ORDER

MICHAEL P. MILLS, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on the motion of defendants for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiffs have responded in opposition to the motion, and the court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, concludes that defendants' motion should be granted as to plaintiffs' federal claims and that this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims.

This is, inter alia, a wrongful search and excessive force case arising out of the October 10, 2013 search of a residence located at 111 Terry Road in Crenshaw, Mississippi. Plaintiff Paul Strickland lives at the location, along with plaintiff Brooke Blue and their three minor children, who are likewise plaintiffs. The structure where plaintiffs live is divided into five (5) adjoining apartments, and plaintiffs live in apartment three. Defendant Jason Sims was working as a Crenshaw police officer on October 9, 2013, and he testified in his deposition that, some time before midnight, something "caught [his] attention" to watch the 111 Terry location. Sims testified that he knew Strickland resided at the location, but he was unaware of the exact layout of the structure there.

Sims testified that he had heard reports from members of the community about drugs being sold at Strickland's residence, though he could not recall specifically who had told him that. Defendant Shawn Shelton, also a Crenshaw police officer, similarly testified that he had conversations with other officers, including Sims, about reports that "Strickland may have been selling narcotics out of his residence." James Willard, who was the Crenshaw Chief of Police at the time, likewise testified that he had heard that Strickland "had been selling narcotics out of his residence." In their brief, defendants provide an unflattering picture of Paul Strickland, writing that:

[Defendants' brief at 2-3].

Sims testified that he noticed an individual exiting a vehicle near Strickland's residence, although he could not discern exactly where that individual went. In their brief, plaintiffs write that:

[Plaintiffs' brief at 2-3].

After the vehicle pulled away from the 111 Terry location, Sims stopped it after he noticed it lacked a license plate. Lekedrick Tribble, a minor, was driving the vehicle. According to Sims, Tribble, whom Sims had never seen before, immediately stated that he had just purchased marijuana at "Paul's" residence. Tribble stepped out of the vehicle, and Sims testified that he saw" what appeared to be marijuana on the floorboard of the vehicle. After questioning Tribble and a female passenger in the vehicle, Chelitta Black, Sims arrested Tribble and took him to the Crenshaw police station. At the station, Sims interviewed Tribble, with his mother present for at least part of the interview. Afterwards, Sims prepared a statement which both Tribble and his mother signed. That statement reads as follows:

Based largely upon this statement, Sims prepared an application for a warrant to search plaintiffs' home. Sims testified that Chief Willard helped him put together the Underlying Facts and Circumstances affidavit in support of the application, and Willard and Officer Shelton co-signed it. Local judge Mike Wilson authorized the warrant early on the morning of October 10.

The Crenshaw police department enlisted the help of officers from both the Panola County and Quitman County Sheriffs' Departments in conducting the search, and both of those counties and several of their officers are defendants in this lawsuit.1 The parties' accounts of what happened during that search differ greatly. Plaintiffs' account of the search is as follows:

Thus, plaintiffs assert that Quitman County Deputy Dewayne Linzy "pointed a gun directly at" their children, but Linzy denied having done so, and all officers testified that they witnessed no such thing occur.

The municipal defendants describe the search as follows:

The parties thus agree that no drugs were found at plaintiffs' residence and that no arrests were made. Following the fruitless search, plaintiffs filed the instant action in state court, and it was timely removed to this court. Defendants have presently moved for summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issue of fact exists regarding their liability and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Unlawful search

The court first considers plaintiffs' unlawful search claims, arising out of their argument that the warrant which authorized the search of their home was legally defective. In discussing this claim, the court will concentrate its discussion primarily upon plaintiffs' claims against Officer Sims, who signed the affidavit in support of the warrant and is clearly regarded by plaintiffs as being the "worst actor" in this regard. While plaintiffs do make rather conclusory allegations that other Crenshaw officers should be liable for having "signed off' on the warrant application, it is clear to this court that, if plaintiffs are unable to establish a violation by Sims in this regard, then they would likewise be unable to do so against the other officers.

It is important to emphasize that, in order to prevail in their unlawful search claims against Sims, plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of two separate legal doctrines: the underlying Fourth Amendment standard and the qualified immunity standard. Plaintiffs' burden of proof regarding each is made more difficult by the fact that, as they concede, Sims sought and obtained a search warrant from a neutral magistrate, rather than simply "going it alone." Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has noted the general rule that "[i]f the facts supporting an arrest are put before an intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary's decision to issue a warrant or return an indictment breaks the causal chain and insulates the initiating party." See Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir.1982).

