ERVIN, Justice.
On 8 November 2016, plaintiff Roy A. Cooper, III, was elected Governor of the State of North Carolina for a four-year term office commencing on 1 January 2017. On 16 December, 2016, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 4 and House Bill 17, which abolished the existing State Board of Elections and the existing State Ethics Commission; created a new Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement; and appointed the existing members of the State Ethics Commission to serve as the members of the Bipartisan State Board. The legislation in question was signed into law by former Governor Patrick L. McCrory on 16 December 2016. On 17 March 2017, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County, convened pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(b1), determined that the legislation in question violated the separation-of-powers provisions of the North Carolina Constitution by unconstitutionally impinging upon the Governor's ability to faithfully execute the laws. Cooper v. Berger, No. 16 CVS 15636, 2017 WL 1433245 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake County, Mar. 17, 2017).
On 25 April 2017, Chapter 6 of the 2017 North Carolina Session Laws became law notwithstanding the Governor's veto. See Act of Apr. 11, 2017, ch. 6, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21 (LexisNexis).
The newly-enacted legislation provided, in pertinent part, that:
There is established the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement, referred to as the State Board in this Chapter.
Id., secs. 4, 7(h)-(i), 9, 10, 17, at 23-34.
On 26 April 2017, the Governor filed a complaint, a motion for a temporary restraining order, and a motion for a preliminary injunction challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 3 through 22
On 23 May 2017, the Governor and the legislative leadership filed summary judgment motions.
The legislative leadership argued, on the other hand, that this case involves a nonjusticiable political question and that the Governor lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Session Law 2017-6. According to the legislative leadership, "the commitment of the power to alter the functions and duties of state agencies is reserved for the Legislature," with the manner in which the General Assembly has chosen to exercise that authority constituting a "political question that this Court has no authority to review." In addition, the legislative leadership contended that the Governor lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Session Law 2017-6 because the alleged constitutional injury upon which the Governor relies did not result from the enactment of the challenged legislation "given the similar or identical provisions in prior law," citing N.C.G.S. § 163-19 and section 4(c) of Session Law 2017-6. In view of the fact that the panel did not reach the merits of the Governor's claim, the legislative leadership urged this Court to refrain from addressing the constitutionality of the challenged legislation even if it concluded that this case was justiciable and that the Governor had standing to challenge the constitutionality of Session Law 2017-6. In the event that the Court elected to reach the merits of the Governor's constitutional claim, the legislative leadership asserts that the challenged legislation represents nothing more than the proper exercise of the General Assembly's constitutionally-derived legislative authority.
On 1 September 2017, "without determining that we lack the authority to reach the merits of plaintiff's claims," the Court entered an order concluding that "the proper administration of justice would be best served in the event that we allowed the panel, in the first instance, to address the merits of [the Governor's] claims before undertaking to address them ourselves." As a result, the Court certified this case "to the panel with instructions ... to enter a new order ... that (a) explains the basis for its earlier determination that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the claims advanced in [the Governor's] complaint and (b) addresses the issues that [the Governor] has raised on the merits."
On 31 October 2017, the panel entered an order determining that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the Governor's claims on the grounds that "[t]he functions, powers, and duties of an agency encompass how a particular agency might work, its structure, and what role it may play in enforcement of the laws"; "the power to alter the functions and duties of state agencies is reserved to the Legislature through its law-making ability and the Governor through executive order subject to review by the Legislature"; and that "[t]he merger of the Board of Elections and Ethics Commission into the Bipartisan Board ... is a political question and therefore a nonjusticiable issue." In compliance with our order requesting it to address the merits of the Governor's claims, the panel found that:
After conceding that "circumstances could arise where a deadlock or stalemate so stifles the work of the Bipartisan Board that [the Governor] would have standing to raise a challenge that this statute is unconstitutional, not on its face but as applied to that particular situation," the panel held that Session Law 2017-6 is not unconstitutional on its face.
In the supplemental briefs that the Court requested following the filing of the panel's order, the Governor argued that "the judicial branch has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve separation of powers disputes," citing McCrory, 368 N.C. at 638, 781 S.E.2d at 25, In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 99, 405 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1991), and State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 608, 286 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1982), and that he has standing to advance the claim asserted in this complaint because the "North Carolina Constitution confers standing on the Governor to challenge statutes that cause him constitutional harm," citing Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution and Mangum, 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 281-82. In addressing the merits of his challenge to
On the other hand, the legislative leadership argues that the panel correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue in this case because the North Carolina Constitution provides the Governor with the authority to "make such changes in the allocation of offices and agencies and in the allocation of those functions, powers, and duties as he considers necessary for efficient administration," subject to later legislative review, quoting Article III, Section 5(10) of the North Carolina Constitution, thereby eliminating any need for the judicial branch to "interject itself into a balance struck in the text of the Constitution specifically dealing with the organization and structure of a state agency." For that reason, "[t]he question raised in this case by the Governor goes to the structure and function of the agency, which is textually committed to a balance struck in the text of the Constitution."
