Filed: Oct. 17, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD ADAM ERWIN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-13-0523-I-1 v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: October 17, 2014 SECURITY, Agency. THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1 Mark L. Cohen, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the appellant. Marilyn R. Chambers, Esquire, and Robert H. Humphries, Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the agency. BEFORE Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member FINAL ORDER ¶1 The appellant has
Summary: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD ADAM ERWIN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-13-0523-I-1 v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: October 17, 2014 SECURITY, Agency. THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1 Mark L. Cohen, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the appellant. Marilyn R. Chambers, Esquire, and Robert H. Humphries, Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the agency. BEFORE Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member FINAL ORDER ¶1 The appellant has ..
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ADAM ERWIN, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DA-0752-13-0523-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: October 17, 2014
SECURITY,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Mark L. Cohen, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the appellant.
Marilyn R. Chambers, Esquire, and Robert H. Humphries, Esquire,
Houston, Texas, for the agency.
BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman
Mark A. Robbins, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained his removal for inability to perform the essential duties of his position.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the
appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the
following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
¶2 The agency removed the appellant from his position as a Marine
Interdiction Agent, based on a charge of inability to perform the essential duties
of his position. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6, Subtab 4b at 1. As a Marine
Interdiction Agent, the agency specified that the appellant was required, among
other things, “to use proper judgment and make quick decisions in law
enforcement situations to protect the life of self, public, and other law
enforcement personnel, [and] carry a government issued weapon.” Id., Subtab 4h
at 1. The appellant’s position required “a high degree of reliability including a
responsibility to the public.” Id., Subtab 4ac at 1. Based on the strenuous and
hazardous nature of the duties typically performed, the agency required the
appellant to meet certain physical and medical requirements such that any
psychiatric condition could result in medical disqualification if the condition
affected his ability to perform the essential duties of his position. Id.; see id.,
Subtab 4z at 7. In the position description summary, the agency stated that any
condition hindering the full and effective performance ability of an individual in
3
the appellant’s position or causing an individual to be a hazard to himself or to
others is disqualifying. Id., Subtab 4ac at 2; see
id., Subtab 4z at 7.
¶3 The agency removed the appellant based primarily on the August 4, 2012
report provided by Dr. Nahmias, a Board-certified psychiatrist, who performed a
psychiatric fitness-for-duty examination and risk assessment. Id., Subtabs 4b, 4h.
The agency asked Dr. Nahmias to evaluate the appellant after the results of a
routine safety survey and subsequent follow-up memoranda revealed concerning
incidents involving the appellant. Id., Subtabs 4h, 4j, Tab 19, Exhibit 9.
Dr. Nahmias diagnosed the appellant with a severe adjustment disorder and
concluded that the appellant posed a potential threat to himself and others. Id.,
Subtab 4l at 7-8. Dr. Prunier, another Board-certified psychiatrist, agreed with
Dr. Nahmias’ opinion that the appellant was not psychiatrically fit for duty. Id.,
Subtab 4j at 2, 4. The agency removed the appellant based on the medical
findings. Id., Subtab 4b at 2.
¶4 The appellant appealed his removal, alleging that he was fit for duty and
that his removal was in reprisal for reporting that several coworkers and managers
engaged in fraud, waste, and abuse. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 18 at 60. He argued,
among other things, that the coworkers and management he implicated in his
report falsely alleged that he was a threat to himself and others and that their false
allegations resulted in his removal. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. The appellant also referred
to an opinion he provided from an independent psychiatrist, Dr. Raheem, who
concluded that he had no psychiatric symptoms that were not amenable to
treatment or required any follow-up. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 6, Subtab 4k. The
appellant initially requested a hearing on his appeal; however, he later withdrew
his request and asked the administrative judge to make a decision based on the
written record. IAF, Tab 11 at 3.
¶5 The administrative judge issued a 30-page initial decision thoroughly
analyzing the probative value of the parties’ submissions, including the three
psychiatric reports, and found that the agency proved the charge by preponderant
4
evidence. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 21. The administrative judge
also found that the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of
whistleblower retaliation. ID at 21, 28. In reaching her decision, the
administrative judge found that the appellant made protected disclosures under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and, based on the knowledge and timing test, those
disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s action; however, she found
that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
the same action absent his disclosures. ID at 23, 28. The administrative judge
also found that the removal penalty was reasonable and promoted the efficiency
of service because the agency submitted evidence demonstrating that there was no
position available that the appellant could perform. ID at 30.
