ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Judge.

St. Louis County and Steve Stenger, County Executive, (collectively "the County") appeal from the summary judgment finding that the County did not have authority to enact an ordinance imposing countywide minimum standards for police. We affirm.

In December of 2015, the St. Louis County County Council adopted and approved an ordinance authorizing the County Executive to issue minimum police standards that would apply to the police departments of cities wholly or partly located in St. Louis County ("the Ordinance").1 The Ordinance begins with the following recitals: there are 57 municipal police departments within St. Louis County; there are disparities between these departments' standards; there is an "inherent inequality of services" as a result; St. Louis County wants to ensure equal access to "consistent, quality public health and safety services;" and "uniform fundamental standards will enhance public health and reinforce trust between law enforcement and the community." The Ordinance states that it was promulgated under authority found in its charter, the state constitution and statutes and was enacted to "enhance the public health, safety and welfare" of the people of St. Louis County.

The Ordinance requires cities to submit police standards for approval by the County Executive. The County Executive has discretion under the Ordinance to determine whether a city is in compliance with the minimum standards he issues or is otherwise operating with deficient policing services. Enforcement mechanisms in the Ordinance include pursuing equitable relief, prosecution and takeover of police services in the non-compliant city by the St. Louis County police department at the city's expense. The County Executive immediately issued minimum police standards pursuant to the Ordinance. The standards impose requirements for the licensing, training and hiring of law enforcement officers and for police department accountability and transparency.

Shortly after the standards were issued, the City of Olivette and other cities in St. Louis County ("the Cities") filed petitions challenging the County's authority to enact the Ordinance.2 The Cities and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The County contended that the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the powers granted to it as a charter county in Article VI, Sections 18(b) and 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution. Article VI, Section 18(b) requires a charter county to include provisions in its charter for the exercise of powers conferred specifically to it by the state constitution and the laws of the state. St. Louis County's charter includes such a provision.3 One of the powers conferred by the state is found in Section 192.300 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, which authorizes counties to enact ordinances that enhance public health and prevent disease. Separate and apart from the authority found in that statute or section of the constitution is the power granted to charter counties by Article VI, Section 18(c) to perform the services and functions of a municipality or other political subdivision, except school districts. This authority is often referred to as a charter county's "police powers." The trial court concluded that the County was not authorized to enact this Ordinance under either of these constitutional provisions or the public health statute and entered judgment in the Cities favor. This appeal follows.

At the outset, the County asks this Court to take judicial notice of the following as set forth in its brief:

It is common knowledge that Michael Brown was shot by a police officer in Ferguson, which is in St. Louis County, and that "events" occurred thereafter. We decline to deem the County's opinion about the quality of the standards in city police departments in St. Louis County to be a fact of common knowledge appropriate for judicial notice. This Court is aware of the issues that have come to light in the after-math of events in Ferguson, as set out in the amicus curiae brief filed in support of the County by the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation ("ACLU"). The ACLU asserts there are the following problems with municipal policing in St. Louis County: undue focus on generating revenue over public safety needs, racial bias, inconsistent standards and the so-called "muni shuffle," in which problem officers are shuffled among departments without formal discipline. It cites the published results of the United States Department of Justice's investigation into the Ferguson police department, a study of the police response to the events following the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson and other similar reports and commentary on these issues. The County believes, and the ACLU agrees, that countywide minimum police standards will help address these problems.

But proof — by taking judicial notice of the above or otherwise — that there is a need for improved policing standards in the municipal police departments of St. Louis County is simply not necessary for resolution of the issue before us. However real, important and urgent the need might be, the County can only legislate if it has the authority to do so. Thus, the only question here is whether the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the County's authority under the powers conferred by Article VI, Section 18(b) of the Missouri Constitution and Section 192.300 of the Missouri Revised Statutes or Article VI, Section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution. Our review of this issue of law resolved on summary judgment is de novo, and the Ordinance is presumed valid and enforceable. Missouri Bankers Association. Inc. v. St. Louis County, 448 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Mo. banc 2014). We begin with the County's arguments regarding Article VI, Section 18(c).

