Filed: Mar. 22, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 22, 2016
Summary: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEBRA M. BROWN , District Judge . On June 5, 2015, Plaintiff Timothy N. Evans filed a pro se complaint challenging the conditions of his confinement. Pursuant to court order, Evans filed an amended complaint on September 8, 2015. After Defendants Nathan Harris, Earnest Lee, and Carla Lofton, employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, filed their answer on October 6, 2015, Evans moved for partial summary judgment 1
Summary: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEBRA M. BROWN , District Judge . On June 5, 2015, Plaintiff Timothy N. Evans filed a pro se complaint challenging the conditions of his confinement. Pursuant to court order, Evans filed an amended complaint on September 8, 2015. After Defendants Nathan Harris, Earnest Lee, and Carla Lofton, employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, filed their answer on October 6, 2015, Evans moved for partial summary judgment 1 o..
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DEBRA M. BROWN, District Judge.
On June 5, 2015, Plaintiff Timothy N. Evans filed a pro se complaint challenging the conditions of his confinement. Pursuant to court order, Evans filed an amended complaint on September 8, 2015. After Defendants Nathan Harris, Earnest Lee, and Carla Lofton, employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, filed their answer on October 6, 2015, Evans moved for partial summary judgment1 on November 9, 2015. As grounds for partial summary judgment, Evans argues that Harris, Lee, and Lofton addressed only the claims in his amended complaint in their answer2 and failed to deny the allegations in his initial complaint; and also claims that he has not yet received any documents from them. Doc. #58. Harris, Lee, and Lofton failed to respond to Evans' motion for partial summary judgment. For the reasons below, Evans' motion for partial summary judgment will be denied.
I
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, illustrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is deemed "material" if "its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law." Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
"If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial." McKee v. CBF Corp., 299 F. App'x 426, 428 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331). If the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," then there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, and summary judgment must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
II
Procedural History
Evans, a death row prisoner at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, filed his pro se complaint challenging the conditions of his confinement on June 5, 2015. Doc. #1. In the months following this initial filing, Evans submitted a variety of amendments to his complaint, most of which sought to add defendants.3 See Docs. #6, #9, #10, #13, #14, #18, #22.
On August 25, 2015, U.S. Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden ordered Evans to "collect all of his claims and clearly present them in one amended complaint, which will be the sole complaint the court relies upon at the Spears hearing currently set in this matter for September 14, 2015." Doc. #21 (emphasis in original). On September 8, 2015, Evans filed an amended complaint.4 Doc. #24. A Spears hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Virden on September 14, 2015.5 In a process order dated September 16, 2015, the Court ordered that "[b]y November 26, 2015, the defendants must provide the plaintiff with his disciplinary records, administrative records, medical records, and any other records related to this incident." Doc. #27 at ¶ 3.
Defendants Harris, Lee, and Lofton filed their answer on October 6, 2015.6 Doc. #35. On November 25, 2015, Harris, Lee, and Lofton filed a notice of service, stating that they had served copies of Evans' institutional file, administrative records, and medical file on all parties. Doc. #70.
On November 9, 2015, Evans moved for partial summary judgment regarding the answer filed by Harris, Lee, and Lofton. Doc. #58. Harris, Lee, and Lofton did not file a response to Evans' motion.7
III
Analysis
Evans argues that, because Harris, Lee, and Lofton do not deny any of the allegations in his initial complaint and have responded only to the allegations in the amended complaint, he is entitled to partial summary judgment. However, Evans has not produced any evidence to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on any of the claims he raises. As such, Evans has not discharged his burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and thus is not entitled to summary judgment. See Davis v. Kyle, No. CIV.A. 6:08CV79, 2009 WL 3674068, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2009) ("Plaintiff failed to support his motion for summary judgment with competent summary judgment evidence. As such, the Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment."). Accordingly, Evans' motion for partial summary judgment [58] is DENIED.
In his motion for partial summary judgment, Evans also requests access to electronically stored data, maintaining that he has not received the discovery ordered by Magistrate Judge Virden on September 16, 2015. However, the notice of service filed by Harris, Lee, and Lofton indicates that the discovery ordered by the Court has since been sent to Evans. Doc. #70. Because the ordered discovery has been provided, to the extent Evans' request may be construed as a separate motion, it is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
