PIERCE, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. The Lee County Chancery Court entered a decree approving and ratifying, with modifications, an annexation ordinance adopted by the City of Tupelo, Mississippi. Notices of appeal were filed by Lee County, Mississippi; the Belden Fire Protection District, the Palmetto-Old Union Fire Protection District, the Unity Fire Protection District (collectively the Fire Protection Districts); and the City of Saltillo, Mississippi. We affirm the chancery court's decree.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Tupelo adopted an annexation ordinance on July 3, 2007, which sought to extend and enlarge Tupelo's boundaries to include seven proposed areas, totaling approximately 16.2 square miles, identified as Area 1, Area 2 North, Area 2 South, Area 3, Area 4, Area 5, and Area 6 ("PAAs" or "annexed territory"), each of which lies adjacent to Tupelo's current municipal limits.1 Tupelo filed a petition in the chancery court on September 12, 2008, seeking approval and ratification of its July 2007 annexation ordinance. Lee County, the Fire Protection Districts, and Saltillo, along with the Town of Plantersville, Mississippi, each filed answers and objections to Tupelo's annexation petition. Trial began in the matter in March 2010 and concluded in June 2010, after which the chancery court approved Tupelo's PAAs in their entirety, with the exception of a portion located in Area 5, which the court excluded from the final annexation decree.

¶ 3. Lee County, the Fire Protections District, and Saltillo appeal to this Court. The three entities are represented by separate counsel and have filed separate briefs. They assert a total of twelve issues between them, some of which are either the same or cumulative. In the interests of clarity and brevity, we have narrowed the total down to six, as follows:

¶ 4. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our discussion of the issues.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

¶ 5. Both Lee County and Saltillo argue that the proceedings in the chancery court were procedurally flawed and that they deprived residents and property owners in the PAAs of their fundamental and statutory due process rights. Both concede that Tupelo met the notice requirements prescribed by Mississippi Code Sections 21-1-15 and 21-1-31 (Rev.2007) after Tupelo filed its annexation petition on September 12, 2008. But they contend the chancery court lost jurisdiction over Tupelo's annexation petition at the conclusion of a hearing held on November 3, 2008, when the matter was recessed without being set for a date and time certain for future proceedings.

¶ 6. Section 21-1-31 sets forth the notice requirements in annexation matters and provides, in part, as follows:

Section 21-1-15, which is incorporated by reference in Section 21-1-31, requires notice to be given both by publication in "some newspaper published or having general circulation in the territory proposed to be [annexed]" as well as by posting "a copy of such notice in three or more public places in such territory[;] [t]he first publication of such notice and the posted notice shall be made at least thirty days prior to the day fixed for the hearing of said petition...."

¶ 7. The notice required by Section 21-1-15 is in lieu of personal service and must be strictly complied with. Myrick v. Stringer, 336 So.2d 209, 210 (1976). "[F]ailure to give proper notice in annexation cases renders a chancery court without jurisdiction to hear the case...." In re Enlargement and Extension of Mun. Boundaries of the City of Clinton, 920 So.2d 452, 456 (Miss.2006). "The record must contain proof that posting and publication were accomplished in compliance with Section 21-1-15." Fletcher v. Diamondhead Incorporators, 77 So.3d 92, 98 (Miss.2011). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that it met all the statutory notice requirements. Myrick, 336 So.2d at 210.

¶ 8. The annexation statutes do not provide for renotice of a continued hearing. Cf. Fletcher, 77 So.3d at 98 (recognizing same for incorporation statutes). Once the statutory notice had been given in this case, all property owners within the areas proposed to be annexed became parties to the annexation proceedings in the chancery court. Sperry-Rand Corp. v. City of Jackson, 245 So.2d 574, 575 (Miss.1971). "This status continue[s] through the final decree," and remains "until and unless reversed or modified on appeal." Id. "Once proper notice of the hearing date set by the chancellor has been provided in compliance with Section 21-1-15, if the hearing is continued, then all parties have notice." Fletcher, 77 So.3d at 98.

¶ 9. The record before us affirmatively shows that Tupelo met the statutory notice requirements. That no order was immediately entered continuing the case to a specific future date and time was of no matter in this instance in light of the following facts.

¶ 10. After Tupelo filed its annexation petition on September 12, Tupelo obtained an order from the chancery court setting November 3 for public hearing on the petition. On October 1, 2008, notices of the public hearing were posted in three separate locations in each of the PAAs, and publication giving notice began on October 2, 2008. A petition in opposition to annexation was filed by 140 individuals on October 6, 2008. At the November 3 hearing, fifteen individual respondents appeared pro se in opposition to annexation, all from PAA "2 North." The chancery court obtained from all fifteen pro se objectors their names, addresses, and phone numbers for the court's file. The chancery court also questioned each objector as to whether he or she had any interest in testifying and in receiving any future pleadings and discovery filings in the matter. The remainder of the November 3 hearing was devoted to discussions between the court and the respective attorneys regarding discovery schedules; eventually, the hearing was recessed with no new hearing date scheduled. On November 12, 2008, a scheduling order was entered setting discovery and dispositive-motion deadlines. And an order dated December 6, 2008, was entered providing as follows:

The record indicates that all pro se objectors who had appeared in the case either through the October 6 petition, or the November 3 hearing, or afterward, were served with copies of all pleadings and discovery filings and provided copies of all orders and notices. This included a copy of the order setting trial for March 29, 2010.

¶ 11. The record also illustrates that an amended scheduling order was entered on February 11, 2009; a second amended scheduling order was entered on May 4, 2009; and a third amended scheduling order was entered on August 4, 2009 — which set a dispositive motion deadline of October 12, 2009. It was not until October 12, 2009, that Lee County and Saltillo each filed motions to dismiss, raising for the first time arguments that the chancery court had acquired, but lost, both subject matter and personal jurisdiction because no order of continuance to a date and time certain had been entered at the November 3 hearing. Lee County and Saltillo both argued to the chancery court that the court's failure to designate "a date and time certain" violated the prescribed statutory requirements and those set forth in Rule 81 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Though inconsequential to our holding with this issue, we mention that the record not only bears out that both Lee County and Saltillo waited until the last day of the dispositive-motion deadline to file their respective motions raising this claim, but they did so after they had participated in extensive discovery. Nevertheless, after the chancery court denied the motions, Saltillo sought, but was denied permission from this Court to file an interlocutory appeal on this and other issues. See Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal, City of Saltillo v. City of Tupelo, 2010-M-00118-SCT (Feb. 17, 2010).