¶6 In challenging the initial decision affirming his removal, the appellant
argues, for the first time on review, that the agency displayed a lack of candor,
committed perjury, and violated his constitutional rights under the First and
Fourth Amendments. 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5. The appellant
also alleges that the agency refused to provide the documents he requested under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in June 2012, and he asks the Board to
delay his appeal until he receives the documents he requested pertaining to his job
performance and the alleged fraud, waste, and abuse. Id. However, none of these
issues were included in the administrative judge’s Notice of Rulings, in which she
identified the issues in dispute on appeal. IAF, Tab 15 at 1. Because the
appellant failed to object to the administrative judge’s ruling identifying the
2
The appellant alleges that agency witnesses perjured themselves in their depositions
by, among other things, falsely stating that his mother died near the time that his
behavior became erratic, that he rarely took vacation, and that his life was on an
unsuccessful spiral. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 5-6. He alleges that the agency
maliciously presented “information in a twisted manner that indicates there is
something wrong with” him in an “effort to turn benign actions into mental illness
accusations.” Id. at 7. He also alleges that the agency violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by searching his home and his car on June 12, 2012, and that the agency violated
his First Amendment rights by terminating him in reprisal for whistleblowing. Id. at 5.
5
issues in dispute or submit a motion to supplement her summary of issues in
dispute, as required on appeal below, the appellant is precluded from raising these
additional issues on review. See id. at 3.
¶7 Moreover, although the appellant complains about the agency’s alleged
failure to produce documents pursuant to his FOIA request, he does not indicate
that he attempted to obtain documents through the Board’s discovery process or
that he filed a motion to compel discovery, although the administrative judge
informed him of the procedure for doing so. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; IAF, Tab 2 at
2-3; see Ioannou v. Office of Personnel Management, 56 M.S.P.R. 426, 431-32
(1993). Furthermore, the appellant has not shown any jurisdictional basis that
permits the Board to hear disputes concerning an agency’s alleged failure to
provide documents in response to a FOIA request. See Ioannou, 56 M.S.P.R. at
431-32; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to
decide disputes over an agency’s compliance with FOIA).
¶8 On review, the appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s finding
that the agency met its burden of proving the charge of inability to perform the
essential duties of his Marine Interdiction Agent position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.
The appellant argues, inter alia, that the administrative judge’s initial decision did
not take “sufficient notice of the perjury of the agency and the impact that the
perjury had on the decision of Dr. [] Nahmias.” Id. For the reasons explained
above, the Board will not consider the merits of the appellant’s perjury
allegations. However, based on the appellant’s general allegation that
Dr. Nahmias relied on misleading statements provided by the agency, we will
review the administrative judge’s assessment of the probative weight of Dr.
Nahmias’ medical opinion. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.
¶9 In assessing the probative weight of medical opinion, the Board considers
whether the opinion was based on a medical examination, whether the opinion
provided a reasoned explanation for its findings as distinct from mere conclusory
assertions, the qualifications of the expert rendering the opinion, and the extent
6
and duration of the expert’s familiarity with the treatment of the appellant. Slater
v. Department of Homeland Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 16 (2008).
Dr. Nahmias examined the appellant and provided a detailed, well-reasoned
opinion and a sworn declaration, diagnosing the appellant with a severe,
unspecified adjustment disorder, and concluding that he was not fit for duty
because he was a potential threat to himself and others. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4L at
7-8, Tab 19 at Exhibit 9.
¶10 Dr. Nahmias based his opinion on more than just the allegedly misleading
statements provided by the agency. Dr. Nahmias also based his opinion on: his
3-hour interview with the appellant; the results of a supervised Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2; the agency’s initial fitness-for-duty
examination with attached information regarding the reason for the request,
memoranda from seven Marine Interdiction Agents and seven 2012 safety
surveys; the results of the fitness-for-duty examination by Dr. Ashby on July 2,
2012, and a handwritten note from Dr. Ashby; and the job description for a
Marine Interdiction Agent. See ID at 6; IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 41 at 1. Dr. Nahmias
also reviewed the appellant’s position description and determined that he is
restricted from carrying a weapon and he is unable to safely, efficiently, and
reliably perform any of the tasks of his position. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4L at 7-8.
Dr. Nahmias concluded that, although the appellant’s restrictions are not
permanent, his prognosis for a return to full-duty is uncertain because of his lack
of cooperation. Id.
¶11 As explained above, another Board-certified psychiatrist, Dr. Prunier,
reviewed the records concerning the appellant and concurred in Dr. Nahmias’
opinion that the appellant was not fit for duty. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4j.
Dr. Prunier also opined that Dr. Nahmias’ evaluation was credible, complete, and
well-documented. Id. On review, the appellant has not submitted any medical
evidence contradicting the opinions of Drs. Nahmias and Prunier.