Section 18(c)

The current form of Article VI, Section 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution was adopted by voter approval in 1970. It provides:

This grant of authority pertains to the performance of the services and functions of a municipality both outside of and within incorporated areas of the county. The County has, in accordance with the first paragraph above, provisions in its charter that authorize it to exercise this power in unincorporated areas by ordinance. See ST. LOUIS COUNTY CHARTER, Sections 2.180.22 and 2.180.23 ("the council shall have, by ordinance, the power to ... [f]urnish or provide within the part of the county out-side incorporated cities any service or function of any municipality or political subdivision, except school districts" and to "[e]xercise legislative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the county outside incorporated cities, and on such other subjects as may be authorized by the constitution or by law"). A county may also perform such services and functions countywide — out-side of and within incorporated cities — or within a particular municipality by contract, and the second paragraph of Section 18(c) sets out what must be in the charter provision and on the ballot proposition. St. Louis County's charter provision corresponding to that constitutional authority is as follows: "the council shall have, by ordinance, the power to ... [p]rovide the terms upon which the county shall perform any services and functions of any municipality or political subdivision in the county, except school districts, when accepted by a vote of a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon in such municipality or subdivision, which acceptance may be revoked by a like vote; and cooperate and contract with the municipalities or political subdivisions in the county as otherwise authorized by this charter and by law." ST. LOUIS COUNTY CHARTER, Section 2.180.21.4 The trial court concluded that a vote was required in order to enact this countywide legislation, and because there was no such vote, it was not a valid exercise of the County's authority under this Section 18(c).

In its opening brief on appeal, the County first contended that voter approval was optional, not required, because the language "when such a proposition is submitted to voters" meant "if such a proposition is submitted to voters." But it also argued that it had received voter approval of provisions in its charter that authorized this Ordinance when the charter was amended in 1979. The County pointed to three general provisions in the charter, which essentially give it any and all powers available in the constitution and the laws of the state and require liberal construction of those powers in the County's favor.5 In response to the Cities' contention that the County failed to provide a limiting provision as required by Section 18(c) — "any such charter provision shall set forth the limits within which the municipalities may exercise the same power collaterally and coextensively" — the County claimed that no municipality can issue county wide standards and therefore no such limiting language was required. In the County's reply brief, that claim morphed into an argument that not only was no such limiting language required in the provision because this was not a municipal function, but also that an election would only be required if the County were in fact providing a service or function that could also be provided by a municipality. In the next breath of the reply brief, however, the County returned to its position that voter approval is optional based on its construction of the word "when."

By the time of oral argument, the County took this argument one step further and claimed that because the issuance of countywide minimum police standards was not a service or function of a municipality, Section 18(c) was not even applicable in the first place. We could speculate that the County's shifting position on Section 18(c) demonstrates its concern about the lack of voter approval for this countywide action.6 But because the County has abandoned reliance on Section 18(c) as authority for the enactment of this Ordinance, we need not address the applicability of that authority any further or decide if voter approval is required. Rather, we turn to whether enactment of this Ordinance was a valid exercise of the County's authority under Article VI, Section 18(b) of the constitution and Section 192.300 of the statutes, which do not require voter approval or depend on whether the action occurs within or outside of incorporated areas.

Section 18(b) and Section 192.300

As required by Article VI, Section 18(b), St. Louis County's charter provides that it may, via ordinance, exercise any power conferred to it by the state. See ST. LOUIS COUNTY CHARTER, Section 2.180.14. The County contends this Ordinance is a valid exercise of its authority under Section 192.300 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, which confers on all counties the power to make "additional health rules" to those promulgated by the Department of Health and Senior Services, so long as they do not conflict with the department's rules:

MO. REV. STAT. Section 192.300 (emphasis added).

