BRIAN C. WIMES, District Judge.
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge David P. Rush's Report and Recommendations (Doc. #56) concerning Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. #39). Defendant filed objections. (Doc. #57). The Court, after an independent review of the record and the applicable law, adopts the Magistrate's Report and Recommendations. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Magistrate's Report and Recommendations be attached to and made part of this Order (Doc. #56). It is further
ORDERED Defendant's motion to suppress evidence (Doc. #39) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Before the Court is Defendant Dustin S. Piper's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 39), which has been referred to the undersigned for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Defendant Piper moves to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant issued on March 1, 2017 and executed by the Polk County Sheriff's Office ("PCSO") on March 9, 2017. The undersigned held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion on March 19, 2019. (See Doc. 55.) Defendant Piper was present with his attorney, Donald R. Cooley, and the United States Government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Abram McGull, II. (Id.) The Court heard testimony from Ken Minica, a detective with the PCSO. (Id.) For the reasons set forth below, it is
On March 1, 2017, Detective Ken Minica with the PCSO prepared an affidavit to obtain a warrant for the search of Dustin Piper's residence, outbuilding, and person for methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other equipment commonly related to the use and distribution of methamphetamine or other controlled substances. In addition to writing the affidavit, Minica prepared the actual search warrant himself. A Polk County prosecuting attorney reviewed the affidavit and then delivered both the affidavit and warrant together to Polk County Circuit Judge John Porter who signed the warrant the same day, March 1, 2017.
In support of the warrant, Minica's affidavit outlines information gathered from five total informants: two past "reliable informants" who are unnamed, Courtney Smith, Aaron Rhoads, and another unnamed informant who was arrested on undisclosed charges the day before the warrant application. The affidavit provides, in relevant part, the following:
(See Doc. 54, Gov. Ex. 1.)
At the time of the application, Minica had been a police officer for approximately ten years and had attended "numerous schools and seminars for hundreds of hours of training" related to various fields of law enforcement, including "narcotics recognition and investigations." (Id.) Minica stated he had "been involved in several search warrants" and that one of his duties as an investigator is "developing probable cause for cases." (Id.) He stated that he "[has] the knowledge, understanding and experience to work crime scenes and search warrant scenes to process, recover, and seize stolen property, controlled substances, [and] drug paraphernalia . . . ." (Id.)
Between the affidavit and the warrant, the only place the full address of Dustin Piper's residence, 4213 South 140
(See Doc. 54, Gov. Ex. 1.)
Minica testified that he knew Dustin Piper lived at 4213 South 140
Pursuant to the warrant, PCSO officers, including Minica, executed the search of 4213 South 140
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally, evidence seized as the result of an unconstitutional search cannot be used against the defendant and must be suppressed. See United States v. Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072, 1078 (8th Cir. 2011).
Defendant argues that all evidence should be suppressed because (1) the warrant failed to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and (2) the affidavit lacked the necessary information to establish probable cause. In response, the Government argues that the warrant provided a sufficient description of the place to be searched and that the supporting affidavit established probable cause. Additionally, the Government contends that even if the warrant is found invalid for lack of particularity or probable cause, the Leon good-faith exception precludes suppression of the evidence. The Court takes up the arguments below.
Defendant argues that the search warrant failed to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment because it omitted the full address of Defendant's residence. The case law is clear that "[t]he test for determining the sufficiency of the description of the place to be searched is whether the place to be searched is described with sufficient particularity as to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premise[s] might be mistakenly searched."
Here, the warrant's description of the premises was certainly detailed and particular. It described the physical attributes of the trailer, the way in which it was positioned on the property, its adjoining outbuilding, the driveway, and the black mailbox with the numbers 4213. Defendant does not claim that the description was inaccurate. The only thing missing from the description in the warrant was the street name, city, county, and state, which the affidavit included. Detective Minica, who prepared both the affidavit and warrant, testified the failure to include the full address in the warrant was an oversight on his part.
Where the warrant contains a technical error or omission regarding the description of the place to be searched, courts often consider whether the officers who executed the warrant personally knew which premises was intended to be searched. See, e.g., United States v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1984); Gitcho, 601 F.2d at 372. In United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006 (1987), the First Circuit, relying on Gitcho, upheld a search warrant that contained a detailed description of the premises but failed to include the full address, which the affidavit included. The court found that the warrant "suffered from a minor, technical omission." Id. at 866. The court further explained that there was "no risk" that officers would "be confused and stumble into the wrong house," because the officers "knew exactly which house they wanted to search." Id. at 866-67.
Likewise, here, Detective Minica and other PCSO officers knew which premises they intended to search, were personally familiar with the location, and understood the warrant to authorize a search of 4213 South 140
Because the "executing officer[s]" in this case were personally familiar with the location to be searched, the description provided in the warrant was "described with sufficient particularity as to enable the executing officer[s] to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort." Skarda, 845 F.3d at 377. There was also no "reasonable probability that another premise[s] might be mistakenly searched." Id. In fact, it would have been virtually impossible for an officer not familiar with the intended location to have mistakenly searched another location, given the physical description of the property and the street number 4213 located on the mailbox. Accordingly, the Court finds that the warrant meets the particularity requirement.
Defendant also argues that probable cause did not exist to support the warrant because the information in the affidavit was not reliable and the affidavit failed to link Defendant to the address to be searched. Probable cause exists if there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Bradley, 924 F.3d 476, 480 (8th Cir. 2019). Determining probable cause is a practical, common-sense decision based on the totality-of-the-circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see United States v. Buchanan, 574 F.3d 554, 561 (8th Cir. 2009). However, "only that information which is found within the four corners of the affidavit may be considered." United States v. O'Dell, 766 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 2014). A reviewing court pays deference to the issuing magistrate's determination of probable cause and simply ensures that the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed. United States v. Stevens, 530 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236).
