Filed: Jun. 17, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD PENNY J. SEWARD, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-1221-14-0541-W-1 v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: June 17, 2016 AFFAIRS, Agency. THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1 Penny J. Seward, Conway, Arkansas, pro se. Thomas Kent Smith, Esquire, North Little Rock, Arkansas, for the agency. BEFORE Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member FINAL ORDER ¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied her
Summary: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD PENNY J. SEWARD, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-1221-14-0541-W-1 v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: June 17, 2016 AFFAIRS, Agency. THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1 Penny J. Seward, Conway, Arkansas, pro se. Thomas Kent Smith, Esquire, North Little Rock, Arkansas, for the agency. BEFORE Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member FINAL ORDER ¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied her r..
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
PENNY J. SEWARD, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DA-1221-14-0541-W-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: June 17, 2016
AFFAIRS,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Penny J. Seward, Conway, Arkansas, pro se.
Thomas Kent Smith, Esquire, North Little Rock, Arkansas, for the agency.
BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
Mark A. Robbins, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied her request for corrective action. Generally, we grant petitions such as
this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material
fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
this Final Order to more fully address the agency’s motive to retaliate, we
AFFIRM the initial decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant is employed by the agency as a Human Resources Specialist.
Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 47. In 2012, she filed a complaint with the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that the agency had committed
prohibited personnel practices in connection with the selection and promotion of
certain other agency employees. Id. at 11-12. After analyzing the appellant’s
complaint, OSC informed her in July 2013 that it was taking no further action on
her complaint. Id. at 12-13, 16. The appellant then contacted her Congressman
to ask him to intervene on her behalf with OSC. IAF, Tab 8 at 115-29. She
forwarded to the Congressman the same materials she had submitted to OSC,
including documents from the Official Personnel Files (OPFs) of the agency
employees who were the subjects of the allegedly improper personnel actions. Id.
It appears that the Congressman’s office forwarded the appellant’s
correspondence, including the supporting materials from the OPFs, to the agency.
¶3 After receiving the materials forwarded by the Congressman’s office, the
agency initiated an investigation into how and why the appellant had access to the
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personnel documents she sent to the Congressman. Id. at 113-14. In March 2014,
the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based on unauthorized access of an
individual’s personnel records, unauthorized possession of Government
documents, and unauthorized disclosure. Id. at 107-12. After considering the
appellant’s response to the proposed removal, id. at 102-06, the deciding official
sustained the charges of unauthorized access of an individual’s personnel records
and unauthorized possession of Government documents and did not sustain the
charge of unauthorized disclosure, id. at 82-84. The deciding official determined
that the appellant’s removal was justified, but offered her a last chance agreement
in lieu of removal. Id. The appellant accepted the last chance agreement.
Id. at
85-86.
¶4 While her proposed removal was pending before the deciding official, the
appellant filed a complaint with OSC in which she alleged that the agency had
proposed her removal in retaliation for her protected disclosures to OSC and the
Congressman. IAF, Tab 8 at 94-101. OSC provided her with a letter closing out
her complaint and notifying her of her appeal rights to the Board. IAF, Tab 4
at 46. This appeal followed. IAF, Tab 1.
¶5 On appeal, the administrative judge determined that the appellant had
exhausted her administrative remedies and made nonfrivolous allegations that she
made a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s
proposed removal dated July 28, 2014, and thus, she had established Board
jurisdiction over her individual right of action (IRA) appeal. IAF, Tab 29, Initial
Decision (ID) at 4. The administrative judge advised the parties that the only
issue adjudicated would be whether the agency retaliated against the appellant for
engaging in whistleblowing when it proposed her removal. IAF, Tab 16 at 1.
¶6 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge found that the appellant
engaged in protected whistleblowing when she reported what she believed to be
prohibited personnel practices both to OSC and to her Congressman. ID at 9.
The administrative judge also found that the appellant established that her
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disclosures were a contributing factor in her proposed removal. ID at 10.
