JOHN A. ROSS, District Judge.
On May 10, 2019, this Court granted Plaintiff's Opposed Motion for Conditional Class Certification and Notice to Putative Class Members in part and conditionally certified a class of:
(Doc. No. 73). The Court ordered the parties to submit a joint agreed upon notice and consent form no later than July 15, 2019.
As a general matter, the Court notes that the purpose of the notice form is to inform potential class members about the existence of the lawsuit and allow them to evaluate whether or not they wish to join it.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that both parties have included the following language on the first page of their proposed notices:
The parties identify this date in a footnote as "three years back from the date the Court enters an order approving this Notice." To the extent the parties are addressing the statute of limitations for the putative class claims, this has already been addressed in the section of the Notice concerning eligibility to join this lawsuit ("You are eligible to join this lawsuit if ... You were employed by Serco in one of the four locations that processed Affordable Care Act applications at any time from three years prior to when you join the lawsuit to the present ..."). As such, the footnote is unnecessary and potentially confusing to recipients of the notice. If, however, the parties are seeking to highlight the deadline for joining this lawsuit (as discussed below, the Court has approved a 60 day notice period to return the consent forms), the Court will permit it with the following change:
This date is 60 days after the dissemination date of August 19, 2019.
Serco first objects to the case caption used as a heading on the first page of the notice, arguing that it creates the impression of judicial endorsement of the case. Plaintiff responds that use of the official case caption is appropriate because it advises putative class members of an official communication from the Court as opposed to a solicitation or advertisement.
While the case caption can appropriately appear in the notice, courts have found that placing the court name in the heading is improper because it may be misconstrued as judicial support for the plaintiffs' litigation.
Second, Serco objects to the "RE" line at the top of Plaintiff's proposed notice concerning "The Right of Current and Former Call-Center Employees Who Worked for Serco, Inc. to Join a Lawsuit Seeking Unpaid Overtime Lawsuit [sic]" on the grounds that this language could suggest the Court has already determined that recipients of the notice worked "unpaid overtime." Serco further argues this language is unnecessary given that the next line of the notice describes why the recipient is receiving it. Plaintiff responds that a "RE" line is commonly used to identify the purpose of the document for the reader and that this introductory text does not imply that the Court has determined the merits of this litigation. The Court agrees. The introductory section merely informs the recipient of a lawsuit concerning unpaid overtime. Moreover, the proposed notice is clear that "[t]he Court has not decided who is right but has authorized this notice to inform you of your right to join this lawsuit." Serco's objection will be overruled.
Third, Serco objects on the grounds that the proposed Notice fails to disclose that Plaintiffs may be responsible for Serco's fees and costs if Serco prevails in the lawsuit.
In its proposed notice, Serco seeks to substitute "CMS-ES," the correct name of the relevant division, for "Affordable Care Act." Plaintiff objects to the late substitution, noting that the Court used the term "Affordable Care Act" as part of the class definition and maintaining that the Notice should follow the approved language of the Court. The Court finds this substitution would not provide potential plaintiffs with any additional information necessary to make an informed decision about whether to participate. Because a court should not alter a plaintiff's proposed notice unless such alteration in necessary,
In light of the Court's previous finding that Plaintiff's counsel engaged in "a concerted effort to circumvent the established notification procedure" for opt-in collective actions, Serco expresses concern about providing Plaintiff's counsel with a list of names and contact information when that information could instead be given to a neutral Third-Party Administrator. Plaintiff responds that use of a third-party administrator is improper and inconsistent with the case law of this Court, citing
The Court will not appoint a neutral administrator to distribute the notice in this case. The Court addressed Serco's concerns and the conduct of Plaintiff's counsel by requiring Plaintiff to issue a curative notice to those plaintiffs who opted-in based on information provided them that was not approved by the Court. Accordingly, Serco shall provide Plaintiff's counsel with the names, home addresses, and e-mail addresses of all employees who may be potential plaintiffs in this case.
Serco also argues that because Plaintiff has failed to suggest that First Class Mail is inadequate to effect notice, her request to send notice by e-mail or posting notice at Serco's facilities should be denied. Plaintiff responds that courts regularly authorize notice by mail, e-mail and posting.
"The Court finds little basis for imposing a presumption that notice by mail should be the only approved method of providing notice absent a showing by the plaintiffs that personal mailing would be unreliable."
Notice by e-mail in addition to ordinary mail appears to be in line with the current trend among courts nationwide and "advances the remedial purpose of the FLSA, because service of the notice by two separate methods increases the likelihood that all potential opt-in plaintiffs will receive notice of the lawsuit."
Plaintiff requests a 60 day notice period to return the consent forms as well as a reminder notice to be sent thirty days before the expiration of the opt-in deadline. Serco contends that a 45 day notice period is sufficient, particularly since hundreds of potential plaintiffs have already been notified by Plaintiff of their right to join this lawsuit.
There is a range of authority regarding the appropriate length for the opt-in period.
Given the breadth of forms of notice available to Plaintiff, the Court finds providing "reminder" notices to potential class members unnecessary and redundant.
Accordingly,
Paragraph 7 states that "Plaintiffs' attorneys are advancing the expenses of the litigation. They are representing the Plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis. No current or former Call-Center Employee who opts in to the lawsuit will owe any attorneys' fees unless the Plaintiffs win the lawsuit." (