RODNEY W. SIPPEL, District Judge.
This matter is before me on the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner Tony O. Johnson. I referred this matter to United States Magistrate Judge Lewis M. Blanton for a Report and Recommendation on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). On July 18, 2013, Judge Blanton filed his recommendation that Johnson's habeas petition should be denied.
Johnson objects to Judge Blanton's Report and Recommendation. After conducting a
Johnson first contends that Judge Blanton applied an incorrect legal standard when analyzing his claims. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner unless the state court's adjudication of a claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This is a highly deferential standard,
Johnson argues that Judge Blanton erred in concluding that he is not entitled to relief on Ground 1 of his petition. In his objections, Johnson restates the arguments he made in support of this habeas petition and contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to a statement made by the prosecuting attorney during voir dire. To prevail on a due process claim based on comments made by the prosecutor, a petitioner must show that the comments "were so egregious that they fatally infected the proceedings and rendered his entire trial fundamentally unfair."
Johnson also objects to Judge Blanton's findings on Ground 2, in which he argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in overruling his objection to a jury instruction. Habeas relief may be granted for erroneous jury instructions only when the error constituted a fundamental defect that resulted "in a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of a fair trial."
Johnson next argues that Judge Blanton incorrectly decided his ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in Grounds 3, 4, 5, and 6 of his petition. Once again, Johnson's objections largely restate the arguments he made in support of this petition. I agree that Johnson is not entitled to habeas relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel grounds for the same reasons stated by Judge Blanton in his Report and Recommendation. On each ground, Johnson failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel erred, or that he was prejudiced by the alleged errors.
Finally, Johnson argues that Judge Blanton erred finding that Ground 7 of his petition is procedurally defaulted. A review of the record reveals that Johnson did not raise this ground in his direct appeal or post-conviction proceedings. Because Johnson did not raise this federal ground in state court, it is procedurally barred.
I have also considered whether to issue a certificate of appealability. To grant a certificate of appealability, the Court must find a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right.
Accordingly,