Filed: May 21, 2012
Latest Update: May 21, 2012
Summary: ORDER W. EARL BRITT, Senior District Judge. This matter is before the court on respondent's 26 March 2012 pro se motion "to release movant upon his own personal recognizance" (Mot., DE # 194, at 1). On 6 November 1992, respondent was committed to the custody and care of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4246(d). 1 Once an individual has been committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4246(d), there are only two methods by which that person may be deinstitutionalized. Under one method, th
Summary: ORDER W. EARL BRITT, Senior District Judge. This matter is before the court on respondent's 26 March 2012 pro se motion "to release movant upon his own personal recognizance" (Mot., DE # 194, at 1). On 6 November 1992, respondent was committed to the custody and care of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4246(d). 1 Once an individual has been committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4246(d), there are only two methods by which that person may be deinstitutionalized. Under one method, the..
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ORDER
W. EARL BRITT, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the court on respondent's 26 March 2012 pro se motion "to release movant upon his own personal recognizance" (Mot., DE # 194, at 1). On 6 November 1992, respondent was committed to the custody and care of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d).1
Once an individual has been committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d), there are only two methods by which that person may be deinstitutionalized. Under one method, the director of the facility in which the respondent is hospitalized may file a certificate with the court stating that the respondent is no longer in need of care:
When the director of the facility in which a person is hospitalized pursuant to subsection (d) determines that the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that his release would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another, he shall promptly file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment.
18 U.S.C. § 4246(e). The other method by which a person may be deinstitutionalized is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h):
Regardless of whether the director of the facility in which a person is hospitalized has filed a certificate pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 4246(e)], counsel for the person or his legal guardian may, at any time during such person's hospitalization, file with the court that ordered the commitment a motion for a hearing to determine whether the person should be discharged from such facility . . . .
Here, respondent himself filed the motion for discharge. However, as demonstrated above, only the respondent's attorney or guardian may formally request a hearing to determine whether the respondent should continue treatment in a psychiatric facility in the absence of a certificate from the director of the facility. The respondent himself may not make such a request pro se, nor may the district court conduct such a hearing sua sponte. See United States v. Hunter, 985 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot, 1 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Logsdon, No. 06-10003-MLB, 2012 WL 359903, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2012); United States v. Nakamoto, 2 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1290 (D. Haw. 1998). Furthermore, the court notes that after respondent filed the instant motion, respondent's attorney filed a motion on 2 April 2012 in order to request a hearing. (DE # 195.) The hearing is scheduled to take place on 2 August 2012. (DE # 196.) Thus, for the foregoing reasons, respondent's pro se motion for release on his own recognizance (DE # 194) is DENIED.
Also before the court is respondent's 19 April 2012 pro se motion for summary judgment (DE # 197). Having fully considered the motion, it is DENIED.