¶ 12. On appeal, both Lee County and Saltillo concentrate their jurisdictional claim on the proposition that changes to boundaries of municipalities are strictly governed by Rule 81. Citing Vincent v. Griffin, 872 So.2d 676 (Miss.2004), a child-support action, and Caples v. Caples, 686 So.2d 1071 (Miss.1996), a child-custody-modification action, Lee County contends: when a matter is continued for a hearing on a later date, an order must be entered on the hearing date which continues the matter to a specific future date and time when further proceedings will be held, otherwise the court loses jurisdiction because necessary and indispensable parties are not advised of the future hearing date.

¶ 13. As we explained in City of Jackson v. Byram Inc., 16 So.3d 662, 672 (Miss. 2009), Rule 81 "provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all civil proceedings but are subject to limited applicability in the following actions which are generally governed by statutory procedures ... (11) creation of and change in boundaries of municipalities." (Emphasis added.) In both Vincent and Caples, this Court spoke to the procedures prescribed by Rule 81(d), which states as follows:

M.R.C.P. 81(d)(1), (2), and (5).

¶ 14. Vincent and Caples concerned matters expressly listed in Rule 81(d)(1). We reversed and remanded both cases for a new hearing (Vincent) or a new trial (Caples) because one of the parties in each case did not receive notice consistent with Rule 81(d)(5). Rule 81(d)(5), however, does not apply in this case.

¶ 15. Here, we find that the chancery court obtained personal jurisdiction over the parties once statutory notice was complied with, and indisputably had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Tupelo's annexation petition. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 21-1-29 and 21-1-33 (Rev. 2007). Based on the procedural facts of the case, jurisdiction remained with the chancery court throughout the proceedings until the notices of appeal were filed. This issue is without merit.

II. Reauthorization Assertion

¶ 16. Saltillo contends that Tupelo was barred from use of the July 2007 annexation ordinance because a voluntary dismissal was entered in the case prior to the time Tupelo filed its annexation petition on September 12, 2008. Saltillo submits that Tupelo's voluntary dismissal constituted an effective repeal of the 2007 ordinance, which Tupelo should have voted to "reauthorize" at some point prior to the closing of the annexation trial in June 2010. Saltillo reasons that, if an ordinance for annexation is enacted upon the approval by the chancery court, it follows that the same ordinance for annexation can be repealed upon the dismissal of an annexation petition by the chancery court.

¶ 17. Though not directly on point, we find that the case of In the Matter of the Extension of Boundaries of City of Sardis, 954 So.2d 434 (Miss.2007), cited by Tupelo in its brief, effectively dispels Satillo's notion. There, the City of Sardis adopted an annexation ordinance which later was confirmed by the chancery court. Id. at 435. Certain objectors appealed, and while on appeal, Sardis repealed the annexation ordinance. Id. at 436. As a result, the objectors and Sardis moved this Court to set aside the chancery court's decree. Id. We responded with an order remanding the matter to the chancery court for consideration of the request to set aside. Id. On remand, Sardis presented the "repealer ordinance" to the chancery court, alongside its motion to set aside the decree. Id. The chancery court denied the motion for the following reasons:

Id. We subsequently reversed and rendered the chancery court decree after finding that the chancery court had applied an erroneous legal standard in its denial of the motion to set aside the decree. Id. at 437-38. We reasoned as follows:

Id. at 437.

¶ 18. Here, Tupelo did not repeal the July 2007 annexation ordinance. Rather, Tupelo simply requested that the chancery court dismiss the matter without prejudice. The record (which the appellants were charged with designating pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure) does not clearly disclose why Tupelo entered the request. It only indicates that the chancery court granted the request and did so without prejudice to Tupelo's annexation petition. That being the case, we need only point out that "[w]ithout prejudice" means "without loss of any rights; in a way that does not harm or cancel the legal rights or privileges of a party." Black's Law Dictionary 1632 (8th ed.2004). This issue is without merit.

¶ 19. Issues two and three are inextricably interlinked and will be addressed together. Again, as mentioned, "[a]nnexation is a legislative affair." Extension of Boundaries of City of Ridgeland v. City of Ridgeland, 651 So.2d 548, 559 (Miss.1995). Confirmation of annexations, however, is placed within the province of the chancery court. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-1-33 (Rev.2007); Matter of the Boundaries of City of Jackson, 551 So.2d 861, 863 (Miss.1989). "The role of the judiciary in annexations is limited to one question: whether the annexation is reasonable." Matter of Enlargement and Extension of the Mun. Boundaries of the City of Jackson, 691 So.2d 978, 980 (Miss. 1997). This Court will not reverse the chancery court's findings as to the reasonableness of an annexation unless the chancellor's decision is manifestly wrong and/or is not supported by substantial and credible evidence. In re Extension of Boundaries of City of Hattiesburg, 840 So.2d 69, 81 (Miss.2003). "To determine the reasonableness of the annexation, this Court has laid out twelve indicia of reasonableness which are not separate, independent tests, but rather need to be considered under the totality of circumstances." In re Enlargement and Extension of Boundaries of City of Southaven, 5 So.3d 375, 376-77 (Miss. 2009). They are as follows:

Id. at 377. We have further held that "municipalities must demonstrate through plans and otherwise, that residents of the annexed areas will receive something of value in return for their tax dollars in order to carry the burden of showing reasonableness." Matter of Extension of Boundaries of City of Columbus, 644 So.2d 1168, 1172 (Miss.1994).

¶ 20. Before we discuss the chancery court's findings pertaining to each of the aforementioned indicia, we first address Saltillo's and Lee County's contention with regard to expert witness Karen Fernandez and Daubert.2

A. Daubert Challenge

¶ 21. Lee County and Saltillo argue that the chancery court admitted the testimony of Karen Fernandez, one of Tupelo's numerous expert witnesses, without any evidence that her testimony met the requirements of Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and the standards of Daubert. We find no error in the chancery court's decision to allow Fernandez to testify as an expert witness in this case.

¶ 22. The admission of expert testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 34 (Miss.2003). Rule 702 states:

M.R.E. 702. In McLemore, this Court adopted the modified Daubert standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony.

McLemore, 863 So.2d at 38 (internal citations omitted).

