MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

L. PATRICK AULD, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Katherine Guest, brought this action on behalf of her mother, Bettie Ann Hopper, pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act") to obtain judicial review of a final decision of Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying Ms. Hopper's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). (Docket Entry 1.)1 Defendant has filed the certified administrative record (Docket Entry 8 (cited herein as "Tr. ___")), and both parties have moved for judgment (Docket Entries 10, 12; see also Docket Entry 11 (Plaintiff's Brief), Docket Entry 13 (Defendant's Memorandum)). For the reasons that follow, the Court should enter judgment for Defendant.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging an onset date of February 15, 2011. (Tr. 231-40.) Upon denial of those applications initially (Tr. 71-112, 161-65) and on reconsideration (Tr. 113-58, 173-82), Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") (Tr. 184). Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert ("VE") attended the hearing. (Tr. 32-70.) The ALJ subsequently ruled that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 11-26.) The Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 2-7), making the ALJ's ruling the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.

In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:

(Tr. 16-26 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations omitted).)

II. DISCUSSION

Federal law "authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of social security benefits." Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, "the scope of [the Court's] review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited." Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has not established entitlement to relief under the extremely limited review standard.

A. Standard of Review

"[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo." Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, the Court "must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Substantial evidence means `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). "It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence." Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as adopted by the Commissioner]." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the ALJ)." Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that "[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability," Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981), and that, in this context, "disability" means the "`inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,'" id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).2 "To regularize the adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration has . . . detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant's age, education, and work experience in addition to [the claimant's] medical condition." Id. "These regulations establish a `sequential evaluation process' to determine whether a claimant is disabled." Id. (internal citations omitted).

This sequential evaluation process ("SEP") has up to five steps: "The claimant (1) must not be engaged in `substantial gainful activity,' i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a `severe' impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the `listings' of specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity to (4) perform [the claimant's] past work or (5) any other work." Albright v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).3 A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry. For example, "[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is engaged in `substantial gainful activity.' If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is `severely' disabled. If not, benefits are denied." Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at each of the first three steps, the "claimant is disabled." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two, but falters at step three, i.e., "[i]f a claimant's impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment, the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (`RFC')." Id. at 179.4 Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can perform past relevant work; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide "whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant's RFC] and [the claimant's] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job." Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Commissioner cannot carry its "evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available in the community," the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.5

B. Assignment of Error

In Plaintiff's sole issue on review, she asserts that the ALJ "improperly rejected the uncontradicted opinions of three Agency psychological experts (one examining and two nonexamining) when he found that Plaintiff had no social functioning deficits on her ability to perform work-related tasks." (Docket Entry 11 at 3.)6 In particular, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for rejecting the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. J. Craig Hunt that Plaintiff "may have difficulty interacting effectively with peers, coworkers, and supervisors due to complications from mood and possible cognitive deficits." (Id. at 8 (quoting Tr. 476).) Plaintiff further contends that "the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Hunt's opinion that Plaintiff has ongoing social limitations cannot be reconciled with the fact that [the ALJ] gave unqualified `significant weight' to the . . . opinions of the Agency's nonexamining psychological consultants, who also identified significant social limitations." (Id. at 9 (citing Tr. 25, 87-88, 130-32).) According to Plaintiff, because the record establishes Plaintiff's social limitations, the ALJ's failure to include any social restrictions in the mental RFC also violates Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015). (See Docket Entry 11 at 12-13.) Plaintiff's contentions do not warrant relief.

Consultative examiners such as Dr. Hunt do not constitute treating sources under the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2), and thus their opinions, as a general proposition, do not warrant controlling weight, Turberville v. Colvin, No. 1:11CV262, 2014 WL 1671582, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23, 2014) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. May 15, 2014) (Eagles, J.). However, the ALJ must nevertheless evaluate consultative opinions using the factors outlined in the regulations, and expressly indicate and explain the weight he or she affords to such opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) ("Regardless of its source, [the ALJ] will evaluate every medical opinion [he or she] receive[s]" and where an opinion does not warrant controlling weight, [the ALJ must] consider all of the . . . factors [in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6)] in deciding the weight [to] give to any medical opinion." (emphasis added)); Social Security Ruling 96-5p, Medical Source Opinions on Issues Reserved to the Commissioner, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996) ("SSR 96-5p") (noting that ALJs "must weigh medical source statements . . . [and] provid[e] appropriate explanations for accepting or rejecting such opinions" (emphasis added)); Social Security Ruling 96-8p, Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996) ("SSR 96-8p") ("The RFC assessment must always consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the [ALJ] must explain why the opinion was not adopted." (emphasis added)); see also Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that reviewing court generally "cannot determine if findings are supported by substantial evidence unless the [ALJ] explicitly indicates the weight given to all of the relevant evidence").

In this case, the ALJ discussed Dr. Hunt's evaluation in a fair degree of detail, and specifically mentioned Dr. Hunt's opinion that Plaintiff "demonstrated adequate interpersonal behavior but might have mood-related difficulties interacting with others, including co-workers and supervisors." (Tr. 22.) The ALJ then explained the weight he gave to Dr. Hunt's opinions as follows:

(Tr. 24 (emphasis added); see also Tr. 476 ("[Plaintiff] demonstrated adequate interpersonal behavior yet may have difficulty interacting effectively with peers, coworkers, and supervisors due to complications from mood and possible cognitive deficits. . . . Based on her history, she appears capable of conforming to social standards and complying with rules and regulations, as well as, cooperating with authority figures." (emphasis added)).)

