JOI ELIZABETH PEAKE, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #28]. Plaintiff brings this action alleging racial discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 & 2000e-3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will recommend that Defendant's Motion be granted and that this case be dismissed.
In February 2013, the City of Greensboro ("the City") hired Plaintiff as a crime analyst in the Crime Analysis Unit ("CAU" or "Unit") of the Greensboro Police Department ("GPD"). The CAU is tasked with researching, compiling, and analyzing crime statistics. Plaintiff, a black female, was one of four crime analysts in the CAU. When she was initially hired, Plaintiff was subject to a probationary period, during which time the City could terminate her without adhering to the administrative process required for permanent employees. Four months after she was hired, in June 2013, Plaintiff applied for an open CAU supervisor position and was granted an interview but ultimately was not hired for that position. In July 2013, five months after she initially was hired, Plaintiff received a performance appraisal of "marginal performance." Plaintiff contends that she was surprised by the negative aspects of the evaluation and did not believe they were justified, having only received positive feedback regarding her work performance prior to the review. Following the review, the probationary period was extended for 90 days, until October 2013. She received an additional review in October 2013, noting various shortcomings. She was offered additional training, and her probationary period was extended to January 2014. Plaintiff filed formal complaints with the City's Human Resources Department, complaining that the shortcomings noted in her performance reviews were unjustified and amounted to harassment. Plaintiff's supervisor met with her in November and December regarding her progress. In December 2013, while still employed, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In January 2014, Plaintiff was informed that her probationary period would not be extended, and she was terminated. Plaintiff contends that her negative performance reviews, extended probationary period, and ultimate termination were the result of racial discrimination and harassment. The Court sets out below in detail the evidence in the record regarding Plaintiff's claims.
When Plaintiff was hired, the acting supervisor of the CAU was Justin Flynt, who reported to Dr. Lee Hunt, the manager of the GPD's Information Services Division. (Flynt Aff. [Doc. #29-1] ¶ 2; Hunt Aff. [Doc. #29-2] ¶ 1.)
Dr. Hunt and Cpl. Flynt have submitted affidavits, asserting that in the months following the initial training, they felt Mr. Sinykin was progressing more quickly in the job than Plaintiff. (
Shortly thereafter, in June 2013, Plaintiff applied for the open CAU supervisor position. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 12; Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 29.) Prior to applying, Plaintiff inquired of Dr. Hunt whether she could apply for this position, and he informed her that she could submit an application. In his affidavit, Dr. Hunt states that Plaintiff met the minimum requirements for the supervisor position, and that in any event his permission was unnecessary, so he informed her that she could apply. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 12.) Dr. Hunt oversaw the hiring process for the supervisor position. (
According to Plaintiff, after she applied for the supervisor position, Dr. Hunt began to target her for "harassment, discrimination, and retaliation." (McKee Aff. ¶ 5.) In particular, she states that she was no longer allowed to use headphones while working and that she was given responsibility for a weekly report that required her to work through lunch once each week. (
On July 16, 2013, Plaintiff met with Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt to discuss her performance review. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 3 at 1; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 7; Flynt Aff. ¶ 9.) According to the Memorandum provided to Plaintiff after the meeting, Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt discussed with Plaintiff the specific areas in which Plaintiff needed to improve in order to rise to a Level Three rating of "Meets Expectations." (Def.'s Br., Ex. 3 at 1; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 7.) At the meeting, Cpl. Flynt, Dr. Hunt, and Plaintiff also discussed the subject of wearing headphones at work. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 3 at 2; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 8; Flynt Aff. ¶ 10.) According to the Memorandum, Plaintiff stated that wearing headphones allowed her to focus on her work and avoid inappropriate conversations among her coworkers, but Plaintiff was unable to give examples of inappropriate conversations she had overheard. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 3 at 2; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 8; Flynt Aff. ¶ 11.) According to the Memorandum, Cpl. Flynt requested that going forward, Plaintiff report any inappropriate workplace conversation or behavior to a supervisor. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 3 at 2; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 8.) In his Affidavit, Cpl. Flynt states that he discouraged Plaintiff from wearing headphones and expressed his concern that doing so would hinder Plaintiff's development by further limiting her interactions with her coworkers. (Flynt Aff. ¶ 10.) While the CAU had no formal policy regarding headphone use, Plaintiff contends that after the July 2013 evaluation, she was not allowed to wear headphones, while other CAU employees were permitted to wear headphones. (McKee Aff. ¶¶ 5, 10.) Subsequently, in October 2013, Brandon Inscore, who had recently assumed the CAU supervisor position, implemented a no-headphone policy for the Unit. (Inscore Aff. ¶ 9; McKee Aff. ¶ 10.)
