HENRY T. WINGATE, District Judge.
BEFORE THIS COURT are the following post-trial motions: Jackson State University's Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
This court has reviewed the submissions of the parties, arguments of counsel, and the relevant jurisprudence. As a result, this court is persuaded that Jackson State University's Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
This lawsuit has taken many twists and turns
This court earlier held that it possesses federal question subject-matter jurisdiction over this litigation. See [Docket no. 64, attached as an exhibit to this Order]. The plaintiff, Denise Taylor-Travis (hereinafter referred to as "Coach Taylor") filed this lawsuit alleging that her previous employer, defendant Jackson State University (hereinafter referred to as "JSU"), had violated her rights by discriminating against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
Since Coach Taylor alleges violations of her civil rights under the Civil Rights Act, a federal enactment, this court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction under the authority of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Coach Taylor filed her complaint on January 24, 2012. [Docket no. 1]. JSU filed its Answer on March 15, 2012. [Docket no. 5]. On October 30, 2013, this court commenced a jury trial on Coach Taylor claims for: retaliation under Title VII; retaliation under Title IX; breach of contract; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In the pretrial order, the parties stipulated that the jury would determine liability on the federal claims only, and the court would rule on the invasion of privacy claim. The parties also stipulated that the court later would determine whether the remaining state law claims would be submitted to the jury or be decided by this court at a subsequent date. [Docket no. 54]. This court thereafter, without objection, ruled that it would submit all of Coach Taylor's claims to the jury with the exception of the invasion of privacy claim.
After sixteen (16) days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in this matter. The jury found, based on the evidence presented at trial, that JSU had not terminated Coach Taylor because of her gender; nor had JSU terminated Coach Taylor in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under Title VII or Title IX. The jury, however, determined that JSU had breached Coach Taylor's employment contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As a result of that finding, the jury awarded Coach Taylor $182,000.00.
This court subsequently decided the invasion of privacy claim in favor of Coach Taylor. [Docket no. 64]. In so doing, this court awarded Coach Taylor $200,000.00 in compensatory damages, but declined awarding pecuniary damages. [Docket no. 64, P. 20]. This court entered a Judgment on Jury and Bench Verdict on August 1, 2014. [Docket no. 65].
On August 29, 2014, JSU filed its misnamed Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.
On August 29, 2014, Coach Taylor filed her Motion for New Trial without a supporting memorandum brief.
On August 29, 2014, Coach Taylor filed her bill of costs in this matter. [Docket no. 69]. JSU objected to the bill of costs on September 4, 2014 without a supporting memorandum brief. [Docket no. 72]. On the next day, September 5, 2014, JSU filed its Motion to Stay Proceedings Regarding Plaintiff's Bill of Costs.
This court on an earlier day set out the facts of this lawsuit as found by this court and the jury during the joint jury and bench trial. [Docket no. 64]. Therefore, this court adopts the recitation of the statement of facts from this court's order dated August 1, 2014. [Docket no. 64, PP. 3-10].
In its Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Renewed) or, In the Alternative, for a New Trial or a Remittitur
JSU also argues that this court erred in ruling that JSU was liable for invasion of privacy because Coach Taylor failed to make a prima facie case of invasion of privacy and that Coach Taylor failed to present competent evidence of her damages for invasion of privacy.
Finally, JSU argues that the following alleged errors combined to preclude it from receiving a fair trial: the court's examination of witnesses; and Coach Taylor's references and arguments about JSU's refusal to arbitrate.
JSU submits its motion for a new trial under the authority of Rule 50(b)
JSU also campaigns that Rule 59(a)
Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC, 2016 WL 3536799, at *4 (E.D. La. June 28, 2016).
At the pretrial conference in this matter, the parties submitted a Pretrial Order, which they had signed in accordance with Rule 16(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Martin v. Lee, 378 F. App'x 393, 395 (5th Cir. 2010).
The parties' pretrial order that they prepared and signed was submitted to this court on October 16, 2013: signed by this court on October 23, 2013: and entered on the record on December 6, 2013. [Docket no. 54]. In the pretrial order the parties submitted to this court, the parties agreed that:
4. The following claims have been filed by the Plaintiff:
[Docket no. 54, P. 2, ¶ 4, *RESTRICTED*].