Based on the language in bold above, our courts have framed the issue as whether the ordinance in question "bears a reasonable relation to public health enhancement and disease prevention." Avanti Petroleum, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 974 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (citing Readey v. St. Louis County Water Company, 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961)). In Avanti, this Court found that an ordinance "preventing sales of tobacco to minors to reduce or prevent their use of such products" bore a "reasonable relation to reducing dangerous disease." 974 S.W.2d at 509. In Readey, the Supreme Court found that an ordinance ordering the addition of fluoride to the county water supply would prevent and reduce the widespread and serious disease of dental decay and would be an efficacious "public health measure." 352 S.W.2d at 627. Other cases have similarly analyzed the ordinance in terms of its relation to the prevention of disease and enhancement of public health. See Professional Houndsmen of Missouri, Inc. v. County of Boone, 836 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992) (finding ordinance imposing requirements on animal owners enhanced public health "by preventing rabies and animal bites" and was "reasonably related to the purpose of public health enhancement and disease prevention"); Borron v. Farrenkopf, 5 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (finding ordinance regulating animal feeding operations "rationally related to the purpose of public health enhancement and disease prevention" because of link between human diseases and livestock animal waste). In each case, the courts found that those ordinances were valid exercises of the authority in Section 192.300 specifically because they would prevent the spread of some disease.

The Ordinance in this case, authorizing the issuance of minimum police standards, has nothing to do with the prevention of any disease. The County concedes as much, but argues that, despite the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "and" in the statute, an ordinance under Section 192.300 need not both enhance public health and prevent disease. Rather, it contends, counties are empowered under that section to enact legislation that will either enhance public health or prevent disease. While "and" can mean "or," and vice versa, most commonly "and" simply means "and." See Stiers v. Director of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. banc 2016). Only when there are strong reasons and the context favors doing so to give effect to the legislative intent should courts resort to reading "and" as a disjunction instead of a conjunction. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 511 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. 1974). The County argues that if the legislature had intended to limit the authority to only ordinances that prevent disease, there would have been no reason to include the phrase "enhance public health" and that term would be rendered meaningless if "and" were construed as a conjunction. The converse is also true though: if the legislature had intended to authorize any measure that enhances public health, there would have been no reason to specifically mention preventing disease because that would certainly be encompassed in the more general phrase "enhancing public health."

The County has failed to show a strong reason for construing "and" to mean "or." The plain meaning of the statute — as followed in the cases discussed above — demonstrates the legislature's intent in Section 192.300 was to authorize counties to enact only ordinances that enhance public health and prevent disease. Moreover, the context in which the statute must be read demonstrates that, even if the authority is broad enough to encompass other public health matters beyond just the prevention of disease, the legislature did not intend for it to include law enforcement. Minimum standards for law enforcement is a matters of public safety, not public health.

In reaching this conclusion, we follow the primary rule of statutory interpretation to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute. State ex rel. Burns v. Whittington, 219 S.W.3d 224, 225 (Mo. banc 2007). "In the absence of statutory definitions, the plain and ordinary meaning of a term may be derived from a dictionary and by considering the context of the entire statute in which it appears." Id. The term "public health" is not defined in Section 192.300 or elsewhere in the statute. According to the consensus of definitions of "public health" and "health" in standard and legal dictionaries, the term refers to the physical and mental well-being, particularly freedom from illness and injury, of the community at large.7 On the face of this broad and general definition of "public health" — and without any context — one could say that just about any legislation designed to improve government services to the public, including the imposition of minimum police standards, enhances the physical and mental well-being of the community. But when read in context, it is clear that matters relating to law enforcement are not within the scope of what the legislature meant by "enhance of public health."

This statute is located in the chapter creating the Department of Health and Senior Services, which is charged with developing a comprehensive disease prevention plan, studying the causes and prevention of diseases, designating "infectious, contagious, communicable or dangerous" diseases and making adequate rules to prevent the spread of such diseases. See MO. REV. STAT. Sections 192.011.2 and 192.020.1. Thus, Chapter 192 addresses the Department of Health's authority with respect to such matters as hepatitis C, hygiene, disinfecting contaminated spaces, radiation, cancer, childhood immunizations, arthritis, head and spinal cord injuries, mammography, weight loss, epilepsy, women's health and animal diseases communicable to humans. Likewise, the Department of Health's Division of Community and Public Health has rules on the following topics: food protection, protection of drugs and cosmetics, general sanitation, lead program, toxic substances, protection against radiation, communicable diseases, typhoid carriers, dead bodies infected with a communicable disease, STDs, HIV/AIDS medication programs, dispensing medicine during emergencies, prescription drug repository program and hemp extract registration. See 19 C.S.R 20-1.010 through 29 C.S.R 20-51.010.

