NOELLE C. COLLINS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Wells Pettibone's Motion to Compel (Doc. 49). The Motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 11). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion will be
On March 2, 2018, Plaintiff Wells Pettibone's ("Plaintiff") filed this action in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Missouri against Defendant TJX Companies, Inc. ("TJ Maxx") and Zurich American Insurance Co. for negligence (Count I) and products liability (Count II) (Doc. 6).
In conjunction with Plaintiff's request to amend the case management order (Doc. 52), on March 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel requesting an order compelling Defendant to answer each of Plaintiff's First Interrogatories and to respond to each of Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents (Doc. 50). Plaintiff also requests costs and attorneys' fees (Id. at 20). Plaintiff originally raised a significant number of discovery disputes (See id.). However, in the course of briefing the matter and after an additional discovery conference, the parties have come to an agreement regarding all but one of the issues.
The facts regarding the remaining discovery dispute are as follows. On November 29, 2018,
(Id. at 12). On December 19, 2018, Defendant responded to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories (Doc. 50-3). Defendant objected to Interrogatory Number 16, stating:
(Id. at 7). In his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's objections are frivolous (Doc. 50 at 13). In support of his assertion, Plaintiff notes that under Missouri law, Plaintiff can bring a failure to warn case both under the theory of negligence and under a theory of strict liability as alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint (Id. at 14). Plaintiff therefore argues that the interrogatory and all its parts are relevant to Plaintiff's causes of action (Id.). Plaintiff further asserts that the term "participated in" is not ambiguous and notes Plaintiff meant the term in its common meaning (Id.).
On March 22, 2019, after Plaintiff filed his Motion to Compel, Defendant issued Supplemental Answers to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories (Doc. 57-1). In its Supplemental Answer to this Interrogatory, Defendant responded:
(Id. at 6).
In its briefing of the current Motion, Defendant continues to object to all three subparts of the interrogatory. First, regarding subpart (a), Defendant again asserts that the subpart is overly broad (Doc. 57 at 4-5). Defendant further indicates that it has identified its employee most directly involved in the purchase of the Product and waives any objection to the extent the interrogatory seeks identification of that individual (Id. at 5). Second, Defendant objects to subpart (b) because Plaintiff's complaint does not state a theory of recovery based on an alleged "failure to inspect" the Product (Doc. 66 at 2). Third, Defendant argues that subpart (c) is not relevant to Plaintiff's strict liability claim and, to the extent the interrogatory may be relevant to Plaintiff's negligence claim, it is argumentative, vague and ambiguous (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff responds indicating that the individual identified by Defendant, Ms. Dwyer, was not presented for deposition despite apparent representations that she would the corporate directed at Defendant on December 11, 2018 (Doc. 50-1 at 14; Doc. 57 at 1). representative presented for deposition in March (Doc. 60 at 2). Plaintiff again asserts that the interrogatory is relevant to Plaintiff's negligence count because failing to inspect a product is one way to fail to select a product that is safe or to fail to warn of potential danger (Id. at 3 n.1).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides for the discovery of any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. "Relevancy is to be broadly construed and encompass[es] `any matter that could bear on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.'" E.E.O.C. v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 2007 WL 1217919 at *1 (D. Neb. March 15, 2007) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). To that end, discovery need not be admissible at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, Plaintiff, as the moving party, "bear[s] the initial burden of showing that the requested discovery is discoverable within the meaning of Rule 26." Bates v. Delmar Gardens N., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-00783-AGF, 2016 WL 3543046, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2016). "[A]fter the proponent of discovery makes a threshold showing of relevance, the party opposing a motion to compel has the burden of showing its objections are valid by providing specific explanations or factual support as to how each discovery request is improper." Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Fine Home Managers, Inc., No. 4:09CV234-DJS, 2010 WL 2990118, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 27, 2010). "The management of discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." In re Missouri Dep't of Nat. Res., 105 F.3d 434, 435 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Bunting v. Sea Ray, Inc., 99 F.3d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The Court finds that while at times inartfully worded, Interrogatory Number 16 and all of its subparts are relevant and proper. First, subpart (a) clearly contemplates disclosure of the individuals who "participated in" or were a part of the decision to purchase the Product. The decision-making and review process involving the selection of the Product to sell in Defendant's retail stores is clearly relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Although Defendant asserts that the interrogatory is overbroad such that a response will necessarily lead to the disclosure of many individuals including administrative staff, and while this may indeed be required, the Court urges Defendant to apply a common sense reading of the interrogatory and disclose those individuals involved in the decision to select the Product. Second, as to the remaining subparts, even if the Court were to narrowly interpret Plaintiff's strict liability count not to include "failure to inspect" or "failure to warn" claims, both subparts (b) and (c) are directly relevant to Plaintiff's negligence claim which includes a "failure to warn" claim and, at least tangentially, includes a "failure to inspect" claim. Further, although subpart (c) uses the term "responsible for" which potentially implies Defendant has a legal duty to warn and the subpart also appears to indicate that there may have been prior knowledge on the part of Defendant as to dangers associated with the Product, a fair interpretation of subpart (c), and one supported by Plaintiff's representations, is that Plaintiff is seeking the individuals, if any, tasked or involved in the dissemination of warnings of dangers, if any, associated with the Product. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees and costs presumably incurred in the preparation of the current Motion, the Court will deny his request.
Accordingly,