As an initial matter, this court finds that several of JSU's issues that it raised in its Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
To establish a breach of contract under Mississippi law, the plaintiff must show: "(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract; (2) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (3) money damages suffered by the plaintiff." Guinn v. Wilkerson, 963 So.2d 555, 558 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)(Quoting Favre Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Cinque Bambini, 863 So.2d 1037, 1044(¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2004)).
Both parties point to a contract between them, a contract each contends was valid and binding under Mississippi law. The two parties, each capable of entering a contract, negotiated and formed a contract in 2001, which was renewed on July 1, 2010, with each committed to complete certain obligations. Under this contract, Coach Taylor was to perform as the head coach for JSU's female basketball team, while JSU was to provide support for Coach Taylor and pay her an annual salary. The contract at issue here covered the period of July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2013. JSU terminated the contract in June, 2011.
Coach Taylor contends that JSU, without just cause, breached this contract, to wit, by terminating her contract when she had done nothing wrong, or alternatively, other coaches had acted the same and were not reprimanded for doing so; a fact which Coach Taylor says is further proof that she was doing nothing wrong. At trial, Coach Taylor called a number of witnesses on this claim and also offered her own testimony.
Her proof of breach, summarized, provided as follows: that the male football coaches utilized their expenses the same way that she had; and that she had been a kind and caring coach for the student athletes under her care.
JSU, in response, alleges that it did not breach the valid and binding employment contract it had with Coach Taylor. According to JSU, it had a valid "for cause" reason to terminate the contract early: Coach Taylor, says JSU, was terminated for misappropriations of funds and, additionally, for mistreatment of students. JSU claims that at trial Coach Taylor did not refute the evidence on these points.
To JSU's volley, Coach Taylor fires back that at trial she had presented overwhelming evidence that other coaches had committed the same acts of which she was accused and were not terminated; therefore, she argues, JSU's reasons for terminating her for such acts must be pretextual. See Dodge v. Hertz Co. 124 Fed.App'x 242 (5
Further, Coach Taylor asserts that at trial she presented evidence which refuted the abuse allegations of the students; her evidence, she says, showed her to be a caring and thoughtful coach. See [Docket no. 64].
JSU cites Hoffman v. Board of Trustees, 567 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1990), in an effort to negate Coach Taylor's argument on pretext, an argument which relies upon "comparisons." Hoffman was the Vocational Director for East Mississippi Junior College (hereinafter referred to as "EMJC"), from 1974 until his termination on September 24, 1987. EMJC renewed Hoffman's employment contract as recently as June 26, 1987, by extending his contract for one (1) year. After Hoffman's contract had been renewed, James B. Moore became the new President of EMJC, starting on September 16, 1987. When Moore commenced work in his new office, employees of EMJC notified him about Hoffman's deficiencies as Vocational Director. Moore attempted to reassign Hoffman, but the other employees resisted Hoffman's transfer to their departments. Moore subsequently learned that Hoffman was inappropriately handling college funds. As a result, Moore terminated Hoffman's employment and contract on September 24, 1987 citing various causes for his termination.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal of Hoffman's lawsuit by the Chancery Court of Kemper County, Mississippi, explained its decision as follows:
Hoffman, at 842. This court notes that Hoffman did not involve, as the lawsuit sub judice does, comparing the malfeasance of one employee with another. To the contrary, Hoffman involved an employer who did nothing about one employee's misbehavior for years, and then finally acted upon that employee's own misdeeds when a new president began his own employment. Thus, Hoffman stands for the proposition that an employer may terminate its employee for cause even where it had ignored that employee's malfeasance for years. This court is not persuaded by the arguments of JSU that Hoffman will provide it relief in the form of a judgment as a matter of law.
JSU further campaigns that "all that matters is whether Jackson State had a good faith belief that Taylor had violated her contractual obligation to promote student well-being." [Docket no. 68, P. 6]. JSU cites a New Jersey Supreme Court case, Cf. Silvestri v. Optus Software, Inc., 814 A.2d 602 (N.J. 2003), which interpreted New Jersey's employment contract law in finding that "such contracts generally are governed by a subjective standard." [Docket no. 68, P. 6].
The Fifth Circuit, however, has spoken on this same matter:
Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 616-17 (5th Cir. 2007).