In seeking to establish a Fourth Amendment violation on the part of Sims, plaintiffs rely upon an exception to this general rule, which is applicable when an affidavit supporting a warrant is tainted by a "materially false statement or omission." See Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 158, 169 (5th Cir.2006), citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). The Fifth Circuit has held that this so-called "Franks exception" requires that plaintiffs demonstrate that a defendant (1) knowingly or recklessly omitted exculpatory information from the affidavit he submitted in support of the warrant application and (2) that "the warrant would [not have] establish[ed] probable cause" if the omitted information had been included in the affidavits. Johnson v. Norcross, 565 Fed.Appx. 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2014), citing Freeman v. Cnty. of Bexar, 210 F.3d 550, 553 (5th Cir.2000). The court concludes that plaintiffs' proof is insufficient to establish fact issues regarding either part of this test in this case.

The court will first discuss the second part of the Franks test, known as the "materiality" test, since the content of Sims' affidavit is relevant to a discussion of all issues relating to his liability. Once again, the materiality inquiry in the Franks test requires a showing by plaintiffs that "the warrant would [not have] establish[ed] probable cause" if the omitted information had been included in the affidavits. Johnson, 565 Fed.Appx. at 289. In this vein, it should be noted that a showing of probable cause to support a search warrant is not a highly stringent one, merely requiring evidence which, considering the totality of the circumstances, reveals "a fair probability that [] contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Importantly, probable cause may rest upon evidence (including hearsay evidence) which is not legally competent in a criminal trial, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), and it need not be sufficient to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).

Based upon this standard, this court views the information which was included in Sims' affidavit as being more than sufficient to establish probable cause to search Strickland's home, even if plaintiffs' objections to certain omissions are assumed to be valid ones. In the court's view, the greatest factual support for a finding of probable cause comes from the statement signed by Tribble and his mother, which has previously been quoted. In his affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant, Sims relied heavily upon Tribble's statement, writing that:

/5/Officer Jason M. Sims, Sr.

In their briefing, plaintiffs have failed to cast doubt upon the accuracy of the information stated above, and, in the court's view, it strongly supports a conclusion that probable cause existed to search Strickland's home. That is, the statement correctly asserts that a suspect whom Sims had observed conducting a brief visit to the 111 Terry location, and in whose vehicle he had found illegal drugs immediately thereafter, stated that he had obtained those drugs from "Paul." While plaintiffs emphasize that the 111 Terry location contains (unbeknownst to Sims at the time) multiple residences, they have not suggested that there was any other individual named "Paul" living at any of them.

In arguing that Sims violated the Fourth Amendment, plaintiffs' focus is not on any misstatements in his affidavit, but upon information which he did not include in it. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that:

The court finds plaintiffs' arguments to be insufficient to establish fact issues regarding the materiality of any of these omissions, based upon the Franks standard.

Plaintiffs contend that Sims should have made it more clear that he did not directly observe Tribble entering Strickland's apartment, but the court views the importance of this omission as being greatly reduced by the fact that Tribble specifically stated that he bought the drugs at "Paul's" apartment. Once again, there is no contention that there was a "Paul" living at any other apartment at 111 Terry, and Tribble's testimony that he bought drugs from an individual with that name removes the materiality of the issue of whether or not Sims actually saw Tribble walk into a specific apartment.

Plaintiffs argue that Sims should have included facts which might have impeached Tribble's credibility, including that he was a minor who had not previously served as an informant and that he had limited ability to write. In the court's view, none of these facts, if included, would have cast sufficient doubt upon the reliability of Tribble's statement to negate a clear finding of probable cause to search Strickland's residence. In so concluding, the court notes that Sims had at his disposal, and stated in his affidavit, objective evidence confirming Tribble's account, including the facts that he personally observed him approaching the 111 Terry location for a short visit and that he subsequently found marijuana in his vehicle. Moreover, it strikes this court that a witness does not require a great deal of age, writing ability, or prior experience as an informant to convey the basic fact that he had, mere minutes previously, purchased marijuana from a particular individual.

The court similarly finds unpersuasive plaintiffs' argument that Sims made a material omission in failing to include allegedly exculpatory statements by Chelitta Black, the passenger in the vehicle. In establishing Black's statements in this regard, plaintiffs rely upon a dash cam video depicting the arrest and a subsequent conversation between Sims and Black. Plaintiffs provide a lengthy description of and excerpt from the transcript of that conversation in their brief, which this court will quote directly:

[plaintiffs' brief at 3-6].