¶ 23. Tupelo tendered Fernandez as an expert in the field of urban and regional planning. As mentioned, she was one of many experts offered by Tupelo at trial.3 According to the record, Fernandez received a Master of Urban and Regional Planning degree in 1988 from the University of New Orleans, and she operates her own consulting firm located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Fernandez is a member of the American Planning Association, having co-hosted two national APA conferences, and the American Institute of Certified Planners, which requires biennial continuing education. Fernandez previously has testified as an expert in three Mississippi annexation matters: Byram Incorporators, 16 So.3d 662;4 In re Enlargement and Extension of the Municipal Boundaries of the City of Jackson, 912 So.2d 961 (Miss.2005); and In re Enlargement and Extension of the Municipal Boundaries of the City of D'Iberville, 867 So.2d 241 (Miss.2004).

¶ 24. Fernandez testified she had undertaken extensive research in this matter by gathering facts and data pertaining to Tupelo and the PAAs. Much of Fernandez's research was evident from maps, charts, graphs, and tables she prepared, all of which were admitted without objection as trial exhibits, showing conditions particular to Tupelo and the PAAs, including but not limited to maps reflecting census blocks and tracts, population change, and population density; maps reflecting current land use within Tupelo's current city limits and the PAAs, including location of undeveloped parcels, analyzed in terms of location, square miles, and acreage; maps reflecting location of proposed installation of water and sewer lines in PAAs; graphs reflecting recent history of issuance of residential and commercial building permits in Tupelo, both by number issued and aggregate value; and a map reflecting development suitability of undeveloped parcels within current city limits in terms of severely constrained (lands floodway/floodplain), moderately constrained, and unconstrained lands.

¶ 25. Fernandez repeatedly visited Tupelo to conduct field reconnaissance, met with city officials, and attended pretrial depositions. Fernandez gathered and analyzed a significant amount of existing information specific to Tupelo, which included Tupelo's Development Code; Tupelo's 2010 and 2025 Comprehensive Plans; Tupelo's ordinances pertaining to health, safety, and welfare, existing water and sewer infrastructure, park and recreation opportunities Tupelo provides; Tupelo's fire protection capabilities; city financial records; flood zones and floodways within Tupelo's current city limits; septic tank suitability in PAAs; and maps of future land use.

¶ 26. After she was tendered as an expert in the field of urban and regional planning, counsel for Saltillo sought to examine Fernandez under the modified Daubert standard. Referencing Daubert throughout his examination, counsel repeatedly asked Fernandez what "theory or technique" she employed on Tupelo's need to expand, and whether that "theory or technique" had been "peer reviewed or tested" by others in the field of urban and regional planning. Clearly not familiar with Daubert (much less this particular aspect of it), Fernandez had difficulty responding to counsel's question(s). Fernandez essentially reiterated after each question that she utilized a number of different data in order to analyze the growth and development within Tupelo. This inquiry went on for some time, until the chancellor interjected with the following:

¶ 27. On appeal, as they did in the chancery court, Saltillo and Lee County insist that Fernandez's expert testimony was admissible only under the "nonexclusive list of factors" set forth by the Daubert Court to be used in assessing reliability of such testimony. Those are: (1) whether the theory or technique can be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been the subject of peer review and publication; (3) whether there is a high known or potential rate of error respecting the technique; (4) whether there are standards that control the operation of the technique; and (5) whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.

¶ 28. In Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 724 (Miss.2005), we explained:

Id. at 723 (emphasis added).

¶ 29. As the chancery court correctly found, Mississippi courts routinely have allowed the use of experts such as Fernandez in annexation cases to assist the court on the twelve indicia and reasonableness of proposed annexation. This includes those periods when Mississippi was still adhering to the more rigid "general acceptance" test enumerated in Frye v. U.S., 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (D.C.App.1923).

¶ 30. In City of Southaven, 5 So.3d at 377-84, Chris Watson,5 testifying as an expert planner on behalf of Southaven, analyzed, among other things, year 2000 census data and building permit data in reaching an opinion on the twelve indicia.

¶ 31. In City of Madison (Enlargement and Extension of the Corporate Limits), 983 So.2d 1035, 1040-50 (Miss. 2008), planning experts considered development already occurring in the proposed annexation areas, the city's revenues and expenditures, ending fund balances over a period of years, and options for financing the cost of annexation in reaching opinions that the city had a need to expand and had the financial ability to annex.

¶ 32. In City of Clinton (Enlargement and Extension of Municipal Boundaries), 955 So.2d 307, 311-28 (Miss.2007), Chris Watson gave expert testimony on the twelve indicia of reasonableness based on his consideration of U.S. census data and what it reflected about population density; the city's ordinances and their application to the PAAs upon annexation; the city's past performance, evidenced by its efforts in accomplishing promises made in prior annexations; the benefits enjoyed by PAA residents as a result of proximity to the current city limits through shopping and working in the municipality, availability of municipal-level police and fire protection in the city, and park and recreation opportunities offered by the city; and the city's need to expand evidenced by the amount of remaining developable land and history of issuance of building permits.

¶ 33. In Prestridge v. City of Petal, 841 So.2d 1048, 1057 (Miss.2003), planning experts testifying on the twelve indicia opined that the proposed annexation areas were within Petal's path of growth as reflected by data on traffic flow and transportation corridors into the proposed annexation areas; that Petal was in need of expansion as evidenced by its extension of infrastructure in the proposed annexation areas and growth along the periphery of Petal's existing city limits; that a need existed for overall zoning and planning to address instances of incompatible land uses, subdivision deficiencies, narrow-road and drainage issues; and that residents of the proposed annexation areas received benefits without payments of taxes through use of the city's parks, medical, social, cultural, and religious facilities.

¶ 34. In City of Pearl, 908 So.2d at 733-43, planning experts considered development already occurring in the proposed annexation areas; the city's tax revenue, Moody's rating, funding options; and the characteristics of land available for development in current city limits.

¶ 35. In City of Ridgeland, 651 So.2d at 554-61, expert testimony included lack of available land to meet increasing development and the need to expand Ridgeland's borders so that it could exercise control over development and provide comprehensive planning for growth.

¶ 36. In Horn Lake, 630 So.2d 10, 17-26 (Miss.1993), a planning expert testified to the city's need to expand, based on characteristics particular to the city, including topography and remaining developable land.

¶ 37. Here, Saltillo and Lee County offer no specific reason(s) whatever as to why Fernandez's testimony should be considered unreliable. They simply maintain their general assertion that the chancery court must be reversed because the court failed to apply the "nonexclusive" Daubert factors.