However, after considering the record evidence, including the hearing testimony,
the administrative judge found that the agency established by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have proposed the appellant’s removal in the
absence of her protected disclosure. ID at 10-15.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7 Federal agencies are prohibited from taking, failing to take, or threatening
to take or fail to take, any personnel action against an employee in a covered
position because of the disclosure of information that the employee reasonably
believes to be evidence of a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health and safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2), (b)(8); see
Jenkins v. Environmental Protection Agency, 118 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 16 (2012). To
establish a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, the employee must prove,
by preponderant evidence, that she made a protected disclosure and that the
disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action against her. 5 U.S.C.
§1221(e)(1); Jenkins, 118 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 16. If the appellant makes out a prima
facie claim of whistleblower reprisal, the agency is given an opportunity to prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same personnel
action in the absence of the protected disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2);
Jenkins, 118 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 16.
¶8 Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought
to be established; it is a higher standard than preponderant evidence. 5 C.F.R.
§ 1209.4(d). In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the
absence of whistleblowing, the Board will consider the following factors: (1) the
strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and
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strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of agency officials who were
involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar
actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
similarly situated. Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Jenkins, 118 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 16.
¶9 Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant engaged in protected
whistleblowing when she reported what she believed to be prohibited personnel
practices to both OSC and her Congressman, and that the appellant established
that her disclosure was a contributing factor in her proposed removal. ID at 9.
The agency does not dispute these findings on review. Thus, the issue to be
determined here is whether the agency has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that, absent any protected disclosures, it would have proposed the
appellant’s removal.
¶10 On review, the appellant reasserts her claim that she had a business need to
access the employees’ records so that she could report a wrongdoing to the proper
authorities, and she contends that the agency only learned of the conduct that
formed the basis for the proposed removal when it learned of her disclosures.
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2-9. The appellant argues that, because
the conduct and the disclosures are inseparable, the agency cannot show by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence
of her whistleblowing. Id. at 9. Specifically, the appellant asserts that, instead of
contacting OSC as she had requested, her Congressman’s office erroneously sent
the agency a copy of the information she had provided to it. Id. at 6. She
contends that, because her contact with the Congressman’s office was a private,
personal, and confidential matter, the agency never should have received a copy
of her complaint and its accompanying documents, and thus, it would not have
taken the action against her. Id. at 6, 8. The appellant argues that the
administrative judge failed to give proper weight to her obligation to report a
prohibited personnel practice and that her obligation to report a wrongdoing
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negated any testimony that she was not authorized to access the personnel
records. Id. at 2-3.
¶11 The Board will consider evidence regarding the conduct of an agency
investigation when the investigation was so closely related to the personnel action
that it could have been a pretext for gathering evidence to retaliate against an
employee for whistleblowing activity. Russell v. Department of
Justice, 76 M.S.P.R. 317, 323-24 (1997). When an investigation is so closely
related to the personnel action that it could have been a pretext for gathering
evidence to retaliate, and the agency does not show by clear and convincing
evidence that the evidence would have been gathered absent the protected
disclosure, then the appellant will prevail on her affirmative defense of retaliation
for whistleblowing. Russell, 76 M.S.P.R. at 324. That the investigation itself is
conducted in a fair and impartial manner, or that certain acts of misconduct are
discovered during the investigation, does not relieve an agency of its obligation to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same
personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e)(2). In considering such evidence, the Board looks at where the
investigation had its beginnings. Russell, 76 M.S.P.R. at 324.
¶12 In this case, the investigation of the appellant’s misconduct was initiated
shortly after her Congressman sent the agency a copy of the information she had
provided to him. Additionally, the agency official who initiated the investigation
was involved in the personnel actions that were the subject of the appellant’s
disclosures. IAF, Tab 8 at 113, 119. Thus, the investigation could have been a
pretext for gathering evidence to use to retaliate against the appellant for
whistleblowing. See Mangano v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 109 M.S.P.R.
658, ¶ 44 (2008) (finding that an investigation could have been a pretext for
retaliation where, inter alia, it was convened by the agency official who was the
subject of the appellant’s whistleblowing). Nevertheless, the whistleblower
protection statutes are not meant to protect employees from their own misconduct,
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and an agency is not prohibited from taking an action based on proven
misconduct simply because individuals with a motive to retaliate were involved in
discovering that misconduct. Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326.
