ORDER

LOUISE W. FLANAGAN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff's motion to compel discovery and for expenses incurred (DE 62), to which defendants responded. Also before the court is plaintiff's unopposed pleading captioned "Motion Notification of Error in his N.C. Department of Public Safety Health Services-Utilization Review Summary" (DE 71) and defendant Stover's motion for a protective order (DE 73). Plaintiff responded to defendant Stover's motion for a protective order. In this posture, the issues raised are ripe for adjudication.

Plaintiff, a state inmate, filed this civil rights action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants Dr. Joseph Lightsey ("Lightsey") and Dr. Phillip Stover ("Stover") acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendant Lightsey failed to provide adequate medical treatment for plaintiff's past injuries to his left arm, wrist, and hand, as well as his spinal injury. Plaintiff contends that defendant Stover acted with deliberate indifference to his spinal injury because he refused to approve three utilization review requests for an MRI on October 26, 2013, May 29, 2014, and October 21, 2014.

Plaintiff now is before the court seeking a court order compelling defendants Lightsey and Stover to produce the following: (1) segregation logs and videotapes created by correctional staff and maintained by the North Carolina Department of Public Safety; and (2) records relating to plaintiff's treatment by a consulting neurologist in September 2005 and February 2006, at Central Prison. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). "[D]iscovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). However, a litigant may not use discovery requests to annoy, embarrass, oppress, or cause an undue burden or expense to his opposing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Additionally, the court has "substantial discretion" to grant or deny motions to compel discovery. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 929 (4th Cir. 1995).

Beginning with plaintiff's request for segregation logs and videotapes, defendants assert that such materials are not within their care or custody. Plaintiff, additionally, has not shown how such materials are relevant to this action. Thus, plaintiff's motion to compel as to such materials is DENIED.

The court now turns to plaintiff's request for a copies of reports from neurology consultations which occurred in September 2005 and February 2006. Plaintiff states that the records are necessary to show that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs by refusing to follow the recommendations contained in the neurologists reports. The court finds that this material is relevant to plaintiff's claim and proportional to the needs of the case. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED.

The court next turns to plaintiff's motion for notification of error. Plaintiff's pleading is not a model of clarity. Plaintiff states in his motion that "defendant Stover, incorrectly referred to in plaintiff N.C. Department of public safety Health Services Utilization Review Summary, as `MRI NECK SPINE' . . . ." (Pl.'s Mot. (DE 71), p. 2.) Plaintiff appears to ask that the court direct defendant Stover to amend plaintiff's medical records to reflect that he had an MRI of his lumbar spine and not his neck spine. Plaintiff's motion lacks merit, and is DENIED. Plaintiff may present evidence to refute the accuracy of the contested medical record to the extent the record is relied upon at a later date.

Finally, the court addresses defendant Stover's motion for a protective order. Defendant Stover requests that the court grant him a protective order excusing him from responding to plaintiff's "First Supplemental for Admissions Request(sic)" (DE 72) and "Second Request for Production of Documents." Defendants seek a protective order on the grounds that these discovery requests were untimely. Given plaintiff's pro se status, the court extends the discovery deadline to permit defendant Stover to respond to the discovery requests at issue. Thus, defendant Stover's motion for a protective order is DENIED.

In summary, the court rules as follows:

SO ORDERED.