This court is persuaded then that an employer, JSU here, may articulate a clear and reasonably subjective basis for its termination of an employee which would not be discriminatory. While this standard is not materially different than that cited by JSU, this court felt it important to cite to binding precedent within the Fifth Circuit.
In the lawsuit at bar, JSU presented evidence of its alleged reasons for terminating Coach Taylor's employment contract: Coach Taylor allegedly violated JSU's reimbursement policy; Coach Taylor allegedly misappropriated funds; and allegedly violated JSU's policy by sexual gender stereotyping, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse of the student athletes for whom she was responsible.
This court is not persuaded, though, that JSU is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or to a new trial based on these grounds. Take the reimbursement policy matter. JSU said that Coach Taylor used the team's expense account for her personal expenses, an action which it contends was unlawful and in violation of her employment contract. Coach Taylor responded that all the coaches acted the same way toward the expense accounts of their respective teams and that no one had ever been reprimanded orally or in writing, nor terminated for doing so, nor advised by JSU that such conduct allegedly was unlawful. The jury, which attentively heard all of the evidence, obviously sided with Coach Taylor.
Next is the misappropriation-of-funds basis for terminating Coach Taylor. JSU contended again at trial that Coach Taylor utilized the funds JSU had designated for team expenditures for her personal use, again, an action which JSU contends was unlawful and in violation of her employment contract. Coach Taylor's proof purported to show, once more, that JSU's administrative body had never taken action against any other coach for acting the same way. Similarly, Coach Taylor purported to show at trial that she had not been the recipient of prior warnings, oral or written, relative to her conduct in this manner. The jury accepted Coach Taylor's position; otherwise, on the court's instructions to the jury, that body of fact finders would have found for JSU.
Then, there are the sexual harassment claims not even mentioned by JSU in its closing arguments. JSU contended that Coach Taylor had discriminated against one of her student athletes because that student was a lesbian. For proof, JSU presented that student athlete who testified that Coach Taylor had inquired of her teammates about that student's sexual orientation and had inquired of that student directly about a domestic violence incident in which that student had been involved. Coach Taylor responded by stating that her inquiries were directed at finding out whether that student athlete was in an abusive relationship, regardless of the sexual orientation of that relationship. JSU also contended that Coach Taylor had inquired about a different student athlete who was "teasing" two (2) of her teammates. Coach Taylor contended that her inquiry was solely to stop a potential love triangle, a circumstance that could cause dissention in the team.
In sum, the jury could have found, as indeed it did, based on the evidence presented, that JSU had intentionally breached its contract with Coach Taylor by terminating her contract early and without good cause to do so.
JSU next argues that it is due a new trial because this court should not have submitted Coach Taylor's breach of contract claim to the jury
Papagolos v. Lafayette Cty. Sch. Dist., 972 F.Supp.2d 912, 932 (N.D. Miss. 2013), amended on reconsideration (Nov. 13, 2013)(Citing City of Grenada v. Whitten Aviation, Inc., 755 So.2d 1208, 1213 (Miss.Ct.App.1999)). "Tortious breach of contract requires, in addition to a breach of contract, some intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or negligence so gross as to constitute an independent tort." Morris v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-00163-MPM-RP, 2017 WL 2125829, at *2 (N.D. Miss. May 16, 2017)(Citing Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Fritz, 523 So.2d 12, 19-20 (Miss. 1987)). As this court has discussed supra, JSU waived this argument by not including it in the pretrial order that they assented to and signed. This court will address JSU's contention nonetheless.
JSU argues that "[w]hat type of breach of contract claim is at issue is determined by what a party has alleged and argued, not by what the party represents in an effort to avoid MTCA's bench trial requirement." See Whiting v. U. of Southern Miss., 62 So.3d 907, 915 (Miss. 2011). The Whiting opinion is relatively sparse when it discusses why the court found that the plaintiff's claims were a tortious breach of contract instead of simple breach of contract.
