ORDER
W. EARL BRITT, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on the 20 January 2012 bill of costs (DE # 123) filed by defendant E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc. ("Gallo"). Also before the court are Gallo's 27 February and 22 March 2012 motions to strike. (DE ## 129, 132.) The matters are ripe for disposition.
I. BACKGROUND
In this case, plaintiff The Country Vintner of North Carolina, LLC ("Country Vintner") initially asserted three claims against Gallo under the North Carolina Wine Distribution Agreements Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-1200 et seq. ("Wine Act"), and a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices. (Compl., DE # 1-2.) On 2 April 2010, this court dismissed Country Vintner's unfair and deceptive trade practices claim. (DE # 63.) On 18 October 2010, Gallo's motion for summary judgment was granted with respect to the remaining Wine Act claims. (DE # 111.)
Gallo filed a bill of costs on 1 November 2010. (DE # 113.) On 16 November 2010, Country Vintner filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment that was entered on 18 October 2010 and from all other adverse rulings in the case. (DE # 115.) The Clerk of Court subsequently denied Gallo's bill of costs without prejudice to renew following the resolution of Country Vintner's appeal. (DE # 120.) On 6 January 2012, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this court's judgment in all respects. (DE ## 121, 122.)
Gallo refiled its bill of costs on 20 January 2012. (DE # 123.) Country Vintner filed an objection to the bill of costs on 3 February 2012. (DE # 125.) On 10 February 2012, Gallo filed a memorandum in opposition to Country Vintner's objection to the bill of costs (DE # 127), and Country Vintner filed a reply in support of its objection on 24 February 2012 (DE # 128).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motions to Strike
The court will first address Gallo's motions to strike. On 27 February 2012, Gallo filed a motion to strike Country Vintner's reply in support of its objection to the bill of costs. On 22 March 2012, Gallo also filed a motion to strike Country Vintner's Suggestion of Subsequently Decided Authority. After having fully considered the motions, and for the reasons set forth in Country Vintner's memoranda in opposition to the motions to strike (DE ## 130, 133), the court will deny the motions.1
B. Bill of Costs
The court now turns to Gallo's bill of costs. In this case, Gallo seeks to recover $111,047.75 for the technical, specialized services that were needed in order to "collect, process, preserve, track, copy to digital format, and ultimately produce" the large amount of electronically stored information ("ESI") that was utilized in the discovery process in this case.2 (Def.'s Mem. Opp'n Pl.'s Obj. Bill of Costs, DE # 127, at 15.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) allows a prevailing party to recover costs other than attorney's fees. The court has wide latitude to award costs, as long as the costs are enumerated in the general taxation-of-costs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1987); Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv611 (JCC), 2011 WL 1599580, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011); Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., 272 F.R.D. 436, 441 (E.D. Va. 2011). Moreover, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Rule 54(d)(1) creates a presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs. Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999). The prevailing party bears the burden of showing that its requested costs are allowable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Francisco, 272 F.R.D. at 441; Fells v. Va. Dept. of Transp., 605 F.Supp.2d 740, 742 (E.D. Va. 2009).
Here, neither party disputes that Gallo is the prevailing party or that the disputed costs specifically involve 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), which permits recovery of "[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not determined whether costs incurred in relation to the collection, processing, and production of ESI are taxable under § 1920(4). The numerous district courts that have considered this question have reached conflicting results. Compare, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F.Supp.2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (awarding costs "for the creation of a litigation database, storage of data, imaging hard drives, keyword searches, deduplication, data extraction and processing") with Rawal v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 07 C 5561, 2012 WL 581146, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2012) (refusing to award electronic processing costs as taxable). (See also Pl.'s Obj. Bill of Costs, DE # 125, at 13 (collecting cases); Def.'s Mem. Opp'n Pl.'s Obj. Bill of Costs, DE # 127, at 20-22 (collecting cases).)
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently had occasion to address the issue of whether ESI-related costs are taxable under § 1920(4) in Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-1520 (U.S. Jun. 14, 2012). Although it is not binding authority, the court finds this decision to be persuasive in light of the similarities to the instant matter. Because the Third Circuit's opinion is well-reasoned and thorough, and because it cites with approval district court cases from within the Fourth Circuit that considered the taxability of ESI-related costs,3 the court adopts the reasoning of Race Tires America and will follow its analysis.
In determining whether ESI-related expenses were taxable as the "costs of making copies of any materials," 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), the Third Circuit found:
The decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially all, electronic discovery consultant charges . . . are untethered from the statutory mooring. Section 1920(4) does not state that all steps that lead up to the production of copies of materials are taxable. It does not authorize taxation merely because today's technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily possessed by the typical legal professional. It does not say that activities that encourage cost savings may be taxed. Section 1920(4) authorizes awarding only the cost of making copies.
. . . .
Those courts that have refused to award the costs of electronic discovery vendors beyond file format conversion have recognized that gathering, preserving, processing, searching, culling, and extracting ESI simply do not amount to "making copies."
Id. at 169-70 (footnote omitted).
The court concluded that of the numerous services the electronic discovery consultants in the case had performed, only the scanning of hard copy documents, the conversion of native files to a TIFF format, and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVDs involved "copying," and that the costs attributable to only those activities were recoverable. Id. at 171. Thus, a prevailing party may recover costs associated with copying or duplicating its files, but it may not receive reimbursement for any other ESI-related expenses. See Mann, 2011 WL 1599580, at *9 (observing that "such tasks as `Searching and Deduping,' and `Creation of Native File Database with Full Text and Metadata Extraction'" do not qualify as "copying"); Francisco, 272 F.R.D. at 446 (denying recovery of ESI-related costs where prevailing party failed to show that the methods it employed were "identical to the process of scanning and copying"); Fells, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 743 (defendant's employment of techniques that created electronically searchable documents did not constitute "copying").4
In this case, the court finds that the only tasks that involve copying are the conversion of native files to TIFF and PDF formats and the transfer of files onto CDs. Based on a review of the bill of costs, Gallo is entitled to reimbursement for the following itemized expenses:
(1) 19 March 2010, TIFF Production, $8.46;
(2) 19 March 2010, CD Copy, $10.00;
(3) 2 April 2010, TIFF Production, $4.20;
(4) 16 April 2010, PDF Production, $6.84;
(5) 19 April 2010, CD Copy, $10.00;
(6) 19 April 2010, TIFF Production, $21.96;
(7) 22 June 2010, CD Copy, $10.00;
(8) 23 June 2010, TIFF Production, $134.10;
(9) 25 June 2010, TIFF Production, $3.00;
(10) 1 July 2010, CD Copy, $10.00;
(11) 1 July 2010, TIFF Production, $0.03.
(See D. Jones Decl., Ex. 1, DE # 123-2.)5 Accordingly, Gallo is entitled to receive a total of $218.59 in ESI-related costs.
Gallo also seeks to recover $350.00 for "[f]ees of the clerk." 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). Country Vintner acknowledges that Gallo is entitled to this amount (see Pl.'s Obj. Bill of Costs, DE # 125, at 11), and the court grants Gallo's request. Thus, Gallo is entitled to recover a total of $568.59 in costs.6
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Gallo's bill of costs (DE # 123) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Gallo is AWARDED costs in the amount of $568.59. Additionally, Gallo's motions to strike (DE ## 129, 132) are DENIED.
