily be
The core curriculum consists of sixteen sessions that span twenty-two hours and forty-five minutes over three to five days. Id. at 5-6. At the end of the training, a written examination over the SFSTs is administered, and participants must receive a grade of eighty percent or higher on the written examination to "successfully complete the training." Id. at 15. In addition, participants also must demonstrate proficiency in administering and interpreting the SFSTs, which includes administering the complete test battery at least once, in an instructor's presence, without deleting or erroneously performing any of the critical administrative elements of the tests before the participants are deemed to have successfully completed the training.
Sgt. Kantola's misunderstanding of the HGN test, the only exclusively scientific test of the three in the battery, illustrates why it is perhaps the least understood of the field sobriety tests. By way of overview, "[n]ystagmus is the involuntary jerking of the eyes." Hill, 865 S.W.2d at 704. Under the HGN test, a person's eye movements are tested as a means of determining whether he or she is under the influence of alcohol. Id. When administered properly by someone with sufficient training, the HGN test has been deemed scientifically reliable under the Frye
While Hill set forth the basic elements of the test, I write separately to set forth the scientific requirements for the proper administration of the HGN test and the pitfalls of its improper administration. Hill, 865 S.W.2d at 704.
According to the NHTSA manual, the involuntary jerking of nystagmus occurs as the eyes gaze to the side. DWI (DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED) DETECTION & STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTING § VIII-5. In addition to being involuntary, the person is generally unaware that it is happening and
Independent of alcohol and other drugs, the manual addresses other circumstances under which the eyes will jerk involuntarily and can impact the reliability of this field sobriety test. There are three general categories of nystagmus: vestibular, neural, and pathological. Id. at § VIII-6-VIII-11. Vestibular nystagmus is caused by movement or action in the vestibular system, which is a sense located in the inner ear that provides information to the brain and consequently to the eyes about position and movement of the head to maintain orientation and balance of the body.
The manual instructs an officer on what to observe in assessing possible medical
After the section on "medical impairment," the manual lists ten steps in administering the HGN test, followed by "three clues" with lengthy descriptions, and then instructions on administering the Vertical Gaze Nystagmus ("VGN"), which is the tenth step of the HGN test. Here is a summary of the ten steps for properly administering the HGN test:
Although VGN was not examined in the research that led to the SFSTs and the results are not included in the score for the HGN test, testing for VGN is the final step in administering the HGN test. The officer is to start with the stimulus in the same position set forth above and raise it until the subject's eyes are elevated as far as possible without moving the head. Then the officer is to hold the stimulus in that position for approximately four seconds. Next, the officer is to watch for jerking at maximum elevation. For VGN to be recorded, it "must be definite, distinct and sustained for a minimum of four seconds at maximum elevation." Id. at § VIII-15-§ VIII-16.
The presence of HGN can indicate use of certain other drugs besides alcohol, including depressants, inhalants. Id. at § VIII-16. VGN can be associated with high doses of alcohol and certain other drugs. Id. at § VIII-35. If VGN is present and HGN is not present, it could be a medical condition and not a sign of alcohol or drug impairment. Id. at § VIII-10.
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I fully concur with the Majority Opinion that the holding in State v. Burks, 373 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Mo.App.S.D.2012) is questionable and should not be followed. If not properly administered, the HGN test loses its scientific reliability and becomes irrelevant to the issues before the court.
However, because Browning did not establish prejudice, I concur with the result reached by the Majority.
Because of its inherently scientific nature, Missouri courts have conditioned the admissibility of testimony about the HGN test on establishing two foundational requirements: (1) that the officer administering the test is
"Proper administration of the HGN test requires (1) that the test be conducted by requiring a suspect to follow an object such as a finger, pencil or pen with his eyes as the object is moved laterally along a horizontal plane to the periphery of the suspect's vision, and (2) that the indicators be interpreted and scored, one eye at a time, as follows: (a) the person administering the test is to observe how smoothly a suspect follows the object as it is moved to the periphery of the suspect's vision. Jerking of the eyes rather than the ability to follow the object smoothly indicates the influence of alcohol; (b) the person administering the test is to observe whether or not a distinctive jerking occurs in the eyes at the maximum point of deviation when the eye moves to the far periphery of vision. Distinctive jerking is indicative of the influence of alcohol; and (c) the person administering the test is to observe the angle at which nystagmus occurs. Nystagmus occurring at or before the eye is looking at a 45-degree angle is indicative of the influence of alcohol. One point is scored for eye movement indicative of alcohol influence for each of the three tests for each eye. The highest possible score is six points, with a score of four or more points constituting substantial evidence that a suspect is intoxicated." Hill, 865 S.W.2d at 704; see also Rose, 86 S.W.3d at 98-99.