A review of the facts of Whiting shows that Dr. Melissa Whiting alleged that while she was a tenure track assistant professor at the University of Southern Mississippi, the Board of Trustees renewed her contract six (6) times. Dr. Whiting received, as all professors did, a Faculty Handbook which laid out the procedures for obtaining tenure. One of the major factors the Board of Trustees would consider in granting tenure was the annual evaluations of the professor. Dr. Whiting received five (5) annual evaluations which reflected she received top marks in all categories. When Dr. Whiting applied for tenure, her department head allegedly gave her bad advice, isolated her from the rest of the faculty in her department by moving her to a different building, and circulated rumors that she had committed academic fraud, all in a "quest to scuttle [her] career." After a hearing on her application for tenure, the committee reviewing Dr. Whiting's application recommended that she be promoted to associate professor, but denied her tenure and told her to wait for one (1) more year to apply again. As earlier stated, the Mississippi Supreme Court dealt with this case as a tortious breach of contract, but without much guidance for its approach.
This court finds Kennedy v. Jefferson Cty., Miss. ex rel. Bd. of Sup'rs provides some guidance. In Kennedy, the plaintiff worked as a hospital administrator for one hospital, and as a consultant for another hospital. During the course of his duties at his hospital administrator job, he terminated a contract with a vendor, who happened to be the son-in-law of a councilman for the Jefferson County Mississippi Board of Supervisors. Shortly thereafter, the Hospital Board terminated the plaintiff's employment contract without notice. The hospital produced evidence that it had terminated the plaintiff for insubordination.
No. 5:13-CV-226-DCB-MTP, 2015 WL 4251070, at *12 (S.D. Miss. July 13, 2015). To establish a tortious breach of contract courts have generally required more evidence than the parties have shown this court.
JSU asserts that Coach Taylor alleged a tortious breach of contract theory as shown by her pleadings: that JSU "knowingly, willingly, and intentionally" breached its employment contract with her
This court is unpersuaded by JSU's arguments that Coach Taylor alleged and pursued a tortious breach of contract cause of action. The facts, as found by the jury, are that JSU breached its contract with Coach Taylor
JSU says that it was due a jury instruction on the breach of contract claim that stated: "In deciding whether [JSU] was justified in its decision to terminate [Coach Taylor], you may not consider [Coach Taylor's] length of employment or [JSU's] failure to discover [Coach Taylor's] misconduct sooner. You also must not consider whether [JSU] has tolerated similar misconduct by other employees." JSU relies on Hoffman v. Board of Trustees, 567 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1990) as its basis for the requested jury instruction. As discussed supra, Hoffman stands for the proposition of law that an employer may rely on an employee's own misconduct to terminate that employee's employment, even where the employer tolerates the misconduct for a period of time. JSU's requested jury instruction does not encompass the conduct contemplated by Hoffman.
Moreover, the requested instruction is overbroad. As submitted, the instruction invades the province of the jury by instructing the jury that Coach Taylor had indulged sooner in misconduct and further, that other employees similarly had behaved with misconduct. The parties had not stipulated as to this twin allegation of misconduct and whether there was such was a jury question. Accordingly, the requested instruction was improper.
This court was not persuaded by JSU's arguments at the time it requested the jury instruction and is not convinced now that JSU should have been granted the requested instruction. This court, therefore, finds that JSU is not due relief based on the requested jury instruction.
JSU next claims this court committed error in finding that JSU was liable for invasion of privacy
JSU campaigns that to prove a prima facie case of invasion of privacy — public disclosure of private facts — this court had to find that: 1. JSU publicly provided private facts; 2. that the release of those private facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and 3. that those private facts were not a legitimate concern to the public. See Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 378 (Miss. 1990).
JSU says that Coach Taylor presented no evidence of the release of private facts as contemplated by the relevant jurisprudence. JSU cites two (2) cases where courts found that parties had released private facts based on the release of medical records or school records.
JSU asserts further that it (JSU) did not actually "release" the private facts publicly; rather, an independent organization did so, The Clarion-Ledger Newspaper. JSU urges this court to find that after The Clarion-Ledger filed a public records request, JSU simply responded in accordance with its duties under the authority of Miss. Code § 25-61-1 et seq, the Mississippi Public Records Act (discussed further infra). Thus, says JSU, it did not release records to the public, but disclosed those matters to a third party, and this third party disclosed the information to the public at large.
JSU's position has no merit here:
Ekugwum v. City of Jackson, Miss., 2010 WL 1490247, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 13, 2010). This court finds that by disclosing the identified information to The Clarion-Ledger, JSU should have reasonably foreseen that The Clarion-Ledger would publish that identified information. This court, therefore, finds that JSU's argument is myopic and this court will not overturn the judgment herein on this basis.