As far as the merits are concerned, the legislative leadership contends that McCrory does not necessitate the invalidation of Session Law 2017-6 because the Bipartisan State Board is structured as an independent agency. According to the legislative leadership, "the quasi-judicial nature of a commission can support its independence from being under the thumb of the executive," citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687-88, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2617, 101 L.Ed. 2d 569, 603 (1988). In addition, unlike the situation at issue here, the General Assembly appointed more members to the executive bodies at issue in McCrory than the Governor, citing McCrory, 368 N.C. at 637-38, 781 S.E.2d at 250-51. Finally, the legislative leadership asserts that the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board is, on an ongoing basis, to be appointed by the members of the Bipartisan State Board and that the sole authority to remove the Executive Director is vested in the members of the Bipartisan State Board, citing section 4(c) of Session Law 2017-6. The legislative leadership further argues that the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 designating the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board represent nothing more than the extension of a pre-existing term of office and that the Governor has mischaracterized the role of the Executive Director, whose authority
"[O]ne of the fundamental principles on which state government is constructed," John V. Orth & Paul Martin Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution 50 (2d ed. 2013), is that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other," N.C. Const. art. I, § 6. The legislative power is "vested in the General Assembly," N.C Const. art. II, § 1, which "enact[s] laws, within constitutional limits, to protect or promote the health, morals, order, safety, and general welfare of society," State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949) (citations omitted); see also N.C. Const. art. II, § 20. "The executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor," N.C. Const. art. III, § 1, who "faithfully executes, or gives effect to, these laws," McCrory, 368 N.C. at 635, 781 S.E.2d at 250; see also N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(4).
"The political question doctrine controls, essentially, when a question becomes `not justiciable ... because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.'" Bacon, 353 N.C. at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961, 23 L.Ed. 2d 491, 514 (1969)). "The... doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the" legislative or executive branches of government. Id. at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866, 92 L.Ed. 2d 166, 178 (1986)). "In determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 7 L.Ed. 2d 663, 682 (1962) (brackets in original) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55, 59 S.Ct. 972, 982, 83 S.Ct. 1385, 1397 (1939)).
Id. at 211, 82 S. Ct. at 706, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 682. In other words, the Court necessarily has to undertake a separation of powers analysis in order to determine whether the political question doctrine precludes judicial resolution of a particular dispute.
The distinction between cases that do and do not involve nonjusticiable political questions can be seen by comparing our decision in Bacon with the Court of Appeals' decision in News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Easley. In Bacon, which involved a challenge to "the constitutionality of the Governor's exercise of his clemency power under Article III, Section 5(6) of the Constitution of North Carolina," 353 N.C. at 698, 549 S.E.2d at 843, this Court stated that "a question may be held nonjusticiable under this doctrine if it involves `a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,'" id. at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 686). As a result of the fact that "Article III, Section 5(6) of the State Constitution expressly commits
As the briefs that he has submitted for our consideration clearly reflect, the Governor has not challenged the General Assembly's decision to merge the State Board of Elections and the Ethics Commission into the Bipartisan State Board, which is, as he appears to concede, a decision committed to the sole discretion of the General Assembly. See N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(10) (providing that "[t]he General Assembly shall prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State and may alter them from time to time"). Instead, the Governor has alleged in his complaint that the enactment of Session Law 2017-6 "curtail[ed], in significant ways[, his] executive powers." More specifically, the Governor has alleged that "Session Law 2017-6 violate[s] the separation of powers by preventing the Governor from performing his core function under the North Carolina Constitution to `take care that the laws be faithfully executed,'" quoting Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution. As a result, the Governor is not challenging the General Assembly's decision to "prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State" by merging the State Board of Elections and the Ethics Commission into the Bipartisan State Board and prescribing what the Bipartisan State Board is required or permitted to do; instead, he is challenging the extent, if any, to which the statutory provisions governing the manner in which the Bipartisan State Board is constituted and required to operate pursuant to Session Law 2017-6 impermissibly encroach upon his constitutionally established executive authority to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
As this Court explained in McCrory, "the separation of powers clause requires that, as the three branches of government carry out their duties, one branch will not prevent another branch from performing its core functions." 368 N.C. at 636, 781 S.E.2d at 250 (citing Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 126-27, 774 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2015)). In that case, this Court considered former Governor McCrory's "challenge [to the constitutionality of] legislation that authorize[d] the General Assembly to appoint a majority of the voting members of three administrative commissions" on the grounds "that, by giving itself the power to appoint commission members, the General Assembly ha[d] usurped Governor McCrory's constitutional appointment power and interfered with his ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed," id. at 636, 781 S.E.2d at 250, and noted that, in order to decide the issues before it in that case, the Court was required to "construe[ ] and appl[y] ... provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina," id. at 638-39, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (citations omitted). Instead of holding that Governor McCrory's challenge to the
Our implicit decision that Governor McCrory's claim was justiciable is fully consistent with the literal language contained in Article III, Section 5(10) of the North Carolina Constitution, which refers to "the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State," or, in other words, to what the agencies in question are supposed to do, rather than the extent to which the Governor has sufficient control over those departments and agencies to ensure "that the laws be faithfully executed," N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(4). Alternatively, even if one does not accept this understanding of the scope of the General Assembly's authority under Article III, Section 5(10), we continue to have the authority to decide this case because the General Assembly's authority pursuant to Article III, Section 5(10) is necessarily constrained by the limits placed upon that authority by other constitutional provisions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132, 96 S.Ct. 612, 688, 46 L.Ed. 2d 659, 752 (1976) (noting that "Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction") (citation omitted). For this reason, the Governor's authority to appoint constitutional officers pursuant to Article III, Section 5(8) is subject to the constitutional provisions limiting dual office holding, N.C. Const. art. VI, § 9, and separation of powers, State ex rel. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 888 (holding that the appointment of sitting legislators to membership on administrative commissions constitutes a separation-of-powers violation); the General Assembly's exclusive authority to classify property for taxation-related purposes does not allow more favorable tax classification treatment for one religious organization as compared to another in light of the constitutional guarantees of religious liberty and equal protection, see N.C. Const. art. 1, §§ 13 and 19; Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc., v. State, 299 N.C. 399, 406 n. 1, 263 S.E.2d 726, 730 n. 1 (1980); and the General Assembly's exclusive authority to enact criminal statutes, N.C. Const. art. II, § 1 (providing that the legislative power of the State is to be exercised by the General Assembly), does not authorize the enactment of ex post facto laws in violation of Article I, Section 16. As a result, under either interpretation of the relevant constitutional language, the authority granted to the General Assembly pursuant to Article III, Section 5(10)
In this case, like McCrory, the Governor has alleged that the General Assembly
In order to have standing to maintain this case, the Governor was required to allege that he had suffered an injury as a result of the enactment of Session Law 2017-6 or, in other words, that he had "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." Mangum, 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 282 (quoting Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 28, 199 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1973)) (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 18). This Court held in McCrory that the Governor had standing to challenge the legislation at issue in that case on the grounds that it "interfered with his ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed." 368 N.C. at 636, 781 S.E.2d at 250. Similarly, as is evidenced by the allegations set out in his complaint, the Governor has clearly asserted the existence of a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" in this case. Mangum, 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 282. Simply put, if a sitting Governor lacks standing to maintain a separation-of-powers claim predicated on the theory that legislation impermissibly interferes with the authority constitutionally committed to the person holding that office, we have difficulty ascertaining who would ever have standing to assert such a claim. Apart from their contention that the claim advanced in the Governor's complaint is a nonjusticiable political question, which we have already rejected, the legislative leadership does not appear to explicitly contend that the Governor lacks the necessary personal stake in the outcome of this controversy to deprive him of standing.
