CHARLES A. SHAW, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on defendants Dave Dormire, Terry Russell, Troy Steele, and Dale Phillips's motion for summary judgment. Also before the Court is defendant Terry Taylor's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Tony Ray King is a prisoner residing at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center ("ERDCC") in Bonne Terre, Missouri. Plaintiff murdered his young son, and while awaiting sentencing, he murdered his cellmate. In his First Amended Complaint, plaintiff brings claims against Dave Dormire, the Director of Adult Institutions for the Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDOC"); Dale Phillips, a Functional Unit Manager at ERDCC, Terry Russell, warden of ERDCC until February or March 2015; Troy Steele, warden at ERDCC since February or March 2015; and Terry Taylor, a nurse for Corizon, LLC, who worked at ERDCC. All defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff alleges that he was held in administrative segregation at ERDCC for 923 consecutive days, from November 5, 2013 to May 16, 2016, the majority of which, from November 5, 2013 until December 30, 2015, he was in single-cell confinement. During his time in administrative confinement, he alleges that he was deprived of privileges allowed to prisoners in the general population, such as attending religious services, recreational opportunities, canteen access, contact visits, and he was allowed only one fifteen-minute phone call per month. Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied adequate hygiene supplies and medical supplies for his dry, cracked, and bleeding skin and for a ringworm rash. He further alleges that he experienced a worsening of his anxiety disorder as a result of being held in prolonged administrative segregation.
Plaintiff brings two counts in his First Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) deprivation of due process rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, against defendants Dormire, Russell, and Steele (Count I); and (2) deprivation of the constitutional right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, against defendants Phillips and Taylor (Count II). For relief, plaintiff seeks a declaration that defendants violated his constitutional rights, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
In response to the First Amended Complaint, defendants Dormire, Russell, Steele, and Phillips filed motions to dismiss, which were denied. After conducting discovery, defendants Dormire, Russell, Steele, and Phillips now move for summary judgment on two grounds. Defendants Dormire, Russell, and Steele argue that in light of the fact plaintiff murdered his cellmate, it was reasonable and lawful to house him in single-cell administrative segregation. They argue he received constitutional due process during his assignment in administrative segregation. Defendant Phillips argues the deprivation of skin lotion does not amount to constitutionally prohibited cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants Dormire, Russell, Steele and Phillips also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant Taylor also moves for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff's dry skin was not a serious medical condition. Defendant Taylor further argues that he did not disregard any medical condition, and to the extent he delayed in treating plaintiff's ringworm, it had no detrimental effect.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be entered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations of his pleadings but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
After reviewing the record, and with the summary judgment standard in mind, the Court accepts the following facts as true for purposes of resolving defendants' motions for summary judgment:
On May 2, 2013, plaintiff was convicted of murdering his seven-year-old son by manual strangulation. While awaiting sentencing for the murder of his son, plaintiff was confined with another cell-mate in the Buchanan County Jail. On June 11, 2013, while confined in the Buchanan County Jail, plaintiff murdered his cellmate, also by manual strangulation.
On September 17, 2013, plaintiff was transferred to ERDCC. On an initial classification form dated the same day, it was noted the ERDCC Classification Committee recommended that plaintiff was to be assigned to the general population at ERDCC — a recommendation that was approved. Doc. 64, Ex. 9 at 1.
Plaintiff entered a guilty plea for the murder of his cellmate on September 26, 2013. He was transferred back to Buchanan County sometime thereafter for sentencing. Upon his return to ERDCC on November 4, 2013, plaintiff was placed in single-cell administrative segregation "pending review by mental health staff." Doc. 62, Ex. D. It was noted on a Temporary Administration Segregation Confinement Form dated November 4, 2013, that plaintiff was "an immediate security risk" and, therefore, "[t]here is an urgent need to separate the offender from others for his/her own safety or that of others" and "[f]or the security and good order of the institution."
On November 6, 2013, a prison psychiatrist, Dr. Anna Irving, M.D., conducted an examination of plaintiff and determined that he was not, at that time, mentally disabled or hostile. On November 13, 2013, following a hearing at which plaintiff was present, the Classification Committee at ERDCC recommended that plaintiff remain in single-cell confinement in the prison's administrative segregation unit, "pending review by mental health staff — special security concerns." Doc. 62, Ex. H. Plaintiff refused to sign the Classification Hearing Form. Doc. 64, Ex. 9 at 2.
