WILLIE J. EPPS, JR., Magistrate Judge.
Before this Court is Magistrate Judge Willie J. Epps, Jr.'s Report and Recommendation (Doc. #26) recommending that the Court deny Defendant Robert Ezell Goldman's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. #17). Defendant filed his Objections to Report and Recommendation on March 17, 2020. (Doc. #39). After an independent review of the record, the applicable law, and the parties' arguments, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #26). Accordingly, it is hereby
Pending before the Court is Defendant Robert Ezell Goldman's Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Doc. 17). The Government has filed suggestions in opposition. (Doc. 21). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendant's motion be denied.
On February 13, 2019, an Indictment was filed charging Mr. Goldman with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2). (Doc. 1). Mr. Goldman now moves for an order suppressing: (1) evidence seized during a search of a vehicle on October 28, 2018, and (2) statements he made relating to that search. (Doc. 17). On January 21, 2020, the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the motion to suppress. Mr. Goldman was represented by Assistant Federal Public Defender Troy K. Stabenow. The Government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Jim Lynn. The Government called Officer Matthew Nichols, Officer Tanner Stone, and Detective Anthony Bowne as witnesses. The defense recalled Officer Stone but did not call any additional witnesses.
Based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the undersigned submits the following proposed findings of fact:
35. The CPD Manual also recognizes that:
Mr. Goldman argues that the search of his Jeep was unconstitutional and that any statements he made were the product of that illegal search. Specifically, Mr. Goldman argues that the inventory search was unconstitutional insofar as Officer Nichols did not follow CPD towing policy. Mr. Goldman also makes a related argument that the officers searched his vehicle solely to determine whether he was connected to the shooting, and that the officers' claim of an inventory search is pretextual. Mr. Goldman further moves to suppress statements he made during and following the search. In response, the Government contends that Officer Nichols had a lawful basis to conduct the inventory search, as well as probable cause to search the Jeep once the officers smelled marijuana emanating from it. Because there were no constitutional violations, the Government argues that none of Mr. Goldman's statements should be suppressed. The parties' arguments are addressed below.
As an initial matter, the Court considers the constitutionality of the traffic stop itself. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "[A] traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" and "must be reasonable to pass constitutional muster." United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008). The "decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." United States v. Gunnell, 775 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2015). "Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a stop." Wright, 512 F.3d at 471 (quotations omitted). If there is probable cause, "the stop is objectively reasonable and any ulterior motivation on the officer's part is irrelevant." Gunnell, 775 F.3d at 1083.
In this case, Officer Nichols had probable cause for initiating the traffic stop. Officer Nichols clocked Mr. Goldman travelling at 52 mph in a 35 mph zone. This traffic violation, by itself, provided probable cause for stopping Mr. Goldman. Wright, 512 F.3d at 471. As a result, the traffic stop was constitutional even if Officer Nichols had an ulterior motive for initiating it. Gunnell, 775 F.3d at 1083. Indeed, Mr. Goldman does not appear to challenge the constitutionality of the traffic stop itself. Under these facts, there is no basis to suppress evidence or statements based on the traffic stop.
Next, "[a] seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation." Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). "Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's `mission'—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Id. (citations omitted). Constitutional authority "for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Id. "[A]bsent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual, an officer may not prolong a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete that stop." United States v. Harry, 930 F.3d 1000, 1005 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing and quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).
Here, the record shows that Officer Nichols had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Goldman pending further investigation. Officer Nichols knew that Mr. Goldman was speeding near the area of a recent shooting. As he began his pursuit of Mr. Goldman, Mr. Goldman attempted to speed away, immediately turned onto a one-way street, and pulled into a private driveway. Shortly after the stop, Officer Nichols smelled the odor of alcohol on Mr. Goldman and noticed that his eyes were bloodshot. Officer Nichols also knew Mr. Goldman had been on parole for robbery. Further, Mr. Goldman appeared nervous and the officers learned he had an outstanding arrest warrant. Under all these circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Goldman from the beginning of the stop and throughout their investigation.
