RANDOLPH, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Before the Court is an appeal of a motion for contempt and modification of alimony and child support first filed by Mari Lynn Hays,1 and later amended to include Mari Lynn in her capacity as conservator for Lon Frederick Alexander, II ("Rick"), seeking unpaid alimony and child-support payments and additional financial support from her former husband, Lon Frederick Alexander ("Lon"), for the couple's adult son, Rick. Mari Lynn claims that the chancery court erred by failing to: (1) require Lon to pay additional alimony and/or child support after Rick had reached the age of majority; or (2) require Lon to make payments into a conservatorship to support Rick after Rick attained the age of majority. We find that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion by declining to require Lon to provide post-majority financial support for Rick, for state law does not vest our Court with the authority to mandate that parents financially support their offspring post-majority. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Mari Lynn and Lon were married in 1986, and their only child, Rick, was born in December 1987. On August 2, 2001, Mari Lynn filed a "Complaint for Divorce on Ground of Irreconcilable Differences" in the Hinds County Chancery Court. On October 17, 2002, the chancery court issued a "Judgment of Divorce — Irreconcilable Differences" incorporating Mari Lynn's and Lon's "Agreement for Custody and Maintenance of Child and Settlement of Property Rights" ("the agreement"). At that time, Rick was fourteen years old.

¶ 3. The agreement provided that Mari Lynn and Lon would have joint legal custody. Mari Lynn would have primary physical custody. Lon would have weekend visitation. Lon was to pay Mari Lynn $1,500 each month "for the support and maintenance of the minor child" and maintain health insurance covering Rick. (Emphasis added.) The parties were to share equally all reasonable medical expenses. Lon also agreed to pay all of Rick's private school expenses and college-education expenses through a baccalaureate degree, so long as Rick was actively pursuing a degree and maintaining a 2.50 grade-point average. The agreement further provided that Lon was to pay lump-sum alimony of $100,000 to Mari Lynn in four payments of $25,000, and installment alimony of $9,500 each month for one-hundred-eight months.

¶ 4. On October 26, 2010, Mari Lynn filed a "Motion for Modification, and Motion for Contempt[,]" alleging that Lon was in arrears in alimony, medical, and college-expense payments under the agreement, and seeking additional financial support from Lon due to Rick's medical conditions. At that time, Rick was less than two months shy of his twenty-third birthday, well past the age of majority. Mari Lynn requested that the chancellor extend Lon's alimony payments or require him to reinstate child-support payments past the age of majority.

¶ 5. On April 21, 2011, the chancellor held a hearing on Mari Lynn's modification and contempt claims. At the close of the hearing, the chancellor asked for briefs regarding "why and how I could modify the alimony as well as the child support and what basis I should do it under. And I would like for y'all to get together and submit to me what you think is owed in alimony from both sides. And I will pick a number if y'all can't agree on something." Thereafter, Mari Lynn provided that Lon owed $59,000 in past-due alimony, had not paid Rick's college tuition for the fall of 2010, and had not paid half of Rick's medical expenses.2

¶ 6. On May 31, 2011, the chancellor ordered Lon to pay Rick's outstanding college expenses, as required by his agreement. On June 15, 2011, the chancellor permitted Mari Lynn, in her capacity as Rick's conservator, to be added as a party plaintiff.3 On June 29, 2011, the court entered an order declining to find Lon in contempt, based on its findings that Lon had paid half of Rick's medical bills until Rick reached the age of majority, as required by the divorce decree; Lon had reasonably believed that Rick's delay in returning to college relieved him of his duty to continue paying Rick's tuition; and Lon had demonstrated an inability to pay an increase in alimony. The chancellor ordered Lon to reimburse Mari Lynn $1,083.15 for his portion of Rick's college expenses for the fall semester of 2010, which Mari Lynn had paid, and found that Mari Lynn was entitled to a judgment against Lon in the amount of $59,000 for past-due alimony. However, the chancellor declined to require Lon to make child-support payments in futuro for Rick, finding no legal basis for an action, brought by one parent against the other, seeking post-majority support payments.

¶ 7. On July 11, 2011, Mari Lynn filed a motion to amend the motion for modification to reflect her status as Rick's conservator, and to request — in addition to her requests for continued alimony and child — support payments — that the chancellor require Lon "to provide support directly to [Rick], through his Conservator...." On December 9, 2011, the chancellor entered an order, inter alia, addressing Mari Lynn's amended motion for modification. The chancellor recognized that "[i]n its Order, the Court did not make any reference to the recent appointment of Mari Lynn Hays as Rick's conservator[,]" and stated that "[b]ecause the proof that would be offered in support of the Amended Motion is identical to the proof already received by the Court ..., rather than try the issue a second time, for the sake of judicial economy, the Court hereby adopts the evidence at the first trial for the Amended Motion." The chancery court denied Mari Lynn's request that Lon be required to support Rick by depositing money into a conservatorship, holding that the court was without legal authority to grant the request.