While an inmate in administrative segregation, plaintiff was monitored by the mental health staff at ERDCC at least every ninety (90) days. On November 25, 2013, plaintiff was assessed by Diane Kearns, LPC, the Institutional Chief of Mental Health Services.
The next classification hearing was held on December 11, 2013, at which plaintiff was present. On the Classification Hearing Form dated the same day, it was written that plaintiff was "currently being reviewed for long term single man cell placement at request of mental health staff." Doc. 61, Ex. 9 at 3.
On January 21, 2014, Dwayne Kempker, the Deputy Division Director for the Missouri Division of Adult Institutions, approved long-term single-cell status for plaintiff. Mr. Kempker wrote in an email to Chrystal Schmitz, Central Transfer Authority Manager for MDOC, "Per the Buchanan County event, I do approve a single cell status until further notice. He was charged with murdering his cellmate there. . . . I do order his single cell status. He may remain at ERDCC unless other necessitating factors arise." Doc. 62, Ex. K.
On March 5, 2014, the ERDCC Classification Committee held a 90-day classification review hearing, at which plaintiff was present. Plaintiff declined to make a statement at the hearing. The Classification Hearing Form for the March 5, 2014 hearing includes a notation that plaintiff was in "single cell status approved — long term, continuously reviewed by mental health staff." Doc. 64, Ex. 9 at 4.
On March 7, 2014, plaintiff submitted an Informal Resolution Request ("IRR") challenging his assignment to administrative segregation. On March 27, 2014, the staff at ERDCC denied the IRR and informed plaintiff as follows: "Your mandated single cell assignment is for safety and security concerns and was approved by a Deputy Director of Adult Institutions of the Department of Corrections. This decision will be re-evaluated occasionally. A recommendation will be made and submitted at the time of review." Doc. 62, Ex. M.
On May 27, 2014, the Classification Committee at ERDCC held a 90-day classification review hearing, a which plaintiff was present. Doc. 64, Ex. 9 at 5. Plaintiff declined to make a statement. The Classification Hearing Form dated that day noted that plaintiff should continue to remain in single-cell status and be monitored by mental health staff.
After his IRR was denied, plaintiff submitted an Offender Grievance on March 25, 2014, and a Grievance Appeal on May 12, 2014, both of which were denied. On June 5, 2014, Alan Butterworth, Functional Unit Manager at ERDCC, wrote to a letter to plaintiff in response to correspondence plaintiff sent to defendant Russell. Mr. Butterworth wrote: "You have been assigned to single cell status at the approval of the Deputy Division Director, with a review date in approx. one year. This recommendation is based on the totality of your circumstances, as well as evaluations from medical, mental health, and classification staff." Doc. 62, Ex. O.
On June 23, 2014, Dwayne Kempker, Deputy Division Director, wrote an appeal response in which he informed plaintiff:
Doc. 62, Ex. P. Mr. Kempker denied plaintiff's request that he be placed in the general population.
The next classification review hearing was held on August 20, 2014, at which plaintiff declined to participate. Doc. 62, Ex. Q at 1. The Classification Hearing Form dated that day noted "single cell status of [sic] approved from Div. Director for continued mental health observation."
A classification review hearing was held on November 10, 2014, at which plaintiff was present. Plaintiff told the committee that he "want[ed] out!" Doc. 62, Ex. Q at 2. At this hearing, the Administrative Segregation Committee recommended continued placement in administrative segregation. The Classification Hearing Form for the November 10, 2014 hearing states, "single cell mandated per director."
On November 12, 2014, ERDCC Corrections Case Manager Diane Montgomery submitted a memorandum to defendant Russell in connection with the one-year review of plaintiff's placement in single-cell administrative segregation. In her November 12, 2014 memorandum, Montgomery wrote:
Doc. 62, Ex. Q at 3.
Defendant Russell did not follow Montgomery's recommendation to release plaintiff from single-cell administrative segregation, and instead recommended continued single cell assignment.
Plaintiff's next classification hearing was held on December 10, 2014, at which plaintiff refused to make a statement. On the Classification Hearing Form dated this date, it is written "remains in Ad Seg per Division Director Dormire" and "mandated single cell status per Director." Doc. 62, Ex. Q at 4.