¶ 38. Whether there are "tests, peer reviews, or publications" on the subject of annexation is beyond this Court's purview. Saltillo and Lee County certainly did not challenge Fernandez with any such information at trial, and it is apparent from the record and the framing of their arguments on appeal they had no intention of doing so. The following excerpt, taken from a question Saltillo propounded to Fernandez during her voir dire, illustrates:

¶ 39. This is too narrow a take and application of Daubert. As Tupelo points out on appeal, no two municipalities or PAAs are the same. Each annexation involves fact-specific conditions and data, along with a multitude of variables that have to be taken into consideration. We find the following Fifth Circuit case cited by Tupelo to be analogous and insightful to the issue at hand. In St. Martin v. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 406-07 (5th Cir.2000), a suit involving damage to a marsh, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's acceptance of the plaintiff's expert, stating:

¶ 40. We find no error in the chancery court's decision to accept Fernandez's expert testimony as both relevant and reliable. The court allowed her testimony to be subjected to intensive cross-examination, and it was then for the chancery court, sitting as trier of fact, to determine the weight and credibility of her testimony. This assignment of error is without merit.

B. Twelve Indicia of Reasonableness

1. Need to Expand

¶ 41. Lee County argues that the chancery court disregarded the weight of the substantial and credible evidence submitted at trial which demonstrated that Tupelo does not have a present need to expand.

¶ 42. This Court has held that when making a determination as to whether a municipality has a reasonable need for expansion, the chancery court "may or may not" consider the following factors:

Enlarging, Extending and Defining Corp. Limits and Boundaries of the City of Horn Lake v. Town of Walls, 57 So.3d 1253, 1259 (Miss.2011).

a. Spillover development into the PAAs

¶ 43. The chancery court determined that, with the exception of PAA 6, all of the PAAs have experienced spillover development, finding as follows:

b. Remaining vacant land within Tupelo

¶ 44. In addressing the remaining-vacant-land factor, the chancery court took into consideration: how the various paths of growth in the PAAs relate favorably or unfavorably to the proximity of the constrained and severely constrained vacant land; and how the paths of commercial and residential growth relate to their proximity to constrained and severely constrained land and accessibility to transportation. The court found that it was reasonable to assume that prime, vacant land constraints located in the southern portion of PAA 5 "[would] not attract commercial development such as is found in the areas nears Barnes Crossing Mall, nor will it serve as an area suitable for expanding commercial development in northeast Tupelo." The court noted that there was between "22 and 32%" of vacant and developable land in Tupelo, "depending upon how agricultural land is considered." As a result of the vacant land, which is constrained by flood plains and floodways and its proximity to commercial and residential development, Tupelo is in need of additional developable land. This, according to the chancery court, "is especially true since a cushion of developable land is needed." Accordingly, the court found that substantial, credible evidence favors annexation of the PAAs with regard to land available for development.

c. City's population growth

¶ 45. On this factor, the chancery court found that Tupelo has experienced a "51.57% increase in population since 1980, which is an annual increase of 1.84%." And most of Tupelo's residential development has occurred since the 1989 annexation.

¶ 46. Lee County argues that the evidence at trial demonstrated that Tupelo's annual population growth has declined substantially since its previous 1989 annexation. Between 1990 and 2000, Tupelo experienced an annual growth in population of 1.04% per year; between 2000 and 2007, Tupelo's population growth slowed to approximately 0.77% per year; and in 2008, its population growth was 0.48%. Tupelo responds, however, that significant population growth is expected to occur in Tupelo as a result of the opening of a Toyota Plant in nearby Blue Springs, Mississippi.

¶ 47. As this Court recognized in Town of Marion v. City of Meridian (In re Enlarging, Extending & Defining the Corporate Limits & Boundaries of the City of Meridian), 992 So.2d 1113, 1117-18 (Miss.2008), the fact that a city may have experienced a decrease in annual population growth, or even a "decline" in overall population, does not necessarily weigh against the city's "need for expansion."

d. Tupelo's need for developable land

¶ 48. The chancery court found that, although Tupelo has land available for development, much of the land needed for various uses is not close enough to the paths of growth and is not reasonably expected to be utilized and developed. The court noted that a "prime of example of [this] problem is the lack of land available for commercial and retail development near the Barnes Crossing Mall." The court found that the mall "acts as a magnet to customers in east and northeast Mississippi," which is causing traffic to be a problem in the area, and which is being addressed by the proposed "northern loop." Both PAA 1 and PAA 6 are in close proximity to this mall, and there has been commercial development south of the mall, "along [Highway] 45, and that development continues south to [Highway] 78."

¶ 49. In addressing this factor, the chancery court referred back to the previous factor pertaining to the fact that Tupelo still has undeveloped, vacant land within its existing corporate limits. The court quoted the following portion from an annexation decision by this Court, in which we reiterated our refusal to set an absolute amount of usable vacant land that would prevent annexation:

In re Extension of Boundaries of City of Winona, 879 So.2d 966, 974-975 (Miss. 2004). Accordingly, the chancery court found that there is substantial, credible evidence to favor annexation of the PAAs with regard to a need for developable land in proximity to Tupelo's path of growth.

e. Need for planning

¶ 50. According to the chancery court, all of the PAAs have needs for planning to some degree. "PAA 1 and PAA 6 have immediate needs for planning because of their close proximity to developing commercial areas in Tupelo." And "Lee County offered no evidence of its intention to do any type of planning in these areas." The chancery court further found that Tupelo has a history of proficiency at city planning, which demonstrates its ability and desire "to perform this task." "Tupelo has shown a commitment to long-term planning as evidenced by the adoption of long-term plans and the continuing modification of those plans." The court found that Tupelo also has allocated personnel and resources to this effort, which the documentary evidence supports. "The location of the PAAs in relationship to the current city limits when coupled with the fact that Lee County has little planning activity causes this to be an important factor indicating the reasonableness of the annexation." Accordingly, the court found substantial, credible evidence to favor annexation of the PAAs with regard to planning.

f. Increased traffic

¶ 51. The chancery court found that, because of Tupelo's increase in vehicular traffic as a result of increased commercial activity and changing traffic patterns, especially in northeast Tupelo, the major thoroughfare committee has continued to develop and modify plans as the growth and change in transportation needs become evident. Thus, "solving the traffic issues in northeast Tupelo is supportive of annexation, especially in PAA 6."

g. Need to expand tax base

¶ 52. The chancery court found this factor nonsignificant.

h. Limitations due to geography

¶ 53. The chancery court found this factor also nonsignificant.

i. Environmental influences

¶ 54. The chancery court found the problem of flood zones and floodways has caused some environmental problems, but ultimately concluded that this factor does not appear to be a major issue relative to the ability of Tupelo to provide services to the PAAs.

j. City's need to exercise control over PAAs

¶ 55. The chancery court found that, "[a]s addressed in other parts of this opinion, [Tupelo] needs to have some degree of control and supervision over the PAAs so that the future development of these areas will occur in an orderly manner."

k. Increased new building-permit activity

¶ 56. The chancery court found that "[h]istorically, Tupelo has been a thriving city with large commercial and residential development. As a result of the current economic downturn, the issuance of new building permits has abated somewhat. There is some evidence that renovations and additions to existing structures have increased."