Finally, we must address the merits of the Governor's claim that Session Law 2017-6 "unconstitutionally infringe[s] on the Governor's executive powers in violation of separation of powers."
As we have already noted, the North Carolina Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, contains an explicit separation-of-powers provision. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 6 (stating that "[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other"). For that and other reasons, "the separation of powers doctrine is well established under North Carolina law." Bacon, 353 N.C. at 716, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (citing, inter alia, State ex rel. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 595-601, 286 S.E.2d at 81-84 (stating at 304 N.C. at 595, 286 S.E.2d at 81, that "each of our constitutions has explicitly embraced the doctrine of separation of powers")). As we explained in McCrory, separation-of-powers violations can occur "when one branch exercises power that the constitution vests exclusively in another branch" or "when the actions of one branch prevent another branch from performing its constitutional duties." McCrory, 368 N.C. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256.
This Court has held that Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution requires "the Governor [to] have enough control over" commissions or boards that "are primarily administrative or executive in character" "to perform his [or her] constitutional duty," id. at 645-46, 781 S.E.2d at 256, with the sufficiency of the Governor's "degree of control" "depend[ing] on his [or her] ability to appoint the commissioners, to supervise their day-to-day activities and to remove them from office," id. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256. In view of the fact that "each statutory scheme" is different, "[w]e cannot adopt a categorical rule that would resolve every separation of powers challenge" and "must resolve each challenge by carefully examining its specific factual and legal context." Id. at 646-47, 781 S.E.2d at 257. In holding that the legislation at issue in McCrory violated Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution, we noted that the General Assembly had "appoint[ed] executive officers that the Governor ha[d] little power to remove" and left "the Governor with little control over the views and priorities of the officers that the General Assembly appoint[ed]." Id. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257.
The test adopted in McCrory is functional, rather than formulaic, in nature. Although we did not explicitly define "control" for separation-of-powers purposes in McCrory, we have no doubt that the relevant constitutional provision, instead of simply contemplating that the Governor will have the ability to preclude others from forcing him or her to execute the laws in a manner to which he or
The Bipartisan State Board established by Session Law 2017-6, which has responsibility for the enforcement of laws governing elections, campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics, clearly performs primarily executive, rather than legislative or judicial, functions.
In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, the legislative leadership has advanced a number of arguments, each of which we have carefully considered. Among other things, the legislative leadership asserts that the General Assembly has not retained ongoing supervision or control over the Bipartisan State Board given that none of its members are either legislators, as was the case in Wallace, or legislative appointees, as was the case in McCrory. This argument rests upon an overly narrow reading of McCrory, which focuses upon the practical ability of the Governor to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed rather than upon (1) the exact manner in which his or her ability to do so is impermissibly limited or (2) whether the impermissible interference stems from (a) direct legislative supervision or control or from (b) the operation of some other statutory provision. Put another way, the separation-of-powers violations noted in Wallace and McCrory do not constitute the only ways in which the Governor's obligation to "faithfully execute the laws" can be the subject of impermissible interference. Instead, as McCrory clearly indicates, the relevant issue in a separation-of-powers dispute is whether, based upon a case-by-case analysis of the extent to which the Governor is entitled to appoint, supervise, and remove the relevant executive officials, the challenged legislation impermissibly interferes with the Governor's ability to execute the laws in any manner.
The General Assembly does, of course, have the authority pursuant to Article III, Section 5(10) of the North Carolina Constitution to specify the number of members of an executive branch commission. Moreover, the General Assembly clearly has the authority to establish qualifications for commission membership, to make certain persons ex officio members of the commission, and to mandate that differing policy preferences be reflected in the commission's membership.