Additional classification hearings were held on March 6, May 28, August 20, and November 12, 2015. On the Classification Hearing Forms for these four hearings, it was written that plaintiff's placement in single-cell administrative segregation was "mandated" by Division Director Dormire. Doc. 64, Ex. 9. The committee recommended continued single-cell administrative segregation following all four hearings. Plaintiff refused to participate in the March 6, May 28, and August 20, 2015 hearings. At the November 12 hearing, plaintiff inquired whether he had been put in for a transfer.
On November 3, 2015, defendant Steele's assistant, Karen Black, submitted a request that plaintiff be placed in the Potosi Reintegration Unit. On December 29, 2015, Cindy Griffith, the Warden at Potosi Correctional Center, responded by email in which she wrote that plaintiff did not appear to meet the Potosi Reintegration Unit's criteria, "as he has only received one minor contraband violation for his entire two and a half years of his segregation assigned." Doc. 64, Ex. 17 at 2. She also wrote that past murder sentences are normally not part of the admission criteria.
The Classification Hearing Form for plaintiff's February 4, 2016 classification hearing states: "[Plaintiff] remains in adseg per Division Director Dormire. [Plaintiff] is no longer mandated to single cell status. Per Director Dormire 12-29-15 [plaintiff] may double cell and after 120-180 days may be reviewed for release to GP." Doc. 64, Ex. 9 at 13. At a classification hearing held on April 28, 2016, it was recommended that plaintiff be released to the general population at ERDCC. On the Classification Hearing Form dated that date it is written, "[Plaintiff] has 120 days in Adseg double cell as directed. Only violation is 24.1 10-25-15. [Plaintiff] has had good behavior and is acceptable for GP."
Defendant Dormire worked as MDOC's Director of Adult Institutions from September 2011 until March 2017. As Director of Adult Institutions, defendant Dormire was responsible for ensuring that MDOC's administrative segregation policies were followed. Pursuant to MDOC policy, defendant Dormire also reviewed decisions to keep offenders in single-cell confinement.
Defendant Russell worked as the Warden at ERDCC from 2010 until his retirement in early 2015. Defendant Steele succeeded defendant Russell as Warden at ERDCC and remained in that position until June 1, 2018. The ERDCC Warden was the highest-ranking administrative officer at the facility, and was responsible for the management of ERDCC staff and inmates. During the periods of time that they served at ERDCC, defendants Warden, Russell, and Steele were part of the chain of command for decisions on whether to release an inmate from administrative segregation.
Defendants Dormire and Steele testified that an inmate who has murdered a fellow cell-mate while incarcerated is generally placed in single-cell administrative segregation for three to five years, and sometimes longer. According to defendants Dormire and Steele, plaintiff was held in single-cell administrative segregation because he had murdered another cellmate. Defendant Dormire testified that based on plaintiff's past criminal history, he was a risk to harm and kill other cellmates. He also testified that he was concerned because there were notations that plaintiff refused to participate in many of the review hearings. Doc. 62, Ex. G at 7. Plaintiff testified that he understood some of the staff at ERDCC considered him to be a threat to other offenders being housed at ERDCC.
ERDCC's Administrative Segregation Regulations placed restrictions on inmates' attire, access to hygiene products, canteen access, personal property, telephone usage, and recreation that did not apply to inmates in general population. Unlike inmates in general population, inmates in administrative segregation were not allowed to purchase skin care products from the canteen and could only obtain these products from the facility's medical staff.
Plaintiff made his first Health Service Request ("HSR") regarding dry skin on May 19, 2015. Plaintiff specifically requested hydrocortisone cream to treat his dry skin. Plaintiff's chief complaint was itchy skin, and the nurse noted some minimal redness. On June 10, 2015, the plaintiff informed Nurse Anna Wideman, who is not a defendant in this suit, that his skin had been dry for the previous 20 months. Nurse Wideman gave plaintiff 1% hydrocortisone cream to apply to the affected area.
Plaintiff did not file another HSR for dry skin until January 19, 2016. Defendant Terry Taylor, a nurse who treated inmates in administrative segregation, testified during an examination of January 20, 2016, he observed that King "had dry skin on his hands and legs," with "scattered pinholes" from scratching. Doc. 70, Ex. D. Defendant Taylor did not note any redness, swelling, bleeding, or drainage. Plaintiff testified that at this appointment his skin was cracking open and bleeding. Defendant Taylor examined plaintiff's skin, and instructed plaintiff to refrain from showering more than once a day and to use soap on the axilla and inguinal areas only. He also instructed plaintiff to avoid hot showers and to increase his intake of water.
