ORDER ON ATTORNEYS FEES

SHARION AYCOCK, District Judge.

After accepting a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney's Fees seeking $157,305.09 for his attorneys' work in this case. The motion is ripe and the Court finds as follows:

Factual and Procedural Background

Stephen Joiner filed a complaint in this court on May 15, 2014 challenging the facial and as applied constitutionality of the City of Columbus's Parade Ordinance and Handbill Ordinance. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction [2], which the Court set for hearing in December. Prior to holding the hearing, however, the City of Columbus amended their Parade Ordinance to comply with the First Amendment. The hearing was cancelled accordingly, and the Plaintiff withdrew the Motion for Preliminary Injunction [45].

Initial discovery was exchanged in the case, but before depositions were taken, Defendants extended, and Plaintiff accepted, a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. The Offer obligated Defendants to pay "jointly but not severally" $10,263.01 plus "all reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs to which the Plaintiff is statutorily or otherwise entitled under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 68 to the extent incurred and substantiated under prevailing legal standards as of the time of conveyance and service of this offer and in amount to be determined by the Court upon evidentiary submissions and, if appropriate, a hearing."

Upon Notice of Acceptance of the Rule 68 Offer [72], the Court entered Final Judgment [73] in favor of Plaintiff on March 30, 2015. Plaintiff thereafter filed his Motion for Attorney's Fees [74].

Standard of Review of Attorneys' Fees

The well-established "American Rule" is that a prevailing party is not ordinarily entitled to recover attorney's fees from the losing party. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council, 478 U.S. 546, 561, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3097, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975)). Congress responded to the Alyeska decision by creating a statutory entitlement to "reasonable" attorney's fees for "prevailing" parties in civil rights litigation. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in relevant part:

While the statutory language is discretionary, the Supreme Court has held that fee awards should be denied only where special circumstances render an award unjust. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263 (1968) (citation omitted). The statutory threshold for entitlement to section 1988 fees is that the plaintiff must be a "prevailing party." This requirement is met if he succeeds "on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing the suit." Texas State Teachers v. Garland Indep. School District, 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1491, 103 L. Ed. 2d 866 (1989) (citation omitted). It is also clear that a plaintiff need not proceed to a "full litigation of the issues" to be a "prevailing party." Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1980). Vindication through a consent decree (Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1980) (per curiam)) or a Rule 68 offer of judgment (Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 67 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1981)) also entitles a successful plaintiff to attorney's fees. In the present case the Court finds no special circumstances, nor do the defendants advance any, that would render an award of attorney's fees unjust.

"[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. The applicant . . . should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Bode v. United States, 919 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he party seeking reimbursement of attorneys' fees . . . has the burden of establishing the number of attorney hours expended, and can meet that burden only by presenting evidence that is adequate for the court to determine what hours should be included in the reimbursement."). However, attorney's fees awards should not provide a windfall to plaintiffs. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (explaining statutory goal of avoiding windfalls to attorneys); see also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1986) ("Congress intended that statutory fee awards be `adequate to attract competent counsel, but . . . not produce windfalls to attorneys.'" (quoting S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913)).

Determinations of hours and rates are questions of fact. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995); Bode, 919 F.2d at 1047 (reviewing hours for clear error). "It remains important, however, for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Our concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that findings be complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the court has used proper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation."); Nisby v. Comm'rs of Court, 798 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir.1986) ("When the district court does not explain its reasons for the attorney's fee it awards, we are unable adequately to review the propriety of the fee award."); Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1219 (3rd Cir. 1978) (requiring explanation of district court's adjustment of lodestar).

Discussion and Analysis

The first step in determining a reasonable attorney's fee is to ascertain the "lodestar" figure; this is done by multiplying the "number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1544, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The district court must determine whether the hours claimed were "reasonably expended on the litigation." Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927, 933-34 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.1990); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not `reasonably expended.'"). The lodestar determination is not mechanistic, and "the district court's determination of the lodestar amount should not be guided solely by the billing records or the rates requested in the fee petition." Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 98-20692, 202 F.3d 264, *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933; Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 536 (5th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the district court is required to identify from the fee petition those hours that were "reasonably" expended on the litigation. When making that determination, the district court is obligated to scrutinize the billing records carefully and to exclude excessive, duplicative, or otherwise unnecessary entries. See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 568, 106 S.Ct. 2686; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933; Abrams, 805 F.2d at 536. The district court should also consider whether the work performed was "`legal work in the strict sense,' or was merely clerical work that happened to be performed by a lawyer." Abrams, 805 F.2d at 536 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974)).

a. Reasonable Hours1

A district court may reduce the hours claimed by the prevailing party in order to account for time expended on unsuccessful claims. This follows from the definition of a "prevailing party" as one who has "succeeded on `any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" See Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 158, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1992) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, and Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486. The district court arrives at a reasonable fee award "either by attempting to identify specific hours that should be eliminated or by simply reducing the award to account for the limited success of the plaintiff." See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, and Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486; see also Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 331 (a reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole); Worldcom, Inc. v. Automated Commc'ns, Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 526, 531 (S.D. Miss. 1999).

Typically courts must determine whether a particular claim is sufficiently "related" to the successful claim to be compensable under section 1988. In the present case, Defendants contend that time spent on Plaintiff's First Amendment facial challenge was not appropriate under Section 1988. As noted above, the City of Columbus revised its ordinances to reflect appropriate First Amendment case law. The facial challenge to the ordinances was not a distinctly different claim based on different facts, just a different legal theory. The Court finds that the facial First Amendment challenge was not necessarily an "unsuccessful claim" as proposed by the Defendants. Accordingly, the time spent on all First Amendment claims shall be counted.

