NEIL P. OLACK, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Trustee's Objection to Exemptions (Dkt. No. 22), the Memorandum Brief in Support of Trustee's Objection to Exemptions (the "Trustee's Brief") (Dkt. No. 50), both of which were filed by Locke D. Barkley, the chapter 13 trustee (the "Trustee"), and the untitled Trustee's Brief opposing the Trustee's Objection to Exemptions (the
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. This matter is a core proceeding as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (B).
The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief (Dkt. No. 1) under to chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 31, 2010. On Schedule C (Dkt. No. 1), the Debtor claimed a 1997 GMC Safari (the "Safari") and a 2003 CBR motorcycle (the "Motorcycle") as exempt property.
May a debtor claim a motorcycle as exempt property under Mississippi law?
Mississippi elected to opt out of the federal exemption paradigm pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Mississippi residents
Miss.Code Ann. § 85-3-1(a). The Exemption Statute does not define the term "motor vehicles."
A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that "the words of a statute will be given their plain meaning absent ambiguity." Hennington v. American Express Co., 2010 WL 1329003, *2 (S.D.Miss. March 29, 2010) (citing Texas Food Indus. Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 81 F.3d 578, 582 (5th Cir.1996)). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "[i]f a statute is not ambiguous, the court should apply the plain meaning of the statute. Ultimately, however, this Court's goal is to discern the legislative intent." Sykes v. State, 757 So.2d 997, 1000 (Miss. 2000) (citing Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones, 369 So.2d 1381, 1388 (Miss.1979)). The Mississippi Supreme Court has also held that it "will not resort to canons of statutory construction when the statute in question is clear and unambiguous." Eagle Pacific v. Quintanilla, 923 So.2d 266, 269 (Miss.App.2006) (internal citations omitted).
When interpreting a statute, this Court begins with the language of the statute itself. The Exemption Statute states,
Miss.Code Ann. § 85-3-1. The term "motor vehicles" is clear and unambiguous and should be given its plain meaning. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007) defines "motor vehicle" as "an automotive vehicle not operated on rails; esp: one with rubber tires for use on highways." The same dictionary defines "automotive" as "self-propelled." Id. Motorcycles are certainly self-propelled vehicles not operated on rails, but which have rubber tires for use on highways. As a matter of fact, "motorcycle" is defined as a "2-wheeled automotive vehicle for one or two people." Id. Therefore, the plain meaning of "motor vehicles" includes motorcycles. If the Mississippi Legislature had desired to narrow the types of "motor vehicles" affected by the Exemption Statute, it certainly knew how to add restricting language to accomplish that goal. Accordingly, this Court holds that motorcycles fall within the category "motor vehicles" and as such are a type of tangible personal property included in the Exemption Statute.
The Mississippi Code is replete with sections which define "motor vehicles" to include motorcycles. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-103 (Motor Vehicles and Traffic Regulation-Definitions) sets forth the following pertinent definitions:
Id.
Miss Code Ann. § 27-19-3 (Motor Vehicle Privilege Taxes—Definitions) sets forth as follows:
Id.
Miss.Code Ann. § 27-19-56 (License Plates) states that, "The terms `vehicle' and `motor vehicle,' as used in this section, include motorcycles." Likewise, Miss. Code Ann. § 27-19-303 (Motor Vehicle Dealer Tag Permit Law-Definitions) also categorizes a motorcycle as a motor vehicle.
Miss.Code Ann. § 27-19-303 (emphasis added). Additionally, Miss.Code Ann. § 17-17-403 (Disposal of Waste, Tires and Lead Acid Batteries-Definitions) categorizes a motorcycle as a motor vehicle. Neither the Debtor nor the Trustee has pointed out any sections of the Mississippi Code where motorcycles are defined as anything other than motor vehicles. This Court's own research has yielded no instances in which a section of the Mississippi Code
The Trustee points out that each section of the Mississippi Code which discusses motorcycles limits the application of that section's definition to that section (Trustee's Brief, p. 3). Accordingly, the Trustee argues that the definition of a motorcycle as a motor vehicle in other parts of the Mississippi Code do not apply to the Exemption Statute, in which the term "motor vehicles" is undefined. The Trustee also asserts that if "the Mississippi Legislature intended for a motorcycle to be exempt, then the Legislature would have [defined motorcycles as motor vehicles in the Mississippi Exemption Statute] as it did in the [other sections of the Mississippi Code]." (Trustee's Brief, pp. 3-4).
The Trustee's argument is fundamentally flawed. If the Mississippi Legislature had defined "motor vehicles" in the Exemption Statute to include, for example, sedans, trucks, minivans, and sport utility vehicles, then the Trustee would have a better argument because the Legislature would have enumerated some types of "motor vehicles" but not included motorcycles in its enumeration. If that were the case, then the Trustee could argue that if the Legislature had wanted to include motorcycles, it certainly could have included motorcycles in its definition. The Mississippi Legislature, however, did not set forth any definition of "motor vehicles" in the Exemption Statute. If this Court were to accept the Trustee's position, then sedans would not be exempt because the Exemption Statute does not define sedans as motor vehicles. The same would be true for trucks, minivans, and sport utility vehicles. Such an interpretation of the Exemption Statute would be absurd. Accordingly, a fair reading of the Exemption Statute does not allow this Court to assume that the Mississippi Legislature meant to include sedans, trucks, minivans, and sport utility vehicles, all of which are routinely exempted from the bankruptcy estate as "motor vehicles," but exclude motorcycles from exemption.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the Exemption Statute is clear and unambiguous. The Court further finds that motorcycles fall within the category "motor vehicles" and as such are a type of tangible personal property included in the Exemption Statute. In the event that the term "motor vehicles" is not clear and unambiguous so that the Court should employ the canons of statutory construction to interpret the meaning of "motor vehicles," this Court finds as follows:
(1) In other Mississippi statutes, the ordinary use of "motor vehicles" includes motorcycles, as discussed herein;
(2) The Mississippi Legislature used the term "motor vehicles" in the Exemption Statute without adding language to include some types of motor vehicles but not others;
(3) The sections of the Mississippi Code that discuss motorcycles demonstrate that for the purposes of traffic regulation, conveyance, registration, and taxation, the Mississippi Legislature considers motorcycles to be a type of motor vehicles. Without indication to the contrary, there is no reason this Court would presume that the Mississippi Legislature had any different intent with respect to its treatment of motorcycles under the Exemption Statute.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Trustee's Objection to Exemptions is not well-taken and should be overruled.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Trustee's Objection to Exemptions hereby is overruled.
SO ORDERED.