Following the July 16, 2013 meeting, Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt prepared an Individual Development Plan ("IDP") for Plaintiff, setting forth a list of specific tasks and goals for Plaintiff to accomplish. (Flynt Aff. ¶¶ 12-13; Def.'s Br., Ex. 4; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 23-27.) The initial IDP period was set for sixty days, beginning on July 16, 2013 and ending on September 15, 2013. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 15; Def.'s Br., Ex. 4; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 23.) Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt also extended Plaintiff's probationary employment for an additional ninety days to October 15, 2013. (Flynt Aff. ¶ 13; Hunt Aff. ¶ 15.) According to Cpl. Flynt, the extension was designed to give Plaintiff sufficient time to meet the goals set out in her IDP. (Flynt Aff. ¶ 13.) Again, because Plaintiff believed that her work product was "excellent and superior to [her] co-workers," she contends that the IDP was unnecessary. (McKee Aff. ¶¶ 4, 7.)
In his Affidavit, Cpl. Flynt states that Plaintiff failed to meet some of the IDP goals, particularly in that she "continued to use the wrong databases for her source data, which meant that the final product was inaccurate. She still did not check her product for accuracy and consistency. She also was not using the standard symbols which had been developed by the unit. . . ." (Flynt Aff. ¶ 14, 15.) A meeting was set for September 25, 2013 to discuss Plaintiff's progress under the IDP. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 15; Flynt Aff. ¶ 15.) Although Cpl. Flynt, Plaintiff's direct supervisor, was out of the office and unable to attend on September 25, the meeting went forward with Dr. Hunt. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 15; Flynt Aff. ¶ 15.) In his affidavit, Dr. Hunt states that during the meeting on September 25, he and Plaintiff discussed specific goals which she had not met, including Goal 3 of the IDP, involving increasing her understanding and use of correct databases, and Goal 5, namely, to "timely complete[] weekly maps used during Tuesday morning meetings." (Hunt Aff. ¶ 15;
On October 3, 2013, Plaintiff met with both Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt to further discuss her IDP. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 16; Def.'s Br., Ex. 9; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 28.) As new supervisor of the CAU, Mr. Inscore observed this meeting. (Inscore Aff. ¶ 3.) According to the Memorandum provided to Plaintiff regarding that meeting, Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt noted the areas in which she had achieved the goals set out in the IDP, but also addressed her failure to fully meet Goals 3 and 5. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 1; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 28; Flynt Aff. ¶ 16.) The Memorandum sets out specific examples that Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt viewed as evidence of Plaintiff's failure to understand and correctly use the relevant databases and prepare the appropriate reports, including incidents on August 1, 2013, August 12, 2013, August 23, 2013, September 9, 2013, and September 11, 2013. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 1-3; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 28-30.) According to the affidavits of Mr. Inscore, Dr. Hunt, and Cpl. Flynt, when asked to respond to these examples, Plaintiff stated, "No comment." (Inscore Aff. ¶ 3; Hunt Aff. ¶ 16; Flynt Aff. ¶ 19; Def.'s Br., Ex. 15 at 1.)
During the October 3 meeting, Plaintiff requested written verification of what her employment status would be as of October 15, the day her probationary employment term was scheduled to end. (Flynt Aff. ¶ 18; Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 3; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 30.) Plaintiff was provided with the Memorandum, noting that her IDP would continue and Plaintiff would be provided with additional training in an effort to further assist her in meeting her IDP goals, and that no decision had been made about her employment status. (Flynt Aff. ¶¶ 17-18; Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 3; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 30.)