¶ 57. Given the substantial, credible evidence presented to the chancery court on this indicium, we cannot say that the court's finding that this indicium weighed in favor of Tupelo's proposed annexation was unreasonable.

¶ 58. Most of the following is taken directly from the chancery court's findings of fact with regard to the path-of-growth indicium.

¶ 59. PAA 2 N is one of Tupelo's paths of growth.

¶ 60. PAA 2S is in one of Tupelo's paths of growth.

¶ 61. PAA 3 is one of Tupelo's paths of growth.

¶ 62. PAA 4 is located in one of Tupelo's paths of growth.

¶ 63. PAA 5 south of West Main Street is not in one of Tupelo's paths of growth.

¶ 64. PAA 5 north of West Main Street is in one of Tupelo's paths of growth.

¶ 65. The factors found showing a path of growth in PAA 6 are as follows:

¶ 66. PAA 6 is in Tupelo's path of growth.

¶ 67. Lee County argues the chancery court's findings are contrary to Tupelo's recently adopted Comprehensive Plan, "Tupelo 2025," (2025 Comprehensive Plan) which sets forth the public policy for Tupelo's physical growth for the period 2008 through 2025. Lee County contends that the adopted growth policy for Tupelo, as established by its 2025 Comprehensive Plan, is to increase density within the existing city.

¶ 68. Tupelo responds that Lee County ignores the method in which the twelve indicia are to be analyzed, and instead relies solely on its expert's misinterpretation of Tupelo's 2025 Comprehensive Plan. Tupelo maintains that the 2025 Comprehensive Plan contemplates both inward and outward growth and includes the PAAs.

¶ 69. We agree with Tupelo. We cannot say that Tupelo's 2025 Comprehensive Plan is limited to an interpretation of being against annexation. And we can only presume that the chancery court concluded likewise. We find the chancery court's findings for the path-of-growth indicium are supported by substantial and credible evidence and were not unreasonable.

3. Potential Health Hazards

¶ 70. The chancery court found the potential health hazards relevant for discussion in this case primarily concern sewer service. The court found that many areas in the PAAs do not have central sewer service, and it is uncontradicted that septic tanks do not work well in the PAAs because of soil conditions that do not allow adequate percolation of effluent from septic-tank field lines.

¶ 71. Tupelo serves some of the PAAs with its modern pressurized sewer system. The court noted that Tupelo, in particular, serves:

¶ 72. The court also found that the other health-hazard issue involves trash collection. Tupelo now has twice weekly trash collection. At present, the PAAs now have only weekly trash collection furnished by Lee County.

¶ 73. The court concluded that the reliance on septic tanks in many parts of the PAAs to be annexed causes this indicium to favor annexation.

¶ 74. Lee County argues that the fact soil conditions are not suitable for septictank use is of no importance with regard to the undeveloped, agricultural lands which make up a substantial portion of the area sought to be annexed. Lee County also contends that Tupelo has failed to extend sanitary sewer service to between twenty-five and thirty-five homes on Green Tee Road in the existing city limits, and to the extent that the soil conditions in the PAAs are unsuitable for septic-tank use, the soil conditions along Green Tee Road are likewise not suitable. Lee County further contends that Tupelo has no plans to extend sewer service to Green Tee Road, despite it having been annexed more than twenty-one years ago, just as Tupelo has no plans for sanitary sewer service in any of PAA 6. Thus, to argue that soil conditions are not conducive to septic-tank usage is of no consequence, as there are no plans to eliminate such uses.

¶ 75. Tupelo responds that Lee County's arguments are based on the unreasonable assumption that no further development will occur in the PAAs and that they ignore that significant portions of the PAAs are already developed, with many already receiving Tupelo utilities. It argues that Tupelo has shown plans and financial ability to extend infrastructure to service the PAAs that are not already being serviced. Tupelo maintains that it provides sewer to "more than 99% of its customers, and provides water to 100%." Tupelo points to the record evidence which shows that only twenty-five to thirty-five of its 16,000 customers do not receive "Tupelo retail sewer" because these customers either chose to remain on septic tanks or live in an area where it was not economically feasible to provide "retail sewer." Tupelo further maintains that it has shown its plan and financial capability to install gravity and pressure lines with attendant pumping stations and ancillary infrastructure in order to provide businesses and residences in the PAAs with municipal-level mechanical sewer services.

¶ 76. Based on our review of the record, we cannot say the chancery court failed to take attending facts on this indicium into consideration. Nor can we say the court's ultimate finding on this indicium was contrary to the evidence presented.

4. Financial Ability

¶ 77. This Court has considered the following factors in determining whether there is reasonable financial ability for the annexation:

City of Winona, 879 So.2d at 981-82 (citations omitted).

¶ 78. The financial ability of Tupelo to provide services promised in the annexation ordinance was demonstrated, primarily, by the testimony of Lynn Norris, Tupelo's chief financial officer, and City Clerk Kim Hanna. The chancery court found from their testimony that Tupelo has a history of strong sales-tax revenues.6 And even though the recent sales-tax revenues had decreased due to the current economic downturn, the testimony of the financial experts showed that Tupelo's financial condition remains strong. Many of the capital expenditures are made from current revenues, especially equipment purchases. Tupelo has "strong fund balances in the city departments." Tupelo has other sources of revenue that have remained untapped, such as the funds that are available from the electric department. Tupelo has the ability to levy additional taxes; however, Tupelo takes the position that an increase in taxes will be unnecessary to finance the annexation costs. Norris testified that, by structuring the city's long-term debt (utilizing "roll off"), Tupelo could obtain additional funds to service the debt that might be incurred to pay for the costs of the annexation. This could be done without an increase of the tax levy for bond-debt service.7

¶ 79. The court noted that much evidence was introduced relating to the "Service and Facilities Plan." Tupelo developed this plan to show how it could provide services and facilities to the PAAs within a five-year time frame. The total amount of expenditures in the plan for both operating and capital expenditures is $24.5 million. The court found that the document was thoughtfully prepared with input from different city departments; the court stated as follows:

¶ 80. We find the chancery court's finding that Tupelo has the financial ability to make improvements and provide municipal services is supported by substantial and credible evidence.