In the court's view, the dash cam video evidence is, on balance, favorable to Sims, and it certainly does not provide a basis for concluding that he committed a Fourth Amendment violation in failing to include Black's statements in his affidavit. Indeed, the court views plaintiffs' own description of the videotape as supporting a conclusion that a reasonable officer in Sims' position would have felt he was "on the right track" in believing that Strickland had sold Tribble the marijuana which he discovered. That is, plaintiffs' transcript quotes Sims as saying that Tribble had confessed to buying the drugs from "Paul," and there is no indication that either Tribble or Black spoke up at any time to deny this assertion. It is sometimes the case that video recordings of arrests will cast doubt upon an officer's version of events, but the court does not regard that as being the case here.

In their brief, plaintiffs seize upon the fact that Black stated that she did not know how or where Tribble obtained the bag of marijuana found in his car, but the court regards this as being a very selective description of her statements. Black quoted Tribble as saying that the stated purpose of his trip was to buy marijuana, and she answered "no sir" when asked whether they had stopped anywhere else to buy drugs. Moreover, Sims made repeated reference to Tribble and Black having stopped at "Paul's" house, and Black never denied that this was where they had stopped. Perhaps most importantly, it should be clear that a witness stating that she was unaware of a particular fact does not constitute exculpatory information; it merely means that a witness has disclaimed knowledge of a particular matter. Accordingly, Black's statement that she didn't know where Tribble got the marijuana is not exculpatory of Strickland.

Plaintiffs also argue that Sims acted improperly in threatening Black that he would "tow [her] truck," arrest her, and "call DHS to come pick [her] baby," in an apparent effort to make her more forthcoming regarding her knowledge of the alleged drug transaction. Plaintiffs may well be correct that Sims should not have employed this form of coercion, but this ultimately has little relevance to the claims in this case.2 Black is not a plaintiff in this lawsuit, and Sims' threats have little relevance to the issue of whether his failure to include her statements in his affidavit was a material omission. In the court's view, the apparent coercion used by Sims would have been relevant in this case if, in response to his threat, Black had made new inculpatory statements and if Sims had chosen to use those statements in his affidavit. Neither of these are the case.

Black's statements after Sims' threat were consistent with those she had made before it, and, at any rate, Sims did not use her statement in his affidavit. Moreover, the court views plaintiffs as having very little reason to complain of Black's statements having been left out of Sims' affidavit, since they were, on balance, somewhat inculpatory of Strickland. Plaintiffs note that Sims' threats to Black were within "earshot" of Tribble, apparently suggesting that they may have influenced his subsequent statement, but the court regards this as being highly speculative, at best. Indeed, Sims notes in the video that Tribble had already confessed to buying drugs from "Paul" at the time the threat to Black was made, thus removing any argument for the materiality of the threat as to Tribble's statement. In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that any omissions in Sims' affidavit were not material, since probable cause to search Strickland's residence would have existed even if all of the matters raised by plaintiffs had been included in the affidavit. As such, the second part of the Franks test is not met, and plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate an underlying Fourth Amendment violation by Sims.

While it is unnecessary to so conclude, the court notes that plaintiffs are also unable to establish fact issues regarding the first part of the Franks test, which inquires whether Sims acted knowingly or recklessly in omitting the information in question from his affidavit. Once again, plaintiffs are unable to establish that any of the information which Sims did include in his affidavit was false, and, given the court's conclusion that any omissions from the affidavit were not material, it would certainly be difficult to conclude that he acted knowingly or recklessly in omitting them. It may well be that Sims' statement in support of his affidavit was rather "bare-bones," but it was sufficient for its purpose, namely providing accurate and material facts in support of a finding of probable cause.

Thus, this court is unable to conclude that Sims acted even negligently in preparing the affidavit, and it certainly has no basis to conclude that he knowingly or recklessly made material omissions in doing so. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Sims enlisted the help of his fellow officers in preparing it, a fact which is consistent with an officer proceeding in a careful manner. The manner in which Sims obtained Tribble's statement further supports this conclusion. As noted previously, Sims took care to question Tribble (at least partially) with his mother present, and he had her co-sign a statement which noted the fact that her son had been Mirandized prior to giving the statement and had an opportunity to review and correct it. These strike this court as being the actions of a non-reckless police officer.

