McGEE, Judge.

James Lamont Hazel (Defendant) was indicted on multiple drug charges including, relevant to this opinion, four counts of possession with intent to distribute heroin, four counts of selling heroin, and one count of trafficking in heroin by possession.

Detective Sidney Jerome Lackey (Detective Lackey), an undercover officer for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, received a tip from a confidential informant that Defendant was dealing heroin. Detective Lackey used a phone number he obtained from his confidential informant to set up four undercover heroin purchases, an operation known as a "buy/bust." A "buy/bust" on 1 December 2010 was the last of the four phases of the operation. On that day, two officers with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department were positioned in the parking lot of an apartment complex located at 1605 Ivy Meadow Lane in Charlotte, where the buy was to take place. While in the parking lot, the officers observed Defendant drive into the parking lot at 10:40 a.m. A third officer, Detective Amir Holding (Detective Holding), testified he watched Defendant exit a car and walk over to breezeway number two. Detective Holding then walked over to breezeway number two, where he heard a door close. Detective Holding waited at the breezeway for ten to fifteen minutes, saw Defendant exit Apartment 216 (the apartment) between 11:05 and 11:10 a.m., and walk toward the front of the apartment complex. At the same time, Detective Lackey arrived at the apartment complex and picked Defendant up in front of the apartment complex. Detective Lackey gave Defendant $800.00 in return for 3.97 grams of heroin. Once the transaction was complete, Detective Lackey gave the "takedown" signal. Defendant was read his Miranda rights and placed under arrest. Because Detective Lackey was still operating undercover, other officers collected the evidence, including the 3.97 grams of heroin, and interviewed Defendant.

Defendant led officers to the apartment, gave them a key to the apartment, and permission to enter. One of the officers testified he had verbal consent to enter the apartment from another man who said he lived in the apartment; however, the officer failed to write down the man's name or obtain a recorded statement. The officers testified they did not know if the man who allegedly gave consent to enter the apartment had been in the apartment that day, and they could no longer remember the man's name. There was testimony that the man's name was not on the lease of the apartment.

Defendant directed officers to the only bedroom in the apartment, where they found a clear plastic bag containing Defendant's clothes. Defendant also directed officers to an additional 0.97 grams of heroin in the kitchen, which was packaged in the same manner as the heroin previously sold in the parking lot buy/bust. The total weight of heroin recovered from Defendant and the apartment was 4.94 grams.

Defendant moved to dismiss the trafficking charge on 2 March 2012, arguing that the trial court should dismiss the charge because the drugs purchased from Defendant in the parking lot and the drugs seized from Defendant in the apartment constituted two separate possession charges, rather than one combined trafficking charge. The trial court denied Defendant's motion. Defendant was found guilty of four counts of sale of heroin, four counts of possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin, and one count of trafficking in heroin by possession. Defendant was sentenced to a combined active term of 83-100 months. Defendant appeals.

I.

We first note that Defendant challenges on appeal only his conviction for trafficking in heroin by possession. The issues on appeal are whether: (1) the trial court improperly combined the heroin recovered from Defendant's person with the heroin recovered from the apartment to support the trafficking charge and (2) the trial court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte exclude testimony indicating that Defendant had possession or control over the apartment. We address Defendant's second argument first.

II

Defendant contends the trial court committed plain error in allowing State's witnesses to characterize the apartment as Defendant's apartment, and in allowing State's witnesses to refer to the individual who gave consent to enter the apartment as Defendant's roommate. We disagree.

Specifically, Defendant argues that because "[c]onvincing the jury that [Defendant] constructively possessed the heroin found in [the] [a]partment ... was critical to the State's case[,]" the admission of this testimony prejudiced him. Because Defendant failed to properly preserve these issues for appellate review, he now contends that the admission of this testimony rises to the level of plain error.

State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citations omitted).

Officer Lackey testified that, following the arrest of Defendant and the seizure of the 3.97 grams of heroin from Defendant's person, additional evidence was recovered "from his [Defendant's] apartment." Defendant objected to the characterization of the apartment as belonging to Defendant, and the trial court sustained Defendant's objection. The jury was excused, and Defendant asked for a motion to strike, which the trial court granted. Upon the jury's return, the trial court instructed as follows:

Detective Terrance Gerald (Detective Gerald) testified the following morning, answering questions on direct as follows:

Defendant's attorney questioned Detective Gerald about the detective's characterization of the apartment as Defendant's apartment, and Detective Gerald responded: "I never said that [Defendant] said that's his apartment. I said [Defendant] said he was staying with someone."

Detective Temple testified that Defendant "gave me consent to enter and search his apartment which he possessed the keys to." Defendant objected to the characterization of the apartment as "his" [Defendant's] apartment, and the trial court again instructed the jury not to interpret Detective Temple's testimony as indicating that the apartment belonged to Defendant. Detective Temple further testified:

At trial, Defendant also objected to the following answer by Detective Temple:

The trial court correctly overruled Defendant's objection to the term "roommate" because that term had been used earlier in the trial without objection. State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 409, 555 S.E.2d 557, 582 (2001).

Defendant argues that testimony indicating the apartment belonged to Defendant, and testimony that the other man claiming control of the apartment was Defendant's roommate, had a probable impact on the jury's determination that Defendant constructively possessed the heroin in the apartment.