5. Need for Zoning and Overall Planning

¶ 81. For this indicium, the chancery court found that Tupelo has a full complement of municipal codes and ordinances, and Lee County has a limited number of such codes and ordinances. Tupelo also has a full staff of personnel to enforce, monitor, and review codes and code enforcement.

¶ 82. The record supports the chancery court's findings.

6. Need for Municipal-Level Services

a. Police protection

¶ 83. Tupelo has a municipal-level police department, staffed with 115 officers. The department has several divisions, which include: patrol division, special operations, motorcycle traffic division, speed control division, detective division, narcotics division, traffic division, aviation division, S.W.A.T. team, bomb squad, canine officers, school resource officers, and code enforcement officers.

¶ 84. The chancery court found that Tupelo has a history of funding the needs of its department and has many police services that seem to be beyond what would be expected of a city its size. "On the other hand, Lee County is called upon to provide law enforcement services to a much larger area with lower population density. Economics constraints alone would preclude Lee County from providing municipal level law enforcement services to the PAAs that Tupelo now offers."

b. Fire protection

¶ 85. At the time of trial, Tupelo had a Class 5 fire-protection rating.8 It has multiple fire stations and a full complement of fire trucks and equipment. It has a fire training facility. In addition, it has a recently completed fire station near the Highway 78 and North Gloster Street interchange. Ninety-three full-time firefighters staff the department.

¶ 86. The PAAs currently are served by fire-protection districts. The chancery court found the fire-protection districts do not have the equipment, resources, personnel, and training necessary to provide the level of municipal fire protection needed by the PAAs. These districts do serve a need in the rural parts of some of the PAAs but cannot furnish a municipal level of fire protection. Aside from the legal issues regarding "right to serve,"9 Tupelo's ability to furnish fire protection greatly favors annexation of the approved PAAs.

¶ 87. The Tupelo Fire Department provides the following services: 1) fire suppression, 2) fire code inspection, 3) emergency medical response, 4) mutual aid to all other fire departments in Lee County when requested, 5) hazardous-material response, 6) fire prevention and education, 7) special rescue response, and 8) regular inspection/maintenance of fire hydrants.

c. Water and sewer services, garbage collection, and street lighting

Water service

¶ 88. The chancery court found that Tupelo obtains its potable water supply from the Northeast Regional Water Supply District from the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. This water supply is sufficient for serving the present city limits as well as all of the PAAs. Tupelo continues to maintain its former water system, which uses wells and elevated water tanks. This is a backup system to the Regional Water Supply District for use in case of an emergency. Tupelo has a preliminary system design map that it covenants to implement after annexation is completed. It will provide all PAAs with fire-protection water mains. The fire-protection water main system also will be constructed in those areas where existing commercial and residential water service is available. The estimated costs of this system of fire-protection water mains will be approximately $5 million.

Sewer system

¶ 89. The present sewer system in Tupelo generally uses a pressure system as opposed to the early gravity-flow technology. Coupled with this system is a new wastewater treatment facility with sufficient capacity to serve the proposed PAAs as well as the new Toyota plant, with room for additional capacity and certification well beyond its present capacity. Tupelo presently serves sewer customers in the following PAAs:

¶ 90. The costs of providing mechanical sewer treatment in those areas not presently served by Tupelo will be approximately $13.5 million over a period of five years.

Garbage collection

¶ 91. Tupelo will provide twice weekly garbage pickup as opposed to weekly garbage pickup in the PAAs that is provided by Lee County.

Street lighting

¶ 92. The chancery court found that Tupelo will provide street lighting to the PAAs that are annexed into the city according to the same policies that presently exist in Tupelo. "This serves as both a deterrent to crime and an enhancement to the quality of life in these areas."

¶ 93. Accordingly, the chancery court found this indicium favors annexation. We find the chancery court's finding that Tupelo has demonstrated a need for municipal services in the PAAs was supported by substantial and credible evidence.

7. Natural Barriers

¶ 94. The chancery court found no evidence of natural barriers that would preclude Tupelo from providing services to the PAAs as outlined in the annexation ordinance. Thus, this indicium favors annexation.

¶ 95. The record supports the chancery court's finding on this indicium.

8. Past Performance

¶ 96. The chancery court found that Tupelo has substantially fulfilled its obligations to provide services to the areas previously annexed in 1989. The court also found that, beyond providing services to the 1989 annexed areas, Tupelo has provided water, sewer, and fire protection to some of the areas within the now proposed PAAs. Accordingly, "Tupelo has satisfactorily shown that its past performance in fulfilling its covenants in the 1989 annexation ordinance warrant confidence that it will do so when this annexation is finally approved."

¶ 97. We find the chancery court's findings for the past-performance indicium are supported by substantial and credible evidence.

9. Impact (Economic or Otherwise) of Annexation upon Those Who Live In or Own Property In Annexed Areas

¶ 98. The chancery court found that the PAAs will receive several immediate benefits as a result of inclusion in Tupelo's city limits. Police protection will commence as soon as annexation is approved. As previously stated in this opinion, Tupelo has a well-equipped, trained, and staffed municipal-level police department. The PAAs will receive the benefits of a Class 5 Fire Department for a period of two years, and that classification will be subject to review after the two-year period. A Class 5 classification will reduce insurance premiums in some instances in the PAAs. The chancery court noted that the Tupelo fire department and county fire departments have a history of working together, and that Tupelo currently responds to calls as needed in the PAAs. The court dismissed the fire protection districts' argument that they alone should control fire protection services in the PAAs. The court found that such a position is not in the best interest of residents in the PAAs and would result in the deprivation to the residents of the superior fire protection Tupelo can provide. Accordingly, the court found that this indicium favors annexation, and its finding is supported by substantial, credible evidence.

10. Impact on Minority Voting Strength

¶ 99. The chancery court found that the evidence shows the dilution of minority voting strength as a result of annexation will be de minimis. Lee County argues, however, that the evidence and testimony presented at trial indicates that Tupelo failed accurately to project the impact its proposed annexation would have upon minority voting strength. Lee County further contends that the chancery court committed reversible error by limiting Lee County's cross-examination of Tupelo's expert, Ferndandez, with regard to this issue.