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's above-quoted analysis in two respects. First, she disputes the ALJ's "impli[cation]" that Dr. Hunt's opinions (emphasized above) contradict each other. (Docket Entry 11 at 8.) According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff's "ability to interact adequately during the examination was different than her ability to do so in the context of full-time work." (Id. (emphasis in original).) However, the ALJ did not base his decision to discount Dr. Hunt's opinion regarding Plaintiff's social functioning on contradiction; rather, the ALJ expressly gave "less weight" to Dr. Hunt's social functioning opinion because the ALJ deemed the opinion speculative. (See Tr. 24.)

Plaintiff also disagrees with the ALJ's characterization of Dr. Hunt's opinion as speculative, because "it ignores the fact that medical opinions about a claimant's ability to work are, in general, predictive (read: speculative) by nature." (Docket Entry 11 at 9.) This argument glosses over the fact that medical source opinions, although often "predictive," can vary greatly in their degree of equivocation. Here, Dr. Hunt qualified his opinion regarding Plaintiff's social functioning with the term "may." (Tr. 476.) Numerous courts have upheld the discounting of medical opinions that use equivocal terms such as "may." See Rogers v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 490 F. App'x 15, 17 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding ALJ properly discounted as equivocal physician's opinion that the claimant "might be unable to deal with the usual stress encountered in the workplace" (emphasis added)); Mericle v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 2:14-CV-2785-CMK, 2016 WL 1073260, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016) (unpublished) (holding ALJ properly noted equivocal language in assigning less weight to doctor's opinion that diagnostic testing scores "may be a slightly lower estimate of [the claimant's] ability" (emphasis added)); Bates v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 8:09-3355-MBS, 2011 WL 1113778, at *8 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011) (unpublished) (finding no error where ALJ gave little weight to doctor's "equivocal" conclusion that the claimant "may be developing some depression as a result of his condition"), report and recommendation rejected on other grounds, 2011 WL 1113474 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2011) (unpublished).7 The ALJ did not err in his decision to discount Dr. Hunt's opinions.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by according "significant weight" to the state agency psychological consultants' opinions but failing to include their social functioning restrictions in the mental RFC. (See Docket Entry 11 at 9-10 (citing Tr. 25, 87-88, 130-32).) More specifically, the state agency psychological consultants both concluded that Plaintiff remained able to perform work with decreased social interaction. (See Tr. 81 ("[Plaintiff] retains the capacity to perform simple routine and repetitive tasks (SRRTs) at a non-production pace in a position with reduced social demands."); see also Tr. 132 ("[Plaintiff] . . . can accept direction from a supervisor and maintain adequate relationships with co-workers in a work setting with minimal social interaction requirements and only casual public contact.") Plaintiff correctly points out that the ALJ's mental RFC did not contain any social restrictions. (See Docket Entry 11 at 9-10; see also Tr. 19.)

However, the ALJ's failure to incorporate the state agency consultants' social restrictions (or to explain why he chose not to do so) constitutes harmless error under the circumstances presented here. Both state agency consultants determined that, despite that social restriction, Plaintiff remained able to perform her past relevant work as a housekeeper (see Tr. 91, 134), a determination the ALJ also adopted (see Tr. 25).8 Thus, even had the ALJ included the state agency psychological consultants' social restrictions in the mental RFC, the ALJ still would have found that Plaintiff remained able to perform her past relevant work as a housekeeper. See generally Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing that "[n]o principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result").

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that, "[a]s Mascio is rooted in unambiguous Agency policy and long-standing Fourth Circuit precedent requiring that the RFC/concomitant hypothetical must accurately describe all of [Plaintiff's] limitations as described in the record, its holding applies no less to unaccounted for social limitations than it does to an RFC which excludes concentration, persistence and pace deficits demonstrated by the record." (Docket Entry 11 at 13.) As an initial matter, doubt exists as to whether Mascio's holding with regards to concentration, persistence, or pace ("CPP") should apply to the facts of the instant case. The Mascio court held that the ALJ's limitation in the RFC to unskilled work did not sufficiently account for a moderate limitation in CPP the ALJ had found at steps two and three of the SEP. See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638. In that regard, the Mascio court expressly held that "the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task" and that "[o]nly the latter limitation would account for a claimant's limitation in [CPP]." Id. Here, in contrast, Plaintiff seeks to extend that holding in Mascio to a step two/three finding involving a mild limitation in social functioning, but without developing any rationale for such an extension. (See Docket Entry 11 at 13.) That failure warrants denial of relief, particularly given that the Fourth Circuit made clear its CPP-based holding rested on the distinction between the ability to perform simple tasks and the ability to stay on task, see Mascio, 780 F.3d at 632, and such a distinction does not clearly apply in the social functioning context.9

Moreover, as discussed above, even had the ALJ included in the mental RFC the state agency psychological consultants' opinions that Plaintiff required a job with decreased social interaction (see Tr. 81, 132), the ALJ still would have concluded that Plaintiff remained capable of performing her past relevant work as a housekeeper. Further, Plaintiff neither proffers any other social restrictions the ALJ should have included in the mental RFC, nor argues that such restrictions render her past relevant work as a housekeeper inappropriate. (See Docket Entry 11 at 12-13.) Under such circumstances, Plaintiff has not demonstrated reversible error with respect to the ALJ's mental RFC determination.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established an error warranting reversal or remand.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Reversing or Modifying the Decision of the Commissioner (Docket Entry 10) be denied, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 12) be granted, and that judgment be entered for Defendant.