The Defendants additionally challenge the requested hours for Plaintiff's four attorneys seeking fees. Defendants question the overall reasonableness of the allegedly expended hours for a case pending approximately fourteen months, as well as the time expended for the following: drafting press releases, duplicative hours of multiple attorneys, inter-office discussions regarding the case, media releases, bill reviews, online research, and hours spent by attorneys not qualified to practice in the Northern District and for whom no entry of appearance was made in this case.

First, the Court finds that fees and expenses incurred after March 10, 2015 are noncompensable pursuant to the terms of the Offer of Judgment. See Offer of Judgment [72-1] (March 10, 2015) (including reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred "as of the time of conveyance and service of this offer . . ." as part of Offer of Judgment).

Second, the Plaintiff's billing summary is marked as "Exhibit A" and "Exhibit B" to their request for attorney fees and sets forth the amounts charged for fees and expenses between April 4, 2011 and April 8, 2015. The present case was not filed until May 15, 2014. At some points during the litigation of this matter, Plaintiff had up to six attorneys working on his case. This circumstance has obligated the Court to scrutinize closely these billings for duplication of effort and repetitive entries. See Walker v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 99 F.3d 761, 768 (5th Cir.1996) (if more than one attorney is involved, the possibility of duplication of effort along with proper utilization of time should be scrutinized). Plaintiff's attorneys of record are Daniel J. Schmid and Mathew D. Staver, both admitted pro hac vice, and Stephen M. Crampton, local counsel. The billing records submitted by Plaintiff reveal that over six attorneys, and at least one law clerk, at some points in time were involved and charging time to Plaintiff's case. Because only the three attorneys listed on the docket have made an entry of appearance on behalf of Plaintiff and are recognized by the Court as qualified to practice in this federal forum, the Court finds hours submitted by attorneys other than those three are unreasonable under Section 1988. Moreover, the Court has combed through the submitted billable hours and has denoted by crossing out the text and including a "X2" identifier to show tasks which were duplicated between attorneys. Those times indicated as "X2" are not reasonable and are deducted from the lodestar hours.

The Defendant has challenged, and the fee applicant has failed to justify his request for attorney's fees for production of press releases, bill reviews, and online research. Accordingly, the Court reduces the fee request for those items. The spreadsheet reflects those reductions as well. The Court additionally finds that clerical work, although performed by an attorney, is not entitled to compensation at an attorney's rate. See Abrams, 805 F.2d at 536. Accordingly, the Court has meticulously combed through the billing summary and indicated which hours are considered clerical hours with the notation "LGA" as the Liberty Counsel did on its billing.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's counsels' billing requires additional scrutiny for excessive billing. In total, Plaintiff requests compensation for over 516 hours for litigating this case. Although the Complaint was not filed until May 15, 2014, Plaintiff's counsel claims to have devoted 135.5 hours to Mr. Joiner's legal claims in the eleven months prior to filing the complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel claims to have spent those hours drafting and preparing to file the complaint. Prior to commencement of this case, Plaintiff's counsel spent 42.6 hours researching First Amendment case law, and 50.7 hours devoted to drafting and finalizing their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Complaint [1] was twenty pages, and was not so complex as to warrant the amount of time charged for its preparation. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed at thirty-three pages and contained significantly more case cites and detail than the Complaint; however, according to Plaintiff's counsel, that document required one-third less time to draft. A review of the time spent on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, however, shows that the reported time for preparation of that motion was excessive as well. The Court finds that the amount of hours billed prior to filing the complaint were excessive and not reasonable. The Court finds that because Plaintiff's attorneys hold themselves out as attorneys who solely or mostly practice in this area of law, allowing reimbursement for excessive hours spent in research and on case law in a decently straightforward case is unreasonable. Accordingly, the hours compensable in this pre-filing period (06/06/13-05/15/14 on billing sheets) shall be reduced by 80 hours. Those hours are deducted from Daniel Schmid's time as he was the main biller during the pre-filing time.

Accordingly, due to the reductions and as reflected on the spreadsheet attached to this Order, the final billable hours are noted here:

b. Reasonable Rates

A reasonable hourly rate is based on the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541. When the attorney's customary hourly rate is within the range of hourly fees in the prevailing market, that rate should be considered in setting a reasonable hourly rate. See Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 876 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1989). The standard is an objective one, requiring evidence. A district court may not simply rely on its own experience in the relevant legal market to set a reasonable hourly billing rate. See League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir.1997) (citing Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1232 & n.7 (5th Cir.1987)) (noting that a Magistrate Judge should not have considered his personal experience in setting a reasonable hourly rate). When a rate is not contested, it is prima facie reasonable. Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. v. Orleans Parish School Board, 919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Islamic Ctr., 876 F.2d at 469).