¶ 100. The record supports the chancery court's finding. Fernandez testified that the present city breakdown of voting age population is 73.8% white population, 24.9% African American population, and 1.3% other population.10 After annexation, the combined city breakdown of voting age population will be 74.1% white population, 24.6% African-American population, and 1.4% other population.

¶ 101. This diminution in minority voting strength is less than that found in City of Meridian, 992 So.2d at 1123-24, where this Court upheld the following finding by the chancery court:

¶ 102. Similarly, we find the chancery court's findings for this indicium were supported by substantial, credible evidence.

¶ 103. As for Lee County's contention that the chancery court erred by limiting its cross-examination, we find no such error. During Lee County's cross-examination of Fernandez on this indicium, Tupelo raised an objection to the line of questioning on the basis that Lee County had not disclosed any opinion of its expert. The chancery court reserved ruling on Tupelo's objection, and allowed Lee County to make a proffer, subject to later ruling by the chancery court on Tupelo's objection. During the proffer, Lee County questioned Fernandez as to whether the 2000 census figures and 2007 estimates were the best information available with regard to her analysis of the proposed annexation's effect on minority voting strength. The chancery court also asked its own questions during the course of Lee County's proffer. Now on appeal, Lee County suggests that the chancery court did not consider Fernandez's proffered testimony. We fail to see how. First, a review of the record reveals that Lee County was not limited in the slightest during its proffer. And second, Fernandez maintained throughout the examination that she had conducted a proper analysis using the best information available and was of the opinion that the effect on minority voting strength was de minimis — as the chancery court found. This contention of error is without merit.

11. Residents in PAAs Not Paying Fair Share of Taxes

¶ 104. On this indicium, the chancery court simply noted some of the benefits that will accrue to residents in the PAAs as a result of annexation, including: "Access to parks and recreational facilities; access to numerous medical facilities and hospitals in Tupelo; access to Bancorp-South Coliseum; access to youth activities; access to retail shopping, especially the Barnes Crossing Mall."

¶ 105. Citing City of Jackson, 912 So.2d 961, Lee County contends the chancery court's finding on this indicium reflects a misapplication of this Court's prior interpretation of the "fair share" indicium and its impact on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a municipal annexation. In City of Jackson, this Court held:

Id. at 971 (citations omitted). Distinguishable from City of Jackson, the record evidence before us supports the chancery court's finding that this indicium favors Tupelo's proposed annexation.

¶ 106. In addition to the benefits summarized above by the chancery court, the record also illustrates that some residents in the PAAs, due to their proximity to Tupelo's fire stations, already receive the benefits of lower fire premiums based on Tupelo's Class 5-rated fire department, but pay no taxes to support the Tupelo Fire Department. And the only access the fire districts have to fire hydrants is through those belonging to Tupelo.

¶ 107. The evidence also revealed that Tupelo has a unique, progressive program in its "Major Thoroughfare Program," which is funded solely by a 10-mill tax levy applied by the citizens of Tupelo on themselves through elections held every five years relative to various phases of the Major Thoroughfare Program. At the time of trial, Tupelo was in Phase IV, which includes, among other projects, expansion of a bridge over Town Creek, widening of South Gloster to five lanes, and construction of the northern loop in PAA 6 at a cost in excess of $14 million to connect Barnes Crossing Road/North Gloster Street with McCullough Boulevard and Coley Road. The 10-mill tax is levied only on property located in Tupelo's municipal limits, and is used solely to fund the improvement or construction of major thoroughfares. The Major Thoroughfare Program operates on a cash basis only, using funds generated through 10-mil tax levy and funds received through grants and other sources, such as MDOT funds. Evidence showed that the impact of the Major Thoroughfare Program has been job growth, improved traffic flow, improved traffic safety, and enhanced economic development. Evidence also showed that residents in the PAAs enjoy and benefit from roads constructed or upgraded through Tupelo's Major Thoroughfare Program, never having paid taxes in support thereof.

¶ 108. In City of Madison, 650 So.2d at 504, in which we upheld the chancery court's finding that this particular indicium weighed in favor of annexation, the chancery court opined as follows:

¶ 109. Given the substantial, credible evidence presented to the chancery court, we cannot say the court's finding that this indicium weighed in favor Tupelo's proposed annexation was error.

12. Other Factors

¶ 110. The chancery court found none applicable in this case.

V. Whether the chancery court erred in failing to consider the inequitable and unreasonable impact of Tupelo annexation upon the Lee County fire-protection districts and the residents and property owners annexed.

¶ 111. Both Lee County and the fire-protection districts contend that the chancery court committed reversible error in approving Tupelo's annexation without consideration of the inequitable and unreasonable impact the proposed annexation will have on the fire protection districts in the county,11 as well as residents potentially subject to double taxation for fire-protection services.12 They argue that Mississippi Code Section 19-5-151 (Supp.2011)13 provides legal authority for the establishment of fire-protection districts and sets forth the express legal rights and obligations of the districts. They also argue that Mississippi Code Sections 19-5-16514 and 19-5-175 (Rev.2003)15 provide that fire-protection districts become public corporations in perpetuity and, as long as the fire-protection districts continue to furnish fire-protection services within their defined boundaries, the districts are the "sole public corporations empowered to furnish such services within such district." Lee County and the fire-protection districts both contend that the evidence at trial indicates that Tupelo, if allowed to annex, will levy full municipal taxes against residents and property owners annexed, a portion of which supports Tupelo's fire services. This, therefore, creates a conflict with Section 19-5-175. And as such, it was incumbent upon Tupelo to resolve this conflict before petitioning for annexation. Relying on Town of Walls, 57 So.3d 1253, Lee County submits that Tupelo's failure to do so has created an inequitable scenario which, Lee County states in its brief, can only play out in one of two ways:

¶ 112. Speaking to the arguments raised by Lee County and the fire protection districts at trial, the chancery court found as follows:

The objectors cite [Section] 19-5-175.

¶ 113. Neither can we, and we find no error in the chancery court's rejection of Lee County's and the fire-protection districts' arguments.

¶ 114. Again, annexation is a legislative matter and the judiciary's role in such matters is limited to assessing whether the annexation is reasonable. City of Jackson, 691 So.2d at 980 (Miss.1997); City of Ridgeland, 651 So.2d at 559.

