TERRENCE W. BOYLE, Chief District Judge.
This is a class action brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§201 et seq. and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA"), N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 95-25.1 et seq. Plaintiff and the class assert claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA"), N.C. Stat. §§ 95-2 4. 1 to 95-25.25 alleging that during the applicable time period, plaintiff and others similarly situated were employed as temporary agricultural workers under the guestworker H-2A program by defendants and suffered de facto wage deductions for various pre-employment expenses that they incurred as a condition of their employment by the defendants. See generally Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff and the class also alleged that during that same time period the defendants were liable for payment of liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and N.C.Gen.Stat. § 95-25.22(a1) based upon their alleged failure to pay all wages when due under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 95-25.6 at the minimum rate disclosed to the plaintiffs pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 95-25.13(1)-(2) and required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) for all hours worked by the named H-2A plaintiff and the members of that alleged class action through the use of an allegedly involuntary savings plan wage deduction system that was the subject of the plaintiff's FLSA collective action claim. Doc. 35 at 14-18 (¶¶ 35-42) and at 39-40 (¶ ¶ 113-115). As with the plaintiff's FLSA claim, this NCWHA class claim was also based upon the plaintiff's allegations that those wage deductions were not voluntary, reduced the net wages of the plaintiff and his co-workers below the promised minimum rate required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and disclosed pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 95-25.13(1)-(2), and occurred without the prior written and signed wage deduction authorization required by the NCWHA. See Doc. 35 at 32-34 (¶ ¶ 93 and 97), and N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 95-25.8(a)(2)(i) and 95-25.8(a)(3)(i). Defendants denied Plaintiff's allegations.
Among the defendants named in the plaintiff's Complaint are John Milton Beaman, the principal of Speight Seed Farms, Inc. ("Beaman"), Speight Seed Farms, Inc., and Emma Ortega, the farm labor contractor supervisor when the plaintiff was allegedly jointly and severally employed by Speight and Beaman, which Defendants deny. Plaintiff contends that during at least 2011 and 2012, Mr. Beaman and Speight Seed Farms, Inc., were agricultural employers operating in and around Pitt County, North Carolina for which they used or employed persons like the plaintiff. Defendants contend that Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees were employed by Speight Seed Farms, Inc., not Beamon.
The allegations of the complaint essentially allege that the defendants violated the rights of the plaintiff and the class he has been certified to represent under the FLSA and the NCWHA in a number of different ways. Those alleged ways included, but are not limited to, the alleged failure to pay the plaintiff and the class he has been certified to represent all wages when due under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 95-25.6 at the minimum rate disclosed to the plaintiffs pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 95-25.13(1)-(2) and required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) for all hours worked by the named H-2A plaintiff and the members of that alleged class action through the use of an allegedly involuntary savings plan wage deduction system that was the subject of the plaintiff's FLSA collective action claim. Doc. 35 at 14-18 (¶ ¶ 35-42) and at 39-40 (¶ ¶ 113-115).
The defendants John Milton Beaman, Speight Seed Farms, Inc., and Emma Ortega have at all times denied, and continue to deny, any violation of the FLSA and the NCWHA regarding the alleged failure to pay wages when due or the alleged failure to pay at the minimum rate required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and as disclosed pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 95-25.13(1)-(2). In addition, nothing in this consent order or in the settlement of this action should be construed as an admission or finding of any violation of the Act or wrongdoing of any kind or nature by these same defendants, and that therefore, upon the date that final payment is made and all other actions specified in this Consent Order are taken in compliance with its terms, defendants John Milton Beaman, Speight Seed Farms, Inc., and Emma Ortega shall be fully released and forever discharged from any and all claims, demands, charges, complaints, rights, and causes of action by the plaintiff and the members of the class he has been certified to represent that arise or may arise against defendants John Milton Beaman, Speight Seed Farms, Inc., and Emma Ortega including but not limited to those under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the NCWHA for the period from January 1, 2010 through the date that this Court enters that consent order.
The named plaintiff and defendants John Milton Beaman, Speight Seed Farms, Inc., and Emma Ortega have decided to enter into this consent order and to settle the claims and potential claims of the named plaintiff and the members of the class he has been certified to represent against defendants John Milton Beaman, Speight Seed Farms, Inc., and Emma Ortega in this case in an effort to avoid further protracted and costly litigation. To that end, the named plaintiff and the members of the class the named plaintiff has been certified to represent and defendants John Mil ton Beaman, Speight Seed Farms, Inc., and Emma Ortega have mutually stipulated to the entry of this Consent Order, and the Court, therefore, upon consideration of the record herein and being fully advised of the premises,
ORDERS and DECREES:
The undersigned parties agree and stipulate that this Consent Order resolves all matters between defendants and plaintiff Juan Manuel Hernandez-Martinez that are alleged in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint that was filed in the above-captioned action, and the plaintiff's claims against all defendants are dismissed with prejudice except that the Court retains jurisdiction over this action to the extent necessary to enforce the terms of this Consent Judgment and Consent Order.