JOHN A. ROSS, District Judge.
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying Kristina Luking's ("Luking") application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. and supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.
Luking applied for supplemental security income benefits on March 18, 2013 and disability insurance benefits on April 18, 2013, alleging disability as of July 27, 2012 due to depression, anxiety, a heart defect, respiratory issues and obesity. After her application was denied at the initial administrative level, she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Following a hearing on February 19, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision on June 15, 2015, denying her applications. Luking's request for review by the Appeals Council was denied. Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
The Court adopts Luking's Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 23 at 2-10), which have been admitted by the Commissioner (Doc. No. 26-1). The Court's review of the record shows that the adopted facts are accurate and complete. Specific facts will be discussed as part of the analysis.
The court's role on judicial review is to determine whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
To determine whether the ALJ's final decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:
The Social Security Act defines as disabled a person who is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment must be "of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a), 404.1520(a). "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled."
Second, the claimant must have a "severe impairment," defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 404.1520(c). The severity of mental disorders is determined by rating the claimant's degree of limitations in four areas of functioning: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation (the "paragraph B criteria"). § 404.1520a(c)(3). "The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on [his or] her ability to work."
Third, the claimant must establish that his or her impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 404.1520(d). If the claimant has one of, or the medical equivalent of, these impairments, then the claimant is per se disabled without consideration of the claimant's age, education, or work history.
Before considering step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). RFC is defined as "the most a claimant can do despite [his] limitations."
At step five, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to see if the claimant can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then he will be found to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
Through step four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he is disabled.
The ALJ found Luking had the severe impairments of asthma, bipolar disorder, depression, obesity and hearing loss, but that no impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. In making this finding, the ALJ found Luking's mental impairments did not satisfy the "paragraph B" criteria because she had only moderate restrictions in activities of daily living; mild difficulties in social functioning; no difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace; and no episodes of decompensation (Tr. 18-19). The ALJ also found the evidence of record failed to establish the presence of the "paragraph C" criteria
After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Luking had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with the following limitations: lift or carry twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently; sit, stand or walk for six hours out of an eight-hour workday; avoid concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, gases, or other pulmonary irritants, extreme heat or vibration, and loud environment without hearing protection; occasional contact with the general public, co-workers and supervisors.
The ALJ found Luking unable to perform her past relevant work as a cashier, personal care aide, and fast food worker, but that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform, such as bench assembler, prep production worker, maid/laundry worker, and hand packager. Thus, the ALJ found Luking was not disabled as defined by the Act.
A claimant's RFC is defined as the most an individual can do despite the combined effects of all of his or her credible limitations.
In evaluating a claimant's credibility, the ALJ should consider the claimant's daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of the symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and functional restrictions.
Here, the ALJ identified a number of reasons for finding Luking's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms not entirely credible. First, there was no correlation to a significant medical event on the alleged onset date other than her selfreport that she was having increasing difficulty with breathing and back pain (Tr. 21, 45). There was also evidence that Luking had stopped working for reasons unrelated to her alleged disabilities. She testified she "was let go because of circumstances with babysitting or not having a babysitter for [her] daughter for the summer." (Tr. 40, 456). The ALJ properly considered the fact that Luking stopped working for reasons other than her alleged disability when assessing her credibility.
The ALJ also noted Luking's failure to comply with medical treatment recommendations for tinnitus management, exercise and weight loss, as well as her failure to use her CPAP machine on a consistent basis. (Tr. 16, 21-22, 1010, 1016-17, 1032, 1114, 1155, 1158, 1215). An ALJ may properly consider a claimant's noncompliance with a treating physician's directions in his credibility analysis.
The ALJ's credibility finding is further supported by the record evidence that with treatment, Luking's symptoms of depression, back pain, and gastritis improved. (Tr. 16, 21-22, 412, 441, 453, 1055, 1048, 1058, 1229). "Evidence of effective medication resulting in relief may diminish the credibility of a claimant's complaints."
With regard to her back pain, the ALJ noted Luking's testimony that she took no pain medications other than Tylenol and had not tried a TENS unit.
The ALJ assessed moderate restriction in Luking's activities of daily living after acknowledging that she experienced weakness in her legs and problems breathing during the day, that she napped, and that she needed reminders to take care of her personal needs. (Tr. 18, 272-74, 277). However, the ALJ also considered Luking's statements that she cared for her then 9year old daughter, prepared simple meals, used public transportation, went out alone, shopped for groceries and necessities two to three times per month, and tried to walk every day and clean her house (Tr. 18, 21, 37, 60, 272-75). Luking argues that engaging in these types of activities is not inconsistent with her subjective complaints and provides little to no support for a finding that she can perform full-time competitive work (Doc. No. 12 at 12). To be sure, "the ability to do activities such as light housework and visiting with friends" alone are insufficient reason to discredit Luking's subjective complaints.
Luking argues the ALJ failed to account for side effects from her medication, namely that her medications caused "a lot of sleepiness." Although the ALJ did not discuss Luking's alleged sleepiness as a side effect, the medical record does not indicate that she complained of this side effect to her physicians. In fact, the ALJ specifically noted a January 2013 visit during which Luking reported no side effects from medications and displayed normal attention and concentration on mental status examination (Tr. 21, 412). Thus, the ALJ did not err in failing to discuss Luking's sleepiness as a medication side effect.
In sum, the ALJ discussed many of the
As noted above, Luking does not challenge the ALJ's consideration of the medical treatment records or evaluation of the medical opinion evidence. Nevertheless, upon review, the Court finds the ALJ considered a detailed medical record, psychological and neurological consultative evaluations performed at the ALJ's request, and the opinion of a state agency psychological consultant. The ALJ also relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to find Luking capable of jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy (Tr. 19-25, 66-68).
For these reasons, the Court finds there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the ALJ's determination, and, therefore, the Commissioner's decision denying benefits should be affirmed.
Accordingly,