In State v. Neal, this Court stated:

State v. Neal, 109 N.C. App. 684, 686, 428 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1993) (citations omitted). It is undisputed that Defendant did not maintain exclusive control over the apartment. However, there was plenary evidence that Defendant was using the apartment: a key to the apartment was on Defendant's key ring; Defendant's clothing was found inside a plastic bag in the bedroom of the apartment; and Defendant was observed entering, and then exiting, the apartment shortly before the final drug transaction. Finally, there was testimony that Defendant stated the apartment was "where he was staying."

Although Defendant did not maintain exclusive control over the apartment, and the degree of control that Defendant did maintain was in dispute, other incriminating circumstances were present, supporting a finding that Defendant constructively possessed the heroin in the apartment at the time of his arrest. Specifically, Defendant told officers he had more heroin, and that it was in the apartment. Defendant gave verbal consent to enter the apartment, which entry was accomplished by the key on Defendant's key ring, voluntarily provided by Defendant. Defendant, according to testimony, led officers directly to the heroin in the kitchen. Defendant then "informed [Detective Temple] that the roommate was not involved in the heroin trade, nor did he have any idea of [Defendant's] involvement in the drug trade."

This evidence of Defendant's repeated statements that the heroin recovered from the apartment belonged to him constitutes sufficient "other incriminating circumstances... for constructive possession to be inferred." Neal, 109 N.C.App. at 686, 428 S.E.2d at 289. Even assuming, arguendo, that the admission of the contested testimony constituted error, it does not rise to the level of plain error. This argument is without merit.

III.

In Defendant's first argument, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the trafficking charge. We disagree.

Defendant specifically argues that the trial court erred in allowing the heroin recovered from Defendant's person to be combined with the heroin recovered from the apartment for the purposes of charging Defendant with trafficking. Although Defendant contends this alleged error constituted a violation of his right to due process, and thus argues for de novo review by this Court, the appropriate standard of review is that for denial of a motion to dismiss.

"`Upon defendant's motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.'" State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation omitted). "In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor." State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994) (citations omitted).

In State v. Keys, as in the case before us, the defendant "was charged and convicted, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 90-95(h)(4)a, of trafficking in heroin by possession of more than four grams but less than fourteen grams. This crime has two elements: (1) knowing possession (either actual or constructive) of (2) a specified amount [more than 4 grams but less than 14 grams] of heroin." State v. Keys, 87 N.C. App. 349, 352, 361 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1987) (citations omitted).

Defendant cites to this Court's opinion in State v. Rozier, 69 N.C. App. 38, 316 S.E.2d 893 (1984), to support his fundamentally flawed statement of the law concerning when drugs recovered in separate locations may be combined for the purposes of supporting a trafficking charge. Defendant states in his brief:

Defendant immediately follows this incorrect assertion of the law with a cite to Rozier. In Rozier, the defendants are making the opposite argument — that the drugs found on their persons should have been combined with the drugs they had previously sold, and that charging them separately constituted error. Id. at 54, 316 S.E.2d at 904. A vital portion of the Rozier analysis, not cited by Defendant in the present case, is as follows: "The circumstances of each case will determine whether separate offenses may properly be charged." Id. at 55, 316 S.E.2d at 904.

The circumstances in Rozier were quite different than those in the case before us. In Rozier,

Id. (emphasis added).

None of these circumstances indicate universal requirements for deciding the validity of charging defendants for two separate crimes involving drug possession, much less universal requirements for charging defendants with only one crime involving drug possession when drugs are recovered from different locations. The circumstances listed in Rozier are just that — particular circumstances from a particular case that this Court held sufficient to support two separate charges related to drug possession in that case.

"In order for the State to obtain multiple convictions for possession of a controlled substance, the State must show distinct acts of possession separated in time and space." State v. Moncree, 188 N.C. App. 221, 231, 655 S.E.2d 464, 470 (2008) (citing Rozier, 69 N.C.App. at 38, 316 S.E.2d at 893). The converse does not inevitably follow. Rozier did not address the requirements for obtaining a single conviction for possession of a controlled substance recovered in different locations and at different times. However, what is clear is that if the State cannot show distinct acts of possession, separated in time, then multiple convictions for possession would be improper. Moncree, 188 N.C.App. at 232, 655 S.E.2d at 471 (because the defendant simultaneously possessed the marijuana in his shoe and the marijuana in his automobile, the "defendant should have been charged with only the one count of felony possession of marijuana").

Defendant in the present case was observed entering the apartment immediately before his sale of 3.97 grams of heroin to Detective Lackey. Upon arrest, and after having been read his Miranda rights, Defendant volunteered that he had more heroin in the apartment, and provided the key and consent for the officers to enter the apartment where 0.97 grams of additional heroin were recovered. This additional heroin was packaged for sale in the same manner as the heroin actually sold to Detective Lackey. According to testimony, Defendant admitted to being a drug dealer. There was no evidence any of the heroin was for Defendant's personal use.

Defendant possessed the heroin in the apartment simultaneously with the heroin sold to Detective Lackey. Considering these circumstances, we hold there was no error in convicting Defendant on one charge of trafficking instead of two charges of possession. This Court, in an unpublished opinion, has reached the same result on facts nearly identical to those in the present case. State v. Kornegay, 153 N.C. App. 201, 569 S.E.2d 33, 2002 WL 31056751 (2002) (unpublished).

As the above argument was Defendant's sole justification for his motion to dismiss the trafficking charge, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.

No error.

Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge CALABRIA concur.