DEBRA M. BROWN, District Judge.
Before the Court are two motions filed by Bolivar County: (1) "Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment," Doc. #11; and (2) "Defendant's Motion to Deposit Funds," Doc. #16.
On November 17, 2015, the United States of America filed a complaint in this Court against Bolivar County, seeking declaratory, equitable, and monetary relief. Doc. #1. The complaint asserted a claim under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, for alleged discrimination by the Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility ("BCRCF") against Tommey Gomillia, an applicant for a correctional officer position. Id. On March 17, 2016, this Court entered a consent decree ("Consent Decree"), agreed to by the parties, terminating this action. Doc. #10.
Of relevance here, the Consent Decree: (1) prohibits Bolivar County from engaging in any act or practice of employment discrimination in violation of Title I of the ADA; (2) directs Bolivar County to provide training on Title I of the ADA; and (3) requires Bolivar County to file biannual reports on its efforts to comply with the Consent Decree. Id. at 3-4. Additionally, paragraph 12 of the Consent Decree provides:
Id. at 5-6.
On May 4, 2016, Bolivar County filed the instant motion for declaratory judgment. In its motion, Bolivar County seeks "declaratory relief adjudicating, construing and interpreting whether the phrase a `total monetary award of $99,999.99' in Section IV
The United States responded in opposition on May 20, 2016. Doc. #13. In its response, the United States asks the Court for an interpretation of the Consent Decree that would result in the Court "order[ing] Bolivar County to pay the monetary award to Mr. Gomillia [required under the Consent Decree] without deducting the $8,371.14 the County is required to pay to PERS." Doc. #14 at 9. Bolivar County replied on May 27, 2016, essentially reiterating its position that it is "not legally responsible for the additionally [sic] payment of $8,371.14." Doc. #15 at 10.
On December 22, 2016, the County filed "Defendant's Motion to Deposit Funds," seeking to deposit $88,645.74 in the registry of the Court. Doc. #16. In a status conference with the parties on December 27, 2016, the United States represented that it does not oppose the County's motion to deposit funds, with the caveat that the deposit of funds is without prejudice to the United States' position that the County owes an additional $8,371.14 to PERS. The United States also represented that, with the same caveat, it has no objection to accepting tender of the County's $88,645.74.
As grounds for its motion for declaratory judgment, Bolivar County cites only the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Under the Act, "a party may not make a motion for declaratory relief, but rather, the party must bring an action for a declaratory judgment." Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm Trading Co. Ltd-Australasia v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 560 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2009)).
While this Court may not enter a declaratory judgment based on Bolivar County's motion, by entering a consent decree with prospective effect, a district court retains inherent jurisdiction to "interpret and modify" the decree. Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347, 1365 (5th Cir. 1995)). However, where a consent decree "cannot reasonably be read to have any prospective effect," the district court entering the decree "ha[s] no jurisdiction to clarify or modify" it in the same action, unless justified by the grounds in Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relevant to non-prospective judgments.
"A judgment operates prospectively if it requires a court to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative." In re Moody, 849 F.2d 902, 906 (5th Cir. 1988). "The distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative." Cook, 618 F.2d at 1152 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)). With respect to a consent decree comprising an injunction, one indication that the decree lacks the requisite prospective effect is that in the decree, the court does not "state that it reserved power to modify the decree or that it retained jurisdiction over the case." Id. at 1152-53.
Here, in issuing the Consent Decree, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction to "enter[] any orders that may be necessary to implement the relief provided in the Decree." Doc. #10 at ¶ 29. Moreover, in this case, the Consent Decree specifies various continuing duties of Bolivar County under the section entitled "Injunctive Relief," at least two of which are of prospective effect— training of new supervisors and semiannual reporting. Compare id. at ¶¶ 10-11 with Cook, 618 F.2d at 1152 ("The decree expressly states ... that the court `declines plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief.'").