On February 4, 2016, plaintiff submitted an IRR in which he stated that he "had dry skin so bad that it was cracking and bleeding," and requested that he "be given something for my dry skin." Doc. 40, Ex. E. Plaintiff's chief complaint in his IRR was that defendant Taylor denied him medical treatment for his dry skin.
On February 7, 2016, plaintiff filed a HSR for dry skin. Triple antibiotic ointment was issued to plaintiff in response to his HSR. On February 9, 2016, plaintiff had another encounter with Nurse Taylor. Plaintiff complained of dry skin on his hands and wanted to receive lotion. Nurse Taylor did not provide plaintiff with any lotion but instead instructed him to shower once per day, use soap on the axilla and inguinal areas only, and drink more water. Nurse Taylor provided plaintiff with two packs of triple antibiotic ointment.
Plaintiff filed an HSR on February 20, 2016, requesting more triple antibiotic ointment for his dry skin. Nurse Taylor saw plaintiff on February 25, 2016, and provided him with two packs of bacitracin ointment.
On March 10, 2016, plaintiff submitted a HSR in which he indicated that he had a spot on his stomach that he suspected was ringworm. The next day plaintiff was seen by Amanda Womack. Nurse Womack instructed Plaintiff to apply cool compresses to the affected area and apply hydrocortisone twice daily. Nurse Womack also instructed plaintiff to return if the area was not better within seven to ten days.
Plaintiff submitted a HSR on March 28, 2016, in which he continued to express concern about the spot on his stomach. Plaintiff stated his rash was spreading and caused him itching, irritation, and discomfort. Taylor met with plaintiff on March 30, 2016, in response to plaintiff's March 28, 2016 HSR. At the time of this consult, plaintiff had a dime-sized spot on his stomach, which was raised and red. Nurse Taylor noted the spot appeared to be tinea versicolor (fungal infection) and instructed plaintiff to monitor the area and follow up if his condition worsened.
Defendant Taylor saw plaintiff again on April 15, 2016, for plaintiff's complaint of dry skin. During this encounter, a referral was made to the nurse practitioner regarding plaintiff's dry skin, and plaintiff was given bacitracin packets.
On April 27, 2016, plaintiff filed another HSR for the rash on his stomach. Plaintiff was seen by defendant Taylor on April 29, 2016. Defendant Taylor sent an email to a nurse practitioner about treatment for tinea versicolor, and the nurse practitioner stated tinea versicolor is considered cosmetic and that no treatment is needed. Tinea versicolor is a different type of fungal infection than ringworm. Plaintiff did not complain of dry skin on the HSR dated April 27, 2016. Defendant Taylor had no further contact with plaintiff after April 29, 2016.
On May 16, 2016, plaintiff was released to the general population and was able to purchase lotion for his dry skin. After plaintiff was moved from administrative segregation to general population, defendant Taylor was no longer responsible for providing him with medical care.
On July 21, 2016, Shannon Oaks diagnosed plaintiff with tinea corporis, which is the scientific term for ringworm. Plaintiff's infected spot on his stomach eventually grew from approximately the size of a dime to the size of a half dollar. Later plaintiff's ringworm infection also spread to his sides, his eyelid and his groin, which caused him itching, irritation, and discomfort. Plaintiff received treatment for ringworm and the condition was resolved.
In Count I of his Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges defendants Dormire, Russell, and Steele deprived him of his due process rights by holding plaintiff in prolonged administrative segregation without meaningful review in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
In the prison context, the Due Process Clause "does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner."
Due process claims challenging assignment to administrative segregation involve a two-step inquiry.
In its initial review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court found plaintiff had pleaded facts sufficient to show "that his continued segregation for 923 days implicates a liberty interest." Doc. 9 at 4. Plaintiff asserts in his response to defendants' motion for summary judgment that discovery has confirmed there are issues of fact as to whether plaintiff's prolonged confinement in administrative segregation imposed an atypical and significant hardship sufficient to implicate the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff, however, does not articulate in his memorandum how his confinement imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him.
The Eighth Circuit has instructed that "[i]n order to determine whether an inmate possesses a liberty interest, we compare the conditions to which the inmate was exposed in segregation with those he or she could `expect to experience as an ordinary incident of prison life.'"
What is more, some of the restrictions listed in plaintiff's IRR do not implicate due process rights. A prisoner does not have a liberty interest in contact visitations.
