STEPHENS, Judge.

In this appeal, we consider whether Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims under North Carolina law brought in Guilford County Superior Court are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a result of the dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of certain federal law claims brought in Plaintiffs' earlier federal lawsuit against Defendants. Because we conclude that dismissal of federal claims pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of collaterally estopping a plaintiff from raising the same issues under state law in our State's courts, we affirm the trial court's order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of collateral estoppel.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from claims and counterclaims of racial discrimination, misconduct, and conspiracies by various factions in the Greensboro Police Department ("GPD") and the government of the City of Greensboro ("the City"). In simplified form, some African American GPD officers alleged that a secret unit of Caucasian GPD officers was targeting them for improper investigations based on their race, while some of the accused Caucasian officers denied those allegations and instead asserted that they were the victims of racially motivated false claims and criminal charges.

In June 2005, GPD Officer James Hinson and other African American GPD officers accused then-GPD Chief David Wray of using certain Caucasian officers of the Special Investigation Section ("SIS"), a subdivision of the GPD, to surveil and target African American GPD officers. Officially, the SIS was tasked with duties such as protecting celebrities who visited Greensboro, investigating allegations of criminal activities by GPD officers, and handling other sensitive police matters.1

Hinson alleged that one tool the SIS used in its supposed racial misconduct against African American GPD officers was a binder containing photographs of African American GPD officers known as the "black book." The SIS did in fact have a black binder which contained photo arrays of African American GPD officers, but SIS officers asserted that the photos were only those officers who had been on duty at the time of an alleged sexual assault by a uniformed African American GPD officer and that the binder was shown only to the victim of the alleged sexual assault as part of an SIS investigation into the matter.

After learning of Hinson's claims, Defendant Mitchell Johnson, who was employed by the City first as Assistant City Manager and later as City Manager, and who also served on the City Council, met with attorneys representing some of the African American GPD officers who made the allegations against the SIS. After that meeting, Johnson instructed the City Attorney's Office to initiate an investigation of Plaintiffs William Thomas Fox and Scott Everett Sanders, two Caucasian GPD officers alleged to have been part of the SIS group racially targeting African American officers. Johnson and the City Council also contracted with Risk Management Associates, Inc., ("RMA") to conduct a private investigation of Plaintiffs and the SIS to supplement the official City investigation. Plaintiffs contend that the investigations were initiated by Johnson as part of a plan to pressure Wray into resigning as well as to tarnish Plaintiffs' own reputations and ultimately remove them from their positions with the SIS.

In the midst of the official and private investigations, on 9 January 2006, Wray resigned as GPD Chief, and Defendant Timothy R. Bellamy was appointed as acting Chief and then Chief of the GPD. A few days later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") began its own investigation into the actions of Wray and Plaintiffs. After learning that the FBI investigation revealed no evidence of civil rights violations by Wray, Fox, or Sanders, Bellamy directed Johnson to request an investigation by the State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI"). In the course of its investigation, the SBI interviewed numerous GPD officers, including defendants Gary R. Hastings and Martha T. Kelly. Plaintiffs contend that Bellamy and Johnson sought the SBI investigation despite knowing that the allegations of wrongdoing by Fox and Sanders were false. Plaintiffs further assert that Hastings and Kelly gave false information to the SBI and destroyed and/or refused to turn over to the SBI evidence and information that was favorable to Fox and Sanders. The SBI investigation concluded in the fall of 2007, and resulted in the indictment of Fox on one count each of felonious obstruction of justice and felonious conspiracy, while Sanders was indicted on one count of accessing a government computer without authorization, two counts of felonious obstruction of justice, and one count of felonious conspiracy.