JSU also says that the information provided to The Clarion Ledger does not qualify as information which would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" under Mississippi jurisprudence. JSU cites Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So.2d 1036 (Miss. 1999) in support of its argument. In Plaxico a non-custodial father (Michael) rented property he owned to his ex-wife, who was also the custodian of his daughter. Michael subsequently learned of a homosexual affair between his ex-wife and her roommate. Michael filed for custody, citing a sexual relationship occurring in the home where his daughter lived while the child's custodian was not married to her sexual partner. During the course of the litigation in Plaxico, Michael went to the cabin, observed his ex-wife and Plaxico having sexual intercourse through a window, returned to his vehicle to retrieve a camera, and then took pictures of Plaxico in a seminude state through the window. Plaxico, aggrieved, filed a lawsuit alleging invasion of privacy under the sub-tort of intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another. The trial court dismissed her action and she appealed.
The Mississippi Supreme Court found that a parent was within his or her rights to protect the interests of his or her child and that Plaxico had not proven that "this conduct [was] highly offensive to the ordinary person which would cause the reasonable person to object."
Id at 1039. Thus, this court finds that Plaxico is not a valid compass to guide this court's decision.
This court is persuaded, as it was when it issued its bench opinion on this very issue, that the actions of JSU in releasing emails and personnel file information to the Clarion-Ledger would be "highly offensive to the ordinary person." Accordingly, this court finds no basis to overturn its previous decision on this ground either.
JSU also asks this court to overturn its previous determination of liability against it because, according to JSU, Coach Taylor is a public figure and, therefore, the decision to terminate her contract was a "legitimate public concern." Coach Taylor is strangely silent on this point, but this court is not convinced by this argument either.
JSU cites Ekugwum v. City of Jackson, Miss., 2010 WL 1490247 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 13, 2010) to stand for the proposition that Coach Taylor is a public figure. Again, Coach Taylor does not address this argument in her responsive brief.
In Ekugwum, United States District Court Judge Daniel P. Jordan III determined that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to overcome a Rule 56 challenge based on the release of information, not, about whether the plaintiff was a public figure. This court can find nothing in that case in which that court addressed the "legitimate public concern" prong of the public disclosure of private facts except:
Ekugwum v. City of Jackson, Miss., 2010 WL 1490247, at *3-4 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 13, 2010). This court, accordingly, is unpersuaded to find in JSU's favor and overturn its previous opinion on this ground.
Further, this court is persuaded, as it discussed supra, that JSU waived this argument when it failed to include a defense that Coach Taylor was a "public figure" in the pretrial order that JSU signed which dictated the course of these proceedings. [Docket no. 54]. Finally, this court in not persuaded that Coach Taylor's image as a "public figure", even if true, would entitle JSU to invade her privacy by providing unsubstantiated, embarrassing allegations about her to the public at large. Other than JSU's excuse that it furnished this information in response to The Clarion-Ledger's request under the Mississippi Public Records Act
JSU lastly campaigns that the Mississippi Public Records Act does not provide a private cause of action, despite this court's earlier ruling that the MPRA did create a private cause of action. The MPRA, according to JSU, would shield JSU from liability because it released information pursuant to a statutorily authorized records release.
In its order dated August 1, 2014, this court has already addressed JSU's contentions and JSU does not offer this court any new jurisprudence that might convince this court to overturn its previous opinion. [Docket no. 64]. JSU's challenge to the prima facie case against it fails because this court found evidence of all three elements: 1. JSU publicly provided private facts about Coach Taylor; 2. the release of those private facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and 3. those private facts were not a legitimate concern to the public. See Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 378 (Miss. 1990). This court, therefore, denies JSU's motion to set aside its previous order finding JSU liable for invasion of privacy.
JSU next asks this court to reduce its previous award of $200,000 to either nothing or a smaller amount. JSU argues that Coach Taylor never produced competent evidence of damages on her invasion of privacy claims. Coach Taylor, contrariwise, argues that this court, in its previous opinion [Docket no. 64] addressed these same arguments.
This court addressed the issue of remittitur in its prior opinion when it said:
[Docket no. 64, P. 18].
