JOI ELIZABETH PEAKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Annette Lawson ("Plaintiff") brought this action pursuant to Section 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for Supplemental Security Income on February 28, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2000. (Tr. at 26, 204-12.)
Federal law "authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of social security benefits."
"Substantial evidence means `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"
"In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ]."
In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that in administrative proceedings, "[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability."
"The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims."
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, "[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is engaged in `substantial gainful activity.' If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is `severely' disabled. If not, benefits are denied."
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at each of the first two steps, and establishes at step three that the impairment "equals or exceeds in severity one or more of the impairments listed in Appendix I of the regulations," then "the claimant is disabled."
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her application date. Plaintiff therefore met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. At step two, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
(Tr. at 28.) The ALJ found at step three that none of these impairments, singly or in combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Tr. at 29-32.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC and determined that:
(Tr. at 32.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Tr. at 41.) However, he concluded at step five that, given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, along with the testimony of the vocational expert regarding those factors, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy and therefore was not disabled. (Tr. at 41-43.)
Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ: (1) failed to recognize credibly established limitations by Plaintiff's examining physicians when formulating the RFC and (2) failed to properly account for Plaintiff's moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. After reviewing the ALJ's decision, the Court agrees that the ALJ's formulation of the RFC in the present case with respect to Plaintiff's mental limitations fails to comport with the Fourth Circuit's holdings in
In several recent cases, including both
In the present case, as in
(Tr. at 31.) Thus, the ALJ specifically concluded that Plaintiff suffered from moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace; that her ability to perform tasks requiring sustained concentration and persistence was significantly limited; that her mental impairments interfered with her ability to sustain focused attention and concentration; and that her mental impairments hindered her from the timely completion of tasks commonly found in work settings in a moderate, but not marked, manner.
However, after making these findings, the ALJ then determined Plaintiff's RFC with respect to her mental limitations as follows:
(Tr. at 32.) Notably, the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff could "perform productive work tasks for up to an average of 98 to 100% of an 8-hour workday" fails to correlate with the ALJ's step three finding that Plaintiff's "impairment interferes with her ability to sustain focused attention and concentration to the extent that it hinders her from the timely completion of tasks commonly found in work settings." (Tr. at 31, 32.) In fact, productivity of 98 to 100% correlates with no limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, whereas the ALJ's step three finding indicates specifically that Plaintiff's "ability to perform tasks requiring sustained concentration and persistence [is] significantly limited." (Tr. at 31) (emphasis added). The ALJ's decision does not include any analysis of this discrepancy or any reasoning or basis to support the determination that Plaintiff could perform productive work tasks for an average of 98 to 100% of an 8-hour workday, particularly given that the ALJ also found that Plaintiff's mental impairments significantly limited her ability to perform tasks requiring sustained concentration and persistence, impaired her ability to maintain attention and concentration, and impaired her ability to timely complete tasks found in work settings. Thus, as in
In the decision, the ALJ states that Plaintiff's "moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, inform the limitations in task complexity and productivity" included in the RFC. (Tr. at 41.) However,
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to include limitations established by her examining physicians with regard to her limitations in handling, fingering, and reaching overhead as a result of her carpal tunnel syndrome. As noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff previously worked at a poultry processing plant but stopped working in 2010 due to carpal tunnel issues. (Tr. at 39, 74-75.) The medical record reflects that Plaintiff's work at the poultry plant involved cutting with the right hand while pulling with the left, and she began having difficulty with that work and sought treatment for wrist and finger pain and numbness beginning in October 2009. (Tr. at 415.) The ALJ noted that surgery had been recommended for carpal tunnel release, but Plaintiff had delayed surgery and orthopedic consultation due to her lack of insurance and inability to pay. (Tr. at 39.) The ALJ also summarized the treatment records of Plaintiff's treating physician Dr. Conti, who diagnosed Plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome confirmed by electrodiagnostic studies and recommended no repetitive work and only 1-2 pounds lifting (Tr. at 35, 415), but the ALJ failed to further evaluate and assign weight to this recommendation. The ALJ noted that a Vocational Rehabilitation report from Dr. Ahmed in 2011 concluded that Plaintiff had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and was capable of work with no "constant repetitive use of the hands," but the ALJ gave that report little weight. (Tr. at 34, 40, 300.) The ALJ also noted that following a consultative examination by Dr. Gelfand, Plaintiff's diagnoses included probable bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and decreased range of motion in her right shoulder, with her ability to lift, carry, and handle objects moderately impaired (Tr. at 35, 303), but the ALJ also gave that opinion little weight because it was "vague and provide[s] no useful insight into assessing claimant's function limitations." (Tr. 40.) The ALJ instead gave significant weight to the "DDS assessments." (Tr. at 40.) As to those assessments, the state agency DDS reviewer, Dr. Huffman-Zechman, concluded that Plaintiff was capable of frequent, but not continuous handling/fingering and frequent but not continuous overhead reaching with her right upper extremity. (Tr. at 131.) This conclusion is consistent with the RFC ultimately adopted by the ALJ. However, Dr. Huffman-Zechman's summary of the evidence regarding Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome states "2009 MER noted CTS. x-ray of bilat wrists was neg." (Tr. at 126.) In fact, the medical evidence reflects that Plaintiff's 2009 x-rays were negative for fracture and arthritis, but that carpal tunnel syndrome was confirmed by electrodiagnostic studies. (Tr. at 415, 390-91.) Indeed, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff's 2009 nerve conduction study showed moderate bilateral median neuropathy at the wrist, as well as possible right ulnar neuropathy at the elbow. (Tr. at 34, 391.) It is not clear if this evidence was presented or considered by Dr. Huffman-Zechman, on whom the ALJ relied in reaching the RFC determination. In any event, the Court need not consider this issue further at this time in light of the remand determination set out above, and any of these issues raised by Plaintiff can be further addressed on remand as appropriate.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be REVERSED, and that the matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner should be directed to remand the matter to the ALJ for proceedings consistent with this Recommendation. To this extent, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. #11] should be DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. #9] should be GRANTED. However, to the extent that Plaintiff's motion seeks an immediate award of benefits, it should be DENIED.