JOE L. WEBSTER, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon the Government's petition to enforce Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") summonses. (Docket Entry 1.) On October 21, 2015, a show cause hearing was held for respondents Wayne C. Lonnen and Karen A. Lonnen, both appearing pro se. (Minute Entry dated 10/21/15.) The undersigned allowed both parties to submit additional briefs to the Court and continued the show cause hearing until November 18, 2015.
On July 29, 2015, the Government filed a petition to enforce IRS summonses issued to respondents. (Docket Entry 1.) In the Show Cause Order, the Court informed respondents to file in writing any opposition to the petition. (Docket Entry 3.) Respondents filed a response, asserting that: (1) IRS Agent Karl D. Weeman failed to provide Mr. Lonnen with requested documents, (2) that Mr. Lonnen never refused to testify or produce documents at the summons interview, (3) that Mrs. Lonnen intended to exercise her spousal privileges, and (4) that the Lonnens were being targeted to "initiate a criminal investigation." (Docket Entry 5.) Respondents seek, inter alia, a court ruling requiring Agent Weeman to "immediately cease and desist from any further action." (Id.) During the show cause hearings and in supplemental briefs submitted to the Court, both parties addressed these arguments as well as Mr. Lonnen's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Docket Entries 8-10; minute entries dated 10/21/15 & 11/18/15.)
To obtain enforcement of an IRS summons, the Government may establish its prima facie case showing that the four Pom// factors: "1) the investigation is being conducted for a legitimate purpose; 2) the inquiry is relevant to that purpose; 3) the information sought is not already in the possession of the IRS; and 4) the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed." Alphin v. United States, 809 F.2d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). "The IRS may establish its prima facie case by an affidavit of the investigating agent averring the four elements from Powell. United States v. Walton, 989 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the party contesting the summons to show that "the IRS is attempting to abuse the court's process. Such an abuse would take place . . . if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer . . . or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation." Conner v. United States, 434 F.3d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 360 (1989).
Here, the Government has presented the affidavit and testimony of IRS Agent Weeman. The Court found that the IRS satisfied a prima facie showing articulated in Powell. (Docket Entry 3 at 2.) Respondents were given the opportunity to disprove the prima facie showing or show an abuse of process. As to Mr. Lonnen, the undersigned finds that he has presented no evidence to oppose the Government's prima facie showing. To the extent Mr. Lonnen's objections contest the fourth factor in Powell, Mr. Lonnen has made no showing that the applicable administrative steps to the IRS code were not followed. Mr. Lonnen argues that he made several requests for a "Notice of Deficiency" and "Demand for payment," which neither appear to be relevant to the enforcement of the summonses at issue.
Mr. Lonnen also asserts a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which the Court finds that Mr. Lonnen has failed to substantiate. IRS summonses are subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege, however, the taxpayer "`must provide more than mere speculative, generalized allegations of possible tax-related prosecution. . . . [T]he taxpayer must be faced with substantial and real hazards of self-incrimination.'" United States v. Argomaniz 925 F.2d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Reis, 765 F.2d 1094, 1096 (11th Cir.1985)). "[T]he privilege may not . . . be invoked on no more than the mere assertion by one claiming the privilege that information sought by the government may be incriminating. Whether there is a sufficient hazard of incrimination is of course a question for the courts asked to enforce the privilege." United States v. Sharp, 920 F.2d 1167,1170 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). Thus, the Court asks two questions regarding the information sought from the person asserting the privilege: (1) whether it's facially evident, "in light of the question asked and the circumstances of its asking" or (2) whether "the person asserting the privilege [has] demonstrated its incriminating potential by further contextual proof." (Id. at 1171.)
Here, Mr. Lonnen interposed the Fifth Amendment to the following questions derived from IRS Form 433-A
Here, the questions asked by the IRS agent relate to Mr. Lonnen's current asset holdings, and "thus, are not inherently incriminating in nature." United States v. Redhead, 194 F. App'x 234, 236 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). This action was brought for collecting information to assess the ability to pay a tax liability, not to establish the underlining tax liability itself. Furthermore, there is no contextual proof to show that the information sought is incriminating. Mr. Lonnen asserts that the IRS is gathering the information sought to create a link of evidence to initiate criminal proceedings against him, but the "data [sought] says little that provides a link to a past transgression." United States v. St. John, No. 8:ll-MC-99-T-27MAP, 2013 WL 1610833, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2013) report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:ll-MC-00099-JDW, 2013 WL 1624216 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2013); United States v. Elmes, No. 09-61726-MC, 2009 WL 4885146, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2009) ("[Information regarding the respondent's current financial status does not provide a real and substantial hazard of criminal prosecution.").
Mrs. Lonnen, who was also served a summons to appear for an interview and to produce documents, has claimed the marital communications privilege. The marital communication privilege "prevents a spouse from testifying against [respondent] regarding confidential communications between the spouses." United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514 (4th Cir. 1995). At the November 18, 2015 hearing, Respondent's counsel indicated that Mrs. Lonnen intends to comply with the summons while "honoring her marital relationship." (Minute entry dated 11/18/15.) Both the Government and Respondent's counsel agreed to entry of an enforcement order requiring Mrs. Lonnen to appear for an interview and assert her marital communications privilege when applicable.
For the reasons stated herein,