ISSUES

¶ 8. Mari Lynn raises the following arguments on appeal:

LAW AND ANALYSIS

¶ 9. We will reverse a decision of the chancery court in a domestic-relations case where the chancery court applied an erroneous legal standard or reached a manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous decision. Williams v. Williams, 37 So.3d 1171, 1173-74 (Miss.2010).

¶ 10. We find that the chancery court properly denied Mari Lynn's request that Lon be required to provide support in futuro for Rick after Rick attained majority. The chancellor found as follows, in relevant part:

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 11. We agree with the chancellor that neither a motion for modification nor a motion for contempt was a permissible procedure to consider support for an adult child after the child had attained majority. We specifically have held that a child-support-modification proceeding brought by one parent against the other is not a proper proceeding in which to consider post-majority support. In Taylor, we held that "[c]ourts in other jurisdictions have held the custodial parent has no standing to bring an action or seek support for a child after the child attains majority[,]" and found that "[w]e think the same rule applies in this state." Taylor, 478 So.2d at 313 (citations omitted). After specifically holding that no such right existed, the Taylor Court continued, without citing authority:

Id. The chancellor properly found that Mari Lynn's motion for modification was "procedurally improper with regard to the modification of child support for Rick."

¶ 12. Although Taylor — in dicta, as it was not an issue to be decided — suggested a procedure for an adult child to seek post-majority support, Taylor clearly did not establish a substantive right (for, indeed, that is a legislative function) to post-majority support, or cite the existence of such authority under either the common law or our statutes. Taylor, 478 So.2d at 313. Nor did Taylor overrule Wright, et al. v. Coleman, 137 Miss. 699, 102 So. 774, 776-77 (1925), which provided that:

Wright, 102 So. at 776-77.

¶ 13. The chancery court properly found that the common law did not endow our courts with the substantive power to require a parent to support an adult child. "The common law of England has, from the earliest times, left this duty [of parents to support their children] to the natural feelings of the parents, and experience has shown that the confidence has not in general been misplaced." Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. 140, 83 So. 146, 147 (1919) (citation omitted). We have explained that, "[a]s a general rule, even in the absence of statute, parents are under a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain and care for minor children[,] ... [b]ut at common law, the duty imposed on the parents to support their children ceased when the children reached majority."5 Watkins v. Watkins, 337 So.2d 723, 724 (Miss.1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

¶ 14. The chancery court also properly found that statutory law did not endow our courts with the power to require a parent to support an adult child. In Watkins, we found that no Mississippi statute vests chancery courts with jurisdiction "to impose a duty on parents to support adult children." Watkins, 337 So.2d at 724. We find the same today. In 2002, when the child-support judgment was entered, Mississippi Code Section 93-5-23 provided that "[t]he duty of support of a child terminates upon the emancipation of the child. The court may determine that emancipation has occurred and no other support obligation exists when the child ... [a]ttains the age of twenty-one (21) years...." Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (2000) (amended 2006) (emphasis added). Justice King correctly observes that Section 93-5-23 makes the chancellor's determination of emancipation permissive ("[t]he court may determine that emancipation has occurred"). However, it does not follow that, in the absence of an emancipation determination in a child-support judgment, the child remains unemancipated beyond the age of majority. This Court has provided that:

Rennie v. Rennie, 718 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted). Obviously, an individual cannot be freed "for all the period of its minority" after the individual has reached the age of majority and is no longer a minor. Under Mississippi law, a "minor" is "any person, male or female, under twenty-one years of age." Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-27 (Rev.2005). In the absence of a determination of emancipation in a child-support judgment, a child is freed for all the period of his minority from the care, custody, control, and service of his parents (i.e., he is emancipated) upon attaining the age of twenty-one, at which time Mississippi statute provides that his minority terminates.6 Accordingly, the duty imposed by Section 93-5-23 for a parent to support its child does not extend beyond the child's minority, which terminates when the child reaches twenty-one years of age, as provided by our Legislature.

¶ 15. Thus, neither the common law nor statutory law provides to the courts of this State the authority, under the facts as presented today, to require Lon to support Rick. The power to grant the authority to require parents in Mississippi to support their adult children financially is confided to a separate magistracy: the Legislature. Our courts are without the constitutional power to declare otherwise.7

CONCLUSION

¶ 16. We conclude that the chancery court properly declined to require Lon to support Rick financially via support payments, by depositing money into a conservatorship, or by making alimony payments to Mari Lynn. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Hinds County Chancery Court.

¶ 17. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., LAMAR, PIERCE AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. PIERCE, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR AND COLEMAN, JJ. KING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ.

PIERCE, Justice, specially concurring:

¶ 18. Although I believe the dissent's heart is in the right place, the Legislature has not created a statutory scheme whereby parents may be required to pay support for, or on the behalf of, adult disabled children. Nor has the Legislature created a statutory scheme whereby adult children may be required to pay for, or on behalf of, disabled parents. For this Court to hold otherwise is to violate the separation of powers.

WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR AND COLEMAN, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

KING, Justice, dissenting:

¶ 19. The majority concludes that neither the common law nor statutory law provides to the courts of this State the authority to require a parent to support an adult child. Maj. Op. ¶ 13-14. Because I believe that the Legislature has provided the chancery courts the authority to order a parent to support an adult disabled child, I respectfully disagree.