7
¶12 In sustaining the agency’s charge, the administrative judge found that the
well-reasoned medical opinions of Dr. Prunier and Dr. Nahmias that the appellant
is not fit for duty were entitled to more probative weight than the second opinion
the appellant provided from Dr. Raheem, concluding that the appellant had no
psychiatric symptoms. ID at 20; IAF, Tab 6, Subtabs 4j-l. Contrary to the
appellant’s arguments on review, the administrative judge carefully considered
the medical evidence, which included affidavits from Dr. Nahmias and
Dr. Prunier disagreeing with Dr. Raheem’s opinion. ID at 6-16, 18-21; IAF, Tab
19, Exhibits 9-10. The administrative judge found that nothing in the record
indicated Dr. Raheem was qualified to render an opinion concerning the
appellant’s fitness for duty. 3 ID at 20. The administrative judge also found that
Dr. Raheem’s report did not indicate that she reviewed the appellant’s position
description, conducted any psychological testing, or reviewed or considered any
of the memoranda or safety surveys that gave rise to the agency’s safety concerns.
ID at 20. Based on the foregoing, the administrative judge found that Dr.
Raheem’s report had limited probative value because it was conclusory and
devoid of any supporting medical documentation or explanation in support of her
conclusions. ID at 20. The appellant’s arguments on review present no reason to
disturb the administrative judge’s findings concerning the probative weight of the
medical evidence or her decision to sustain the agency’s charge based on her
finding that “it was more likely than not true that the appellant is unable to
perform the essential duties of his position.” ID at 21.
¶13 On review, the appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s finding
that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation,
arguing that “the agency has never treated a similarly[-]situated employee as they
[treated him].” PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. He asserts that there were other agents
described as unsafe in the safety survey and that the agency did not refer any of
3
Dr. Raheem’s curriculum vitae is not part of the record and her professional licenses
and certifications are not specified.
8
them for a fitness-for-duty physical. Id. He further argues that there are agents
who fail their physicals, and the agency just tells them to get another one. Id.
¶14 In finding that the agency had shown by clear and convincing evidence that
it would have removed the appellant absent any protected disclosures, the
administrative judge found that there was no evidence showing that the agency
treated any similarly-situated employee, who was not a whistleblower, more
favorably than the appellant. ID at 28. The appellant has not submitted or cited
any evidence to support his conclusory arguments on review, and we discern no
reason to reweigh the evidence or substitute our assessment of the record
evidence for that of the administrative judge. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service,
74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative
judge’s findings when the administrative judge considered the evidence as a
whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton
v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶15 On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
the removal penalty is reasonable and promotes the efficiency of service, arguing
that the “[t]he agency made no attempt at a less costly and more compassionate
solution.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. Generally, in instances where an employee
cannot perform the essential functions of his position, the Board will consider
whether the agency could have instead reassigned the employee to a vacant
position within his medical restrictions. See Brown v. Department of the Interior,
121 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 17 (2014). Removal for inability to perform the essential
functions of a position promotes the efficiency of the service, particularly when
the inability to perform would endanger the health and safety of others. See id.
¶16 The agency identified several non-law enforcement positions that the
appellant was qualified for; however, Dr. Nahmias reviewed the position
descriptions for these jobs and opined that the appellant was unable to perform
any of the job functions of those positions. ID at 29-30; IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4i,
Tab 19, Exhibit 22. Based on this evidence, the administrative judge found that
9
the agency had demonstrated that it could not reassign the appellant to another
position and that his removal promoted the efficiency of the service. ID at 30.
The appellant argues that the agency should have considered a lesser penalty to
address its safety concerns, such as verbal counseling or training. However,
where, as here, the agency has established the charge, the Board generally will
not disturb the penalty unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. We do not
believe the penalty of removal exceeds the bounds of reasonableness in this case.
We therefore find that the appellant’s arguments on review are not sufficiently
sound to overturn the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s removal,
based on the proven charge of inability to perform the essential duties of a Marine
Interdiction Agent, was reasonable and promoted the efficiency of the service.
¶17 Finally, as an attachment to his petition for review, the appellant has
submitted numerous leave slips ranging in date from 2010 through 2012 and an
electronic message acknowledging a pending FOIA request. PFR File, Tab 1 at
10, 12-34. The appellant asserts that some of this evidence was unavailable
before the record closed on appeal. Id. at 10. Even if we determine that this
evidence was unavailable, however, it is not of sufficient weight to warrant an
outcome different from that of the initial decision. See Russo v. Veterans
Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). Accordingly, while the appellant
disagrees with the administrative judge’s findings and determinations, he has
shown no basis upon which to disturb the initial decision.
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
10
and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your
claims of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),
(b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge
the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you
may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The
court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the
date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If
you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request
review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not
both. Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be
precluded from seeking review in any other court.
If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.
Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants," which is
contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
Additional information about other courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
11
at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of attorneys who have expressed
interest in providing pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board
appellants before the Federal Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board
neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any
attorney will accept representation in a given case.
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
William D. Spencer
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