In addition to challenging the validity of the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 governing the composition of the Bipartisan State Board, the Governor has also challenged the statutory provisions "creat[ing] the position of Executive Director of the [Bipartisan] State Board" and making the Executive Director, who is designated as the "chief State elections official," "responsible for staffing, administration, and execution of the State Board's decisions and orders" and for performing "such other responsibilities as may be assigned by the State Board." Ch. 6, sec. 4(c), 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 26 (enacting N.C.G.S § 163A-6 (a), (c), (d) (2017)). Although the General Assembly appointed the individual then serving as the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections to be the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board for a term of office lasting until at least May 2019, see id., sec. 17, at 34, the Bipartisan State Board is entitled to appoint an Executive Director by a majority vote after that point, N.C.G.S. § 163A-6 (2017). As a result, the relevant provisions of Session Law 2017-6 ensure that the Governor will not have any control over the identity of the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board until May 2019 and, perhaps, even after that time, given the manner in which the General Assembly has structured the membership of the Bipartisan State Board in Session Law 2017-6, id. § 163A-2.
Although the legislative leadership argues that, rather than appointing the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board, the General Assembly simply extended the term of the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, we do not find that argument persuasive. As an initial matter, given that Session Law 2017-6 abolished the State Board of Elections, the position of Executive Director of that body no longer exists. Instead, Session Law 2017-6 expressly "create[s] the position of Executive Director of the [Bipartisan] State Board," id. § 163-6(a), clearly indicating that the position of Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board is a new office rather than the continuation of an existing one. In addition, given the General Assembly's decision to combine the functions previously performed by the State Board of Elections and the Ethics Commission into the functions to be performed by a single agency, the duties assigned to the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board are necessarily more extensive than the duties assigned to the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections. See Ch. 6, sec. 4(c), at 26 (enacting N.C.G.S. § 163A-1 (2017)). As a result, we cannot agree that the General Assembly's decision to designate the Executive Director of the State Board of Elections as the Executive Director of the Bipartisan State Board constitutes nothing more than the exercise of the General Assembly's authority to extend the term of an existing officeholder in order to achieve some valid public policy goal.
As the Bipartisan State Board is structured in Session Law 2017-6, the General Assembly's decision to appoint the Executive
Finally, the Governor has questioned the validity of the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 requiring that the office of the chair of the Bipartisan State Board be rotated between the state's two largest political parties and the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 restructuring the county boards of elections. Among other things, the Governor contends that the restructuring of the county boards of elections worked by Session Law 2017-6 "interferes with the executive function by creating deadlocked structures" and argues that the manner in which the county boards of elections are structured, coupled with the similar provisions governing the structure of the Bipartisan State Board, are likely to have the effect of thwarting the implementation of any particular Governor's election law-related policy preferences given that both boards will have a sufficient number of members who are unlikely to share the Governor's policy views to preclude the implementation of his or her preferred method of executing the elections laws. Although we agree that the provisions of Session Law 2016-7 governing the selection of the chair of the Bipartisan State Board and the manner in which the
As we have already noted, the General Assembly noted an appeal from the temporary restraining order that the panel entered following the filing of the Governor's complaint. However, given that this temporary restraining order was dissolved relatively shortly after its entry, any decision that we might make with respect to its validity "cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy." Roberts v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass'n, 344 N.C. 394, 398-399, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996). Moreover, since we conclude that the issues that had to be addressed during the proceedings leading to the entry of the challenged temporary restraining order are unlikely to recur, we do not believe that the legislative leadership's challenge to the entry of the temporary restraining order is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 286, 292, 517 S.E.2d 401, 405 (1999) (stating that "[a]n otherwise moot claim falls within this exception where `(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again'" (quoting Ballard v. Weast, 121 N.C. App. 391, 394, 465 S.E.2d 565, 568 (alterations in the original), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 343 N.C. 304, 471 S.E.2d 66 (1996))). Similarly, given that the temporary restraining order has been dissolved and that we have decided the Governor's constitutional claim on the merits, we are not persuaded that a decision to address the legislative leadership's challenge to the temporary restraining order would, at this point, serve the "public interest." Cape Fear River Watch v. N.C. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 368 N.C. 92, 100, 772 S.E.2d 445, 450 (2015) (declining to reach the merits of an obviously significant issue relating to the regulatory treatment of coal ash lagoons because any decision to do so would not "have any practical impact"). For all of these reasons, the legislative leadership's appeal from the temporary restraining order is dismissed as moot.
Thus, we hold that the panel erred by dismissing the Governor's complaint. Simply put, the claim asserted in the Governor's complaint does not raise a nonjusticiable political question, and the Governor clearly has standing to assert the claim that he has presented for consideration by the judicial branch. In addition, for the reasons set forth in more detail above, the provisions of Session Law 2017-6 concerning the membership of and appointments to the Bipartisan State Board, taken in context with the other provisions of that legislation, impermissibly interfere with the Governor's ability to faithfully execute the laws in violation of Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution. Finally, the legislative leadership's appeal from the 28 April 2017 temporary restraining order is moot and does not come within the proper scope of either of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine upon which the legislative leadership relies. As a result, (1) the panel's 1 June 2017 order is reversed, with this case being remanded to the panel for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including the entry of a final judgment on the merits, and (2) the legislative leadership's appeal from the 28 April 2017 temporary restraining order is dismissed as moot.
ORDER ENTERED ON 1 JUNE 2017 REVERSED AND REMANDED; APPEAL
Chief Justice MARTIN dissenting.
The majority opinion imposes a constitutional requirement that the Governor be able to appoint a majority of the members of the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement from his own political party. In so doing, the majority deviates from our holding in State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 248 (2016). Because the majority opinion impermissibly constrains the General Assembly's constitutional authority to determine the structure of state administrative bodies, I respectfully dissent.