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that plaintiffs are unable to establish either of the two parts of the Franks test with regard to Sims and that he therefore committed no Fourth Amendment violation in obtaining a search warrant in this case. This conclusion likewise applies to the other individual Crenshaw defendants who signed off on the warrant, as to whom plaintiffs provide very few substantive arguments.

The court now turns to the issue of qualified immunity, which constitutes an additional burden for plaintiffs to surmount, in the event that this court has incorrectly determined that no Fourth Amendment violation was committed by Sims. Moreover, the qualified immunity issue is relevant to all plaintiffs' claims against all remaining defendants in this case, and the court will accordingly discuss it in some detail.

The Fifth Circuit has described the basic qualified immunity standard as follows:

Johnson, 565 Fed.Appx. at 290, citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir.2007).

It should he apparent that, in this case, the first part of the qualified immunity analysis, i.e., whether any defendant violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights in preparing the search warrant, has already been answered in the negative by this court. The second part of the qualified immunity analysis, i.e., whether the "defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question" involves a very different inquiry from the first, and it imposes very substantial additional burdens on plaintiffs.

Part of the power of the qualified immunity doctrine arises from the fact that it must simply be raised as a defense by a defendant, and the plaintiffs have the burden of establishing the proof and arguments necessary to overcome it. See Pierce r. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that an individual defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity). Part of plaintiffs' burden in this regard is to demonstrate that the defendants violated "clearly established law" at the time of the conduct in question, and the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear just how heavy a burden this may be.

Plumhoff, 134 S.Ct. at 2023. Thus, the Supreme Court has stressed that plaintiffs' burden of demonstrating that defendants violated "clearly established law" requires not a citation to generalized principles of law, but, rather, specific authority on point which "placed the statutory or constitutional question" confronted by the official "beyond debate." Id.

The difficult nature of plaintiffs' qualified immunity burden was clearly demonstrated in the 1987 decision of Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). In Anderson, the Supreme Court considered a qualified immunity defense raised in a case where an FBI agent performed a warrantless search of a house based upon an incorrect suspicion that a bank robber was hiding there. Significantly, the majority in Anderson did not appear to disagree that the law was clearly established at the time that the Fourth Amendment prohibited warrantless searches of homes, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court emphasized that:

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034.

The Supreme Court in Anderson thus made it clear that, in the qualified immunity context, the "objective unreasonableness" inquiry is not merely a legalistic discussion of precedent, but also a determination of what a reasonable officer could have believed regarding the legality of his actions, given the specific circumstances of a case. This is a crucial point, since what lawyers and judges may conclude regarding the state of the law involves a very different inquiry than determining what a reasonable officer faced with a "real world" situation could have believed regarding the legality of his actions. In this vein, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[w]hen properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Taylor v. Barkes, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015), citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Clearly, this is an exceedingly difficult burden, as it was intended to be.

It should thus be clear that, in seeking to recover monetary damages against Sims and the other Crenshaw defendants based on the obtaining of the search warrant, plaintiffs face a much more difficult burden than if they were criminal defendants seeking to exclude evidence against them at trial. This fact is borne out by this court's own experience, which has seen a large number of motions to exclude evidence, but comparatively few civil actions against officers in this context. This court has previously stated its views that there was probable cause for obtaining the warrant in this case and that Sims proceeded in a non-reckless manner in doing so. In light of these findings, it should be obvious that the court does not regard plaintiffs as having overcome Sims' qualified immunity defense, nor those asserted by the other Crenshaw officers. The court therefore concludes that qualified immunity constitutes an additional, cumulative basis for dismissing plaintiffs' unlawful search claims against Sims and the other individual defendants who signed the application for a search warrant in this case.

Excessive Force

The court turns now to plaintiffs' excessive force claim. This claim is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, which requires a showing of (1) an injury (2) which "resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need" and (3) that the force used was objectively unreasonable. Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 500-01 (5th Cir.2008). As with their unlawful search claims, plaintiffs have conceded their federal excessive force claims as to the county and city defendants, reserving those claims against the individual officers. All of these defendants have raised qualified immunity defenses, which, as discussed in depth previously, places a heavy burden upon plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defense is inapplicable.

In response to these qualified immunity motions, the entirety of plaintiffs' arguments and authority on the excessive force issue is as follows:

[Plaintiffs' brief at 17-18].