When Hill was decided in 1993, the court gauged the "scientific reliability" of the HGN test based on the testimony of an expert who explained studies conducted "on behalf of the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to determine the most accurate field sobriety tests available to police officers and to standardize the procedures for those tests." 865 S.W.2d at 704 (emphasis added). One of the tests identified was the HGN test. Id. Hill's articulation of the means by which foundation for admission of the HGN test results could be established was drawn directly from the testimony of the expert who explained these studies. Id.
The standardized procedures for administering the HGN test are thus specified in NHTSA's DWI Detection & Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Manual ("NHTSA Manual"). The NHTSA Manual was first published in 1992, and has been revised several times over the years. However, with respect to the HGN test, the NHTSA Manual has always required: (i) that each eye be separately tested; and (ii) that each eye be tested twice. The three measurement points for the HGN test identified in Hill can each yield a "point," with a total of three points possible for each eye. However, at least four points are required to suggest intoxication, necessarily requiring both eyes to be implicated by the testing. Rose, 86 S.W.3d at 98 ("Where . . . a driver scores four or more points on the HGN, there is substantial evidence that the driver is intoxicated."). Plainly, the scientific steps for administering the HGN test address how to properly gauge and calculate points— the accumulation of which is integral to the test's ability to reliably gauge intoxication.
Sgt. Kantola testified about the manner in which he administered the HGN test. His testimony indicated that at least with respect to the smooth pursuit measurement aspect of the HGN test, he
"Where the administering officer `failed to substantially comply with proper testing procedures,' most jurisdictions would `treat this issue as affecting the weight of HGN evidence rather than its admissibility.'" Rose, 86 S.W.3d at 99, n.6 (citing Ballard v. State, 955 P.2d 931, 941 (Alaska App.1998)). "In Missouri, however, proper administration of the HGN test is a foundational requirement under Hill." Id. (citing Duffy v. Director of Revenue, 966 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Mo.App.W.D.1998)).
In Duffy, the officer's testimony indicated that he did not know how to score the HGN test. 966 S.W.2d at 378. The Department of Revenue argued that the officer conducted the "mechanics" of the test correctly such that his lack of exact knowledge as to how to score the test was somehow irrelevant. Id. We rejected that argument, noting that "probable cause refers to the quality and quantity of proof tending to establish a certain thing." Id. (citation omitted). "Obviously, a scientific test as to intoxication, which is improperly administered . . ., does not tend to prove intoxication under a probable cause or reasonable doubt standard." Id. Accordingly, the trial court in Duffy erred in admitting the testimony for lack of foundation.
Given the holdings in Rose and Duffy, Sgt. Kantola's concessions about his administration of the HGN test raise legitimate concerns about whether he "properly administered" the HGN test, and thus about whether the trial court erred in admitting the test results. The State countered Browning's claim of error by relying heavily on the holding in State v. Burks, 373 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Mo.App.S.D. 2012), where the Southern District held that "challenges raised . . . to the procedures followed by [an officer administering the HGN test] go to its weight, rather than to admissibility of the test results." We question that holding. If applied in every case where an officer has failed to "properly administer" the HGN test, the holding in Burks will effectively swallow and negate the State's burden to establish the foundational requirement that the HGN test was properly administered. It is true, as Burks notes, that Hill did not expressly state that "the admission of HGN tests requires testimony from the officer that all of the NHTSA guidelines were followed during the administration of [the] test." 373 S.W.3d at 6. However, there is no question that the NHTSA standards, and expert testimony about those standards, formed the basis for Hill's conclusion that the HGN test was "scientifically reliable," and for Hill's imposition of the burden on the State to establish that the test has been "properly administered" as a condition to its admissibility. There is no source to consult for determining whether the HGN test has been "proper administered" other than the NHTSA Manual. We believe, therefore, that consistent with the holdings in Duffy and Rose, material deviations from the testing procedures set forth in the NHTSA Manual will require a trial court to deny admission of HGN test results.