We must resolve every separation of powers challenge "by carefully examining its specific factual and legal context." Id. at 646-47, 781 S.E.2d at 257. The type of separation of powers violation that the Governor alleges here occurs "when the actions of one branch prevent another branch from performing its constitutional duties." Id. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256 (citing Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 715, 549 S.E.2d 840, 853, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 975, 122 S.Ct. 22, 150 L.Ed.2d 804 (2001)). When this type of violation is alleged, we must determine whether the Governor has "enough control" over administrative bodies that have final executive authority to be able to perform his constitutional duties. Id. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256. McCrory set forth a functional analysis to be applied in this context, one that focuses not on the precise mechanism by which the Governor's power is allegedly interfered with but instead on the extent to which the challenged legislation limits the Governor's ability to perform a core executive duty. See id. at 645-47, 781 S.E.2d at 256-57.
To determine whether the Governor had "enough control" under the circumstances of McCrory, we noted several aspects of that case that were relevant to our analysis. There, each commission created by the challenged legislation — specifically, the Coal Ash Management Commission, the Mining Commission, and the Oil and Gas Commission — "ha[d] final authority over executive branch decisions." Id. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256. The General Assembly appointed a majority of the voting members of each of the three commissions. See id. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256. And the challenged legislation allowed the Governor to remove commission members only for cause. Id. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 257. By having majority control over commissions with final executive authority, the General Assembly prevented the Governor from performing his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and the General Assembly retained too much control over that power through its legislative appointments. Id. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257 (citing Bacon, 353 N.C. at 717-18, 549 S.E.2d at 854; and State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 608, 286 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1982)); see also N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(4) ("The Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.").
McCrory therefore clarified that the Governor must have "enough control" over a body with final executive authority, such as by an appropriate combination of appointment and removal powers, to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Contrary to what the majority suggests, however, McCrory did not mandate that the Governor be able to appoint a majority of voting members who share his views and priorities to every executive branch board or commission. Nor did it say that the Governor himself had to have "the final say on how to execute the laws." Cf. McCrory, 368 N.C. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257 (referring to "a commission that has the final say on how to execute the laws" (emphasis added)). As the majority says, McCrory did essentially hold that legislation is unconstitutional when it "leaves the Governor with little control over the views and priorities of the [majority of] officers" on an executive branch board or commission, at least when (as in McCrory) only one other appointing authority is selecting that entire majority. See id. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257. But that is just another way of saying that, in that circumstance, the Governor may not be left with a minority of appointees.
In this case, even if having to appoint half of the members of the Bipartisan State Board from a list provided by the chair of the opposition party is tantamount to those members being appointed by someone else, that
As the three-judge panel recognized, Session Law 2017-6 gives the Governor enough control over the Board to avoid violating the separation of powers clause. "Enough control" does not mean unlimited or unbridled control. It does not necessarily mean majority control, either. It simply means that the Governor must not be compelled to enforce laws while having little or no control over how that enforcement occurs. See id. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257. Here, the Board requires an affirmative vote of five of its members to take any action, Act of Apr. 11, 2017, ch. 6, sec. 4(c), 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 25 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C.G.S. § 163A-3(c) (2017)), and the Governor has enough control over the Board because he appoints half of its members from his own political party, see id. at 23 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 163A-2(a) (2017)). This means that the Board may not take any action without at least one vote of a member appointed by the Governor from his own party. At least one of those appointees, in other words, will cast the deciding vote when the Board is otherwise divided along party lines. Conversely, the four appointees from the Governor's party can veto any action that the opposition-party members of the Board otherwise want to take.
Additionally, the Governor has the exclusive power to remove members of the Bipartisan State Board for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. See id. at 24 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 163A-2(c) (2017)). Although this is the same amount of removal power that the Governor had in McCrory, see 368 N.C. at 637-38, 781 S.E.2d at 251, and although it is limited to for-cause instances, this removal power is robust enough to address any concerns peculiar to this Board — namely, that Board members could violate the public trust by using their official positions for obviously malicious or purely partisan purposes. See Malfeasance, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("A wrongful, unlawful, or dishonest act; esp., wrongdoing or misconduct by a public official...."). Giving the Governor the power to remove members without cause, moreover, would leave the Board open to political coercion. Cf. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353, 355-56, 78 S.Ct. 1275, 1278, 1279, 2 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1958) (reasoning that the War Claims Commission's need for insulation from political coercion weighed in favor of the President being able to remove Commission members only for cause).
Let's not lose sight of the Board's purpose, which is to administer elections and adjudicate ethics complaints. The structure and makeup of the Board requires members to cooperate in a bipartisan way before taking any official action and encourages neutrality and fairness.
Indeed, in light of today's holding, the Federal Election Commission — which is the closest federal analogue to the Bipartisan State Board — would be unconstitutional under North Carolina law. The FEC is composed of six voting members, no more than three of whom may be from the same political party, and the voting members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (Supp. III 2015). Does the majority really believe that our state constitution prohibits neutral, bipartisan election boards?
It is beyond question that the courts should have "neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment." United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568, 121 S.Ct. 1782, 1791, 149 L.Ed.2d 820 (2001) (quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). "Our constitutionally assigned role is limited to a determination of whether the legislation is plainly and clearly prohibited by the constitution." Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 127, 774 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2015); see also Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 334, 410 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1991) (explaining that legislation will not be invalidated unless it is unconstitutional "beyond reasonable doubt" (quoting Gardner v. City of Reidsville, 269 N.C. 581, 595, 153 S.E.2d 139, 150 (1967))); State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989) ("[This Court] will not lightly assume that an act of the legislature violates the ... Constitution...."). By contrast, the General Assembly acts as the "arm of the electorate," McCrory, 368 N.C. at 639, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (quoting Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 546, 556 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2001) (per curiam)), and is constitutionally empowered to organize the departments and agencies of our state government, see N.C. Const. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 5(10); see also Wallace, 304 N.C. at 595-96, 286 S.E.2d at 82. The General Assembly could, of course, choose to give the Governor the ability to appoint a majority of appointees, without any constraints, to any given executive branch board or commission. But doing so is the prerogative of the General Assembly, not of the courts. See In re Alamance Cty. Ct. Facils., 329 N.C. 84, 95, 405 S.E.2d 125, 130 (1991) ("The courts have absolutely no authority to control or supervise the power vested by the Constitution in the General Assembly as a coordinate branch of the government." (quoting Person v. Bd. of State Tax Comm'rs, 184 N.C. 499, 503, 115 S.E. 336, 339 (1922))).
