ORTRIE D. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Pending is Plaintiff's appeal of the Commissioner of Social Security=s final decision denying her husband's application for disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Commissioner's decision is reversed and the matter is remanded for reconsideration.
Plaintiff's husband ("Hodges") was born in October 1954 and completed high school. Hodges' most recent job was as a detailer at a Harley-Davidson dealership/repair shop; he held this position from 1997 until he was laid off in December 2008. He alleged he became disabled on December 18, 2008 — the date he was laid off — due to a combination of degenerative disc disease, mental impairments, and other limitations resulting from motorcycle accidents in 1991 and 2000. Plaintiff raises several issues, but the Court views only one as justifying remand: the ALJ's failure to adequately address the fact that Hodges apparently performed his last job only due to accommodations that are not likely to be replicated elsewhere in the national economy.
The 1991 accident caused extensive injuries to Hodges's face and skull. Among the remedial measures was insertion of an implant in his orbital floor. Hodges testified he was instructed that he would have to regularly massage his eye to keep his muscles from attaching to the implant, and this requirement would last a year and possibly the rest of his life. R. at 384-85. There is some confirmation of this instruction in the Record, but it is not well-detailed.
The ALJ never assessed Hodges's need to massage his eye. He never addressed whether it was or was not necessary. This is critical because Hodges testified he could return to his past job as a detailer if he was given this accommodation. R. at 406-07. Furthermore, the vocational expert testified that a person with Hodges's age, education and experience possessing the residual functional capacity described by the ALJ could not find work if this accommodation was required. R. at 421. The ALJ seemed to acknowledge the need for Hodges to massage his eye. R. at 17 (citing R. at 228), but described this requirement as "mild." There is no explanation for this conclusion, nor is there any apparent support for it. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff's ability to see and such issues as glaucoma and myopic astigmatism, but he did not address Plaintiff's alleged need to take breaks to massage his eye and the need for an employer to accommodate this requirement.
The Commissioner's final decision is reversed and the case is remanded. On remand, the ALJ will consider whether Plaintiff needed to massage his eyes as Plaintiff described in his testimony and, if so, what impact this had on his employability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.