¶ 20. In this case, both parties admit that Rick suffered from serious ailments prior to their divorce.8 Mari Lynn argues that the medical conditions have escalated, while Lon argues that they have remained the same since before the parties' divorce. Regardless, it is clear that Rick has suffered from serious medical conditions since his minority. In denying Mari Lynn's requests for support of Rick into adulthood, the chancery court stated that "it is without statutory authority or jurisdiction to entertain the consideration of continued support for an adult disabled child. It is the Court's sincere hope that the Mississippi Supreme Court will address this specific issue and give direction to the chancery courts of this state. It is also the Court's sincere hope that the Mississippi Legislature will address this matter. Until such time, however, this Court is simply without authority or jurisdiction to grant post-majority support for a disabled adult child." With appreciation for the difficult position of the chancery court, I disagree, and find that statutory authority does exist granting our courts the power to require a parent to support an adult child.9

¶ 21. Mississippi law provides that "[t]he duty of support of a child terminates upon the emancipation of the child." Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (Rev.2004); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-11-65(8) (Rev.2004). The majority cites Watkins for the proposition that no statute vests chancery courts with jurisdiction "to impose a duty on parents to support adult children." Maj. Op. ¶ 14; Watkins v. Watkins, 337 So.2d 723, 724 (Miss.1976).10 With all due respect to the majority, the statutory scheme regarding child support has undergone significant changes since 1976, when this Court decided Watkins.11 In 1976, neither Section 93-5-23 nor Section 93-11-65 contained any provisions mandating when the duty of support terminated. Laws 1954, Ch. 228, § 1; Laws 1960, Ch. 268, § 1. In fact, the Legislature did not explicitly provide for when the duty of support terminated until 1996, when it provided that the duty terminates upon the child's emancipation. Laws 1996, Ch. 345, § 1. Thus, the decision turns on the definition of "emancipation of the child."

¶ 22. The Legislature provided that a "court may determine that emancipation has occurred pursuant to Section 93-11-65." Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added). This determination of emancipation is clearly permissive, and not mandatory. See Burt v. Burt, 841 So.2d 108, 111-12 (Miss.2001) ("The statutory requirements for emancipation [under the prior version of Section 93-5-23] are clearly permissive and not mandatory; the court may determine that the child has been emancipated if any of the four factors are satisfied." (emphasis in original)).12 Thus, the Legislature clearly gave the courts the option to use Section 93-11-65 as guidance to determine emancipation in a divorce case, but did not mandate a finding of emancipation under any particular circumstances.13 Rather, the statute explicitly gives the courts the authority to determine when emancipation occurs with regard to child support ordered pursuant to a divorce proceeding.

¶ 23. Section 93-11-65 provides that

Miss.Code Ann. § 93-11-65(8)(a) (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added). While emancipation under Section 93-11-65, which is not at issue in this case, "shall" occur when one or more of the four factors is met, this section also provides that emancipation occurs unless the court provides otherwise in the underlying child support judgment. This provision clearly gives courts the latitude to make provisions regarding emancipation in their child support judgments other than those situations outlined in the statute.

¶ 24. Thus, under both Section 93-5-23, at issue here, and Section 93-11-65, the duty of support ends with emancipation of the child. The plain language of both Sections gives the courts latitude to determine under what circumstances emancipation occurs.14

¶ 25. This Court has defined emancipation as

Burt, 841 So.2d at 111 (quoting Caldwell v. Caldwell, 579 So.2d 543, 549 (Miss.1991)). Twenty-one is generally considered the age of majority and presumptively the age of emancipation. See Watkins, 337 So.2d at 724. "At that age a person is presumed to possess the physical and mental capabilities to support himself, to establish his own residence, and in general to manage his own affairs." Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Colo.1983). However, when a child is under a mental or physical disability which renders the child incapable of self-support,15 the presumption of emancipation at age twenty-one may be overcome.16 Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 800 (Alaska 1989); Riggs v. Riggs, 353 S.C. 230, 578 S.E.2d 3, 5 (2003). "A different interpretation would be wholly inconsistent with the independence that the word `emancipation' connotes." Koltay, 667 P.2d at 1376. A child who is so mentally or physically disabled as to render him incapable of self-support, and who is thus dependent on one or both of his parents, clearly is not free from the "care, custody, control, and service" of his parents. Furthermore, in such a situation, parental control has not been relinquished. Thus, because I believe that the plain language of the statutes grant the courts the latitude to determine when emancipation occurs, and because emancipation does not occur when, upon attaining the age of majority, a child labors under a mental or physical disability rendering him or her incapable of self-support,17 I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the chancery court and remand the case for a determination of 1) whether Rick labors under a mental and/or physical disability that renders him incapable of self-support, and thus whether Rick was ever "emancipated," and 2) if the court determines that Rick overcomes the presumption of emancipation at age twenty-one and has never been emancipated, whether support is appropriate in this case. If the chancery court reaches the second question, it would be appropriate for the court to consider to what extent Rick receives or is capable of earning his own income, whether it be through government assistance or any work Rick is able to perform.

DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.