I would hold that, by giving the Governor appointment and removal power over Bipartisan State Board members, and by allowing the Governor to appoint half of those members from his own political party, the General Assembly has satisfied the requirements established by our constitution. See Hart, 368 N.C. at 126, 774 S.E.2d at 284 ("If constitutional requirements are met, the wisdom of the legislation is a question for the General Assembly."); McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 515, 119 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1961) ("The wisdom and expediency of a statute is for the legislative department, when acting entirely within constitutional limits."). The majority instead constitutionalizes a requirement that the Governor be able to appoint a majority of Bipartisan State Board members from his own political party — to a board responsible for administering our state's election and
Justice JACKSON joins in this dissenting opinion.
Justice NEWBY dissenting.
This case presents the question of whether the General Assembly has the authority to create an independent, bipartisan board to administer the laws of elections, ethics, lobbying, and campaign finance. Because the state constitution expressly commits this specific power to the legislative branch, this Court lacks the authority to intervene; the issue presents a nonjusticiable political question. In exercising judicial power under these circumstances, this Court violates the very separation-of-powers principle it claims to protect. The Court strips the General Assembly of its historic, constitutionally prescribed authority to make the laws and creates a novel and sweeping constitutional power in the office of Governor — the authority to implement personal policy preferences. In doing so, the Court ignores the carefully crafted, express constitutional roles of the political branches and boldly inserts the judiciary into the political, legislative process. If the Court should reach the merits, I would agree with the analysis of Chief Justice Martin's dissent; however, because the trial court correctly held that this case presents a non-justiciable political question, I dissent separately.
Under the state constitution, the General Assembly considers various policy alternatives, and those measures enacted become the laws. The Governor may influence the lawmaking process and can even veto a measure. Nevertheless, once the General Assembly passes a law, the constitution requires the Governor to "faithfully" execute "the laws." "The laws" are not the Governor's policy preferences, but are those measures enacted by the General Assembly.
The idea of the judiciary preventing the legislature, through which the people act, from exercising its power is the most serious of judicial considerations. State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 650, 781 S.E.2d 248, 259 (2016) (Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the agent of the people's sovereign power, State ex rel. Ewart v. Jones, 116 N.C. 570, 570, 21 S.E. 787, 787 (1895), the General Assembly has the presumptive power to act, State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989) ("[G]reat deference will be paid to acts of the legislature — the agent of the people for enacting laws."). Possessing plenary power, the General Assembly is only limited by the express terms of the constitution. McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 515, 119 S.E.2d 888, 891-92 (1961).
When this Court strikes down an act of the General Assembly, it prevents an act of the people themselves. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 336-37, 410 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1991); see also McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 515, 119 S.E.2d at 891 ("The courts will not disturb an act of the law-making body unless it runs counter to a constitutional limitation or prohibition.").
Since 1776 our constitutions have recognized that all political power resides in the people, N.C. Const. art. I, § 2; N.C. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 2; N.C. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § I, and is exercised through their elected officials in the General Assembly, N.C. Const. art. II, § 1; N.C. Const. of 1868, art. II, § 1; N.C. Const. of 1776, § I. See Jones, 116 N.C. at 570, 21 S.E. at 787; see also John V. Orth & Paul Martin Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution 95 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter State Constitution] ("The legislative power is vested in the General Assembly, so called because all the people are present there in the persons of their representatives."). The structure of the bicameral legislative branch itself diffuses its power, see McCrory, 368 N.C. at 653, 781 S.E.2d at 261, and the people themselves limit legislative power by express constitutional prohibitions, see Baker, 330 N.C. at 338-39, 410 S.E.2d at 891-92.
Accountable to the people, N.C. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 5, through the most frequent elections, id. art. II, §§ 2, 4, "[t]he legislative branch of government is without question `the policy-making agency of our government....' The General Assembly is the `policy-making agency' because it is a far more appropriate forum than the courts for implementing policy-based changes to our laws," Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 169, 594 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2004) (quoting McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1956)). See also McCrory, 368 N.C. at 653, 781 S.E.2d at 261 ("The diversity within the [legislative] branch ... ensures healthy review and significant debate of each proposed statute, the enactment of which frequently reaches final form through compromise.").
Article III vests primary executive power with the Governor. N.C. Const. art. III, § 1. Though each of our state constitutions has placed executive power in the Governor generally, id. art. III, § 1; N.C. Const. of 1868, art. III, §§ 1, 4; N.C. Const. of 1776, § XIX, the constitutional powers of the executive have always been divided among various officials, N.C. Const. art. III, §§ 7(1)-(2), 8, with the Governor acting as chief executive, id. art. III, §§ 1, 5, within a multimember executive branch. See McCrory, 368 N.C. at 655-57, 781 S.E.2d at 262-63.
