DIETZ, Judge.
Respondent, the mother of J.K.P., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. She argues that the trial court erred in allowing her to waive her right to counsel and represent herself at the termination hearing. She also contends that the trial court improperly corrected a clerical mistake on the waiver-of-counsel form after entering judgment. We reject Respondent's arguments and affirm.
The Wake County Department of Human Services (WCHS) filed a petition on 29 May 2012 alleging that J.K.P. was a neglected juvenile. By order filed 17 August 2012, the trial court adjudicated J.K.P. neglected. Respondent appealed and this Court affirmed the adjudication on 7 May 2013. In re J.P., ___ N.C.App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 928 (2013) (unpublished). WCHS filed a motion to terminate Respondent's parental rights on 18 September 2013.
The trial court held a review and permanency planning hearing on 2 October 2013, at which Respondent indicated she did not wish to have her court-appointed attorney, Mr. Milholland, represent her. The trial court allowed both Respondent's court-appointed attorney and her guardian ad litem to withdraw. Respondent later filed an affidavit of indigency requesting court-appointed counsel, and the trial court appointed Ms. Ferrell to represent Respondent in the termination hearing.
The trial court held the termination hearing on 28 February 2014. Ms. Ferrell advised the court that "[Respondent] has informed me that she wishes to represent herself in this matter." The trial court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Respondent about her desire to proceed pro se and her understanding of the consequences, and then asked Respondent to read and sign a waiver-of-counsel form. Respondent checked the box indicating that she intended to represent herself and signed her name. On the signed form, the court made written findings of fact to show that Respondent's waiver was "knowing and voluntary"; however, the court checked the box corresponding with the conclusion of law that "[p]arent's waiver is not knowing and voluntary." Respondent proceeded pro se at the termination hearing.
By order filed 4 April 2014, the trial court terminated Respondent's parental rights. Respondent timely filed her notice of appeal on 6 May 2014. Three days later, before the record on appeal was docketed with this Court, the trial court signed appellate entries and amended Respondent's waiver form to correct the court's mistaken check mark in the wrong box on the waiver-of-counsel form.
On appeal, Respondent contends the trial court erred in allowing her to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro se at the termination hearing. A parent's right to counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding is governed by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1101.1, which provides:
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1101.1 (2013).
Here, after the trial court explained the nature of the proceeding and the consequences of waiving the right to counsel, Respondent read and signed a waiver form containing the following language:
Below Respondent's signature on the form, the trial court made specific factual findings supporting its conclusion that Respondent's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. The court found that Respondent understood she was represented by a court-appointed attorney and agreed that her court-appointed attorney "has not been ineffective." The court also found that Respondent knew she "was expected to know the law of [termination of parental rights], rules of evidence, [and] rules of court."
Respondent does not challenge these findings by the trial court, nor does she argue that these findings are insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that her waiver was knowing and voluntary. Instead, Respondent argues that she never requested to represent herself and that the court never told her she had a right to counsel. We disagree.
First, the transcript unquestionably shows that Respondent asked to represent herself. Before the proceedings began, the trial court
At the beginning of this lengthy colloquy, Respondent's counsel informed the court that Respondent did not want to be represented by counsel. The trial court then asked Respondent repeatedly "why is it that you wish to represent yourself?" Each time, Respondent provided a cogent answer confirming that she wanted to represent herself. As Respondent explained, she intended to hire a lawyer in the future to collaterally attack the constitutionality of the proceedings. Respondent believed that, unlike her appointed counsel, "I'll make sure ... everything is on record so that when I do have an attorney, he can go back to the record and see everything that I was said [sic] in that courtroom."
Moreover, Respondent read and signed the waiver of counsel form which expressly states that "I do not want the assistance of any lawyer. I understand that I have the right to represent myself, and that is what I intend to do." Accordingly, we reject Respondent's argument that she never asked to represent herself.
Respondent next argues that the trial court never told her she had a right to counsel. But during the lengthy colloquy quoted above, the trial court explained that Respondent was represented by court-appointed counsel because she "filed an affidavit of indigency" and requested a lawyer. Indeed, Respondent repeatedly invoked her right to have court-appointed representation during the juvenile proceedings in the trial court and was represented by counsel at various points throughout the proceedings. Moreover, the court told Respondent that if she chose to represent herself "you waive your right to a lawyer." Finally, Respondent read and signed the waiver form which stated that "I have been told that I have the right to have a lawyer represent me. I have been told of my right to have a lawyer appointed by the Court if I cannot afford to hire one." Thus, we reject Respondent's argument that she was never told she had a right to be represented by counsel.
In sum, the trial court properly concluded that Respondent knowingly and voluntarily chose to represent herself at trial. However unwise that decision may have been, it "must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the right to self-representation in criminal proceedings).
Respondent next argues the trial court expressly found that her waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary because the court checked the "not knowing and voluntary" box on the waiver form. Respondent acknowledges that the trial court amended the form several days after entering judgment to show that Respondent's waiver was knowing and voluntary, making the following handwritten change on the form:
But Respondent argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make this amendment because Respondent already had filed her notice of appeal. We disagree.
Generally, "a timely notice of appeal removes jurisdiction from the trial court and places it in the appellate court." In re C.N.C.B., 197 N.C. App. 553, 555, 678 S.E.2d 240, 241 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But Rule 60(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial court to correct "clerical mistakes" in orders and judgments on its own initiative, even after notice of appeal has been filed, so long as the case has not yet been docketed with this Court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(a) (2013).
"Clerical mistakes" are typographical errors, mistakes in writing or copying something into the record, or other, similar mistakes that are not changes in the court's reasoning or determination. See In re D.D.J., 177 N.C. App. 441, 444, 628 S.E.2d 808, 811 (2006). Importantly, this Court has
The AOC form used here, entitled "Waiver of Parent's Right to Counsel," contains a "Findings of Fact" section that requires the trial court to make findings of fact demonstrating that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. The section contains six blank lines for the court to make such findings of fact. The form also includes a "Conclusions of Law" section which requires the trial judge to check one of two boxes concluding either: (1) "The parent's waiver is knowing and voluntary," or (2) "The parent's waiver is not knowing and voluntary."
Here, the trial court hand-wrote five sentences in the "Findings of Fact" section of the form and checked the box associated with the conclusion of law that Respondent's waiver "is not knowing and voluntary." But, as explained above, the handwritten findings of fact support the conclusion that Respondent's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. Moreover, the trial court made additional remarks at the conclusion of the hearing that confirm the court intended at the time to check the "is knowing and voluntary" box. The trial court stated:
We hold that the trial court's findings on the form, and its additional, contemporaneous statements at that hearing, show that the trial court made an inadvertent "clerical mistake" by checking the wrong box. Under Rule 60(a), the trial court had jurisdiction to correct that mistake at any time before the record on appeal was docketed in this Court. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(a). Because the court corrected this clerical mistake before the appeal was docketed, we reject Respondent's jurisdictional argument.
The trial court's findings support its conclusion that Respondent knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel at the termination proceeding below. Accordingly, we reject Respondent's arguments and affirm the trial court's judgment. AFFIRMED.
Judges STROUD and DILLON concur.
