AUDREY G. FLEISSIG, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court will order petitioner to show cause as to why the it should not dismiss the instant petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
On August 12, 2013, petitioner pled guilty to robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree. On August 22, 2013, petitioner was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on both counts, concurrent to one another and concurrent to three federal sentences in United States v. Parker, Nos. 2:12CR4005 FJG, 2:12CR4029 FJG and 2:10CR4055 FJG (W.D.Mo.)
Petitioner failed to file any motions for post-conviction relief, although he did file a state habeas corpus motion, pursuant to Mo.Sup.Ct.R.91 on June 27, 2016, seeking to have his conviction and sentence overturned. See Parker v. State, No. 16SL-CC02838 (21
Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by placing his application for writ in the prison mailing system on March 27, 2017.
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides that a district court shall summarily dismiss a § 2254 petition if it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d):
The United States Supreme Court, in Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641 (2012), held that a judgment becomes final under § 2244)(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking review in the state's highest court expires. For Missouri prisoners, like petitioner, who do not file a motion to transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court, the limitations period begins to run fifteen (15) days after the Missouri Court of Appeals affirms a conviction on direct appeal. See Mo.S.Ct.R. 83.02. Thus, petitioner's statute of limitations expired on May 22, 2014. And he was almost three years late in filing the instant action.
In an attempt to assert that his habeas action is timely, petitioner asserts that a new rule of constitutional law was amended by the Supreme Court effecting petitioner's conviction. Specifically, he claims that he is "serving a state sentence where a hypothetical approach was used to convict [him of robbery] in light of the holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)."
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in the definition of a "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) ("ACCA"), is unconstitutionally vague. 135 S.Ct. at 2551.
In light of the aforementioned, the Court will order petitioner to show cause, in writing and no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, why this action should not be dismissed as time-barred.
Accordingly,
On March 30, 2012, Case No. 2:12CR4029 FJG (W.D.Mo), was transferred from the District of Oregon to the Western District of Missouri for entry of a guilty plea and sentencing. Petitioner entered a guilty plea to three counts of bank robbery on July 30, 2012, and he was sentenced by the District Court on March 15, 2013 to 100 months' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with Case Nos. 12-4005-1 and 10-04055-1. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
On November 2, 2010, Kenneth D. Parker was indicted on two counts of bank robbery in Case No. 2:10CR4055 FJG (W.D.Mo). On July 30, 2012, defendant entered a plea of guilty to both counts of felony bank robbery, and he was sentenced by the District Court on March 15, 2013 to 100 months' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with Case Nos. 12-04029-1 and 10-04005-1. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.