¶13 The agency received evidence from the appellant’s Congressman that gave
it reason to believe the appellant may have improperly accessed the personnel
records of other agency employees. To hold that the agency could not investigate
the appellant’s misconduct simply because the initial source of its information
was related to her protected disclosures would effectively shield the appellant
from the consequences of her misconduct. We do not read the whistleblower
protection statutes as requiring such a result. See id. Instead, we find that the
appropriate inquiry in these circumstances is whether the agency proved by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action had it
obtained the evidence of misconduct through means other than the employee’s
protected disclosures. 2 Applying the Carr factors, and for the reasons set forth
below, we find that the agency has met its burden.
¶14 First, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency had strong
evidence in support of the proposed removal. In reaching her conclusion, the
administrative judge thoroughly considered the hearing testimony, the record
evidence that includes a report of contact documenting the appellant’s improper
access of individual personnel records, and the appellant’s response to the
proposal notice. ID at 4-14. The administrative judge also explicitly considered
the appellant’s claim that she had a business need to access these records so that
she could report a wrongdoing to the proper authorities. ID at 12.
¶15 In her response to the proposal notice, the appellant acknowledged that she
was wrong to have accessed at least some of the employees’ personnel records.
2
The appellant asserts that the Congressman’s office erred in forwarding the evidence
in question to the agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. Even if the appellant’s assertion is
correct, she has not shown why the agency should have ignored evidence of misconduct
simply because the Congressman’s office may have forwarded that evidence in error.
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IAF, Tab 8 at 103. She subsequently signed a last chance settlement agreement in
which she admitted that the agency’s decision to remove her was “fully justified.”
Id. at 86. Although the appellant now asserts on review that she had to sign the
agreement to avoid being removed, PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, the fact that she was
faced with the unpleasant choice of entering into a last chance settlement
agreement or opposing a potential removal action does not rebut the presumed
voluntariness of her ultimate choice, see Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133,
1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
¶16 Further, while the appellant asserts on review that she accessed the
personnel documents in the performance of her official duties, she acknowledged
in her hearing testimony that she “audited” an individual who was not assigned to
her area of service. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD). She also acknowledged that,
when she determined that the selection of that individual was “illegal” because he
did not have the requisite qualifications for the position, she did not tell her
supervisor or anyone else that she had determined that his selection was
improper. Id. Rather, she printed and removed copies of the Standard Form (SF)
50s from the agency and then submitted copies of them to OSC and reported the
selection as an alleged prohibited personnel practice. Id. On cross-examination
the appellant “recanted” her statements in response to the proposed removal,
including her acknowledgment that it was wrong to access the employees’ OPFs
and her admission that she violated various policies and procedures, stating that
she now has had time to think about it. Id. However, the administrative judge
considered her recantation and found that the appellant offered no explanation as
to why, given her concern about the legality of the personnel actions, she did not
tell her supervisor or any other member of the Human Resources Management
team. ID at 12. T.B., another agency Human Resources Specialist, testified that,
if she discovered that an employee was not qualified for a position, she would
speak up. HCD. T.B. also testified that she was aware of issues involving the
qualifications of one of the individuals identified in the appellant’s initial
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complaint to OSC, but that instead of accessing that individual’s OPF, she
“voiced her dissatisfaction.” Id. She testified that she never took home any
employees’ personnel records or sent the documents anywhere outside of the
agency. Id. We therefore reject the appellant’s assertion that the evidence in
support of the proposed removal was weak because her job duties required her to
access the personnel records in question.
¶17 The appellant also argues that the administrative judge erred in crediting a
supervisor’s testimony that the appellant had no business reason to access the
records in question. She argues that it “was not reasonable” for the supervisor to
remember what work instructions and audits he had assigned her a year before.
Similarly, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred by considering
the proposing official’s testimony, and she asserts that his testimony was merely
“opinion,” “hearsay,” and “not evidence.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. We disagree.