Following a trial in February 2009, a jury found Sanders not guilty of improperly accessing a government computer. As a result of a post-trial Brady2 motion by Sanders, previously undisclosed statements came to light, leading to the dismissal of all the remaining charges against both Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend those exculpatory statements had been intentionally and maliciously suppressed by Hastings and Kelly, among others, as part of a conspiracy against Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint on 23 March 2010 against Johnson, Bellamy, Hastings, and Kelly, as well as the City, RMA, and GPD officers John Slone and Ernest Cuthbertson (collectively, "the federal defendants") in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. See Fox v. City of Greensboro, 807 F.Supp.2d 476 (2011). In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged claims for

Id. at 483-84. After the federal defendants moved to dismiss, Plaintiffs sought and were granted leave by the federal court to amend their complaint to "clarify and amplify the factual basis for their allegations." Id. at 501. Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on 1 April 2011. The federal defendants then moved to dismiss the amended complaint, including, inter alia, Plaintiffs' claims "that the City, Johnson, Bellamy, Hastings, and Kelly took certain actions ... that led to `unfounded' criminal charges against Plaintiffs (which ultimately terminated in their favor) and the arrest and detention of Plaintiffs in violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 491. Specifically as to those Fourth Amendment claims, "Defendants argue[d] that Plaintiffs' vague allegations d[id] not sufficiently indicate that each Defendant performed actions proximately causing Plaintiffs' indictment and arrest." Id.

The federal court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' federal law claims, including the Fourth Amendment claims. Id. at 501. In addition, noting that, "[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a federal district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such state-law claims if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[,]" the federal court "decline[d] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Plaintiffs'] state-law claims[,]" which it dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 500 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

On 23 January 2012, Plaintiffs filed a complaint ("the state complaint") in Forsyth County Superior Court3 against all of the federal defendants except RMA, and added Defendant Norman O. Rankin, another GPD officer (collectively, "the state defendants"). The state complaint alleged the following claims: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and punitive damages against Johnson, Bellamy, and Hastings; malicious prosecution and abuse of process against Kelly; civil conspiracy and punitive damages against Cuthbertson, Slone, and Rankin; and declaratory judgment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and punitive damages against the City. Johnson, Bellamy, Hastings, and Kelly ("Defendants") were sued in both their official and individual capacities, while Cuthbertson, Slone, and Rankin were sued only in their individual capacities.

On 24 February 2012, the individual state defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them "because [the complaint] fails to sufficiently plead a conspiracy, abuse of process, and other matters." See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2013). The City also moved to dismiss. At the motion hearing, the state defendants argued that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by, inter alia, the statute of limitations, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, collateral estoppel, and the failure to plead sufficient facts. On 11 July 2012, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to the City and dismissed all claims against it with prejudice, a ruling that also effectively eliminated Plaintiffs' claims against the individual state defendants in their official capacities. See Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 367, 481 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997) ("[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Thus, where the governmental entity may be held liable for damages resulting from its official policy, a suit naming public officers in their official capacity is redundant.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). On 14 August 2012, the trial court entered an order dismissing Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy and abuse of process claims against the remaining state defendants in their individual capacities, but "otherwise denied" the motions to dismiss, leaving intact Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims against Defendants in their individual capacities.

Defendants appealed from the trial court's 14 August 2012 order, contending that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the trial court's dismissal of their civil conspiracy and abuse of process claims. In an unpublished opinion entered 17 December 2013, this Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal as interlocutory. Fox v. City of Greensboro, 752 S.E.2d 256 (2013), available at 2013 N.C.App. LEXIS 1321, disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 494, 757 S.E.2d 919 (2014). In its opinion, this Court noted that

Id. at *3, 2013 N.C.App. LEXIS 1321, at *6-7 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). This Court then held that Defendants

Id. at *4, 2013 N.C.App. LEXIS 1321, at *8-11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Following dismissal of the prior appeal, Defendants filed a timely answer to Plaintiffs' complaint on 14 November 2013, specifically pleading the factual basis for their collateral estoppel defense and attaching and incorporating by reference the relevant federal complaint and order upon which that defense is based. On 5 August 2014, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of our North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure:

Following a hearing on 4 September 2014, the trial court denied Defendants' motion specifically as to the issue of collateral estoppel by order entered 25 September 2014. From that order, Defendants appeal.

Grounds for Appellate Review

As Defendants note, this appeal is interlocutory.

Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558, 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As noted supra, following dismissal of their previous appeal, Defendants filed an answer in which they specifically asserted collateral estoppel as a defense to Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims and moved for judgment on the pleadings based upon their collateral estoppel defense. Defendants having made "a colorable assertion that the claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel[,]" the denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings affects a substantial right. See id. Accordingly, Defendants' interlocutory appeal is properly before this Court.

