JAMES C. FOX, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the court on the Government's Motion to Dismiss [DE-76] James Earl Walton's pending Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [DE-70, -72].
On August 15, 2007, Walton was charged in a four-count indictment. See Indictment [DE-1]. In Count One, Walton was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count Two charged Walton with possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In Count Three, Walton was charged with possession of firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Count Four charged Walton with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924.
At Walton's arraignment, held on January 7, 2008, he entered a plea of guilty to Counts One and Three, pursuant to a written plea agreement [DE-23]. It was agreed that the Government would dismiss Counts Two and Four at sentencing. Id. at 8.
On May 29, 2008, Walton was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment on Count One and 60 months' imprisonment on Count Three, to run consecutively. See Judgment [DE-30]. Walton's sentence was set to run consecutive with any sentence he was currently serving. Id. Walton did not file a direct appeal.
On December 6, 2011, Walton filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [DE-36]. On March 28, 2013, this court allowed the Government's Motion to Dismiss Walton's motion.
Walton's instant § 2255 motion [DE-70, -72] was filed on July 18, 2016. In his motion, Walton's sole argument is that in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), he no longer qualifies as a "career criminal." Mot. Vacate [DE-72] at 4. Specifically, Walton contends that his prior convictions that were considered crimes of violence no longer qualify as such. Id.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of an action when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. When determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)).
As noted, this is not Walton's first§ 2255 motion. Therefore, Walton must satisfy the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), which provides as follows:
The record does not reflect that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has authorized Walton to pursue his second or successive§ 2255 motion. Consequently, Walton's§ 2255 motion is an unauthorized second or successive§ 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Moreover, while not every numerically second case is deemed second or successive, Walton has not alleged facts to show that the instant motion is not successive. See e.g., United States v. Hairston, 754 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a numerically second§ 2255 motion should not be considered second or successive under§ 2255(h) where the facts relied on by the movant did not exist when his first motion was filed and adjudicated); In re Goddard, 170 F.3d 435, 438 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that when a prisoner's first§ 2255 motion is granted to reenter judgment and permit a direct appeal, his collateral attack count is reset to zero).
For the foregoing reasons, the Government's Motion to Dismiss [DE-76] is ALLOWED and Walton's Motion to Vacate [DE-70, -72] is DISMISSED.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (A certificate of appealability will not issue unless there has been "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (Where a court has rejected the constitutional claims on their merits, a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find that the court's assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong, but when a court denies relief on procedural grounds, the petitioner must demonstrate that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the court's procedural ruling was correct.).
SO ORDERED.