In considering plaintiffs' arguments, the court initially notes that they make no argument that they suffered any sort of physical injury. Moreover, Blue testified in her deposition that neither she, nor Strickland, nor any of the children had sought medical treatment for any injury, physical or emotional, resulting from the search. This is significant, since in Brown v. Lippard, the Fifth Circuit wrote that:

Brown v. Lippard, 472 F.3d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir.2006).

As noted above, plaintiffs cite Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 900-903 (5th Cir. 1998) for the proposition that "actual physical injury is a factor but not a necessary element of an excessive force claim," but they ignore the fact that the Fifth Circuit still required a showing of some injury in that case, either physical or psychological. Petta, 143 F.3d at 902 (requiring that "the Petta children ... prove that Rivera's actions caused them any injury.") The Fifth Circuit in Petta did note that the "significant injury" requirement had been discarded in Fourth Amendment cases, but the requirement of some injury, either physical or psychological, still exists.

The Fourth Amendment injury standard was stated by the Fifth Circuit in Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2004), where the Court wrote that:

In Flores, the Fifth Circuit appeared to accept for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff suffered from "post-traumatic stress disorder, mental anguish, headaches, and nightmares." Flores, 381 F.3d at 395. It is not clear to this court what proof the plaintiff in that case used to establish that evidence, however, and it is therefore of somewhat limited utility in this ease. Still, the plaintiff in Flores clearly alleged an actual diagnosable mental disorder (PTSD), which at least suggests that some objective medical evidence was involved.3 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit in Flores relied upon its decision in Dunn, and the panel decision in that case noted that the plaintiff had presented testimony from her psychiatrist that she suffered from PTSD. Dunn v. Denk, 54 F.3d 248, 249-50 (5th Cir.1995). This further suggests to this court that some form of medical evidence is generally required to establish a psychological injury in this circuit.

The two adult plaintiffs do not even make an arguable case for any such psychological injuries in this case, and, additionally, they submit no authority "clearly establishing" that any of defendants' actions were objectively unreasonable as to them. This court's analysis is thus clear with regard to them, and it will reserve its remaining discussion for the claims of the minor children. As noted in the court's statement of facts, plaintiffs do at least arguably make sonic allegations of psychological injury with regard to their children, as follows:

In the court's view, such evidence is insufficient to establish a psychological injury, since the foregoing authority suggests that the Fifth Circuit would require that any psychological injury be demonstrated by medical testimony, or at the very least some form of reliable, objective proof of an injury.

In the court's view, Blue is not qualified to testify whether her children suffered a psychological injury caused by Deputy Linzy's allegedly pointing a gun at them or whether a decline in the children's grades is attributable to that brief incident (which Linzy denies even occurred). Moreover, as an individual with a financial interest in this lawsuit, she is not an objective observer regarding this issue. The court further notes that plaintiffs have presented no evidence from the minor plaintiffs themselves in this case, either as to what they witnessed during the search or the effect it may have had upon them. They have likewise presented no school records or testimony from teachers (or any other objective observers) as to any decline in the children's performance or signs of psychological injury in them after the search in this case. Thus, plaintiffs' proof in this case is much weaker than it could be, even considering their failure to offer actual medical evidence. Plaintiffs simply ask this court to allow a jury to take Blue's word for it all.

It seems clear to this court that, even assuming for the sake of argument that Blue's word alone is sufficient to create fact issues regarding whether Linzy at least briefly pointed a gun in the direction of her children, her account is not nearly detailed and specific enough to support a conclusion that he acted in an objectively unreasonable manner, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the qualified immunity doctrine. This is particularly true in a case involving an execution of a search warrant on a suspected drug dealer's home, where armed entry by police is clearly reasonable. Plaintiffs simply rely upon Blue's account that Linzy "pointed a gun directly at her oldest daughter (Beyonce) and the other children," and this is not the sort of testimony that would establish that an officer was "plainly incompetent" or "knowingly violated the law" so as to overcome a qualified immunity defense. Moreover, "pointing a weapon" at someone strikes this court as being a quite nebulous and subjective concept, and it certainly appears that the holder of the weapon is in a much better position to state whether he actually did so.