¶ 115. True, in Town of Walls, we acknowledged a fire-protection district's statutory right to exist as the "sole public corporation empowered to furnish" the services it was authorized to furnish, so long as the district actively continues to furnish such services. Town of Walls, 57 So.3d at 1266-67 (quoting Mississippi Code Section 19-5-175). And we accepted the chancery court's additional findings in that case that, based on the results of Horn Lake's 2002 annexation (in which the city took in six square miles of the fire-protection district), the taxpayers located in the latest proposed annexation area likely would be subject "to paying additional monies without receiving additional services." Id. at 1270-71. We also accepted the court's finding that, based on the effect of the 2002 annexation, Horn Lake's latest proposed annexation would probably "have a chilling effect on the district's efforts to secure funding by way of donations and dues collections." Id. As a consequence, the remaining members of the fire-protection district not annexed by Horn Lake likely would be forced "to survive on reduced funds and resources for continued protection in fire emergencies." Id. at 1271. And finding that the chancery court relied on substantial, credible evidence in finding that the impact of annexation on the fire-protection district did not favor annexation by Horn Lake, we held no error in the chancery court's conclusion on this factor. Id.

¶ 116. But, as Tupelo correctly points out on appeal, this particular factor in Town of Walls was not dispositive of the case. We affirmed the chancery court's decision to deny Horn Lake's annexation petition based on the court having found the petition unreasonable, in toto, when considered under the totality of the circumstances through application of the twelve indicia. Id. at 1257-58. The only indicium the chancery court found in favor of Horn Lake's proposed annexation was "path of growth." Id. at 1262. Except for "natural barriers" and "effect on Minority voting," which were found neutral, the chancery court found all other indicia weighed against annexation. Id. at 1259-70.

¶ 117. Here, no evidence was presented to the chancery court demonstrating that Tupelo's 1989 annexation had any negative impact upon the fire-protection districts then affected thereby, or on the residents then inside or outside the areas annexed. Instead, the record illustrates the following with regard to the three fire-protection districts arguing Section 19-5-151 et seq., on appeal.

Belden Fire Protection District

¶ 118. Tupelo annexed a portion of the Belden Volunteer Fire Protection District in the 1989 annexation, and it has since been served only by the Tupelo Fire Department. A portion of the current Belden Fire Protection District is situated within PAA 5 and PAA 6. Belden currently is rated Class 8 based in large part on its access to Tupelo's fire hydrants, which are located both within Belden's district area (outside Tupelo's current municipal limits) and alongside the adjoining Tupelo corporate limits. As attested to by Willie Payne, Belden's fire chief, Belden is permitted to access Tupelo's fire hydrants free of charge. If not for that access, Belden would have to obtain water from other sources, such as lakes.

Palmetto-Old Union Fire Protection District

¶ 119. A portion of the Palmetto-Old Union Volunteer Fire Protection District is situated within PAA 5 and is rated a Class 9. Like Belden, Palmetto-Old Union does not have any fire hydrants, and during its most recent flow test with the Rating Bureau, the district had to access water through one of Tupelo's fire hydrants.

Unity Fire Protection District

¶ 120. The portion of Unity Volunteer Fire Protection District situated within PAAs 1, 2 North and 2 South, which includes Indian Hills, Deer Park, and Big Oaks subdivisions, is rated Class 10, equivalent to no fire protection, due to lack of access to water.

¶ 121. Each fire-protection district uses only volunteer firefighters, whereas each firefighter in the Tupelo Fire Department is certified as a professional firefighter, with certification received following six weeks of training at the fire academy in Jackson, including at least 1,001 hours of training, with skills tested at the end of each week. Volunteer firefighters are not required to be certified. For rating purposes, one professional firefighter is equivalent to three volunteer firefighters, due to difference in response time, training, and availability of firefighters. As explained by Larry Dean Williams, Unity's fire chief, only those volunteer firemen who are available, i.e., not at work or otherwise engaged, are able to respond to calls, and there have been situations in which enough volunteers were not available to respond to a fire.

¶ 122. In City of Pearl, 908 So.2d at 740, involving a successful annexation effort by the City of Pearl, this Court quoted the chancery court's opinion in pertinent part as follows:

¶ 123. Unlike in Town of Walls, substantial and credible evidence was presented here to support the chancery court's finding that the Tupelo Fire Department provides a superior level of fire protection than the fire-protection districts are capable of providing. As to whether the land owners and the residents inside the PAAs will be double-taxed or not, the fire-protection districts have no standing to argue such a claim. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Blount, 63 So.3d 453, 467 (Miss.2011). We also decline to take into consideration Lee County's contention(s) as to what its political officials may or may not do post-annexation.

VI. COSTS

¶ 124. The chancery court ordered that "costs, being $95.00 for filing fee and $2,491.32 for publication cost[s], be taxed in accordance with [Mississippi Code Section] 21-1-35 [(Rev.2007)], as follows: 30% taxed to [Tupelo]; 40% taxed to Lee County; 20% taxed to City of Saltillo; and 10% taxed to Town of Plantersville." Lee County contends that the chancery court erred in assessing it forty percent of the publication costs, because the expense associated with the publication of notice of a hearing on an annexation petition is not within the meaning of "costs," as governed by Rule 54(d) of Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶ 125. We find no error in the chancery court's order of costs. Section 21-1-35 states as follows:

Miss.Code Ann. § 21-1-35 (Rev.2007).

¶ 126. Rule 54(d) does not expressly define what constitutes costs; rather, the rule provides our trial courts the discretion to shift costs in appropriate cases. The rule states in part: "Except when express provision therefor is made in a statute, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs...." M.R.C.P. 54(d). The comment to Rule 54(d), however, provides some guidance on what constitutes costs:

M.R.C.P. 54 cmt.

¶ 127. Sections 21-1-15 and 21-1-31 require notice by publication in annexation proceedings. Mississippi Code Section 25-7-65 (Rev.2010) delineates the fees that printers and publishers may charge for such publication(s). These fees, in our opinion, constitute official expenses in this instance, by virtue of Sections 21-1-15, 21-1-31, and 21-1-35. See Miss Code Ann. §§ 21-1-15 to 21-1-31 and 21-1-35 (Rev. 2007). And based on the language set forth by Rule 54(d), the chancery court had the discretion to assess these expenses in the manner so ordered. Accordingly, we find this issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶ 128. Because the chancery court's findings were based on substantial, credible evidence, were not manifestly wrong, and were well within the chancery court's discretion, and because the chancery court did not employ an erroneous legal standard, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court of Lee County.

¶ 129. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. LAMAR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.