MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. PATRICK AULD, Magistrate Judge.
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") (Docket Entry 2), filed in conjunction with a Complaint (Docket Entry 1). For the reasons that follow, the instant Application will be denied.
I. Magistrate Judge Authority in this Context
For cases proceeding in a United States District Court:
A judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has construed the foregoing statutory language as follows: "Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) a judge may have a magistrate decide any `pretrial matter' except certain specified motions. These exceptions are motions which Congress considered to be `dispositive.'" Aluminum Co. of Am., Badin Works, Badin, N.C. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 663 F.2d 499, 501 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added) (citing House Report No. 94-1609, P.L. 94-577, reprinted at U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6162 (1976)).2 By published decision, the Fourth Circuit thus has stated that, consistent with the plain language of Section 636(b)(1)(A), a magistrate judge may decide any pretrial matter except the eight motions Congress specified in said statutory provision. The Fourth Circuit has since reiterated that view, albeit by unpublished opinion. Batiste v. Catoe, 27 F. App'x 158, 159 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that magistrate judge's ruling on pretrial motion not listed in Section 636(b)(1)(A) constituted "nondispositive" order, and citing in support Maisonville v. F2 Am., 902 F.2d 746, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1990), and determination therein that "`dispositive' motions are limited to the listing contained in § 636(b)(1)(A)").
District judges in the Fourth Circuit have followed the reasoning of Aluminum Co. of Am. and Batiste. For example, in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 397 F.Supp.2d 698 (W.D.N.C. 2005), the court declined to review de novo a magistrate judge's order on a motion to remand, observing that: "[T]he language of § 636(b)(1)(A) is exceedingly clear that a magistrate judge may `hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except' a very specific list of eight matters. Congress would be hard-pressed to use language more clearly indicating its intent to create an exhaustive list than `any . . . except.'" Id. at 701 (ellipsis and emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Everett v. Cherry, 671 F.Supp.2d 819, 820 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2009) ("Section 636(b)(1) enumerates those pre-trial matters that, if referred to a magistrate judge, must be reviewed de novo by a district judge upon objection. The court will not make the unprincipled decision to rewrite the statute, adding `motions to amend' to those pre-trial matters, for that is the province of Congress."), aff'd sub nom., Everett v. Prison Health Servs., 412 F. App'x 604, 605 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[The plaintiff] moved for leave to amend her complaint . . . to add [a defendant and] a state-law claim of medical malpractice against [that defendant]. After a hearing, the magistrate judge denied [the] motion. [The plaintiff] timely objected, thereby preserving the issue for review. . . . [T]he district court could not modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order unless the magistrate judge's decision was `clearly erroneous or contrary to law.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010).").3
Recently, however, the Fourth Circuit issued an unpublished decision holding that a "magistrate judge, proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012), lacked authority to issue an order denying [an application for] leave to proceed IFP." Hunter v. Roventini, Nos. 14-2259, 15-1019, 2015 WL 3483102, at *1 (4th Cir. June 3, 2015) (unpublished). In doing so, the Hunter Court did not address Aluminum Co. of Am. or the plain language of Section 636(b)(1)(A); instead, it only cited and parenthetically quoted Woods v. Dahlberg, 894 F.2d 187, 187 (6th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that "`denial of such a motion is the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal and is outside the scope of a magistrate's authority.'" Hunter, 2015 WL 3483102, at *1.4 The undersigned Magistrate Judge recognizes that unpublished Fourth Circuit decisions constitute significant persuasive authority; however, given the published ruling in Aluminum Co. of Am.,5 the plain language of Section 636(b)(1)(A), and the persuasive authority (cited above and below), the undersigned Magistrate Judge will enter an order, rather than a recommendation, in this instance.