Discussion

Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We disagree.

I. Relation of the trial court's Rule 12(c) and 12(b)(6) orders

As a preliminary matter, we consider Defendants' assertion that the trial court's August 2012 order denying their Rule 12(b)(6) motion did not bar the trial court from adjudicating Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). It is well established that, ordinarily, "no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another's errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action." Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972). The only exception occurs when three conditions are met: (1) the subsequent order "was rendered at a different stage of the proceeding, [(2)] the materials considered by [the second judge] were not the same, and [(3)] the [first] motion ... did not present the same question as that raised by the later motion...." Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. 374, 376, 361 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1987) (citation omitted). Defendants argue that all three of the Smithwick conditions are satisfied here.

First, Defendants point out that a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) may be made only after the pleadings are closed, while a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be made before the pleadings are closed. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12; see also Robertson v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 440, 363 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1988) (noting that "[t]he principal difference between the two motions is that a motion under Rule 12(c) ... is properly made after the pleadings are closed while a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must be made prior to or contemporaneously with the filing of the responsive pleading"). Plaintiffs counter that, because "[b]oth a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief should be granted when a complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action or pleads facts which deny the right to any relief[,]" id. (citations omitted), there is no "functional" difference between the stage of the proceedings when each motion is decided. We must reject Plaintiffs' contention:

Cash v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 N.C. App. 192, 201-02, 528 S.E.2d 372, 378 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Regarding the second and third Smithwick conditions, this Court's opinion dismissing Defendants' previous appeal shows that different materials and questions were considered by the trial court in ruling on the respective Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions. In ruling on Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court considered only Plaintiffs' complaint and the arguments of the parties, while the later Rule 12(c) ruling was based upon the trial court's consideration of additional materials: Defendants' answer, the federal complaint, and the federal court's decision. Further, as we observed supra, this Court dismissed Defendants' interlocutory appeal precisely because it was not persuaded by Defendants' argument that the trial court's denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion "necessarily rejected their argument that Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims were barred by collateral estoppel." Fox, 2013 WL 6667041, at 2, 2013 N.C.App. LEXIS 1321, at *4. In contrast, the trial court's Rule 12(c) order explicitly ruled on Defendants' collateral estoppel argument. In sum, the Rule 12(c) order appealed from here is not an improper "overruling" by a second superior court judge of an earlier superior court judge's Rule 12(b)(6) order.

II. Standard of review

"A motion for judgment on the pleadings [pursuant to Rule 12(c)] should not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." B. Kelley Enters., Inc. v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 211 N.C. App. 592, 593, 710 S.E.2d 334, 336 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974) (citations omitted). We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c). Id. Further, for a Rule 12(c) motion based upon an assertion of collateral estoppel:

Burgess v. First Union Nat'l Bank of N.C., 150 N.C. App. 67, 75, 563 S.E.2d 14, 20 (2002) (citation, internal quotation marks, brackets, and emphasis omitted).

III. The trial court's rejection of Defendants' collateral estoppel defense

Defendants' collateral estoppel defense is based on their contention that, in its 2011 opinion dismissing, inter alia, Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the federal court ruled against Plaintiffs on the same issue of proximate cause applicable to their state malicious prosecution allegations, thereby precluding re-litigation of those claims in Guilford County Superior Court. Although we agree that both Plaintiffs' federal Fourth Amendment claims and their state malicious prosecution claims include the same element of proximate cause,4 after a careful analysis of the procedural posture of the federal case, we are not persuaded that the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims for failing to meet the federal "plausibility" pleading standard means "the federal court has already determined that [P]laintiffs cannot establish the same requisite causation element essential to their [state malicious prosecution] claim[s]."

"Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, when an issue has been fully litigated and decided, it cannot be contested again between the same parties, even if the first adjudication is conducted in federal court and the second in state court." McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv. of N.C. State Univ., 142 N.C. App. 48, 52, 542 S.E.2d 227, 231 (citation omitted; emphasis added), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 452, 548 S.E.2d 527 (2001). In addition, "parties are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior determination, even where the claims asserted are not the same." Id. at 51, 542 S.E.2d at 231 (citation omitted). "The elements of collateral estoppel ... are as follows: (1) a prior suit resulting in a final judgment on the merits; (2) identical issues involved; (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit and necessary to the judgment; and (4) the issue was actually determined." Bluebird Corp. v. Aubin, 188 N.C. App. 671, 678, 657 S.E.2d 55, 61 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 679, 669 S.E.2d 741 (2008). Thus, as an initial step, we must determine whether the federal court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) was a final judgment on the merits that actually decided the issue of proximate cause.

It is well settled that "[a] dismissal under [North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 12(b)(6) operates as an adjudication on the merits unless the court specifies that the dismissal is without prejudice." Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 404, 417 S.E.2d 269, 274 (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (2013). However, the federal court did not dismiss Plaintiffs' federal claims under North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6), but rather dismissed them pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). See Fox, 807 F.Supp.2d at 484. No North Carolina case law or statute that we have discovered directly addresses the question of whether a dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) operates as an adjudication on the merits so as to collaterally estop a plaintiff from re-litigating a claim or issue in our State's courts. Of course, if the evaluation of a claim in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) were identical to the evaluation made in response to a motion under North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6), it would be clear that the federal court's dismissal had adjudicated and settled the same issue Plaintiffs raise in their state complaint. However, our review of the pertinent statutes and case law demonstrates that the standard under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), which the federal court here held Plaintiffs failed to meet, is a different, higher pleading standard than mandated under our own General Statutes. In other words, the fact that Plaintiffs' allegations of proximate cause in the federal complaint did not meet the pleading standard under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) does not necessarily mean that their allegations of proximate cause would have resulted in dismissal pursuant to North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6).

As the federal court noted in its order, "[t]he purpose of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test[] the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). In so doing, the federal court explicitly applied the so-called "plausibility" pleading standard as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly:

Id. at 484. As a prior panel of this Court has previously held, the higher federal plausibility pleading standard differs from our State's notice pleading standard:

Holleman v. Aiken, 193 N.C. App. 484, 490-91, 668 S.E.2d 579, 584-85 (2008) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Given the difference between the federal and State pleading standards, we must conclude that a federal court's dismissal of claims pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of collaterally estopping a plaintiff from raising the same or related claims under State law in our State's courts. See Hoots, 106 N.C.App. at 404, 417 S.E.2d at 274. In other words, a determination that Plaintiffs' allegations regarding proximate cause in their Fourth Amendment claims did not pass the federal plausibility test does not automatically mean they fail to meet the notice pleading requirements of our State. We acknowledge that the federal court's well-reasoned and highly detailed opinion amply demonstrates that the allegations in Plaintiffs' federal complaint regarding proximate cause between Defendants' alleged acts and Plaintiffs' criminal prosecutions were, "to put it charitably, sparse at best." Fox, 807 F.Supp.2d at 495. However, the "issue actually litigated in the prior suit ... and ... actually determined" by the federal court, see Bluebird Corp., 188 N.C.App. at 678, 657 S.E.2d at 61 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), was whether Plaintiffs' pleadings met the plausibility standard applicable to motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). The federal court's opinion simply did not consider or address the issue of whether Plaintiffs' pleadings sufficiently stated a claim to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the notice pleading requirements of North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c) based upon their assertion of collateral estoppel.

We emphasize that our holding here is specific and limited to the sole issue raised by Defendants in this appeal: whether Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating their state malicious prosecution claims in North Carolina courts because the federal court dismissed their federal "malicious prosecution" claims for failing to meet the plausibility standard applicable to motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). We express no opinion about whether Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims were sufficiently pled under North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6). As noted by this Court in Defendants' previous appeal, that interlocutory issue is not before us at this point. See, e.g., Turner, 363 N.C. at 558, 681 S.E.2d at 773.

In sum, Plaintiffs are not collaterally estopped from bringing their malicious prosecution claims under state law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss on that basis, and its order is

AFFIRMED.

Judges McCULLOUGH and ZACHARY concur.