That said, "[t]he length of time of a prisoner's segregation is a significant factor in the determination of whether the confinement is an `atypical and significant hardship.'"
The amount of time plaintiff in this case was held in administrative segregation was significantly shorter than the cases discussed above where a liberty interest was found. Nonetheless, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court assumes without deciding that plaintiff has established his placement in administrative segregation for 923 days created an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison deprivation, sufficient to rise to the necessary level that it impinged on a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.
As for what process plaintiff was due, the Eighth Circuit has explained that "where an inmate is held in segregation for a prolonged or indefinite period of time, due process requires that his situation be reviewed periodically in a meaningful way and by relevant standards to determine whether he should be retained in segregation or returned to population."
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff was held in administrative segregation for a little over two and a half years, and his assignment to administrative segregation was periodically reviewed to determine whether he should remain in administrative segregation or be returned to the general population. From the time he was assigned to administrative segregation to when he was released, ERDCC held thirteen hearings, at which plaintiff was provided the opportunity to make statements and argue in favor of transfer to the general population. Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether the reviews were meaningful.
Citing to
The Court agrees with plaintiff that some of the factors the Eighth Circuit relied upon in
The cases are not analogous. Here, plaintiff, who is in prison because he murdered his son by strangulation, was assigned to administrative segregation for strangling his cellmate, not for his own protection. Plaintiff was assigned to administrative segregation to protect the safety of other inmates. Morever, the time Mr. Williams spent in administrative segregation was significantly longer — more than five times as many years — and there was no due process review for much of the time he spent there. Mr. Williams did not challenge the first time he was assigned to administrative segregation for murdering an inmate. As for the second time he was assigned to segregation, the Eighth Circuit did not even review the first three years of Mr. Williams's fourteen-year assignment, a longer period of time than plaintiff in the present case was in segregation. The Court only considered whether the reviews were meaningful from 1999 onward.
As the Eighth Circuit stated in
Defendants in the case at bar were tasked with trying to predict plaintiff's future behavior based not only on his conduct while in administrative segregation, but also on his conduct and the behavior that led up to his placement in administrative segregation. Defendant Dormire testified that plaintiff was held in single-cell administrative segregation, and later double-cell administrative segregation, because just prior to his transfer to ERDCC he had manually strangled his cellmate in the county jail, and Dormire believed that releasing plaintiff to the general population would create a danger to the safety and security of the institution. According to Dormire and Steele, MDOC inmates who have murdered a fellow cell-mate while incarcerated are generally placed in single-cell administrative segregation for three to five years, and sometimes longer.
Plaintiff argues that his criminal history, and more specifically the fact that he strangled his cellmate, does not relieve defendants of their obligation to provide him with meaningful review. Citing to
Plaintiff also criticizes defendants for failing to take into account his good behavior. There is nothing in the record to suggest that defendants did not consider the fact that plaintiff had a good conduct record in administrative segregation. It is undisputed that plaintiff received regular review hearings, at which it was noted that plaintiff had good conduct. The uncontroverted evidence also shows that after each review hearing a report and recommendation was sent to defendants Kempker, Dormire, or Steele, all of which noted plaintiff's good conduct. Defendants then reviewed and acted upon these reports in deciding whether and when to release plaintiff. Plaintiff's good behavior was outweighed by his past conduct, however, until such time that defendants believed it was safe to return plaintiff to the general population.
The Supreme Court has instructed district courts to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state prison officials, who are trying to manage a volatile environment.
The uncontroverted evidence shows that plaintiff received timely reviews, at which he was given the opportunity to make statements, but he remained in administrative segregation because defendants believed plaintiff might harm someone if he were to be released to the general population. This belief was based on plaintiff's past conduct, reports from the classification committee, plaintiff's conduct at review hearings, and statements from staff, including medical professionals. The Court cannot find that this belief was unreasonable or unsupported by the facts. Plaintiff's reviews were meaningful, in that defendants considered proper factors and made informed, albeit discretionary judgments, that plaintiff remained a security risk until the date he was released. To the extent plaintiff's placement in administrative segregation for 923 days implicated a liberty interest, the Court concludes plaintiff received sufficient due process with respect to his continued assigned to administrative segregation.
The Court finds there are no genuine issues of material fact and concludes that defendants Dormire, Russell, and Steele have established they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's claim of deprivation of due process rights. As a result, the Court does not reach defendants' argument that they are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
In Count II of his Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges defendants Phillips and Taylor violated his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in that they denied plaintiff adequate hygiene supplies and medical care. Plaintiff alleges defendant Phillips failed to provided him with lotion, and defendant Taylor failed to treat his dry skin and a ringworm rash.