Even assuming that Blue's account in this regard could somehow be considered sufficient, the court concludes that plaintiffs have presented insufficient authority to "clearly establish" the parameters of any permissible "pointing of weapons" at occupants of a home during the execution of a search warrant, so as to overcome the qualified immunity defense raised by each individual defendant in this case. As quoted above, plaintiffs cite a single decision from a different circuit, Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2001) on this issue, but this is plainly insufficient to clearly establish the law in this regard.4 Plaintiffs' reliance upon a single decision from another circuit is particularly lacking in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has stated that, to overcome a qualified immunity defense, the defendant must have violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1981) (emphasis added). While it may be rather fictional to assume that officers would even be aware of Fifth Circuit authority on this issue, plaintiffs have a particularly poor argument on this point in relying on a single decision from another circuit.

Some indication of the quantum of authority which might suffice in this regard can be gleaned from recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent, where the Court has suggested that either a decision from that Court or a "robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals" would be necessary to "clearly establish the federal right respondent alleges" in qualified immunity cases. Taylor v. Barkes, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015), citing City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1778, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015). Clearly, a single decision from one circuit court does not constitute a "robust consensus" among the federal circuits, and plaintiffs have therefore failed to "clearly establish" the parameters of the legal duty which they claim was violated in this case. Even assuming that there are other federal circuits which reached a similar result as the Tenth Circuit in Holland, it is clear that, in the qualified immunity context, plaintiffs have the burden of finding and citing that authority, and they have failed to do so.

It appears likely to this court that any "robust consensus" of federal appellate authority which might arise on this issue would need to take account of a number of difficult factors to ensure that the rights of plaintiffs and police officers are appropriately balanced. Courts would likely have to grapple, for example, with the seeming ease with which fact issues in this regard could be manufactured, if it were sufficient for a plaintiff to allege that a gun was pointed at him or a family member and that an emotional injury resulted. Indeed, it is difficult to discern how fact issues in this regard could ever be found lacking in such a legal context, if a plaintiff simply offered his own self-serving testimony in this regard. In the court's view, courts seeking to establish standards in this context would also likely need to consider the issue of whether an officer in question had reason to have drawn his weapon at all. In cases where an officer had such a reason (as when executing a search warrant of a suspected drug dealer's house), then it should seemingly be much more difficult for plaintiffs to establish that his actions in "pointing" his weapon in a particular direction were objectively unreasonable than if he had no good reason to have pulled his weapon at all.

That brings this court to a final weakness in plaintiffs' qualified immunity arguments. As discussed previously, the Supreme Court in Anderson r. Creighton emphasized that a central part of the qualified immunity analysis involves determining whether a reasonable officer in the position of the defendant could have believed that his actions were lawful. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. This necessarily requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the specific circumstances which the officer encountered would have led a reasonable officer to understand that his actions were unlawful, in light of clearly established authority of which a reasonable officer would have known. In their arguments quoted above, plaintiffs do not offer either sufficient factual context or legal arguments to allow this court to make a determination in this regard, with regard to Linzy or any of the other defendants. Indeed, plaintiffs' qualified immunity arguments as a whole are quite brief and conclusory and do not reflect the facts that 1) they have the burden of proving that qualified immunity is inapplicable and 2) they are seeking to impose the expense and stress of trial upon officers whom the law does not lightly consider to be either "plainly incompetent" or willful constitutional violators. In light of the foregoing, the court finds plaintiffs' proof and arguments insufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense, and defendants' motion to dismiss the excessive force claims asserted against them will therefore be granted.

At this juncture, the sole remaining claims before the court are plaintiffs' state law claims, including claims asserted under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). In a case such as this one, where all federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) gives this court discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has noted that the "general rule favor(s) dismissal of state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed," see Guzzino v. Felterman, 191 F.3d 588, 595 (5th Cir.1999), and the court concludes that it should follow the general rule in this case. In so concluding, the court places significant weight upon the fact that Mississippi state courts have a strong interest in determining whether and under what circumstances the municipalities and officers of this state should be held liable under state law for allegations such as those in this case, particularly since these issues implicate the public coffers. Mississippi courts also have much greater experience in applying that state law, and only the Mississippi Supreme Court has the authority to make new law in this context, thus greatly increasing its flexibility to deal with novel issues of law, with no need for Erie guesses or the time-consuming certification process. The court will therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims and dismiss those claims without prejudice.5

It is therefore ordered that defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted in part, as to plaintiffs' federal claims, and this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Plaintiffs' federal claims will therefore be dismissed with prejudice, and their state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

A separate judgment will be entered this date, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58.

JUDGMENT

For the reasons given in the court's order entered this date, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that this case is dismissed.