This appeal raises the issue of whether the Automated Criminal/Infraction System database ("ACIS") is subject to public disclosure under the North Carolina Public Records Act, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 132-1 et seq. ("the Act"). In its order dismissing the matter on the pleadings, the trial court summarized the factual background of the case as follows:
In the fall of 2011, Lexis sent letters to Defendant John W. Smith II, in his official capacity as Director of the AOC, and to Defendant Nancy Lorrin Freeman, in her official capacity as the elected Clerk of the Wake County Superior Court ("the clerk"). Citing the Act, Lexis requested an index
On 13 October 2011, Lexis filed a complaint alleging that the clerk's and the AOC's refusal to provide an electronic copy of the ACIS database violates the Act. Lexis sought declarations that the ACIS database is a public record under the Act and that the AOC and/or the clerk are custodians of ACIS, as well as an order requiring the release of ACIS as a public record pursuant to the Act. Defendants filed a joint answer on 15 December 2011. On 6 February 2012, Lexis moved for judgment on the pleadings. Following a hearing, by order entered 8 February 2013, the trial court denied Lexis's motion, granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants, and dismissed the matter. Lexis appeals.
On appeal, Lexis brings forward four arguments: that the trial court (1) misapplied the standard for judgment on the pleadings by assuming the counter-allegations in Defendants' answer to be true, and erred in (2) failing to address whether ACIS is a public record subject to disclosure under the Act, (3) concluding that the AOC is not the custodian of ACIS, and (4) denying disclosure of ACIS pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-109(d). Because they are closely related and are dispositive of the merits of Lexis's position on appeal, we address Lexis's second and third arguments together. We reverse and remand the trial court's order as to the AOC. In light of this result, we do not address Lexis's first argument. We affirm as to the clerk.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. Toomer v. Branch Banking & Trust. Co., 171 N.C. App. 58, 66, 614 S.E.2d 328, 335, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 78, 623 S.E.2d 263 (2005). "Under a de novo review, the [appellate] court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Lexis argues that the ACIS database is a "public record" as defined in the Act and the AOC is its custodian. We agree.
The Act provides that
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 132-1(a) (2013) (emphasis added). Further,
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 132-6(a).
Both parties agree that the individual criminal records of the clerks of court are public records and that the clerks are the custodians of those records. As required by the Act, the clerk of court in each county will, upon request, provide copies of the criminal records for his or her county.
As for the first issue, we agree with Lexis's assertion that, once the clerks of court enter information from their criminal records into ACIS, the database becomes a new public record "existing distinctly and separately from" the individual criminal records from which it is created.
"Database." Merriam-Webster.com. Concise Encyclopedia, http://www.merriam-webster.com/concise/database (last visited Jan. 23, 2014) (emphasis added). Thus, we conclude that the ACIS database falls squarely within the definition of a public record as an electronic data-processing record.
Next, as noted supra, the Act provides that the custodian of public records has the duty to provide the public with copies of those records when requested. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6(a). The AOC argues that it is not the custodian of the criminal records whose information is used to create ACIS. We agree, but find this assertion inapposite. Lexis is not seeking copies of the criminal records, but rather a copy of ACIS.
We also reject as misplaced the AOC's related argument that it is not the custodian of the information contained in ACIS. The Act does not refer to custodians of information but of records. See id. The plain language of the Act requires custodians to provide copies of their public records and nothing in the Act suggests that this requirement is obviated because the information contained in a public record is publically available from some other source. Many public records contain information that is derived from and/or contained in
Further, we find irrelevant the AOC's observations that individual clerks of court input information from their counties' criminal records into ACIS and retain the sole ability to alter the information they input. In opposing the AOC's argument on this point, Lexis cites News & Observer Pub. Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 412 S.E.2d 7 (1992). In Poole, the plaintiffs sought
Id. at 470, 412 S.E.2d at 10 (emphasis added). The Commission acknowledged that many of the materials it generated or gathered were public records, but argued that the reports prepared by the SBI were not public records, citing a statutory provision which specifically exempts records and evidence created by the SBI from the definition of public records under the Act. Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that, "when the SBI submitted its investigative reports to the Commission, they became Commission records. As such they are subject to the Public Records Law and must be disclosed to the same extent that other Commission materials must be disclosed under that law." Id. at 473, 412 S.E.2d at 12. Thus, the rule established by Poole is that, even when one government agency wholly creates a record and then simply delivers a copy of that record to a second agency, the second agency becomes a custodian of the record under the Act. See id.
Here, the case for disclosure under the Act is even stronger than in Poole. The clerks of court have not simply made copies of their records and sent them to the AOC. Rather, as explained supra, the clerks have acted at the direction of the AOC to create an entirely new and distinct public record, to wit, ACIS. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-109(a) (2013) ("Each clerk [of court] shall maintain such records, files, dockets[,] and indexes as are prescribed by rules of the Director of the [AOC]."). For all the reasons stated above, we hold that ACIS is a public record in the custody of the AOC.
We also agree with Lexis that the trial court erred in concluding that requiring the AOC to provide a copy of ACIS upon request would "negate the provisions of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-109(d)[.]"
Subsection (d) of the statute provides:
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-109(d). Nothing in this subsection limits the public's ability to obtain copies of public records under the Act. The plain language of this subsection simply allows
We are sympathetic to the AOC's argument that, if copies of the entire ACIS database are available upon request under the Act, third parties may be discouraged from entering into "contracts under reasonable cost recovery terms ... to provide remote electronic access to [court] records...." Id. However, we note that section 7A-109(d) is expressly permissive, rather than mandatory. See id. (providing that "the Director [of the AOC] may enter into one or more nonexclusive contracts under reasonable cost recovery terms with third parties") (emphasis added). If provision of copies of ACIS under the Act renders the option of providing remote electronic access unnecessary or not cost-effective, the AOC can simply decline to offer this additional method of access.
Our Supreme Court has directed "that in the absence of clear statutory exemption or exception, documents falling within the definition of `public records' in the [Act] must be made available for public inspection." Poole, 330 N.C. at 486, 412 S.E.2d at 19 (emphasis added). We conclude there is no clear statutory exemption or exception applicable to the ACIS database. Accordingly, as to the AOC, the order of the trial court is reversed. We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for Lexis.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
Judges GEER and ERVIN concur.