Unlike the General Assembly, the Governor historically has only those powers expressly granted by the constitution. E.g., N.C. Const. art. III, § 5 (outlining the "Duties of Governor"); N.C. Const. of 1868, art. III, § 6 ("to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons"); id., art. III, § 9 ("to convene the General Assembly in extra session"); N.C. Const. of 1776, § XIX (including the "Power to draw for and apply such Sums of Money as shall be voted by the General Assembly" and to exercise clemency, "the Power of granting Pardons and Reprieves"). Among the express constitutional duties of
While Article III generally outlines executive authority, it nonetheless specifies numerous occasions when the legislature shares in the various responsibilities.
This Court's decision in Winslow v. Morton illustrates how the aforementioned constitutional powers of the legislative and executive branches apply without conflict. In Winslow this Court reviewed the historic and express gubernatorial role of commander-in-chief of the militia. 118 N.C. at 488, 24 S.E. at 417. In comparing that role to the federal Executive, the Court noted that Congress, under the Federal Constitution, may provide by law for "raising, equipping and maintaining armies and navies" and "may make rules for the government of the land and naval forces." Id. at 489, 24 S.E. at 418 (citation omitted). "When Congress asserts its authority... within the purveiw [sic] of its powers the President is deprived of the supreme power of military head of the Government" and instead "incurs the obligation as Chief Executive to see that the laws made by the legislative branch of the government are faithfully executed." Id. at 489, 24 S.E. at 418 (citation omitted). In the same way,
Id. at 489-90, 24 S.E. at 418 (citing N.C. Const. of 1868, art. III, § 1, and quoting id., art. XII, § 2).
Synthesizing the executive's constitutional role as commander-in-chief with the legislature's lawmaking power, the Court concluded that the Governor could in his discretion "dismiss officers of the militia when his powers and duties are not defined by any legislative act." Id. at 490, 24 S.E. at 418 ("The power to dismiss being conferred by the constitutional provision and affirmed by statute, it is clear that the Governor may still
"The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other." N.C. Const. art. I, § 6. The separation-of-powers clause is located within the Declaration of Rights of Article I, an expressive yet nonexhaustive list of protections afforded to citizens against government intrusion, along with "the ideological premises that underlie the structure of government." State Constitution 46. The placement of the clause there suggests that keeping each branch within its described spheres protects the people by limiting overall governmental power. The clause does not establish the various powers but simply states the powers of the branches are "separate and distinct." N.C. Const. art. I, § 6. The constitutional text develops the nature of those powers. State Constitution 46 ("Basic principles, such as popular sovereignty and separation of powers, are first set out in general terms, to be given specific application in later articles.").
Thus, the separation-of-powers clause "is to be considered as a general statement of a broad, albeit fundamental, constitutional principle," State v. Furmage, 250 N.C. 616, 627, 109 S.E.2d 563, 571 (1959), and must be considered with the related, more specific provisions of the constitution that outline the practical workings for governance,
Given that "a constitution cannot violate itself," Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 352, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (1997), a branch's exercise of its express authority by definition comports with separation of powers. A violation of separation of powers only occurs when one branch of government exercises, or prevents the exercise of, a power reserved for another branch of government. McCrory, 368 N.C. at 660, 781 S.E.2d at 265.
When confronted with an alleged separation-of-powers violation, a court must first determine if the conflict is nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts will refuse to resolve a dispute of "purely political character" or when "[judicial] determination would involve an encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers." Political Questions, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Federal guidance provides that, "as essentially a function of the separation of powers," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed. 2d 663, 686 (1962), a court should not review questions better suited for the political branches. The same separation-of-powers principles limit this Court's review.
Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 717, 549 S.E.2d 840, 854 (2001) (ellipses in original).
As explained by the Supreme Court of the United States, under the political question doctrine, a court should refuse to become embroiled in a separation-of-powers dispute if any one of the following is true: (1) there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;" (2) the matter involves "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;" (3) the matter is impossible to "decid[e] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;" or (4) a court cannot possibly undertake an "independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 686. The presence of any one of these factors cautions against judicial entanglement. Judicial review of a political question itself violates separation of powers because the Court asserts a power it does not have to prevent the exercise of a specific power held by a political branch.
Against the backdrop of the General Assembly's plenary legislative power,
N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(10). By the plain language, the General Assembly has the express authority to "prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State and may alter them from time to time." Id.; see also McCrory, 368 N.C. at 664, 781 S.E.2d at 268 (noting "the General Assembly's significant express constitutional authority to assign executive duties to the constitutional executive officers and organize executive departments").
Elsewhere in the same Article, the text again acknowledges the General Assembly's authority over administrative agencies:
N.C. Const. art. III, § 11. It is the General Assembly that statutorily assigns the "respective functions, powers, and duties" of "all administrative departments, agencies, and offices." Id. Moreover, the text specifically acknowledges the validity of "[r]egulatory, quasi-judicial, and temporary agencies" independent of any principal department of the executive branch. Id.
By executive order, the Governor may also "make such changes ... as he considers necessary for efficient administration." Id. art. III, § 5(10). When the Governor makes changes, he submits them to the General Assembly, and they become effective "unless specifically disapproved by resolution of either house ... or specifically modified by joint resolution." Id. Much like the gubernatorial veto, the General Assembly retains the prerogative to statutorily override these changes, to reorganize the structure and functions of the executive branch, and to alter the branch's supervisory structure. Id. art. III, §§ 5(10), 11.
The framers of our current constitution understood the text of Article III, Sections 5(10) and 11 as simply incorporating the historic legislative authority to create and reorganize administrative divisions by statute:
N.C. State Constitution Study Comm'n, Report of the North Carolina State Constitution Study Commission 131-32 (1968) [hereinafter Report].