According to the October 3 Memorandum, in order to assist her in achieving the goals, she would be paired with a more experienced analyst for one-on-one training over five business days during October 4, 2013 through October 10, 2013. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 3; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 30.) According to the Memorandum, Plaintiff requested a written list of tasks she would be required to complete during the one-on-one training. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 3-4; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 30-31; Hunt. Aff. ¶ 16.) However, the Memorandum notes that because the CAU's work changes on a daily basis, providing a detailed list of future assignments was not possible. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 4; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 31; Flynt Aff. ¶ 18.) Nevertheless, the October 3 Memorandum included a short list of definite tasks that Plaintiff would be required to complete during the training. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 9 at 4; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 31.)
According to Mr. Inscore, Plaintiff initially refused to submit to the one-on-one training with crime analyst Gina Smith-Battle,
According to Mr. Inscore, he observed certain deficiencies in Plaintiff's understanding of the work during her one-on-one training. (
On October 3 and October 10, immediately before and after the training period, Plaintiff filed formal complaints against Dr. Hunt and Cpl. Flynt with the City's Human Resources Department. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 12.) Plaintiff's chief complaint was that the shortcomings noted in her September 25 and October 3 performance reviews were unjustified, and amounted to harassment. (
On October 14, Mr. Inscore and Dr. Hunt extended Plaintiff's probationary employment period for an additional ninety days, through January 15, 2014. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 11; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 21; Inscore Aff. ¶ 8; Hunt Aff. ¶ 17.) According to Dr. Hunt, this second extension of her probationary period was designed to allow Plaintiff additional time to meet the IDP goals, and to evaluate whether one-on-one training improved her performance. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 17; Def.'s Br., Ex. 11; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 21.) Mr. Inscore states in his affidavit that he personally worked with Plaintiff on her data retrieval skills on October 14 and 15, and that during these sessions, he observed several deficiencies in Plaintiff's understanding of the process. (Inscore Aff. ¶ 7;
According to Mr. Inscore, he met with Plaintiff periodically during the revised IDP period to discuss her progress. (
(Inscore Aff. ¶ 14.)
On or about December 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the City with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
On January 6, 2014, Mr. Inscore and Dr. Hunt met to discuss Plaintiff's employment status. (Inscore Aff. ¶ 14.) According to Mr. Inscore, based on his concerns, he and Dr. Hunt decided to recommend to GPD Deputy Chief Joe Smith that Plaintiff's probationary period of employment not be further extended, and that she be terminated. (
Now, in the instant action, Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to Title VII alleging racial discrimination, racially hostile work environment, and retaliation. Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Plaintiff's claims are without evidentiary basis and should be dismissed.
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Pursuant to Title VII, Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against her because of her race, subjected her to a racially hostile work environment, and retaliated against her by terminating her employment after she engaged in protected activity. In its instant Motion, Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (Def.'s Mot. [Doc. #28].) The Court will address each of Plaintiff's claims in turn.
Title VII's antidiscrimination provision makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An employer will be held liable under this provision if "a protected characteristic [is] a `motivating factor' in an employment decision."
Under the
In the case at hand, Plaintiff argues that because of her race, Defendant criticized her work performance in evaluations, placed her on an IDP, and ultimately terminated her employment. (Pl.'s Resp. [Doc. #35].) However, based on the evidence before the Court, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In particular, it does not appear that Plaintiff has made a prime facie showing that she was performing her job satisfactorily. Although Plaintiff states that her work product was "excellent," (McKee Aff. ¶¶ 2, 7), a positive self-assessment does not establish a prima facie case of satisfactory job performance.