If, from the range of market rates submitted by the parties, the court chooses an hourly rate different from an attorney's alleged customary billing rate, the court must articulate reasons for doing so. Islamic Ctr., 876 F.2d at 468 (citing Black Grievance Committee v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 802 F.2d 648, 652-53 (3rd Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 3255, 97 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1987). The district court's selection of a reasonable rate, if such a selection is made by the court, is reviewed on appeal for clear error. See Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324; Powell v. Comm'r, 891 F.2d 1167, 1173 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that determination of reasonable rates is question of fact, subject to clear error standard); Islamic Ctr., 876 F.2d at 468 (using clear error standard to evaluate hourly rates awarded). To determine reasonable rates, a court considers the attorneys' regular rates as well as prevailing rates. HJ, Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1991) (considering regular rates as well as prevailing rates); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (calling for "reference to the customary billing rate followed by comparison to the prevailing community rate to ensure that the attorney's customary rate is reasonable"), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 3488, 87 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1985).

Plaintiff has not stated what his attorneys' customary billing rates are. However, Plaintiff did attach to his Motion for Attorneys' Fees three affidavits to support his contention that compensating Stephen Crampton and Mathew Staver $400 an hour, and Daniel Schmid $200 an hour is reasonable. In particular, Plaintiff attached a Declaration from Jim Waide, a practitioner in the Northern District of Mississippi, who attested that based on Crampton's experience and reputation, "a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Crampton would be $400 per hour, which is within the range of rates for attorneys in this community with similar skill and experience." Charles LiMandri also submitted a declaration supporting Plaintiff's fee request. LiMandri apparently practices in California and states that "as an attorney who specializes in First Amendment civil liberties litigation on a national basis, a reasonable rate for Daniel J. Schmid is $200 per hour; for Stephen M. Crampton is $400 per hour; [and] for Mathew D. Staver is $400 per hour . . . ." While LiMandri made that declaration on behalf of a national practice in constitutional law, the law is clear that the Court is to consider the "prevailing community rate," of which his affidavit offers no basis. See Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that rates must be based on the "local market," which the Fifth Circuit defines as the "community which the district sits."). Stephen Crampton also submitted a declaration that according to his familiarity with the local legal community, "a reasonable rate for Mr. Schmid is $200 per hour, [and] for Mr. Staver is $400 per hour." In rebuttal, the Defendant offered two affidavits of local practitioners, both with extensive civil rights litigation experience. David O'Donnell averred that in Mississippi, a reasonable range for fees for the handling of cases like this one was between $150 and $250 an hour. Indeed, he stated that the "customary rate for an attorney with less than five years litigation experience is $125-$150 an hour. Attorneys with 15 or more years of litigation experience customarily command $150-$200 an hour in Mississippi." J. Lawson Hester, another Mississippi practitioner gave a similar statement that his normal billing rate in these types of cases, even with his twenty-eight years of experience, is $200 an hour or less, with less experienced partners and associates being billed at a rate between $155 an hour to $175 an hour. Both declarants stated that they were unaware of any civil rights practitioner charging more than $265 an hour, regardless of experience.

As Plaintiff has not put forth evidence of his attorneys' customary billing rates, the Court finds that the prevailing market rates in this locality to be closer to $250 an hour for those with extensive litigation experience, and $150 an hour for those with less experience. See Sales v. Bailey, No. 2:12cv056-SA, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 52754, *5-7 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 22, 2015); CrossFit, Inc. v. Columbus CrossFitness, LLC, No. 1:13cv144-GHD, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 81436, *5-10 (N.D. Miss. June 16, 2014); Alexander v. City of Jackson, No. 3:04cv614-HTW, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35091, *35-38 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2011).

Accordingly, after a reduction of the number of hours as noted above and on the spreadsheet attached, the Court calculates the total lodestar as follows:

The Johnson Factors

There exists "a strong presumption that the lodestar represents the reasonable fee . . . [a]nd `the district court should not enhance the lodestar unless the prevailing party shows that enhancement is necessary to make the award of attorneys' fees reasonable.'" Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 897-98, 104 S.Ct. 1541). Once the lodestar is determined it may be adjusted upward or downward in accordance with the twelve factors (often called "multipliers") set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors used to determine whether an adjustment is needed are as follows: (1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the result obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. Johnson's viability has taken a few hits. For example, in Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, the United States Supreme Court stated that the lodestar approach has "become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence." 559 U.S. 542, 551, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court mentioned Johnson as an alternative methodology, but was critical of its "series of sometimes subjective factors." Id., 130 S.Ct. 1662. Perdue has not, however, been interpreted as overruling the Fifth Circuit's practice of using the Johnson factors when considering enhanced or reduced fees. See DaSilva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 599 F. App'x 535, 541 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he Johnson factors allow either upward or downward adjustments."); Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (using Johnson factors post Perdue). Still, not all Johnson factors remain viable in all cases. For example, "enhancement for contingency is not permitted under the feeshifting statutes . . . ." Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992). And Perdue tells us that "superior results are relevant only to the extent it can be shown that they are the result of superior attorney performance." 559 U.S. at 554, 130 S.Ct. 1662. Even before Perdue, the Fifth Circuit had already limited a number of Johnson factors when redundant to the lodestar approach. For example, in Shipes v. Trinity Industries, the Fifth Circuit held that "[f]our of the Johnson factors [—] the novelty and complexity of the issues [factor 2], the special skill and experience of counsel [3], the quality of representation [9], and the results obtained from the litigation [8] [—] are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar amount." 987 F.2d 311, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that upward adjustments for these factors would be "proper only in certain rare and exceptional cases"). The Shipes court also found that "time limitations [7]" were "accounted for in the lodestar amount," and that "preclusion of other employment [4] . . . will ordinarily be subsumed within the lodestar amount." Id. at 321-22.