The legislature created a distinct and separate entity to handle matters of law enforcement: the Department of Public Safety. That department's role is to "provide overall coordination in the state's public safety and law enforcement program" and to coordinate other agencies on public safety and law enforcement matters. MO. REV. STAT. Section 650.005.1, The duties of the state highway patrol, liquor control, fire prevention (formerly a bureau of the public health department), the state militia, the state's boat commission and veteran's commission are part of the Department of Public Safety. See Mo. REV. STAT. Section 650.005.2-10. Chapter 650 addresses the Department of Public Safety's authority with respect to motor vehicle regulations, community crime-tip programs, missing endangered persons procedures, firearms training and qualifications for retired law enforcement officers carrying concealed weapons, a DNA profiling system, crime laboratories, drug enforcement, regulation of boilers, an office for victims of crimes and emergency communications systems. The Department of Public Safety has rules relating to fireworks, amusement rides, elevators, gaming, boating and water skiing. See 11 C.S.R. 40.1.010, et seq. In fact, the Department of Public Safety is the agency that promulgated the state minimum standards for law enforcement officers known as POST, the "Peace Officer Standards and Training Program." See Mo. REV. STAT. Section 590.010 and 11 C.S.R. 75-1.010, et seq.

By creating different departments to address "public safety" and "public health," the legislature has indicated that it considers these two different and distinct areas of government authority. In fact, throughout the revised statutes, the legislature has used these terms in a way that demonstrates they are distinct, such as in the phrase "public health, safety and welfare," We must presume the legislature did not intend, therefore, for these phrases to be synonymous or redundant and that each of these terms mean something different. See Young v. Boone, 462 S.W.3d 783, 792-93 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). Because the legislature did not include in its grant of authority to counties in Section 192.300 the power to enact ordinances that enhance public safety, and only used the term public health, it must not have intended to confer — at least in this statute — the power to legislate on matters of public safety. It may not be possible to define all the actions the legislature intended to be covered by the phrase "enhance public health." But we know at least that it does not include that which is a matter of law enforcement because the legislature has placed law enforcement squarely within the realm of public safety, as opposed to public health. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. Chapters 192 and 650, supra. Likewise, St. Louis County's charter itself recognizes that law enforcement is not a matter of public health, as like the State, it too has separate departments for "community health and medical care" and "police." See ST. LOUIS COUNTY CHARTER, Article IV.

The County's reliance on information presented to the County Council as to the impact of this Ordinance on public health does not aid its argument for how this was a valid exercise of authority under Section 192.300.8 The positive impact that improved law enforcement may have on the public — including the extent to which it improves the community's physical and mental well-being — is simply not what was meant by "enhance public health" in Section 192.300. To hold otherwise would be to broaden the scope of authority beyond what the legislature intended by granting counties the power to make "additional health rules" in Section 192.300.9 Thus, this Ordinance was not a valid exercise of the County's authority conferred by that statute.

All points are denied, and the judgment is affirmed.

Angela T. Quigless, P.J. concurs with opinion of Judge Robert G. Dowd, Jr.

Lisa S. Van Amburg, J., concurs in separate concurring opinion.

Lisa Van Amburg, Judge, concurring.

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ordinance is beyond the scope of § 192.300. In my view, however, voter approval of the ordinance as an assumption of municipal functions is required only by § 2.180.21 of the County's charter and not by Article VI § 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution.

As the majority notes, § 2.180.21 of the charter authorizes the county to perform municipal services and functions "when accepted by a vote of a majority of the qualified electors...." This requirement alone is fatal to the County's position. But regardless of whether an earlier version of Article VI § 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution mirrored this language, I do not construe the current version to mandate a vote. Missouri voters approved and adopted the current version of § 18(c) in 1970. It states that, "When such a proposition is submitted to the voters of the county[,] the ballot shall contain a clear definition of the power, function or service to be performed and the method by which it will be financed." I interpret this to mean that, when the nature of the ordinance is such that it requires a vote under a county's charter, then the ballot measure should contain sufficient specifics to inform the voters' decision. In other words, this sentence simply prescribes the content of the ballot.

Therefore, I would opine that the ordinance does not exceed the county's authority under the Missouri Constitution, but voter approval is still required under the county's charter.