Moreover, whether considered as part of Plaintiff's prima facie case or Defendant's proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, Defendant has presented extensive undisputed evidence to establish that Plaintiff was terminated because of her job performance. (Def.'s Br. [Doc. #29] at 9.) Defendant's evidence includes detailed records outlining specific deficiencies in Plaintiff's job performance beginning shortly after she was hired, and continuing throughout the entirety of her employment. In their affidavits, Dr. Hunt and Cpl. Flynt state that only a few months after Plaintiff and Mr. Sinykin were hired, Plaintiff's work was noticeably inferior to that of Mr. Sinykin. In Plaintiff's July 5, 2013 performance review, Cpl. Flynt noted Plaintiff's repeated mistakes related to using source data from the incorrect database and failure to timely complete assignments. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 2; Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 51.) Cpl. Flynt's Memorandum of the July 16, 2013 meeting with Plaintiff reflect that these concerns were communicated to Plaintiff. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 3; Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 54 at 7.) Plaintiff's first IDP reflects her performance issues, and sets forth the specific areas for improvement identified by Dr. Hunt and Cpl. Flynt. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 4; Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 54 at 23-27.) Further, Cpl. Flynt's Memorandum following an October 3, 2013 meeting with Plaintiff indicates that while Plaintiff achieved several of the goals under the IDP, she was still having problems with routine tasks such as accessing the right databases, data processing methods and procedures, and retrieving correct numbers. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 9; Pl.'s Br., Ex. 54 at 28.)
Defendant's evidence further reveals that Plaintiff's work performance issues continued after Mr. Inscore joined the CAU as supervisor. Throughout October 2013, Mr. Inscore noted several instances which demonstrated Plaintiff's lack of understanding regarding the use of correct data sources. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 15 at 6-9.) Plaintiff's November 4, 2013 revised IDP evidences this concern and others, including issues related to Plaintiff's efficiency and time management skills. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 13.) Further, Mr. Inscore's notes from November 2013 to January 2014 demonstrate that Plaintiff continued to exhibit deficiencies in data accuracy, efficiency, and time management. (Def.'s Br., Ex. 16.) The undisputed record reveals that Plaintiff's supervisors submitted negative performance reviews, placed Plaintiff on an IDP, and ultimately terminated her employment because of her continued performance deficiencies.
Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence indicating that Defendant's proffered reason for its actions is pretextual. The record shows that Plaintiff's supervisors repeatedly attempted to provide her with opportunities to develop necessary skills. Indeed, instead of terminating Plaintiff in July 2013, Plaintiff's supervisors twice extended her probationary period in order to allow Plaintiff additional time to improve her work performance. Additionally, her supervisors organized intensive one-on-one training, set out specific performance goals in Plaintiff's IDP, and met with Plaintiff often to discuss her progress under the IDP.
In Plaintiff's opposition brief to Defendant's summary judgment motion, she has set forth numerous "disputable points" which she contends preclude summary judgment. (Pl.'s Resp. at 4-9.) "Disputable Points" 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 all relate to Plaintiff's job performance. Plaintiff's position appears to be summarized in her statement that the quality of her work performance "is disputable because [she] disagrees." (
Plaintiff also raises three other purported "Disputed Facts," denominated as Disputable Points 2, 3, and 4. In Disputed Fact 2, Plaintiff contends that her probationary period should have ended after 90 days, in May 2013, prior to the July 2013 review indicating marginal performance. However, even if that is true, the question of whether she was still on her initial probationary period would not be material to her claim of race discrimination in violation of Title VII. It is undisputed that Plaintiff and Mr. Simykin were initially placed on the same probationary status, and regardless of the length of the initial probationary period, it is undisputed that during the period from July 2013 through January 2014, Plaintiff was subject to additional evaluations, an either extended or renewed probationary period, and an IDP, based on the evaluations included in the record. To the extent that Plaintiff contends that Defendant somehow failed to follow its own procedures, those contentions would not create an issue of material fact with respect to her claim of race discrimination. Similarly, in Disputed Fact 3, Plaintiff contends that she and Dr. Hunt were professional acquaintances prior to her employment with GPD, and that she had met him more than the two times reflected in Dr. Hunt's affidavit. However, this issue is not material to her claim of race discrimination. As part of this Disputed Fact, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Hunt made "disparaging remarks" by telling her during an evaluation in September 2013 that she "looked good on paper" and "answered the interview questions correctly" but that she "didn't know anything" and "can't do any analytical work." Again, even if true, these remarks are consistent with Defendant's evaluation of Plaintiff's work and would not reflect evidence of racial discrimination. Finally, in Disputed Fact 4, Plaintiff contends that there is an issue of disputed fact regarding whether she was allowed to wear headphones in the office. However, even if the Court accepts Plaintiff's contentions that she was prohibited from wearing headphones, the fact that she was not allowed to wear headphones after the July 2013 performance review, which advised her to "interact more" with colleagues, is not a basis for finding race discrimination.
