NANETTE K. LAUGHREY, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Fineola Ingram, Justin Simmons, and Brian Boykin sue on behalf of themselves and a putative class of persons who are, or were, detained at the Cole County, Missouri Detention Center. They allege the jail's clothing policies violate their rights under the United States and Missouri Constitutions. They sue Defendant Cole County, Missouri, which operates the jail, and Defendants Cole County Sheriff Greg White and Chief Deputy Sheriff John Wheeler, who are the jail administrators. The Defendants move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, or in the alternative to strike certain allegations. [Doc. 16.] The motion to dismiss is granted, and the remainder of the motion is denied as moot.
Plaintiff Boykin was detained in the jail in March 2015, and remained detained there through at least the time of filing of the Complaint. Plaintiff Ingram was detained in the jail beginning in November 2013, for about 85 days. Plaintiff Simmons was detained in the jail from April 1, 2013 until September 27, 2013, and again from April 27, 2015 until July 9, 2015.
The Plaintiffs allege:
[Doc. 1, p. 5-6.]
The jail has a Jail Inmate Rule Book. The book includes rules relating to nudity, personal hygiene, general cleanliness, and the content of jail cells:
[Doc. 1, pp. 6-7, ¶ 35.]
The Plaintiffs further allege:
[Id., p. 7.]
The Plaintiffs sue under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the similar sections of the Missouri Constitution.
The Defendants argue dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a complaint fails to allege facts establishing each element of the claims. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Thus, while well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as true, legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The allegations must rise above the "speculative" or "conceivable," and must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 555, 563, 570). See also Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8
As detainees at the time of the alleged constitutional violation, the Plaintiffs' claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421, 423 (8
Pretrial detainees are entitled to "`at least as great' protection as that afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment." Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). "Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee's constitutional rights are violated if the detainee's conditions of confinement amount to punishment." Id. (quoting Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 809 (8
The Plaintiffs assert that having to remain without clothing in their cells for a period of seven hours every few days if they wish to have their one set of jail-issued clothing laundered violates their constitutional rights.
The Eighth Circuit "has not adopted an unconditional prohibition against deprivations of necessities. Rather, [it] considers several factors in determining the constitutionality of deprivations, including the degree and duration of the deprivations, the reason for the deprivations, and the other surrounding circumstances." Green v. Baron, 879 F.2d 305, 310 (8
Courts routinely reject Eighth Amendment claims concerning lack of clothing, and analogous claims, on the basis that the alleged deprivation is not sufficiently serious. For example, in Rodgers v. Thomas, 879 F.2d 380, 382 (8m
Id. at 385.
In Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 267 (8
In Dundee v. Rambo, 2011 WL 776161, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 3, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1086504 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2011), a jail detainee alleged there was no regular laundry schedule and he was forced to wear the same clothing for weeks, which caused rashes. He alleged he was issued a shirt and pants, but no towel, underwear, or socks. When the jail did the laundry, detainees would place their clothes in a bag and wait until the laundry was returned. The plaintiff was not initially issued a towel, and had to use his shirt to dry himself after showers, until another detainee left and he then received a towel. The district court dismissed his Eighth Amendment claim, holding he had not alleged more than de minimis injury. "[D]iscomfort compelled by conditions of confinement, without more, does not violate" the Eighth Amendment. Id. at *8. See also Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 444-47 (8
Examining the totality of the circumstances here, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have alleged no more than minimal deprivation. While detainees must send their entire set of clothing to be laundered, and must remain naked for seven hours, the laundry is being done overnight. Detainees are sleeping in the nude, not going about their activities during the waking part of the day in the nude. Furthermore, detainees are issued a sheet and a blanket, as the Plaintiffs allege, and may cover themselves with sheet and blanket if they wish. The Plaintiffs allege that their sheets and blankets are infrequently washed, but they do not claim that having to use such bedding when sleeping naked caused any pain or injury, nor do they allege any other pain or injury that rises to the level of a constitutional vioaltion. The Plaintiffs' claims are similar to those rejected in the cases discussed above.
The Plaintiffs do complain that the laundry policy can cause them to be seen naked by opposite-sex guards without the Plaintiffs' consent, and by their cellmates. But the Plaintiffs "have no general right [not to be] seen naked by guards of the opposite sex," Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 904-05 (8
Of course, "[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in combination when each alone would not do so. This is true when the deprivations have a mutually enforcing effect which produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need, such as food or warmth, for example `a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.'" Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304). See also Gordon v. Faber, 800 F.Supp. 797, 798-99 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (prisoners were forced to go to outside exercise yard in sub-freezing weather without hats or gloves, and suffered pain). The laundry policy at issue here creates no combination of factors that establish a constitutional violation.
The Plaintiffs also seem to suggest that the jail rules, which require inmates to remain clothed except to shower or use the toilet, and to maintain good hygiene, establish or demonstrate constitutional requirements. But "[t]here is no federal liberty interest in having state officers follow state law or prison officials follow prison regulations." Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8
Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the laundry policy has no purpose beyond demonstrating officials' ability to impose such policy "`because they can,' or at least think they can." [Doc. 27, p. 9.] The jail rules to which the Plaintiffs point expressly mention cleanliness and hygiene, in the context of clothing and linen exchange. [See Doc. 1, p. 7, ¶ 35.] That the alleged laundry practice promotes cleanliness and hygiene in an insensitive manner does not alone make it unconstitutional. Even if the Court were to conclude that the policy could serve no valid penological purpose, such conclusion alone would not make it unconstitutional. See Rodgers v. Thomas, 879 F.2d 380, 384 (8
The Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, or corresponding provisions of the Missouri Constitution.
Defendants White and Wheeler argue that as jail officials, they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the federal claims brought against them in their individual capacities. An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless his conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Deciding qualified immunity is a two-step process. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The first step is to determine whether a constitutional violation is adequately alleged. The second step is to decide whether "the right asserted was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." Mitchell v. Shearer, 729 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8
As explained above, the Plaintiffs allege no viable constitutional violation. Therefore, Defendants White and Wheeler have qualified immunity with respect to the federal constitutional claims against them in their individual capacities.
The Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and the alternative request to strike certain allegations is denied as moot. [Doc. 16.]