As this court stated in its previous opinion, "[o]ne who has established a cause of action for invasion of privacy is entitled to recover damages for [her] mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is a kind that normally results from such an invasion." [Docket no. 64] Citing Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So.2d 207, 212 (Miss. 1986).
JSU correctly states "[I]t is the plaintiff who bears the burden of proof as to the amount of damages[.]" See J & B Entertainment v. City of Jackson, Miss., 720 F.Supp.2d 757, 764 (S.D. Miss. 2010). JSU is incorrect, however, that Coach Taylor failed to produce any evidence of her damages. Coach Taylor herself testified that she had mental health disturbances as a result of the invasion of her privacy by the online publication of the private facts released by JSU, not just her fears over termination as asserted by JSU. Coach Taylor also introduced unrefuted evidence in the form of witness testimony that she had occasioned mental disturbances as a result of the invasion of privacy.
"[A] plaintiff must [] prove that such [mental distress] damages were reasonably foreseeable." Sumler v. East Ford, Inc., 915 So.2d 1081, 1089 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). It was foreseeable that the story published by The Clarion Ledger would have an emotional impact on Coach Taylor. As JSU indicates, "[i]t is not enough that a plaintiff dislike a defendant's acts, a plaintiff must show that a defendant intentionally and maliciously sought to do the plaintiff harm." Id. This court has already found in its previous order that JSU acted "intentionally and maliciously" by releasing Coach Taylor's private facts for the world to see, and this court is not inclined to overturn its previous ruling.
JSU then says that even if this court were to allow its previous award of $200,000 to stand, it is due to be remitted. This court previously reviewed the cases submitted by JSU and was not inclined then, nor now, to reduce the award from $200,000. This court, in its previous order, specifically looked at cases
JSU next contends that this court made additional and cumulative errors which combined to deny it a fair trial: the court's questioning of witnesses in front of the jury; and allowing Coach Taylor to discuss JSU's refusal to arbitrate before the jury.
"A trial court [] abuses its discretion in examining witnesses if the questioning demonstrates bias or partiality." See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). According to JSU, this court "repeatedly questioned [its] witnesses in a way that suggested the Court [sic] believed them not to be credible [sic]." Coach Taylor says that this court had the prerogative to question witnesses to determine the viability of witnesses. JSU responded by stating that this court could have exercised its prerogative to examine witnesses outside of the presence of the jury. JSU does not indicate to this court which questions of the court were improper to ask of the witnesses, nor does it indicate how those questions were improper, except to say that the court should not have asked questions of the witnesses.
In its memorandum brief in support of its motion for a new trial, JSU states, "[t]hough Jackson State recognizes that there is no per se rule forbidding the Court from examining witnesses, it is error for a trial court to do so in a manner that leads the jury to believe that the Court has a predisposition that one party should prevail over the other party." [Docket no. 68, P. 15]. For support, JSU cites Rodriguez v. Riddell Sports, 242 F.3d 567 (5
Rodriguez v. Riddell Sports, Inc., 242 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001).
This court is unpersuaded that it conducted an improper examination of any of the witnesses. The sole purpose of the court's examining of witnesses in this matter was to aid the jury in understanding the testimony of witnesses. This court also gave a curative instruction to the jury, that the jury should not place any undue weight on the questions the court propounded to witnesses. JSU is not due relief on this ground either.
JSU's final argument is that this court erred in allowing Coach Taylor to mention, in the presence of the jury, JSU's refusal to arbitrate. Coach Taylor argues, in response, that JSU's refusal to arbitrate was probative because she, Coach Taylor, had filed claims for violations of Title IX and Title VII, requiring evidence showing how JSU had treated Coach Taylor from the initial notice of her termination through the denial of arbitration. JSU cites Anderson v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co., 457 F.2d 784 (5
In Anderson v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant-railroad who was involved in a fight with another employee, the train's engineer, who had brandished a firearm during the altercation. The plaintiff suffered a stroke and brought a civil action under the authority of the Federal Employers Liability Act
In 1972, the same year that Anderson was announced, the first proposed Federal Rules of Evidence were published by the Advisory Committee. As part of those rules, the Advisory Committee penned Rule 407 — Subsequent Remedial Measures. Rule 407 reads:
Fed. R. Evid. 407. This court is persuaded that Anderson is a common law subsequent remedial measures case. In the lawsuit sub judice JSU's refusal to arbitrate was not introduced to prove culpable conduct which led to the injury, but conduct which shows the animus that had developed between JSU and Coach Taylor. This court is further persuaded that because Coach Taylor placed JSU's conduct in terminating her contract at issue, JSU's refusal to arbitrate is probative of its mindset in pursuing the course of action that it did in terminating Coach Taylor. Accordingly, JSU is not due relief on this ground either.
