LOUISE W. FLANAGAN, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (DE 22). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), United States Magistrate Judge Robert B. Jones, Jr., entered a memorandum and recommendation ("M&R"), (DE 29), wherein it is recommended that defendants' motion be granted in part, to which the parties timely filed objections, and which defendants' objections were responded to by plaintiff. In this posture, the issues raised are ripe for ruling. For the reasons stated more specifically below, the court declines to adopt the M&R in relevant part, adopts the M&R in all other respects, and grants defendants' motion.
Plaintiff, a teacher with the Onslow County School System, instituted this action on October 16, 2013, against defendants Onslow County Board of Education ("Board"), Pamela Thomas, and Donna Lynch. On November 11, 2013, plaintiff amended her complaint to include defendant Kathy Spencer. As alleged in the complaint defendant Spencer is the superintendent of the Onslow County School System; defendant Lynch is an employed by defendant Board as principal of Jacksonville High School; and defendant Thomas is a member of defendant Board. As pertinent here, plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against her in her employment on the basis of race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. (Compl. ¶¶38-46).
Plaintiff also asserts a claim under §§ 1981 and 1983 against the remaining defendants. However, those claims are not relevant to the instant order. As discussed in the M&R, plaintiff failed to serve the additional defendants in a timely manner. Therefore, where plaintiff has not objected to the M&R's conclusion that such claims should be dismissed, and, upon considered review of the relevant portions of the M&R, the court adopts this as its own, and the claims against the remaining defendants are dismissed.
Finally, plaintiff brought an intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claim against all defendants. The M&R recommends dismissal of plaintiff's IIED claim, and plaintiff has not objected. As above, where plaintiff has not objected and the court perceives no issue with the M&R's recommendation, the court adopts this conclusion as its own.
On October 17, 2010, a white Jacksonville High School student posted a threat against defendant Lynch on his Facebook page. (
On October 18, 2010, the day the threats were to be carried out, plaintiff came to work unaware of any potential danger. (
Sometime over the course of the day, plaintiff became aware that the campus was the subject of some type of threat; however, plaintiff remained unaware of any threat directed toward her, despite asking members of the school's administration. (
In the aftermath of the event, plaintiff had differing levels of interaction with defendants Lynch and Spencer, which gave rise to the instant claim. With regard to defendant Lynch, plaintiff first learned of the threat against her on October 19, 2010, when defendant Lynch showed plaintiff the Facebook post. (
At a later meeting with school administrators regarding the incident, the school's assistant principal, Angela Garland, indicated plaintiff was not told of the threats against her because the administration was afraid she would communicate the nature of the threat to other teachers. (
With respect to plaintiff's interactions with defendant Spencer, on October 20, 2010, defendant Spencer, in her capacity as superintended of Onslow County Schools, came to Jacksonville High School to meet with the teachers at their monthly meeting. (
Plaintiff alleges that she was treated differently than a white employee of the school system, defendant Lynch, with regard to the measures taken to ensure her safety during the October 18, 2010, incident. (
As a result of the threats, plaintiff experienced sleeplessness, nervousness, heart palpations, sweating, chills, high blood pressure, and insomnia. (
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint but "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses."
Furthermore, the complaint need not set forth "detailed factual allegations," but instead must simply "plead sufficient facts to allow a court, drawing on `judicial experience and common sense,' to infer `more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'"
The district court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's M&R to which specific objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The court does not perform a de novo review where a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations."
Defendants contend that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a prima facie case for discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983. Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged a sufficient causal nexus between defendants purported discriminatory conduct and the adverse employment action she suffered. Defendants' objection must be granted, and thus, the court departs from the M&R.
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff's §§ 1981 and 1983 claims effectively merge for purpose of the court's analysis.
The court first addresses the precise nature of the adverse employment action suffered by plaintiff. Plaintiff suggests she suffered an adverse employment action on October 18, 2010, when "her life was threatened by one of her students and she was never informed." (DE 33, at 4). Plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action stemming from the October 18, 2010, incident. An adverse employment action requires a tangible, negative effect on plaintiff's "compensation, job title, level of responsibility, or opportunity for promotion."
In any event, plaintiff has also alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of race when she was prevented from returning to work after a period of disability leave in January 2011. The M&R concluded that defendants' refusal to allow plaintiff to return to work constituted an adverse employment action. However, as noted, an adverse employment action alone is insufficient to state a claim for relief under §§ 1981 and 1983. Such adverse employment action must occur "under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."
Defendants' alleged refusal to allow plaintiff to return to work in January 2011 did not occur "under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Plaintiff alleges no facts surrounding defendants' January 2011, refusal to allow her to return to work to suggest race was a motivating factor in the decision. Moreover, plaintiff provides no indication that defendants would have treated a white employee differently.
Upon de novo review of those portions to the M&R to which objections were raised, and upon considered review of those portions to which no such objection has been filed, for the reasons given, the court declines to adopt the recommendation of the magistrate judge, (DE 29), as it relates to plaintiff's §§ 1981 and 1983 claim. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motion to dismiss (DE 22) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's §§ 1981 & 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Also, plaintiff's IIED claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The court adopts the M&R in all other respects. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED.