MICHAEL T. PARKER, Magistrate Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [57] filed by Defendants Ronald E. Woodall and Wexford Health Sources and the Motion for Conditional Medical Release [50], Dispositive Motion [54], Motion for Protective Order [64], and Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction [69] filed by the Plaintiff Mack Lambert. The Court having carefully considered the motions, the submissions of the parties, and the applicable law finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment [57] should be GRANTED, the Motions [50], [54], [64], and [69] should be DENIED, and this matter should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff Mack Lambert, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the instant civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on or about July 3, 2014.
Plaintiff claims that he was denied constitutionally adequate medical care while incarcerated at SMCI. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that beginning in April 2013, he has suffered from a chronic hernia condition that he believes requires surgery. He alleges that he was examined by Defendant Ronald E. Woodall, as doctor at SMCI, but that Woodall refused to authorize the surgery. According to the Plaintiff, Woodall denied the surgery because, in his medical opinion, he did not believe that Plaintiff would survive the surgery due to his poor health.
Plaintiff also names Wexford Health Sources, Inc., as a Defendant, stating that it is the company that provides health care to the inmates at SMCI. Plaintiff alleges that Wexford is responsible for the inadequate treatment of Plaintiff's hernia condition. Plaintiff further alleges that he experienced a delay in receiving hemorrhoid medication, blood pressure medication and a hernia belt in July or August of 2014, for which Wexford is ultimately responsible.
Plaintiff requests injunctive relief in the form of an order from this Court directing SMCI to provide him with adequate medical treatment, or, in the alternative, an order from this Court directing that he be released from prison in order to receive proper medical care.
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only when "the record indicates that there is `no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The Court must view "the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. However, the nonmoving party "cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or `only a scintilla of evidence.'" Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). In the absence of proof, the Court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted). A nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings to avoid a proper motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325-26.
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious health and safety needs. Domino v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must meet an "extremely high" standard to show deliberate indifference. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). For a prison official to be liable for deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Deliberate indifference is particularly difficult to establish when the inmate was provided with ongoing medical treatment. "Unsuccessful medical treatments, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner's disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances." Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 (citations omitted). Complaints that more treatment should have been ordered, without more, are insufficient to show deliberate indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 ("[T]he decision whether to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment."). Rather, the plaintiff must show that prison officials "refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985).
Finally, a prisoner's allegation that prison officials failed to timely provide him with treatment does not, by itself, constitute deliberate indifference. "[D]elay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate indifference that results in substantial harm. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006).
In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. First, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Woodall declined to authorize a necessary surgery to remove a hernia. However, Plaintiff conceded at the Spears hearing that the reason Dr. Woodall refused to authorize the surgery was his belief that Plaintiff would not survive the procedure due to his other health issues.
The Plaintiff also stated at the Spears hearing that he was ultimately provided a hernia belt and medication to treat his condition, and his medical records reflect the same.
As for the Plaintiff's claims that he was denied his nitroglycerin prescription in June 2011, which he claims was necessary to treat his heart problems, the record is devoid of any indication that Plaintiff was prescribed nitroglycerin at that time or in the preceding months. Rather, the record reflects that Plaintiff was prescribed nitroglycerin for a short time between 2013 and 2014.
"Medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate's allegations of deliberate indifference." Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's dismissal of inmate's deliberate indifference claims as frivolous); Harris v. Epps, 523 Fed. App'x 275, 275 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curium) (affirming summary judgment where inmate's medical records reflected that he had received ongoing medical treatment). The Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence contradicting his medical records. Having been confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff can no longer rest on the allegations in his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325-26.
Although Plaintiff is clearly dissatisfied with the Defendant Woodall's attempts to treat him, his own testimony as well as his medical records indicate that he regularly received ongoing medical treatment. Even taking Plaintiff's allegations as true — that Dr. Woodall declined to authorize surgery and prescribe medication, which in the Plaintiff's opinion, he thought he needed — his claims nonetheless fail. It is well settled that a prisoner's disagreement with medical treatment fails to establish deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346; Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1999); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). Moreover, "the decision whether to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment." See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756. At best, Plaintiff's claims allege negligence and medical malpractice on behalf of the Defendant Woodall, which falls short of the required showing of deliberate indifference. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 (holding that acts of negligence or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference).
While it is clear from the record that the Plaintiff is in poor health, the record also reflects the he is receiving consistent and constitutionally adequate care. Accordingly, Defendant Woodall is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wexford Health delayed certain medical treatment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in July or August of 2014, he was deprived of his hemorrhoid medication, blood pressure medication, and hernia belt. However, the Plaintiff concedes that he eventually received these treatments.
Plaintiff's claims against Wexford fail on several fronts. First, any support for the alleged delay in treatment is completely absent from the Plaintiff's medical records. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege whatsoever that he suffered the requisite "substantial harm" as a result of the delay in treatment. See Easter, 467 F.3d at 463 ("[D]elay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate indifference that results in substantial harm."). Next, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant Wexford Health affirmatively participated in any act causing a constitutional deprivation or that Wexford implemented unconstitutional policies that injured the Plaintiff. Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff simply alleges that because Wexford provides health services to inmates at SMCI, it is the entity ultimately responsible for assuring that he timely receives his medications. Such a claim cannot withstand summary judgment.
Finally, because the Plaintiff's complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendant Wexford Health cannot be held liable for the actions of an employee under the respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to place liability on Wexford simply for the acts of Defendant Woodall who provided medical treatment to him, Wexford is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In his Motions [50] & [54], which the Court will construe as motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff simply repeats his original allegations and references other claims that are not before the Court. Therefore, due to the analysis of the Plaintiff's claims supra, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's Motions [50] & [54] should be denied.
In the Motion for Protective Order [64], Plaintiff requests an order from this Court directing Defendant Woodall to cease retaliating against him by withholding medications. In the Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction [69], Plaintiff reiterates his claims that he is being denied medications and reasserts his requests for relief.
A party requesting a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must demonstrate each of the following: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury; 3) the threatened injury must outweigh any damage that the injunction will cause to the adverse party; and 4) the injunction must not have an adverse effect on the public interest. Women's Med. Ctr. of Northwest Houston v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 419 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001). "An injunction is an extraordinary remedy and should not issue except upon a clear showing of possible irreparable injury." Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing the four elements required to receive injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for the reasons set forth above. As for the relief Plaintiff seeks from alleged retaliation, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the alleged denial of medication by Dr. Woodall was in any way connected to his lawsuit. It is well established that general allegations of retaliation do not constitute a cognizable claim. See, e.g., Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that in order to state a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must allege (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1. That the Motion for Summary Judgment [57] filed by Defendants Woodall and Wexford Health be GRANTED and this action be dismissed with prejudice;
2. That the Motion for Conditional Medical Release [50], Dispositive Motion [54], Motion for Protective Order [64] and Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction [69] filed by the Plaintiff Mack Lambert be DENIED; and
6. That a separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will be filed herein.
SO ORDERED.