Mr. Goldman's primary argument is that the inventory search of the Jeep was unconstitutional. In support of this argument, Mr. Goldman contends that the decision to inventory and tow his Jeep violated CPD's written policies. (Doc. 17, p. 5, ¶ 13; p. 9). He also contends that the inventory search was pretextual because the officers simply wanted to determine whether he was involved in the shooting. (Id., pp. 7-9.)
"A warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent a recognized exception." United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 2013). One recognized exception is known as an inventory search. See United States v. Hall, 497 F.3d 846, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2007). "It is well-settled law that a police officer, after lawfully taking custody of an automobile, may conduct a warrantless inventory search of the property to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody." United States v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). "Police may take protective custody of a vehicle when they have arrested its occupants, even if it is lawfully parked and poses no public safety hazard." United States v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 1159, 1163 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). "The practice of securing and inventorying the contents of vehicles in police custody is a response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody, the protection [of] the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and the protection of the police from potential danger." Hall, 497 F.3d at 850 (quotations omitted).
"The central question in evaluating the propriety of an inventory search is whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the search was reasonable." United States v. Green, 929 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). "An inventory search is reasonable if it is conducted according to standardized police procedures, because doing so vitiate[s] concerns of an investigatory motive or excessive discretion." Id. However, this "does not foreclose the use of some discretion by officers so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Hall, 497 F.3d at 850 (quotations omitted). "Even if the officer suspects he might uncover evidence in a vehicle, the police can still tow a vehicle and inventory the contents, as long as the impoundment is otherwise valid." Id. (cleaned up).
Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Officer Nichols's decision to inventory and tow the Jeep was reasonable. CPD policy provides that if a vehicle is "on private property and the person in charge or in control of a vehicle is arrested and no one to relinquish control is reasonable available, the property owner will be given the choice to allow the vehicle to remain on the property or have it removed." Manual, § 510.7. CPD policy further recognizes that "circumstances may arise which warrant departure from these guidelines" and that officers have "discretion . . . under the circumstances reasonably available at the time of any incident." Id., § 106.3; see also § 106.2.
Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Goldman parked the Jeep on private property. It is also undisputed that officers arrested Mr. Goldman at the scene. Additionally, the record does not show that any other individual was at the scene on behalf of Mr. Goldman and "reasonably available" to take control of the Jeep. Manual, § 510.7. Although Mr. Goldman suggests he should have been allowed to contact someone to take control of the Jeep, (Doc. 17, p. 5, ¶ 13), CPD policy does not appear to include this requirement. Moreover, "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment requires a police department to allow an arrested person to arrange for another person to pick up his car to avoid impoundment and inventory." United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 873 (8th Cir. 1994).
Mr. Goldman also argues that the officers failed to comply with the tow policy because the property owner was not "given the choice to allow the vehicle to remain on the property or have it removed." Id., ¶ 510.7. This argument is unavailing. There is nothing in the record that suggests the property owner would have allowed the Jeep to remain on the property. In fact, the record supports an opposite inference. The Jeep was blocking another vehicle's access to the roadway, and Mr. Goldman admitted that he resided elsewhere. Finally, Mr. Goldman was arrested in the early morning hours, at approximately 5:00 a.m. Under these facts, Officer Nichols reasonably exercised his discretion in deciding not to wake up or otherwise contact the property owner before inventorying and towing the Jeep. See Arrocha, 713 F.3d at 1163 ("The requirement that discretion be fettered, however, has never meant that a decision to impound must be made in a `totally mechanical' fashion.") (citations and quotations omitted).
Mr. Goldman also contends that the inventory search was simply a pretext to find evidence related to the shooting. Mr. Goldman relies on several facts, including that Officer Nichols detained him immediately after he denied consent to search the Jeep, the number of officers involved in the search, the officers' use of gloves and evidence baggies to protect evidence, and that the officers conducted forensic testing to try and connect him to the shooting.
