Mark D. Pfeiffer, Chief Judge.

John T. Larsen ("Larsen") was charged with the class D felony of driving while intoxicated ("DWI") as a persistent offender after he had previously pled guilty to a municipal DWI ordinance violation which arose from the same incident. The Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri ("circuit court"), dismissed the felony DWI charge on double jeopardy grounds and the State has appealed. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 28, 2014, John Larsen was arrested for DWI in Greenwood, Missouri. He was charged with violating a municipal DWI ordinance in the City of Greenwood Municipal Court and pleaded guilty to that charge on October 7, 2014. The judge presiding in the Greenwood municipal division of the circuit court entered judgment against Larsen the same day.

On October 23, 2014, the Jackson County Prosecutor sought to prosecute Larsen for the class D felony of driving while intoxicated as a persistent offender,1 said charge arising from the same incident as the municipal ordinance violation and resulting October 7, 2014 judgment.

Larsen's attorney filed a motion to dismiss the felony DWI charge, asserting double jeopardy protection. See State v. M.L.S., 275 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Mo.App.W.D. 2008) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a criminal defendant from being subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense." (internal quotation omitted)). The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case, stating:

The State has filed this timely appeal.

Standard of Review

"Whether a defendant is afforded the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause is a question of law, which we review de novo." M.L.S., 275 S.W.3d at 296.

Analysis

In the State's point on appeal, it argues that the Greenwood municipal division of the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction2 and its judgment is a nullity; thus, the State argues that the present felony DWI charge is not barred under principles of double jeopardy analysis. However, the State's subject matter jurisdiction argument is nothing more than a "jurisdictional competence" argument that our Missouri Supreme Court has previously rejected. See J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo.banc 2009).

In Webb, our Supreme Court succinctly explained that the subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri's courts is dictated by article V of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 253. For example, in Webb, the court in question was a circuit court; thus, our Supreme Court evaluated that judge's subject matter jurisdiction under article V, section 14 (the provision governing circuit judge jurisdiction). Id. at 253-54. In footnote 7, the Supreme Court referred to the subject matter jurisdiction of associate circuit court judges under article V, section 17 (the provision governing associate circuit judge jurisdiction). Id. at 254 n. 7. Here, the question presented is: What subject matter jurisdiction does a judge have in the municipal division of the circuit court? The answer is found in article V, section 23: "A municipal judge shall hear and determine violations of municipal ordinances in one or more municipalities."

Following the dictate of Webb, then, the only question that need be decided here is whether the judge who was presiding in the Greenwood municipal division was hearing and determining a violation of a municipal ordinance when the court entered judgment against Larsen on October 7, 2014. Clearly, that is precisely what happened: as a result of the June 28, 2014 drunk driving incident, Larsen was charged with violating a Greenwood municipal ordinance prohibiting DWI. A judge from the Greenwood municipal division of the circuit court heard and determined the violation of said municipal ordinance and, accordingly, that judge possessed subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment on Larsen's municipal DWI charge.

What the State is really arguing in this appeal is that section 479.1703 constitutes a statutory restriction upon the authority of the municipal division of the circuit court to render a judgment in this particular case. In pre-Webb nomenclature, Missouri's appellate courts referred to such an argument as one of "jurisdictional competence."

Webb, 275 S.W.3d at 254 (numerous internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, the State does not contest that municipal divisions of the circuit courts generally possess the subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine municipal ordinance violations as dictated by article V of the Missouri Constitution. Instead, what the State argues is that there is a statutory restriction in this case that addresses the municipal division's authority to render a judgment in this particular case.4 Hence, this is nothing more than a "jurisdictional competence" argument — not a subject matter jurisdiction argument — and this argument must fail.5

The municipal division of the circuit court in this case possessed both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine Larsen's municipal DWI ordinance violation. Its judgment is not a nullity. Because a defendant cannot be prosecuted for an offense that includes within the new charge all of the same elements of a previous offense to which the defendant pled guilty (which the State concedes in the present case), or of which he was previously convicted in a municipal division of the circuit court, see State v. Steck, 68 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Mo.App.S.D.2002), the State is prohibited from charging Larsen with the class D felony of driving while intoxicated as a persistent offender and the circuit court did not err in dismissing the State's case on double jeopardy grounds.

Conclusion

The judgment of the circuit court dismissing the State's case is affirmed.

Zel M. Fischer, Special Judge, and Gary D. Witt, Judge, concur.