Accordingly, the Court evaluates the remaining Johnson multipliers to determine whether the lodestar amount should be enhanced or reduced.

1. Novelty, Difficulty and Attorney Skill

The Johnson opinion recognizes the common-sense proposition that easier and more routine matters take less time to prepare than do cases that present novel, difficult questions. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-18. Similarly, it is also reasonable to assume that a more experienced attorney will take less time to accomplish a routine task than will a novice. See LULAC, 119 F.3d at 1234. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has stated that it is appropriate to distinguish between legal tasks that plainly require an attorney's skill, and other tasks such as investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics, work which often can be accomplished by non-lawyers but which a lawyer may do because he has no other help available, or simply because the lawyer may desire to perform a specific task. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that such work not requiring the skill of an attorney, but which an attorney nevertheless may perform, may command a lesser rate. Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d at 1235. This Court took these matters into account when it determined the lodestar and finds no basis for further adjustment.

2. Preclusion of Other Employment

This factor involves conflicts of interest which may arise from the representation and the time the representation in question may take away from the attorney for other opportunities. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. Few Fifth Circuit decisions deal in any depth with this factor. However, district court cases note that as a general matter the "preclusion from accepting other employment" factor is more appropriate when considering an increase in or enhancement of the lodestar amount. See Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 944 F.Supp. 508 (N.D. Tex. 1996). This court finds no basis for enhancement in the instant case.

3. Customary Fee—Attorney Experience, Reputation, and Ability

At least two of the Johnson factors are relevant in determining a reasonable rate of compensation. They are: (1) the experience, reputation and ability of counsel; and (2) the customary fee for similar work in the community. Shipes, 987 F.2d at 319; Alberti, 896 F.2d at 930. Because these factors were analyzed and considered in determining the reasonable rate for compensation under the lodestar calculation, this factor has no effect.

4. Time Limitations Imposed by Client or Circumstances

This factor—time limitations imposed by the client or by circumstances—ordinarily arises in conjunction with a request for enhancement of the lodestar amount. See Alberti, 896 F.2d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 1990). The Johnson Court stated that this factor is particularly important when a new counsel is called in to prosecute the appeal or handle matters at a late stage in the proceeding. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718; In re Combustion, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1116, 1137 (W.D. La. 1997). These circumstances are not present in the instant case.

5. Amount Involved and the Results Obtained

Generally, where the plaintiff recovers most, if not all, of the amount claimed of the relief sought, the results obtained may be classified as excellent and the fee awarded should reflect this outcome. Similarly, if a favorable decision corrects a discriminatory or other unconstitutional circumstance which affects a large class of citizens, then the fee should reflect the relief obtained. See Johnson, 488 F.2d. at 718; In Re Combustion, Inc., 968 F. Supp. at 1139 (bringing this factor into play where an important public policy is advanced by the decision); Feinberg v. Hibernia Corp., 966 F.Supp. 442, 453 (E.D. La. 1997) (refusing to enhance a fee award where the settlement amount of $20,000,000.00 represented only 20%-25% of the original claim).

Plaintiff did not specify damages sought in this case, only requesting injunctive relief, compensatory damages for the harm he suffered, and nominal damages. This court already has taken these matters into account.

6. The Undesirability of the Case

The district court may conclude that a case is undesirable where the prevailing attorney was subjected to oppressive, unpleasant, or intimidating conditions during the representation of the client. Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d at 834. This factor was added to the list of factors to be considered by the Johnson Court, in recognition of the possibility that representation in civil rights cases might have a negative economic impact on an attorney's practice. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. This factor is not present in the instant case.

After reviewing all the Johnson factors, the Court is of the opinion that the lodestar amount should be neither enhanced nor reduced based on the multipliers.

c. Compensation for Attorneys' Fee Dispute

Prevailing parties are entitled to attorney's fees for time spent establishing and litigating a fee claim as well as for time spent prosecuting the merits of the civil rights action. Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1979). The Plaintiff's attorneys seek $22,379.50 for their work on the fees issue in this case. That figure, however, is based on the higher rate of billing that Plaintiff asserted they were owed and work performed by attorneys who have not made an entry of appearance in this matter. As noted above, the prevailing community rate applies also to this fee request and the request will be reduced by the hours accountable to attorneys not specified above or on the docket.

The Court further finds that the hours spent crafting this motion and reply are unreasonable, especially given the numerous hours spent researching and compiling attorneys' fees for settlement issues prior to the Offer of Judgment.3 Accordingly, the fee request for the motion for attorneys' fees will be reduced by half after reduction of the requested rate and for persons not appearing in this action. After review of the time sheets and the materials presented, the Court hereby awards the Plaintiff $7,636 for fees incurred in filing the motion for attorneys' fees and reply thereto.

d. Costs

After subtracting the costs for online research as noted above, the total awardable costs are $1,556.78.

Conclusion

Attorneys' fees and costs in this case are appropriately awarded in this case. However, the Court finds that due to the duplicative billing, excessive number of hours reportedly spent on this case, and the posture of the case when the Offer of Judgment was accepted, the requested attorneys' fees are unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court reduces the number of compensable hours and the rates to the more prevailing community rates. The Motion for Attorneys' Fees [74] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court finds reasonable attorneys' fees in the total amount of $65,560, and costs of $1,556.78 to fully compensate Plaintiff's counsel for their time and efforts in this case.