However, as discussed above, the inventory search was reasonable and supported by the applicable facts and law. "The presence of an investigatory motive, even if proven, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful inventory search." Agofsky, 20 F.3d at 873. Evidence will not be suppressed unless an investigative motive was the "sole motivation in carrying out the search." United States v. Evans, 781 F.3d 433, 437 (8th Cir. 2015). In Arrocha, the Eighth Circuit explained that:
Arrocha, 713 F.3d at 1163-64 (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
The same outcome is warranted here. The officers may have had an investigative motive with respect to the shooting, but the record does not support a finding that it was their sole motivation for the inventory search. Instead, the officers lawfully arrested Mr. Goldman and then reasonably decided to inventory and tow the vehicle.
Finally, on cross-examination at the suppression hearing, Officer Nichols testified that the officers did not complete an inventory list of the items found in the Jeep.
Here, the inventory search was reasonable for all the reasons set forth above. In addition, Mr. Goldman has not identified what items were present in the Jeep and should have been inventoried, or "explain[ed] how their absence from the inventory list suggests an improper motive for the search." United States v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2015); see also Mayfield, 161 F.3d at 1145 ("Although the inventory list started at the scene was not completed as it should have been, the seized items were listed on an evidence form later, and there were no other items of value in the car according to the suppression hearing testimony of Trooper Ludford."). Nor does Mr. Goldman argue that any contents of the Jeep were lost or damaged. The Government also introduced a video-recording of the inventory search, which shows many of the items that were located in the Jeep. This recording lessens the need for a formal list and helps protect "against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property." Hall, 497 F.3d at 850.
For all these reasons, the inventory search was constitutional.
Assuming, arguendo, that the inventory search was invalid, the officers had an independent constitutional basis to search the Jeep. Before conducting the inventory search, Officers Stone and Bowne approached the vehicle. As the officers approached, they immediately smelled the strong odor of marijuana emanating from inside the Jeep. "[O]fficers may search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." United States v. Perez-Trevino, 891 F.3d 359, 367 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). Consequently, the search of the Jeep was constitutional because there was probable cause to believe that marijuana would be found inside it. See United States v. Peltier, 217 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the smell of marijuana gave the deputy probable cause to search Peltier's truck for drugs").
Finally, Mr. Goldman argues that he "was kept at the scene, in handcuffs, un-Mirandized, while officers repeatedly told him they were trying to link him to a recent shooting. His handgun was then produced from inside a closed bag in his car. Any statements he made were therefore the product of the illegal search that generated the evidence used to induce him to speak." (Doc. 17, pp. 9-10).
As discussed above, the Court finds that the search was constitutional. Consequently, the Court rejects Mr. Goldman's request to exclude his statements based on that search. See United States v. Cotter, 701 F.3d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court "did not err in refusing to suppress Cotter's subsequent Mirandized confession, as it was not the fruit of a poisonous tree"). In addition, Mr. Goldman made several spontaneous statements while the Jeep was being searched and before he was Mirandized. These statements were recorded by a dash cam video and include: (1) "aw, fuck. I'm going to jail for life;" (2) "please don't be dirty, please be clean," and (3) "its never been shot, I promise to God its never been shot." These spontaneous statements are also admissible and should not be suppressed. See United States v. Crisolis-Gonzalez, 742 F.3d 830, 837 (8th Cir. 2014) ("Miranda does not protect an accused from a spontaneous admission made under circumstances not induced by the investigating officers or during a conversation not initiated by the officers.") (quotations omitted).
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's arguments regarding evidence suppression in this case are without merit, and the motion to suppress should therefore be denied.
Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court, after making an independent review of the record and applicable law, enter an order DENYING Defendant Robert Ezell Goldman's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 17).
Counsel are reminded that each party has fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file and serve objections. A failure to file and serve objections by this date shall bar an attack on appeal of the factual findings in the Report and Recommendation which are accepted or adopted by the district judge, except on the grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.
