JEAN C. HAMILTON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Jimmy Pampkin's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (Petition, ECF No. 1.) Respondent has filed a Response (ECF No. 7), and the Petition is ready for disposition.
On September 6, 2010, two men invaded the home of Harvey Butler, shot him, and stole his cash and his vehicle. Mr. Butler's stepson, Johannsen Rotellini, witnessed the event and provided descriptions of the assailants to law enforcement. Law enforcement subsequently found Mr. Butler's stolen vehicle and apprehended the driver, Marvin Williams. Mr. Williams was transported to the police station where he was questioned by Detective Michael Pratt. Mr. Williams explained to Detective Pratt that he had obtained the vehicle from "Big Moo" (later identified as Marquis Hardin), who had stated that he obtained the vehicle from "JD" and "Vloc." Based on Mr. Williams's statements, Detective Pratt entered the nicknames "JD and "Vloc" into a crime database and ascertained the identity of "JD" as Petitioner. Detective Pratt then prepared a photographic lineup from which Mr. Rotellini identified Petitioner, as did Mr. Butler. Mr. Rotellini and Mr. Butler also identified Petitioner in a subsequent physical lineup.
On April 19, 2012, a jury in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City found Petitioner guilty of robbery in the first degree, assault in the first degree, and armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced Petitioner as a persistent felony offender to 40 years in prison. (Resp. Ex. 1.) Petitioner timely appealed, and on October 22, 2013, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. State v. Pampkin, 411 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). On January 3, 2014, Petitioner moved for postconviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. Petitioner was appointed counsel and he thereafter filed an amended Rule 29.15 motion, which was denied. On December 8, 2015, following an evidentiary hearing, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. The mandate issued on January 4, 2016. Pampkin v. State, 477 S.W.3d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (per curiam).
In his Petition, Petitioner raises the following two grounds for relief:
(Petition at 5-6.) Petitioner exhausted his claims in the state courts, as he presented them respectively in his direct appeal and in his post-conviction motion. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the South Central Correctional Center in Licking, Missouri.
"[A] district court shall entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "In the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by the [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (`AEDPA')] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant relief to a state prisoner unless the state court's adjudication of a claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established law if "it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citations omitted). If the state court's decision is not "contrary to" clearly established law, the remaining question is whether the state court's determination was "unreasonable." Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2012). This standard is "difficult to meet, and even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). "[A] state court's decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent when the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case, or either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Moore v. Purkett, 275 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citation omitted). "Federal habeas relief is warranted only when the refusal was objectively unreasonable, not when it was merely erroneous or incorrect." Carter v. Kemna, 255 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted).
A state court's decision involves "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings...only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotation and citations omitted). "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," unless the petitioner rebuts the determination with "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The presumption of correctness of findings of fact applies to the factual determinations made by a state court at either the trial or appellate levels. See Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
In Ground 1, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Pratt to testify, over defense counsel's objections, as to the statements Mr. Williams made tracing the stolen vehicle to Petitioner. At trial the State sought to introduce Detective Pratt's testimony that, upon questioning Mr. Williams, he "learned" the nicknames of two individuals who "may have been involved the robbery and assault." Defense counsel objected to Detective Pratt's testimony on the grounds that it constituted inadmissible double hearsay. In overruling defense counsel's objection, the trial court determined that the testimony was offered to explain subsequent police conduct, and not for the truth of the matter asserted. (Resp. Ex. 1 at 535-544.) Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's hearsay objection, and that Detective Pratt's testimony was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal.
In affirming Petitioner's sentence and conviction, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated as follows:
(Resp. Ex. 6 at 6-7.)
"[T]he right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). "The Confrontation Clause bars `admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.'" United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 878 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004)). However, the Supreme Court made clear in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause "is limited to hearsay evidence—that is, evidence offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." United States v. Holmes, 620 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2010). "Where an out-of-court statement is offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to explain the reasons for or propriety of a police investigation, then it is not hearsay and does not implicate the Confrontation Clause." See United States v. Shores, 700 F.3d 366, 374 (8th Cir. 2012).
Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the state courts' rulings with regard to this claim comport with Crawford and its progeny, and that they were neither contrary to, nor unreasonable applications of, clearly established federal law, and were not based upon unreasonable determinations of fact. See id.; United States v. Brooks, 645 F.3d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 2011). Therefore, Ground 1 will be denied.
In Ground 2, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress Mr. Butler's and Mr. Rotellini's out-of-court and in-court identifications as the products of suggestive lineup procedures. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the pretrial lineup was unnecessarily suggestive and unreliable because Petitioner was the only individual dressed in a collared shirt that resembled the shirt worn by the Mr. Butler's assailant, as described by Mr. Rotellini. Petitioner contends that it is probable that the trial court would have sustained such a motion to suppress, and that the result of the trial would have been different. Petitioner raised this point in his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.
In determining that Petitioner was not entitled post-conviction relief, the motion court noted trial counsel's testimony that he believed a motion to suppress would have been meritless, and that arguing the identification issue to the jury was a better strategy. The Court of Appeals found that the motion court did not clearly err in its determination, reasoning as follows:
(Resp. Ex. 12 at 11-16.)
In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). The petitioner must first show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. Review of counsel's performance by the Court is "highly deferential," and "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 689, 690. The petitioner must then establish prejudice by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. When determining if prejudice exists, the court "must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Id. at 695.
This Court finds that the state courts reasonably applied the principles of the Strickland framework in determining that Petitioner's trial attorney did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, trial counsel testified at the Rule 29.15 evidentiary hearing that he believed a motion to suppress would have been meritless, and that arguing the identification issue to the jury was better trial strategy. In addition, during the trial Mr. Rotellini testified that he did not base his identification on Petitioner's shirt alone, and that he recognized Petitioner's face in the lineup. Mr. Butler also testified that he got "a very good look" at Petitioner's face. Thus, the Court agrees that trial counsel's decision not to file a motion to suppress was not objectively unreasonable. See Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423, 435-36 (8th Cir. 2005) (even if photographic identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, central question regarding eyewitness identification at trial is "whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable despite any suggestive or inappropriate pre-trial identification techniques"; factors court considers include level of certainty demonstrated by witness); see also Griffin v. Delo, 33 F.3d 895, 901 (8th Cir. 1994) ("When a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged on the basis of failing to...act, the reasonableness of the nonfeasance must be assessed in light of all circumstances, and a significant degree of deference given to counsel and his or her professional judgment."). In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the state courts did not issue a decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, and that they were not based upon unreasonable determinations of fact. Therefore, Ground 2 will be denied.
Accordingly,
