MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR., CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
BEFORE THE COURT is the [43] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in this declaratory judgment action involving insurance coverage. The Motion has been fully briefed. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the relevant law, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be granted based on the exclusion contained in "Endorsement 6018KK Commercial Vehicle" in the applicable State Farm policy regarding "damages arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of any equipment that is ... mounted on ... any vehicle."
BACKGROUND
In May 2015, Defendants John and Rita White filed a complaint in Mississippi state court against Defendants Bobcat Tree Work, LLC, and Christopher Joe Wilson, the owner of Bobcat, "alleging personal injuries and a derivative claim for loss of consortium under circumstances caused by alleged negligence, gross negligence and willful and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress." (See Am. Compl. 2 (¶ 9), ECF No. 3; see also generally State Court Compl., ECF No. 3-1). In the state court case, the Whites allege that while working for Bobcat, Mr. White suffered injuries when "a portion of a felled tree collided with the elevated `bucket' of a boom lift that was affixed to a truck and the force of the collision damaged the bucket in which he stood, resulting in his falling to the ground from an elevation of sixty-three (63) feet...." (See Am. Compl. 2-3 (¶¶ 10-11); State Court Compl. 2-3 (¶¶ 5-6), ECF No. 3-1).
Wilson had a commercial automobile liability insurance policy through State Farm ("the Policy"). Accordingly, State Farm agreed to defend Wilson and Bobcat under a reservation of rights. On October 16, 2015, it also instituted this declaratory judgment action against Defendants to determine coverage. However, on October 30, 2015, "Wilson and Bobcat, by and through their personal counsel, terminated the services of the attorney[s] hired by" State Farm after State Farm refused their request to withdraw the reservation of rights. (See Am. Compl. 4 (¶ 20), ECF No. 3). The attorneys hired by State Farm thereafter withdrew from the state court case.
Wilson and Bobcat, through personal counsel, then agreed to the entry of judgment in the state court case in favor of the Whites in excess of $2.8 million, but at the same time entered into a Covenant Not To Execute and/or Enroll Judgment with the Whites. The parties in that case also filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment. State Farm subsequently moved to intervene and requested a stay of that case pending a rule on the coverage issues in this case. The state court denied the stay, but allowed the intervention. As a result of State Farm's intervention, the parties have represented that the Whites rescinded the Covenant Not To Execute and moved to withdraw the Motion for Entry of Judgment. Bobcat and Wilson also instituted a separate state court action against State Farm based on its intervention for alleged tortious interference and other causes of action.
Defendants contend that there is insurance coverage under the Policy for the Whites' injuries. State Farm claims that no coverage exists based on Policy exclusions, and because Wilson and Bobcat "fail[ed] to cooperate under the terms of the [P]olicy." (See Am. Compl. 5 (¶ 23), ECF No. 3). It has "request[ed] a judicial determination that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Bobcat or Mr. Wilson for any claims arising out of" the accident at issue. (See id. at 6 (¶ 32)). On July 15, 2016, it filed the current Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, asserting, inter alia, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that one or more Policy exclusions apply. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds summary judgment in favor of State Farm appropriate.
DISCUSSION
The parties appear to agree — and the insurance policy states — that Mississippi law applies. In applying that law, "[t]he Court begins by determining whether the exclusion is ambiguous and in need of interpretation. Under Mississippi law, `interpretation of an insurance contract presents a question of law.'" Coleman v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., No. 5:08cv260-DCB-JMR, 2009 WL 1873742, at *3 (S.D.Miss. June 29, 2009) (citation omitted), aff'd, 369 Fed.Appx. 595, 598 (5th Cir.2010). "The goal in performing this interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties and the Court should take into account the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances under which it was made and the purpose sought to be achieved by the parties." Id. (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). "If the language in an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it as written." Id. (citation, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted). Ambiguous language should be construed "against the insurer, as the drafter of the policy, and in favor of the insured." Id.
"A term within an insurance policy is ambiguous if it can be interpreted to have two or more reasonable meanings." Id. at *4. "[The C]ourt must give the policy language its plain and ordinary meaning,... and resolve any ambiguities or equivocal expressions in favor of the insured, ... but not create ambiguities where none exist." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). "Where a policy term `is worded so that it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning, it is not ambiguous and will be enforced as written.'" Id. (citation omitted).