To the extent Plaintiff may also be claiming that Defendant failed to hire her for the CAU supervisor position because of her race, such claim likewise should not survive summary judgment. Under
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on Plaintiff's claim that Defendant terminated her employment or otherwise took an adverse employment action against her because of her race. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's disparate treatment claims.
Title VII's anti-discrimination provision also prohibits employers from subjecting employees to racially-hostile work environments.
A hostile environment exists "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to prevail on a Title VII claim that a workplace is racially hostile, "a plaintiff must show that there is (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff's . . . race; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer." Okoli v. City of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir.2011) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although not immediately evident from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and summary judgment briefing, it appears Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is based on alleged harassment by her supervisors. (
The Court notes that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is based in large part on the allegations underlying her disparate treatment claim discussed above, and thus fails for similar reasons.
Moreover, this is not the type of "severe and pervasive" harassment that a Title VII hostile work environment claim is designed to address. Rather, in order "for harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive, the workplace must be `permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.'"
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on her hostile work environment claim, and the Court will recommend that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant on this claim.
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision imposes liability on an employer that discriminates against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);
In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that Defendant retaliated against her by criticizing her work product, placing her on an IDP, and eventually terminating her. It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed internal claims of discrimination with the City's Human Resources Department in early October 2013, approximately three months before she was terminated, and with the EEOC on December 3, 2013, approximately one month prior to her termination.
Plaintiff's burden of establishing causation at the prima facie stage is not onerous.
Here, Plaintiff filed her internal discrimination claims and her EEOC claim approximately three months and one month, respectively, before she was terminated. Dr. Hunt was aware that Plaintiff had filed internal discrimination charges against him. (Hunt Aff. ¶ 21.) In the circumstances, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has met the low burden of establishing causation at the prima facie stage. However, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, Defendant has rebutted Plaintiff's prima facie case of retaliation by articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. As the Court previously described, Defendant has produced records detailing Plaintiff's unsatisfactory job performance, and contends this was the reason for Plaintiff's termination.
In response, Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Defendant's articulated reason is pretext for retaliation. The record reveals that Cpl. Flynt and Dr. Hunt first documented Plaintiff's performance deficiencies in July 2013, almost three full months before Plaintiff filed her first internal discrimination claim in October 2013. There is no evidence that Cpl. Flynt or Dr. Hunt increased their scrutiny of Plaintiff's work or otherwise began to unfairly criticize Plaintiff's performance after she filed discrimination claims. Rather, Plaintiff's negative performance reviews following the filing of her discrimination charges reflect a continuation of her prior, well-documented weaknesses. Further, after Plaintiff filed discrimination claims, evidence shows that Plaintiff's supervisors twice extended her probationary employment period and modified her IDP in an effort to allow Plaintiff additional time to demonstrate her ability to fulfill the required job functions.
In sum, Plaintiff has presented no evidence which calls into question Defendant's assertion that it fired Plaintiff because of her failure to meet the job requirements of a crime analyst. In the circumstances, no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant fired Plaintiff because she filed claims of discrimination. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that summary judgment be entered in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to her Title VII claims for disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Therefore, the Court will recommend that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and that this action be dismissed.
In light of this determination, the Court will Order that the parties stand down from trial preparation. The trial date and pre-trial deadlines will be continued and will be re-set as needed after the District Judge's consideration of this Recommendation and any objections thereto.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #28] be GRANTED, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS ORDERED that in light of this determination, the parties stand down from trial preparation, and the trial date and pre-trial deadlines are CONTINUED and will be re-set as needed after the District Judge's consideration of this Recommendation and any objections thereto.