This court, having addressed all of JSU's contentions in its Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, New Trial, or Remittitur
In her Motion for a New Trial
Coach Taylor filed her motion asking this court to exercise its authority under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard for review in Coach Taylor's motion for a new trial is the same as the standard stated in Section IV. A. i. supra.
Coach Taylor asks this court for a new trial based on an allegedly improper jury instruction. Coach Taylor argues that this court should have given a "but for" causation instruction on her Title IX retaliation claim. [Docket no. 70]. Coach Taylor urges this court to find that the Fifth Circuit precedent upon which it relied in giving its instruction to the jury, Lowery v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 171 F.3d 242 (5
JSU responded to Coach Taylor's Motion for New Trial, arguing that Lowery remains binding Fifth Circuit precedent. According to JSU, Jackson interpreted a Title VII claim, based on a statutory grant of a private cause of action. In Lowery, argues JSU, the Fifth Circuit found that Title IX "implies a private right of action for retaliation, narrowly tailored to the claims of employees who suffer unlawful retaliation solely as a consequence of complaints alleging noncompliance with the substantive provisions of [T]itle IX." Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 254 (5th Cir. 1997). This court is persuaded that the two cases are different in kind and that Lowery remains binding Fifth Circuit precedent.
Coach Taylor's ancillary argument that both Gross and Nassar support its position is not well-taken. Neither case involves a Title IX claim: Gross is an AEDA case based on a statutory grant of a private cause of action; and Nassar is a Title VII case involving a statutory grant of a private cause of action. Lowery established a judicially created private cause of action based on a statute, in which the Fifth Circuit found the "sole or only reason" causation standard was the standard implied by the statute.
Accordingly, this court is persuaded that Coach Taylor's Motion for a New Trial
JSU, in its Motion to Stay Proceedings Regarding Plaintiff's Bill of Costs
This court has reviewed the post-trial motions filed by both parties and finds that all motions must be DENIED for the reasons stated supra. Neither party has persuaded this court that it is due either a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a Judgment as a Matter of Law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Jackson State University's Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Taylor-Travis's Motion for New Trial
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Jackson State University's Motion to Stay Proceedings Regarding Plaintiff's Bill of Costs
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West)
20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West)
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West)
(b) Renewing the Motion After Trial; Alternative Motion for a New Trial. If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment—or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged—the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:
(c) Granting the Renewed Motion; Conditional Ruling on a Motion for a New Trial.
(d) Time for a Losing Party's New-Trial Motion. Any motion for a new trial under Rule 59 by a party against whom judgment as a matter of law is rendered must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 50
(b) Time to File a Motion for a New Trial. A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.
(c) Time to Serve Affidavits. When a motion for a new trial is based on affidavits, they must be filed with the motion. The opposing party has 14 days after being served to file opposing affidavits. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) New Trial on the Court's Initiative or for Reasons Not in the Motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, the court, on its own, may order a new trial for any reason that would justify granting one on a party's motion. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court may grant a timely motion for a new trial for a reason not stated in the motion. In either event, the court must specify the reasons in its order.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16
L.U.Civ.R. 16 (as effective April 30, 2013)
[Docket no. 54, P. 22, ¶ 14, *RESTRICTED*].
This court later ruled, without objection, that this court would submit all of the state law claims to the jury.
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-46-13 (West)
[Docket no. 64, PP. 6-7].
Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990).
Plaxico at 1039.
Miss. Code. Ann. § 25-61-1 (West) et seq.
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this Act be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this Act and of an Act entitled "An Act relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees in certain cases" (approved April 22, 1908) [45 USCS §§ 51 et seq.] as the same has been or may hereafter be amended.
45 U.S.C.S. § 51