SO ORDERED.

Liberty Counsel

DRAFT BILL

DISBURSEMENTS

FEE SUMMARY

Time Sheet — Stephen M. Crampton

6/4

0.4 Receive and review emails from legal assistant re service on defendants; receive, review and respond to email from D. Schmid re new contact information, status of service, and plan of action going forward.

0.6 TC with Mr. Schmid re preparation for calling opposing counsel and scheduling of hearing on motion for PI; conference call to City Atty, Jeff Turnage; discussion re nature of case, prospects of early settlement, and identity of lead counsel for the defendants (J. Lawson Hester); attempt to reach Mr. Hester; left message.

6/6

0.6 Draft local counsel agreement; email to Mat and Anita Staver re same.

6/9

0.2 Receive and respond to emails from Mr. Schmid re scheduling of conf. call to opposing counsel; attn. to calendaring same.

0.8 Prepare notice of change of address. LGA

0.2 Prepare for and participate in conference call to Mr. Hester; TC with Mr. Schmid re follow up and course of action in light of Mr. Hester's refusal to take our calls.

6/11

0.3 Follow up email to Mat and Anita Staver re status of local counsel agreement; receive and respond to their email back to me.

6/12/14

0.2 Receive, review and respond to email from Anita Staver with signed local counsel agreement.

0.6 2 TC's with Mr. Schmid re failure of City to return our phone calls and failure to respond to our motion for PI; discussed strategy for going forward, and need for affidavit reflecting service of process and idea of filing motion for entry of default order granting PI. Second TC re contents of motion and need for including fact findings and conclusions of law, and Mr. Schmid's having obtained signed affidavits of service.

3d TC with Mr. Schmid re filing of affidavit of service and need to prepare as succinct a proposed order granting preliminary injunction as possible.

6/13/14

1.1 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid transmitting draft motion for entry of PI by default and declaration in support; edit same; prepare email to Mr. Schmid explaining revisions.

1.4 Receive and review second email from Mr. Schmid enclosing copy of draft Order; TC Mr. Schmid re status of motion, anticipated response, and our reply; redraft proposed order to limit it to bare bones findings and conclusions of law; TC with Mr. Schmid re same and finalizing and filing it.

0.2 Third TC Mr. Schmid re what to call the motion for default PI for purposes of e-filing.

6/16/14

3.2 TC (2) Daniel re response to motion for default PI motion; receive and review response to PI motion itself; strategize re reply brief; research re service of process on individual in official capacity and its effect on municipality that was not properly served.

1.8 Receive, review and edit draft reply in support of motion for entry of preliminary injunction by default; research same; finalize and file notice of change of address.

6/17

0.8 Receive and review as-filed reply brief; receive and review Ds' motion to strike; tc Mr. Schmid re status of case and timing for attempting to re-serve City with process.

6/18/14

0.9 Receive and review Answer and Affirmative Defenses; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re same and possible motion to strike or for sanctions.

6/19/14

0.3 Receive and review Scheduling Order; attn. to calendaring same.LGA

0.3 TC D. Schmid re analysis of Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Motion to Strike filed by Ds and strategy for responding to same.

6/30/14

0.2 TC with Mr. Schmid re need to prepare response to Ds' motion to strike and possible email inviting counsel to withdraw some of his wholly irrelevant affirmative defenses.

0.3 Prepare invoice. In voice Prop.

Time Sheet for July 1-August 1, 2014 — Stephen M. Crampton

7/1/14

1.6 Receive, review and edit draft response in opposition to motion to strike; research re caselaw cited by Defendants; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re response; TC with Mr. Schmid re filing of response and finalizing same.

7/2

0.3 Receive and review final response to motion to strike.

0.2 Prepare email to Mr. Schmid re prospect of researching a motion to strike the affirmative defenses.

7/7

4.1 Research re motion to strike impertinent or irrelevant defenses.

7/9

0.8 Receive, review and edit draft motion to strike; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re same.

7/11/14

0.6 Receive and review Defendants' "Rebuttal" in support of motion to strike our motion for entry of default preliminary injunction.

7/14/14

0.3 TC Mr. Schmid re whether to file reply in support of motion for entry of default preliminary injunction; review Defendants' Rebuttal re same.

7/28

0.3 Receive and review notices from court re issuance of new summons as to Mayor and alias summons to Mayor; receive and review email from Mr. Schmid to process server re same.

7/29

0.3 Receive and review response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion to strike certain defenses.

8/1

0.4 Receive and review Order denying Plaintiff's motion for entry of preliminary injunction by default; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re same.

0.3 Prepare invoice. INVOICE PREP

Time Sheet for August 2 - August 31, 2014 — Stephen M. Crampton

8/19/14

0.9 Receive call from Judge Sanders' chambers re tardy confidential settlement memo and prep for case management conference; 2 TC's with Mr. Schmid re nee for same and rescheduling of conference; review order re same; receive second call from Judge Sanders' chambers re rescheduling; attn. to calendaring same.

8/20/14

1.2 Receive and review Ds' response in opposition to motion for PI and exhibits; review same; email to Mr. Schmid re same; TC Mr. Schmid re contents of response, revision of ordinances, and revision to our strategy as a result of City's actions.

8/25/14

0.4 TC Mr. Schmid re his analysis of City's response and chances of prevailing on preliminary injunction if we move forward; discuss need for extension of page limit for reply brief in light of City's actions in revising the ordinances; receive and review email from Mr. Schmid to City requesting consent to motion for leave to exceed page limit.