Regarding the particular provision of the Consent Decree implicated by Bolivar County's motion, the motion seeks to clarify Bolivar County's responsibility for a particular disputed sum. Doc. #12 at 1. The United States argues that Bolivar County's responsibility to pay that sum arises from paragraphs 12.a. and 12.b of the Consent Decree. Doc. #14 at 5-6. Paragraph 12.b requires the "[a]djustment of Mr. Gomillia's retirement date, with all associated rights and benefits, to reflect no lost time between September 2011 and the date of his reinstatement under Paragraph 12(a)." Doc. #10 at ¶ 12.b. The conditions in paragraph 12.b of the Consent Decree, which are dependent on Gomillia's acceptance of the relevant job offer, are "provisional or tentative" because the lack of definitive language regarding both Gomillia's reinstatement and the "rights and benefits" associated with an adjusted retirement date subject the conditions to judicial supervision.
Bolivar County seeks an interpretation of the Consent Decree that would ultimately lead to two declarations by the Court: (1) that the County owes a "total monetary award of $99,999.99 to Tommey Gomillia" and (2) that the County is "not obligated" to pay $8,371.14 in employer contributions to PERS on Gomillia's behalf.
To interpret a consent decree, "the general principles of contract interpretation apply, among which is the rule that `the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners,'" with the plain meaning of language in a consent decree given effect. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 824 F.2d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Eaton v. Courtaulds of N. Am., Inc., 578 F.2d 87, 91 (5th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 158 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1998).
The County's first requested declaration essentially recites the language in paragraph 12.c of the Consent Decree. Compare Doc. #10 at ¶ 12.c. with Doc. #12 at 7. The Court will deny this request because the requested declaration, which merely repeats the substance of the text in paragraph 12.c, would provide no clarification.
As for the second requested declaration, the County argues that paragraph 12.c, which sets forth the "total monetary award" of the consent decree, does not include a payment to PERS and, therefore, precludes such a payment. Doc. #12 at 3-4. However, paragraph 12.c unambiguously concerns an award to be paid to Gomillia. As such, it does not determine whether the County must pay PERS the disputed employer contributions, which are neither "credited to individual member accounts" nor "payable to members through refunds." PERS of Miss., Member Handbook 13 (2016), http://www.pers.ms.gov/content/handbooks/member_handbook.pdf.
Rather, as the United States correctly argues in its response, Gomillia's entitlement to retirement benefits is governed by paragraphs 12.a and 12.b, which together require that: (1) upon reinstatement, Gomillia be provided a remedial seniority date of September 6, 2011, and that such date be applied to Gomillia's "non-competitive job benefits;" and (2) Gomillia's "retirement date, with all associated rights and benefits, [shall] reflect no time lost between September 2011 and the date of his reinstatement ...." Doc. #14 at 5-6. Put differently, paragraphs 12.a and 12.b unambiguously require that, upon reinstatement, Gomillia's retirement benefits reflect no time lost from September 2011 until the date of reinstatement.
There is no dispute that the PERS employer contributions represent a form of retirement benefit or that the failure to pay required employer contributions would reflect "time lost" of such benefits. Moreover, the County does not respond to the United States' argument that the language in paragraphs 12.a and 12.b of the Consent Decree "unambiguously require[s] Bolivar County to pay the employer cost of retirement benefits." Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Consent Decree unambiguously requires Bolivar County to pay the disputed PERS employer contributions. Having reached this conclusion, the Court declines to consider Bolivar County's argument, raised in its reply brief, that the parties' negotiations did not contemplate PERS employer contributions.
In its motion, Bolivar County asks the Court to interpret paragraph 12 of the Consent Decree with respect to the issue of whether Bolivar County is responsible for the payment of $8,371.14 to the Public Employees Retirement System on behalf of Tommey Gomillia. For the reasons above, the Court, although deciding to interpret the Consent Decree, declines to interpret the Consent Decree in the manner urged by Bolivar County. Thus, Bolivar County's motion [11] is