The testimony in question concerns the appellant’s duties, the incident in
question, and why her removal was proposed, and as such is relevant and material
evidence that was provided under oath, and therefore, was properly considered
and weighed by the administrative judge. See, e.g., Tisdell v. Department of the
Air Force, 94 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 13 (2003) (explaining that an administrative judge
has wide discretion to control the proceedings before him, to receive relevant
evidence, and to ensure that the record on significant issues is fully developed).
Further, in Borninkhof v. Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 83 (1981), the
Board noted that hearsay evidence is admissible in Board hearings “under well
settled law that relevant hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative
proceedings.” Thus, the appellant has shown no error by the administrative judge
in considering the proposing official’s testimony.
¶18 Regarding the second Carr factor, the administrative judge found no
evidence of any retaliatory motive on the part of the proposing official. Rather,
the administrative judge found that all of the personnel actions predated the
proposing official’s arrival at the facility, and thus, he played no role in the
10
alleged prohibited personnel practices. ID at 13-15. Although the administrative
judge thoroughly addressed the motive on the part of the proposing official, she
did not address whether there was any motive to retaliate on the part of other
agency officials. ID at 13-15. When applying the second Carr factor, the Board
will consider any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency official who
ordered the action, as well as any motive to retaliate on the part of other agency
officials who influenced the decision. See Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326; McCarthy v.
International Boundary & Water Commission, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 62 (2011),
aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We therefore modify the initial decision
to more fully address the agency’s motive to retaliate.
¶19 The appellant asserted below that A.U., the Acting HR Chief, retaliated
against her based on, inter alia, her initial OSC complaint. IAF, Tab 1. We find
that A.U. could have had a strong retaliatory motive as she was previously the
appellant’s immediate supervisor and testified against the appellant in her prior
Board appeal. See Seward v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No.
DA-1221-11-0189-W-1, Final Order (Jan. 26, 2012). A.U. also signed the SF-50s
that the appellant provided in support of her initial OSC complaint in this case.
IAF, Tab 8 at 124-27. Upon the agency’s receipt of the documents from the
Congressman, A.U. directed the appellant’s immediate supervisor to investigate
the appellant’s actions in accessing the employees’ personnel records. Id. at 113.
However, the only additional involvement A.U. had in this case after initiating
the investigation is a “Report of Contact” dated May 30, 2014. IAF, Tab 8 at 91.
That document indicates that A.U. received the signed decision from the deciding
official regarding the appellant’s proposed removal and that A.U. met with the
appellant to deliver that decision to her. Id. There is no evidence in the record
that A.U. had any further role in investigating the appellant’s misconduct or
proposing her removal. Thus, while A.U. could have had a strong retaliatory
motive against the appellant, we find that the strength of the evidence in support
11
of the proposed removal far outweighs the motive to retaliate. See Carr, 185 F.3d
at 1326.
¶20 Finally, concerning the third Carr factor, the record reflects that the agency
has had no other employees engage in similar misconduct. Because there is no
evidence showing that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are
not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated, we find that the third
factor is not a significant factor for the Board’s analysis in the instant appeal.
McCarthy, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 65.
¶21 Weighing the three Carr factors, we agree with the administrative judge
that the agency established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
issued the notice of proposed removal in the absence of the appellant’s protected
disclosures. While the appellant appears to believe that she was punished for
making protected disclosures, her disclosures themselves are separate from her
improper accessing of personnel records. The appellant could have made her
disclosures without improperly accessing those records; to the extent she needed
the personnel records to report wrongdoing, she could have tried to obtain them
through the Freedom of Information Act or other authorized means.
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
You have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your
claims of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),
12
(b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge
the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you
may request review of this final decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The court of
appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the date of this
order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose
to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request review of the
Board’s decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any other
court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not both. Once you choose to seek
review in one court of appeals, you may be precluded from seeking review in any
other court.
If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
title 5 of the U.S. Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the U.S. Code, at our
website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm. Additional information about
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is available at the court’s
website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide
for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the
court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11. Additional information about
other courts of appeals can be found at their respective websites, which can be
accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono
representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
Circuit. The
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Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any
attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
William D. Spencer
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