8/26/14

2.4 Receive and review motion for enlargement of time to file reply brief and proposed order re same; edit motion and proposed order; review more carefully City's response brief and outline points needed on reply; research re City's argument on why failure to include explicit time limitation on decision maker's acting on permit application should not be fatal to Ordinance.

8/27/14

1.1 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid to court enclosing courtesy copy of motion for enlargement; TC Mr. Schmid re strategy for reply brief; research case law re standing of Joiner to challenge parade ordinance even though he has not applied for permit.

8/28/14

2.7 Receive, review and edit draft reply brief in support of motion for preliminary injunction; research re case law finding unconstitutional permit schemes that fail to set forth explicit time limitations within which decision maker must grant or deny application; TC Mr. Schmid re lack of ruling on motion for leave to exceed page limits; receive and review minute order granting motion to exceed page limits; receive and review as-filed reply brief; prepare and send email to Mr. Schmid re final brief.

8/30

0.2 Prepare invoice.

Time Sheet for September 1 - October 1, 2014 - Stephen M. Crampton

9/11/14

4.1 TCs (2) with Mr. Schmid re preparation of confidential settlement memo and Case Management Report; receive, review and edit Case Management Report; attn to setting dates for discovery cutoff, disclosure of expert witnesses, length of trial, etc.; receive, review and edit confidential settlement memo; revise amount of damages to reflect length of time Pastor Joiner was incarcerated; revise legal argument to include legal citations and demonstrate strength of our case; receive and review email transmitting draft Case Management Report to opposing counsel; receive and review email from opposing counsel re availability to discuss report; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re same; receive and review emails from Mr. Schmid re scheduling of conference call with counsel; respond to same with suggestion for emailing first and ascertaining what objections he had before speaking with him; receive and review email from Mr. Schmid to opposing counsel requesting email correspondence before teleconference, as we discussed.

9/12

1.4 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid re proposed settlement strategy re attorneys' fees; respond with additional hours I have incurred since leaving LC and informing of my new billing rate; TC Mr. Schmid re response received from opposing counsel with modest revisions to Case Management Report; receive and review email from opposing counsel; receive and review final Case Management Report as filed with the court; receive and review email to Judge Sanders transmitting final confidential settlement memo; review memo.

9/25

0.6 Review Proposed Case Management Order in preparation for conference with magistrate judge; TC Mr. Schmid re strategy for same and need to obtain setting on PI motion.

9/26

0.8 Prepare for and participate in Case Management Conference; TC Mr. Schmid re debriefing, opposition to Defendants' request for discovery, and need to obtain hearing on motion for PI.

10/1/14

0.9 Receive and review Case Management Order from federal court; attn. to calendaring deadlines for discovery, initial disclosures, dispositive motions, pre-trial, trial, and so forth; receive and review Notice of Settlement Conference; attn. to calendaring deadlines relevant thereto; preparation of invoice. LGA

Time Sheet for December 9, 2014-January 3, 2015 Stephen M. Crampton

12/9

0.9 Prepare email to Mr. Schmid inquiring as to the status of settlement negotiations; TC with Mr. Schmid re same; receive, review and respond to email from Mr. Schmid re scheduling of moot court in preparation for PI hearing; attn. to calendaring same; prepare email re travel arrangements and suggested accommodations for Mr. Schmid.

12/10

1.4 Prepare email to Mr. Schmid reminding him of need to touch base with the court as to the time reserved for the hearing on our motion for PI; receive and review response re same; begin review of briefs and evidentiary materials in preparation for moot court session.

12/11

0.8 Receive and review emails from Mr. Schmid and Ms. High re status of settlement negotiations and preparation for PI hearing; receive and review emails re estimated length of hearing; prepare email with suggested response and plan for preparation for examining witnesses; TCs (2) with Mr. Schmid re same.

12/12

3.2 Prepare for and conduct moot court mock oral argument with Mr. Schmid in preparation for PI hearing; receive and review emails re City's 11th hour proposed revisions to ordinance; TCs with Mr. Schmid re same; review and analyze proposed new ordinance.

12/13

1.2 Receive and review emails from Mr. Schmid re latest communications from City re intent to hold emergency meeting to adopt new ordinance and its impact on PI hearing; receive and review email from City's counsel re same; TCs with Mr. Schmid re same; review and compare proposed new ordinance with current ordinance; analyze constitutionality of proposed ordinance.

12/15

2.2 Receive, review and edit draft motion to withdraw motion for PI; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re revision to style of motion; receive and review email from courtroom deputy re her intent to cover the PI hearing and inquiring of its anticipated length; receive and review emails from Mr. Schmid, Mr. Turnage, and Ms. High re cancellation of hearing; respond to same; receive and review email from court granting motion to withdraw PI and cancelling the hearing.

1/14/15

0.4 Prepare email to Mr. Schmid re need to confer about written discovery; TC Mr. Schmid re same.

1/15

1.9 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid transmitting draft interrogatories; review and revise same; receive and review second email with revised interrogatories, this time directed only to the City; review and revise same.

1/16

2.2 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid transmitting draft requests for production of documents; review and revise same; review and revise latest draft of interrogatories; receive and review email with draft requests for admissions; review and revise same; receive and review email from court re notice of service of interrogatories; receive and review email from Ms. High agreeing to electronic service of discovery.