As demonstrated here, the text of Article III, Sections 5(10) and 11 specifically assigns to the General Assembly authority over the administrative divisions it legislatively creates,
Significantly, there is nothing in the constitutional text of Article III, Sections 5(10) or 11 which limits the power of the General Assembly to create an independent, bipartisan board. Likewise, there is no constitutional text that grants the Governor the power to assert personal policy preferences, much less the power to override a policy decision of the General Assembly. Neither Section 5(4) of Article III nor any other constitutional provision gives the Governor an authority that in any way conflicts with the General Assembly's assigned power in Sections 5(10) and 11. Section 5(4) does not limit the power of the General Assembly in any manner; it simply requires the Governor to execute the laws as enacted by the General Assembly. Section 5(4) says nothing about the Governor's role in reorganization and clearly is not an "explicit textual limitation" on the General Assembly's power. The constitutional provisions of Article III do not conflict. The General Assembly makes the laws, and the Governor implements them. As conceded by the majority, when "the Governor is seeking to have the judicial branch interfere with an issue committed to the sole discretion of the General Assembly," the matter is nonjusticiable. The trial court correctly observed:
Moreover, not only does this case present a political question because the constitution textually commits the type of government reorganization here to the General Assembly, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 686, this lawsuit likewise requires an "initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion," id. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 686.
Ch. 6, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 21. As evident from the stated purpose, the decision to place elections, lobbying, ethics, and campaign finance within a bipartisan, independent agency, at its heart, is a policy one, seeking to insulate these areas from political influence and creating the structure for achieving this end. Such a decision is precisely the type of "initial policy determination" assigned to the legislative branch. See Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 363 N.C. 500, 512, 681 S.E.2d 278, 286 (2009) (Newby, J., concurring) (concluding that political considerations "should be left to a body like the General Assembly, which is in the best position to consider the full range of evidence and balance the competing objectives").
While the Governor attacks the independent and bipartisan nature of the consolidated board, a judicial resolution would require an initial policy determination this Court cannot make
The majority's novel analysis creates two significant problems in our jurisprudence, forecasting perilous consequences for years to come. The majority's approach eliminates the political question doctrine and inserts the judiciary into every separation-of-powers dispute between the political branches. Most concerning, the Court's decision judicially amends our constitution to grant the Governor a constitutional power to enact personal policy preferences, even elevating those preferences over the duly enacted laws when they conflict. While the majority correctly states the traditional rule for nonjusticiability as outlined in Bacon and Baker, it then crafts an exception to nonjusticiability that completely swallows the rule: Matters are justiciable any time a party seeks to have the Court "ascertain the meaning of an applicable legal principle, such as [a constitutional provision]."
Under the majority's new test, every separation-of-powers dispute is justiciable. Without exception, a party to a constitutional lawsuit asks the Court to "ascertain the meaning of [the] applicable legal principle." Swept up in this broad reach is Bacon, in which this Court held a challenge to a governor's textual clemency power was a nonjusticiable political question. Bacon, 353 N.C. at 716-17, 721-22, 549 S.E.2d at 854, 857. The plaintiff there sought the "meaning" of the applicable legal principle, Article III, Section 5(6). See id. at 701-04, 711, 549 S.E.2d at 844-47, 851 (asking whether a governor, who as Attorney General defended against the plaintiff's appeal, could consider the plaintiff's clemency request under Article III, Section 5(6)). Under the majority's new test, however,
The majority vainly searches to support this inventive approach with a Court of Appeals decision. In News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Easley, the News & Observer filed a public records request for clemency records, arguing the Public Records Law was a "regulation[] prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons" as envisioned by Article III, Section 5(6). News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Easley, 182 N.C. App. 14, 641 S.E.2d 698, 704-05 (2007) (quoting N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(6)). In essence, the dispute was not a question regarding a constitutional power textually committed to one branch. It involved the straightforward application of a constitutional provision to a statute. The Court of Appeals simply decided the Public Records Law was not a regulation "relative to the manner of applying for pardons." Id. at 23, 641 S.E.2d at 704.
Seeming to question its own analysis, the majority maintains that
While the majority cites examples of express limitations that applied in other cases, it does not identify any such constitutional provision that expressly "limits" the General Assembly's authority under Article III, Sections 5(10) and 11.
The majority concedes that the constitution in Article III, Sections 5(10) and 11 textually assign to the General Assembly the authority to create the bipartisan board. It further admits that if the constitution assigns a specific power to a branch, a challenge to that power is nonjusticiable. Missing an actual "explicit textual limitation," the majority manufactures one to create a conflict in the text by judicially rewriting Article III, Section 5(4) to say, "The Governor shall take care that the Governor's personal policy preferences be faithfully executed." It thereby judicially creates a constitutional authority of the Governor to enforce personal policy preferences superior to the General Assembly's historic constitutional authority to make the laws. The majority then holds that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the General Assembly violated separation of powers in creating this bipartisan board because the board's structure prevents the Governor from exercising this newly-minted constitutional authority. Under this holding, the Governor no longer must seek to influence policy by participating in the constitutionally specified procedures of executive orders and the veto, both of which the General Assembly can override. The Governor prevails simply by complaining to the judicial branch that any legislation interferes with the implementation of personal policy preferences.
Prominent jurists have warned that courts undermine their legitimacy when they take sides in policy questions assigned to the political branches:
Baker, 369 U.S. at 267, 82 S.Ct. at 737-38, 7 L.Ed. 2d at 714-15 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). With today's sweeping opinion, the majority effectively eliminates the political question doctrine, embroiling the Court in separation-of-powers disputes for years to come. In reaching this decision, the majority creates a new and superior constitutional power in the Governor to enforce personal policy preferences, elevating those policy preferences over the constitutionally enacted laws. The General Assembly has the express,