In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, a prison inmate must show that he was subjected to the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
Defendant Phillips argues that case law does not support plaintiff's assertion that he was entitled to lotion for dry skin. The Court agrees. Plaintiff does not cite to and the Court did not find controlling case law holding that an inmate is entitled to lotion as a personal hygiene product required under the Constitution.
The cases plaintiff cites in his opposition brief are distinguishable from the case at bar in that the prison conditions at issue in these cases were more deplorable and unhygienic, or they involved indifference to a serious medical condition.
The Eighth Circuit has held that a prisoner's inability to purchase body lotion, among other items, does not state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, because discomfort does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff's claims against defendant Taylor are for deliberate indifference to his medical condition, specifically dry skin and a ringworm infection. Defendant Taylor was a nurse who treated plaintiff while he was in administrative segregation. Defendant Taylor was not the only nurse who saw plaintiff for his medical needs. Plaintiff claims defendant Taylor deliberately ignored his dry skin and ringworm in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" which is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must establish two elements: "First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious.'"
With regard to plaintiff's dry skin, there is no evidence in the record that a physician diagnosed plaintiff with a medical condition requiring treatment. Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether plaintiff's dry skin was so severe that it would have been obvious, even to a layperson, that plaintiff required the attention of a doctor.
There is little evidence in the record before the Court as to the seriousness of plaintiff's dry skin. There are no photographs or other visual evidence. In the medical records there is mention of dry skin, redness, and scattered pinholes from scratching, and when plaintiff was seen on February 9, 2016, plaintiff had red skin on his left wrist and two open areas on his right hand. Plaintiff also testified that in January 20, 2016, his skin was so dry it was cracking open and bleeding. There are, however, no other specifics, such as the size of the cracks or wounds, how severe was the bleeding, or how long this condition lasted. Plaintiff states that he was concerned about contracting Hepatitis C through his sores, but there is no evidence this would have been possible, and no evidence that plaintiff developed any sort of infection as a result of his dry skin.
In the Court's view, plaintiff has not presented adequate evidence that his dry skin was a serious medical condition. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, dry skin in the winter that results in cracking and bleeding for a period of time does not rise to the level of a serious medical condition such that a layperson would recognize the inmate required the attention of a medical doctor.
Even if the Court were to conclude that plaintiff's dry skin rose to the level of a serious medical condition, there is no evidence in the record that defendant Taylor disregarded it. Defendant Taylor treated plaintiff for dry skin on January 20, February 9 and 25, and April 15, 2016. On each of these occasions, he instructed plaintiff to stay hydrated by drinking eight to ten cups of water a day, to shower no more than once a day, to avoid hot water, and to use soap on the axilla and inguinal areas only. On three of the four occasions, defendant Taylor provided plaintiff with multiple packs of bacitracin ointment, which plaintiff admits helped alleviate his symptoms. Plaintiff may disagree with defendant's treatment plan, but disagreement with a medical judgment is not sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs.
With regard to plaintiff's ringworm rash, it is undisputed that plaintiff was seen by defendant Taylor for a small rash on his stomach on two occasions, on March 28 and April 29, 2016.
In the record before the Court, plaintiff presented no medical evidence that his ringworm rash was a serious medical condition that required the attention of a medical doctor. As for whether it would have been obvious to a layperson that plaintiff required medical attention, during the two times plaintiff was seen by defendant Taylor, the rash on plaintiff's stomach was the size of a coin. The Court cannot conclude that a layperson would easily recognize that a small, coin-sized rash required a doctor's medical attention.
In any event, plaintiff cannot establish constitutional deliberate indifference on the part of defendant Taylor. At most, defendant Taylor misidentified a small rash, and proper treatment was delayed by a few weeks. Perhaps the misidentification was negligent, but it hardly rises to the requisite level the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
In sum, the Court finds plaintiff has failed to establish that defendants Dormire, Russell, and Steele did not provide plaintiff with constitutional due process as to his continued assignment to administrative segregation. As for defendant Phillips, plaintiff has not shown that lotion is a hygiene product to which he was entitled under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, with regard to defendant Taylor, there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered from a serious medical condition, or that defendant Taylor deliberately disregarded any such condition.
Accordingly,
An appropriate judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