After reviewing the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit, the Court concludes the issuing judge overlooked a critical aspect of probable cause and, thus, did not have a substantial basis to find it existed. The affidavit requested a search warrant for a specific address but did not contain the necessary facts linking Defendant to that address. Though the Court ultimately concludes the Leon good faith exception saves the evidence from suppression, the Court takes up the parties' arguments below.
Defendant largely attacks the credibility of the informants who provided information to law enforcement and contends that their information is unreliable. While the core question in assessing probable cause based on informant information is whether the information is reliable, O'Dell, 766 F.3d at 874, their reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge are not "independent, essential elements" in finding probable cause. United States v. Robertson, 39 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 1994). A totality-of-the-circumstances analysis prohibits an "excessively technical dissection of informants' tips" that views "bits and pieces of information in isolation." Buchanan, 574 F.3d at 562-63 (internal quotes omitted); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 234-35. Furthermore, information by more than one informant may be reciprocally corroborative if the statements are consistent with one another and sufficiently detailed. United States v. Fulgham, 143 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding probable cause where "information given by the first informant was corroborated with specific, consistent details provided by the second informant").
Here, the affidavit contained information from five total informants. The specific and detailed information provided by the last unnamed informant corroborated the statements of previous informants. Taken together, the information was sufficiently reliable to believe that Dustin Piper possessed and distributed methamphetamine at the time of the warrant application. Furthermore, there was a "fair probability" that methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia would be found at "Dustin Piper's residence." However, the affidavit did not contain the necessary facts connecting "Dustin Piper's residence" to the specific address, "4213 South 140
To find probable cause, "there must be evidence of a nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched." United States v. Tellez, 217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000). Here, the affidavit concludes,
(Doc. 54, Gov. Ex. 1) (emphasis added). It seems clear by the use of "therefore" that Detective Minica believed Dustin Piper resided at that address, but nothing in the affidavit explains why he believed this.
Even though the Court is not persuaded the affidavit establishes a sufficient nexus between Defendant and the place to be searched, the Leon good-faith exception applies here and precludes suppression of the evidence. The Supreme Court, recognizing that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, has repeatedly made clear that the rule does not apply in cases where "the police acted `in objectively reasonable reliance'" of a search warrant issued by a judge or magistrate. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)). Evidence seized as a result of such good-faith reliance will thus be admitted unless:
United States v. Ortiz-Cervantes, 868 F.3d 695, 702-03 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotes omitted); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
Notwithstanding its exceptions, the good-faith inquiry "is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances." Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (internal quotes omitted). Circumstances include "what the affiant knew but did not include in the application for the warrant." United States v. Thurman, 625 F.3d 1053, 1057 (8th Cir. 2010).
Here, Detective Minica and other PCSO officers had sufficient reasons to believe Dustin Piper resided at the specific address, but those reasons were simply not included in the affidavit. Minica testified at the evidentiary hearing that he knew Dustin Piper lived at 4213 South 140
More generally, Defendant essentially argues that the supporting affidavit here was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that reliance on the search warrant was "entirely unreasonable." The Court disagrees. Detective Minica's affidavit was more than a "bare bones" affidavit. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. It contained information gathered from five total informants, one of which gave a specific and detailed firsthand account. That informant stated that he or she had personally been to Dustin Piper's residence on multiple occasions, including "within the last four days" where he or she saw over "three pounds" of methamphetamine. The informant also provided specific information that only someone familiar with Defendant would know, including that he "carries a Keltic pistol on his person at all times," that he "has a chemical acid that is kept inside the residence to destroy methamphetamine if law enforcement show up at his residence," and that he keeps various other items in the house commonly associated with the distribution of illegal drugs. The other four informants described in the affidavit reciprocally corroborated the fact that Defendant is known for selling methamphetamine. Based on these facts, a police officer's belief that probable cause existed here would not be "entirely unreasonable."
Ultimately, it cannot be said that a "reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances." With prior experience in "developing probable cause," Minica had no reason to question the issuing judge's determination in this case. Minica testified he "did not think there [was] anything wrong with the search warrant." Assuming Minica did not knowingly and intentionally mislead the issuing judge, which Defendant does not allege, the PCSO officers' reliance on this judicially-issued search warrant is the exact kind of reasonable reliance the Supreme Court had in mind in Leon. Neither does Defendant allege that the judge "wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant" or that the warrant was "so facially deficient that no police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid." Therefore, PCSO officers objectively and reasonably relied on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, and the evidence should be admitted.
Although Defendant makes no argument regarding the particularity issue and Leon, it is worth noting that warrants failing for lack of particularity have also been upheld by the good-faith exception. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Thomas, 263 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1990). In Curry, the search warrant contained neither an address nor a description of the property. 911 F.2d at 76. Nevertheless, the court upheld the warrant because (1) the accompanying affidavit sufficiently described the property, and (2) the same officer who prepared the affidavit was the officer who ultimately directed the search. Id. at 78.
Likewise, here, the accompanying affidavit sufficiently described the property, and PCSO officers were personally familiar with the location. The issuing judge simply failed to catch Minica's omission of the address in the warrant, and PCSO officers reasonably relied on his failure to catch the error. Therefore, even if the warrant's description of the premises was insufficiently particular, the good-faith exception would permit admission of the evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