1/20/15

1.6 Receive and review series of emails re filing of notice of service of discovery, need for corrected certificate of service, and filing of same; receive and review email from courtroom deputy for Judge Sanders re need to reschedule mediation; TC with Mr. Schmid re same; receive and review email from Mr. schmid to court re rescheduling; respond to email from court confirming availability on Feb. 19; receive and review email from Ms. High responding to inquiry re availability; receive and review email from Mr. Turnage re same; receive and review notice from court confirming rescheduling; attention to calendaring same.

1/26

3.2 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid re expert witness disclosure; review draft disclosures; research case law and federal rules re right to add rebuttal expert witness where case management order does not specifically mention rebuttal experts; TC with Mr. Schmid re same; receive and review notice from court alerting us of filing of expert disclosure.

1/27/15

0.6 Receive and review email from Ms. High acknowledging receipt of expert witness disclosures; receive and review email from Mr. Turnage objecting to our reservation of right to add rebuttal expert in the event Defendants retain expert witness; TC with Mr. Schmid re Turnage's taking umbrage at our reservation of rights and settlement strategy for upcoming settlement conference.

1/28

0.4 Receive and review emails from Mr. Turnage and Mr. Schmid re disagreement as to whether we have a right to add rebuttal expert witness in the event Defendants secure one under the rules governing here.

2/2

3.1 Receive and review emails from Mr. Schmid enclosing draft interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents to Defendant Shelton; review and edit same; review videotapes of incident giving rise to arrest of Pastor Joiner re same; prepare emails to Mr. Schmid with proposed revisions and comments on discovery.

2/3

0.8 TC Mr. Schmid re preparation of confidential settlement memorandum, strategy for same, and how to address attorneys' fees claim; receive and review email re service of discovery on Defendant Shelton; receive and review email from Defendants' counsel acknowledging receipt of same; attn. to calendaring and preparation of fee report.

Time Sheet for February 4 - March 4, 2015 Stephen M. Crampton

2/9

0.2 TC with Mr. Schmid re history of settlement negotiations and possibility of my attending settlement conference alone.

2/10

0.3 TC with Mr. Mihet re preparation for settlement conference, parameters within which we will agree to settle, and status of case.

2/11

1.2 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid re draft of confidential settlement memorandum; review and edit same; prepare email to Mr. Schmid with my suggested revisions; TC with Mr. Mihet re plans for my attending settlement conference alone and strategy for increasing value of our product; TC with Mr. Schmid re additions to confidential memo and demand for damages for client.

2/12

0.9 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid enclosing draft of additional insert into confidential memo; respond to same; receive and review email re submission of final memo to Magistrate Judge; receive and review electronic notice of service of Defendants' responses to Requests for Admissions; TC with Mr. Schmid re final edits to memo.

2/17

3.4 Review Complaint, Answer, and various motions and timeline preceding hearing on motion for PI in preparation for settlement conference; prepare list of various motions and dilatory tactics of Defendants in anticipation of need to explain why attorneys' fees are so high; review settlement memorandum and begin outline of discussion points to raise with Magistrate Judge at conference; prepare email to Pastor Joiner and Mrs. Joiner re what to expect and logistics for attendance at settlement conference; receive and review email responses; begin research re catalyst theory in Fifth Circuit and what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate in this district.

2/18

2.6 Continue preparation for settlement conference; review documentation received from Mr. Schmid re breakdown of time entries per motion and item in preparation for explaining fee request; TC with Pastor Joiner in preparation for his participation in settlement conference; TC with Mr. Mihet re final instructions for settlement authority and strategy for negotiating terms.

2/19

6.3 Finalize preparation for settlement conference; complete research re hourly rates in this district; finalize outline of talking points; travel to Aberdeen for settlement conference; meet with client in final preparation for conference; attend settlement conference; debriefing with client; exchange texts and emails with Mr. Mihet re progress (or lack thereof) in negotiations; return to Tupelo; TC with Mr. Schmid re where we go from here.

2/24

0.8 Receive and begin review of Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories.

2/26

0.4 Receive and review notice of service of Defendants' designation of expert witnesses; TC with Mr. Schmid re scheduling of depositions and need to prepare formal notices therefor.

2/27/15

1.9 Review Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Documents; review and analyze various documents produced; identify certain police officers to be deposed and documents to be used in depositions.

3/3

0.6 TC with Mr. Schmid re possible deposition schedule; receive and review draft notices of depositions; review and critique 30(b)(6) notice with respect to topics to be discussed.

3/4

1.3 Receive and review Defendants' designation of expert witnesses; TC with Mr. Schmid re possible responses to same, revised deposition schedule, pros and cons of moving for extension of time for completion of discovery, and need for motion for summary judgment; receive and review electronic notice of filing of Defendant Shelton's responses to P's requests for admissions; second TC with Mr. Schmid re his discussion with Mr. Mihet and need to seek extension of discovery deadline in order to deal with no. of expert witnesses.

Time Sheets for March 5 - April 6, 2015 Stephen M. Crampton

3/5

0.6 TC with Mr. Schmid re his attempts to reach opposing counsel to discuss extension of time; also discussed motion to compel, and lack of good faith basis for many of D's objections to our discovery requests; receive and review email from Mr. Schmid to opposing counsel requesting extension of discovery deadline; attn. to calendaring and invoice.