As an initial matter, an application to proceed IFP constitutes a "pretrial matter," 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See, e.g., Smith ex rel. K.M.J. Int'l, Inc. v. United States Gov't, No. 1:10CV673, 2013 WL 5462387, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2013) (unpublished) (Osteen, Jr., J.) ("[T]he order of the Magistrate Judge relates to a pretrial matter (IFP status)."); Central States, Se. & Sw. Area Pension Fund v. Smeltzer Enters., Nos. 08-50180, 08-50852, 2009 WL 3672120, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (unpublished) (listing "determination of in forma pauperis status" as example of "pretrial matter"); Scherer v. United States, No. 01-2428-JWL, 2001 WL 1516736, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 7, 2001) (unpublished) (describing "denial of in forma pauperis status" as order on "pretrial matters"). Further, Section 636(b)(1)(A)'s "specifically enumerated list of motions [excluded from disposition by a magistrate judge] does not include a [m]otion for [l]eave to [p]roceed [i]n [f]orma [p]auperis." Seals v. Seals, No. 2:14CV2058-JPM-CGC, 2014 WL 3592037, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. July 21, 2014) (unpublished); see also Talley v. Jackson, No. C15-855-RSM, 2015 WL 3796339, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2015) (unpublished) ("Congress has explicitly provided magistrate judges the authority to hear and determine certain pretrial matters in actions pending before the district court. See 28 U.S.C. [§] 636(a)-(b). This authority extends to ruling upon applications to proceed in forma pauperis. . . ."); Smith, 2013 WL 5462387, at *1 ("[A]n order [relating to IFP status] may be reconsidered `only where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.' 28 U.S.C. § 636.").
In other words, the plain language of Section 636(b)(1)(A) compels the conclusion that magistrate judges may rule on IFP applications, and courts "are not permitted to ignore [a] statute's plain language," United States v. Stitt, 552 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Matter of Baby "K", 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e cannot ignore the plain language of the statute because to do so would transcend our judicial function." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Everett, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 820 n.4 ("Section 636(b)(1) enumerates those pre-trial matters that, if referred to a magistrate judge, must be reviewed de novo by a district judge upon objection. The court will not make the unprincipled decision to rewrite the statute, adding [other motions] to those pre-trial matters, for that is the province of Congress."). Finally, even if the list of motions in Section 636(b)(1)(A) somehow implicitly encompassed any pretrial matter somehow deemed dispositive, a magistrate judge may rule on an IFP application because such a ruling does not dispose of the action. See Poche v. Butler, Civil Action No. 07-3506, 2007 WL 2695350, at *1 n.1 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2007) (unpublished) ("[The] order [denying IFP status] did not prevent [the p]etitioner from proceeding by a means other than by in forma pauperis. . . ."); see also Yepes v. Hininger, No. CV514-085, 2015 WL 1546869, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2015) (unpublished) ("[T]he [m]agistrate [j]udge's [o]rder on [the p]laintiff's [m]otion to [p]roceed in [f]orma [p]auperis squarely falls within his authority to issue orders on nondispositive pretrial matters." (emphasis added)); Arvie v. Tanner, Civil Action No. 12-1638, 2012 WL 3597127, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished) (identifying denial of "motion to proceed in forma pauperis" as "non-dispositive"), aff'd, 518 F. App'x 304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 689 (2013); Seaberry v. Stalder, Civil Action No. 05-1960-P, 2006 WL 1635707, at *1 (W.D. La. June 13, 2006) ("[The denial of IFP status] is an [o]rder from the [m]agistrate [j]udge on a non-dispositive matter. . . ." (emphasis added)).6
In sum, the undersigned Magistrate Judge will enter an order as to Plaintiff's instant Application, "[b]ecause [even the denial of IFP status will] not prevent [Plaintiff] from proceeding by a means other than by in forma pauperis, and because a motion for permission to proceed in forma pauperis is a pretrial motion and is not enumerated in the authorizing statute as a dispositive motion," Poche, 2007 WL 2695350, at *1 n.1.7
II. Eligibility for IFP Status
"In assessing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a court may consider the resources that the applicant has or `can get' from those who ordinarily provide the applicant with the `necessities of life,' such as `from a spouse, parent, adult sibling or other next friend.'" Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Williams v. Spencer, 455 F.Supp. 205, 208-09 (D. Md. 1978)); accord Lowery v. Astrue, Civ. No. 10-2103, 2010 WL 3037023, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished); Assaad-Faltas v. University of S.C., 971 F.Supp. 985, 990-91 (D.S.C. 1997) (citing Monti v. McKeon, 600 F.Supp. 112, 113-14 (D.Conn. 1984), aff'd, No. 84-7759, 788 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 1985) (table)). The instant Application reflects that one family member provides Plaintiff with a residence and another family member pays Plaintiff's living expenses (not covered by governmental assistance). (See Docket Entry 2 at 2 ("My sister owns the house I live in and my brother pays all my living expenses.").) In the absence of any showing to the contrary, the Court concludes that Plaintiff could obtain from his family members the funds necessary to pay the relatively modest filing fee and other costs excused by pauper status.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff has not shown entitlement to proceed as a pauper.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 2) is DENIED. Plaintiff shall pay the filing fee by November 2, 2015. Failure by Plaintiff to comply with this Order will result in the dismissal without prejudice of this action.