There are additional considerations "when the Court is confronted with exclusions and limitations to coverage." Id. "Clauses in a policy seeking to limit coverage `must be written in clear and unmistakable language" and are strictly construed.... But, when stated without uncertainty or ambiguity, exclusionary language is binding upon the insured." Id. (citations omitted). "No rule of construction requires or permits the court to make a contract differing from that made by the parties themselves, or to enlarge an insurance company's obligations where the provisions of its policy are clear." Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 543 F.Supp.2d 582, 586 (S.D.Miss.2008), aff'd, 293 Fed.Appx. 273, 276 (5th Cir.2008).
The Court finds that the exclusion contained in "Endorsement 6018KK Commercial Vehicle" of the Policy is dispositive. That exclusion states in pertinent part that "[t]here is no coverage for an insured for damages arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of any equipment that is ... mounted on ... any vehicle." (See Policy, ECF No. 43-3).
Defendants argue that this exclusion is ambiguous in its use of the term "arising out of." The Court disagrees, and is of the opinion "that the words `arising out of,' when used within an insurance contract, are broad, general, and comprehensive terms effecting broad coverage." See Coleman, 2009 WL 1873742, at *4. "The words are understood to mean originating from, having its origin in, growing out of or flowing from. A claim need only bear an incidental relationship to the described conduct for the exclusion to apply." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, White fell from an elevated bucket of a boom lift that was mounted to a truck. Although Defendants argue that "[t]he fact that Mr. White was in an alleged attachment on the vehicle does not necessitate that his injuries arose out of its use[,]"1 (Def. Mem. 16, ECF No. 47), the Court is not persuaded by this argument based on the use of the "arising out of" language in the Policy. Instead, the Court finds that the undisputed facts fall squarely within the exclusion.
Nevertheless, Defendants also contend that "equipment" and "mounted on" are ambiguous and are not defined in the policy. "[D]isagreement over the meaning of a provision [or term] does not make it ambiguous as a matter of law." See Simmons, 293 Fed.Appx. at 375 (citing Burton v. Choctaw Cty., 730 So.2d 1, 7 (Miss.1997)). Lack of a definition in the policy does not equate to ambiguity either.
Rather, "according to the Mississippi rules of insurance contract interpretation, this court must find [the terms'] plain, ordinary, and popular meaning." See Simmons, 543 F.Supp.2d at 586. "The Mississippi Supreme Court often consults leading dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of insurance contracts." Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "equipment" as "[t]he articles or implements used for a specific purpose or activity (esp. a business operation)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Simmons, 543 F.Supp.2d at 586 (relying on definition of "dwelling house" in Black's Law Dictionary for interpretation of that undefined term in an insurance policy). And, the ordinary meaning of "mount" is "to attach to a support." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mount; see also, e.g., Minebea Co. v. Think Outside, Inc., No. 01cv771 BTM(POR), 2002 WL 34455511, at *5 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 19, 2002) (discussing the ordinary meaning of "mounted").
White testified, and his state court complaint allegations confirm (see State Court Compl. 2-3 (¶ 5), ECF No. 3-1), that he was in a bucket apparatus attached to a truck at the time of his accident. (See White Dep. 19:1-17, ECF No. 43-2; see also Photographs of Truck, ECF No. 43-8). Defendants argue that equipment has many meanings, and, moreover, that "`mounted on' [could] mean that the equipment has been installed by the insured onto the insured's vehicle [or] that the all [sic] of the equipment is attached onto the insured's vehicle...." (Def. Mem. 17, ECF No. 47).
However, the Court, persuaded by the common meaning of the relevant language of the insurance policy, finds that there is no ambiguity. The bucket apparatus was an article or implement used for a specific purpose or activity, especially a business operation. There is no dispute that the bucket apparatus was designed for use in tree removal. Furthermore, the photographs of the bucket apparatus clearly show that it is "mounted" on the truck, as that term is ordinarily understood. As such, the claims at issue are excluded from coverage under the Policy. State Farm is not obligated to provide coverage to Defendants Wilson or Bobcat under the Policy based on any claim made by the Whites as a result of the subject accident, and the Court need not consider State Farm's additional arguments for summary judgment.2
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [43] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 7th day of September, 2016.