3/6

0.3 Receive and review email from opposing counsel re need to confer before responding to our request for extension of time to complete discovery; TC with Mr. Schmid re appropriate response to same and whether City has legal authority for claim that their "experts" are not required to file written reports.

3/9

1.4 Receive and review email with draft motion for extension of time; review and edit same; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re same; receive and review email from opposing counsel re their refusal to consent to motion for extension of time; TC with Mr. Schmid re where that leaves us and need to notice depositions; receive and review electronic notices from court re filing of Defendant Shelton's responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; receive and review as-filed version of motion for extension of time to complete discovery.

3/10/15

1.3 Receive and review Defendant Shelton's responses to Plaintiff's First Requests for Admissions; TC with Mr. Schmid re setting of location for depositions and finalizing of notices of depositions; receive, review and edit draft notices of depositions (3).

3/10/15 Pursuant to Offer of Judgment, incurred after 3/10 are non-compensable.

1.6 TC with Mr. Schmid re receipt of Offer of Judgment; receive and review email transmitting Offer; review and analyze Offer; research re prevailing party, recovery of attorney's fees and interpretations of Offers of Judgment.

3/11

0.8 TC with Mr. Schmid re Offer of Judgment and possible pitfalls in acceptance of same; receive and review email from Mr. Schmid with his research regarding Rule 68 and determination of prevailing party; prepare and send email to Mssrs. Schmid and Mihet pointing out change in the law governing prevailing party status in 2001 Supreme Court case of Buckhannon; exchange text messages with Mr. Mihet re need to discuss situation.

3/12/15

1.2 Receive and review email notices from court re filing of Defendants' Response in Opposition to Motion for Extension of Time; review memorandum, exhibits and motion; prepare email to client re receipt of Offer of Judgment and significance of same; receive and review email response; receive and review response from client; prepare lengthy reply, in order to explain why offer of judgment should be accepted; exchange emails with co-counsel re same.

3/16/15

0.5 Receive and review electronic notice of Defendants' filing of notice of deposition; retrieve and review notice of deposition; prepare email to client informing him of notice and advising him to make himself available.

3/17

0.5 TC Mr. Mihet re pros and cons of acceptance of offer of judgment, and mechanics of application for attorneys' fees; TC Mr. Schmid re decision to accept offer of judgment and need to locate attorneys willing to sign affidavits supporting the reasonableness of our fee request.

3/18

0.9 Research re fee awards in similar cases in Mississippi; research re what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate in this district.

3/20/15

1.3 Continue research re reasonable hourly rates for comparable work by attorneys with comparable experience in this district; receive and review Defendants' Re-Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff; receive and review Order granting motion for extension of time; prepare email to Mssrs. Schmid and Mihet re same.

3/23

1.4 TC with Mr. Schmid re preparation of letter accepting offer of judgment and summary of research re reasonable hourly rates in this district; receive and review draft letter; research re conditions and form of acceptance of Rule 68 offer of judgment; edit draft letter; prepare email to Mr. Schmid transmitting same.

3/24

0.4 Receive and review final letter accepting offer of judgment; TC with Mr. Schmid re procedure for filing same.

3/25

1.6 Receive, review and edit draft order granting judgment pursuant to acceptance of Defendants' offer of judgment; prepare email transmitting proposed revisions; TC with Mr. Schmid re same; receive and review emails from court clerk re need for submission of proposed judgment and from Mr. Schmid re same; receive and review submission of proposed order to court;037e receive and review emails between Mr. Schmid and Ms. High re Defendants' alternative proposed judgment; TC with Mr. Schmid re same.

3/26

1.7 Receive, review and edit redraft of proposed judgment in favor of Plaintiff; prepare email to Mr. Schmid re same; TCs with Mr. Schmid re fee application, potential affidavits in support of reasonableness of hourly rates, and draft motion and memorandum; prepare email transmitting same; receive and review email from Mr. Schmid to Mr. LiMandri requesting affidavit in support of fee application; receive, review and respond to email from Mr. Schmid enclosing email from Ms. High objecting to certain content in our latest proposed order entering judgment; receive and review email from client re when to expect payment on the judgment; respond to same.

3/30

0.4 Receive and review final judgment entered by court; receive and review email from Mr. Schmid re same; attn. to calendaring deadlines for submission of application for attorneys' fees.

3/31

0.9 Prepare email to Mr. Schmid asking for hourly rates and years in practice for all attorneys who worked on this case; prepare email to attorney Jim Waide asking for affidavit attesting to reasonableness of hourly rates; receive, review and respond to email from client re local fallout from entry of judgment.

4/2

0.7 Receive and review draft declaration for attorney Charles LiMandri in support of our motion for attorneys' fees;037e edit same;037e prepare email to Mr. Schmid re same.

4/3

0.5 Receive and review email from Mr. Schmid to Mr. LiMandri enclosing draft declaration and materials for review, Mr. LiMandri's response, and Mr. Schmid's reply.

4/6

2.6 Prepare email to attorneys Jim Waide and Rachel Pierce re declaration in support of attorneys' fees;037e receive and review response to same;037e prepare email to Mr. Schmid re revised plan for filing declarations; prepare declaration for Mr. Waide in support of Mr. Crampton's hourly rates;037e research re attorneys' fee awards in similar cases in Mississippi;037e prepare email to Mr. Waide transmitting draft declaration for his signature; attn. to time sheets.